Utterback and Abernathy first introduced the concept of "dominant design" in 1975.8 They proposed that the emergence of a dominant design is a major milestone in an industry evolution and changed the way firms compete in an industry and thus, the type of organizations that succeed and prevail. A dominant design can be a new technology, product or a set of key features incorporated from different distinct technological innovations introduced independently in prior product variants. Their 1975 paper, however, never uses the term "dominant design". It does refer to "dominant strategy" and "dominant type of innovations". Yet, in their 1993 work, Suarez and Utterback reference the 1975 paper as the source of the concept of "Dominant design".9 David Teece, of later fame for the theory of dynamic capabilities, overtly develops the concept of dominant design in his 1984 paper on Profiting from technological innovation,10 in which he acknowledges the contribution of Utterback and Abernathy in their conceptual treatment of the evolution of technology in an industry.
The process by which a specific design achieves dominance consists of a few characteristic milestones:11
Dominant design milestones have been identified in many product lines. The emergence of a dominant design typically coincides with the point at which the number of firms competing in the industry peaks. Once it emerges, it implicitly sends a message to producers and consumers that its key features is a "must have" by future products. Examples of a dominant design include the simple four function calculator and the iPod and iPhone. Other examples include:
Utterback and Suarez propose that once a dominant design emerges, it can have a profound impact on both the direction of further technical advance, on the rate of that advance, and on the resulting industry structure and competitive dynamics. Prior to the creation of the dominant design, firms are constantly experimenting and therefore cannot enjoy economies of scale. After the emergence of the dominant design, some firms accumulate complementary assets and exploit possible economies of scale, which in turn raises entry and mobility barriers in the industry. Firms that enter the industry during a period of experimentation risk choosing the wrong technological path, but have high upside if they choose the right one. Pre-dominant design entrants have been shown to have a higher chance of survival than those that enter after the emergence of the dominant design.13 Utterback and Kim (1985) and Anderson and Tushman (1990) considered the effect of a disruption that invades a mature industry and thus starts a new cycle. In each cycle, the number of firms increases in the early ("fluid" or "ferment") period, reaches a peak with the emergence of the dominant design, decreases until a few firms dominate the industry, and then restarts again when a disruption creates the conditions for a new wave of entry and the re-enactment of the industry life cycle.
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Anderson, Philip; Tushman, Michael L. (1990). "Technological Discontinuities and Dominant Designs: A Cyclical Model of Technological Change". Administrative Science Quarterly. 35 (4): 604–633. doi:10.2307/2393511. ISSN 0001-8392. Archived from the original on 2024-01-15. Retrieved 2024-01-14. https://www.jstor.org/stable/2393511 ↩
Utterback, James M.; Suárez, Fernando F. (1993-02-01). "Innovation, competition, and industry structure". Research Policy. 22 (1): 1–21. doi:10.1016/0048-7333(93)90030-L. hdl:1721.1/2335. ISSN 0048-7333. https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/004873339390030L ↩
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Anderson, Philip; Tushman, Michael L. (1990). "Technological Discontinuities and Dominant Designs: A Cyclical Model of Technological Change" (PDF). Archived (PDF) from the original on 2024-01-15. Retrieved 2024-01-14. http://www.iot.ntnu.no/innovation/norsi-pims-courses/tushman/Anderson%20%26%20Tushman%20%281990%29.pdf ↩
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Utterback, James M; Abernathy, William J (1975-12-01). "A dynamic model of process and product innovation". Omega. 3 (6): 639–656. doi:10.1016/0305-0483(75)90068-7. ISSN 0305-0483. Archived from the original on 2020-02-06. Retrieved 2024-01-14. https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/0305048375900687 ↩
Teece, David (1986). "Profiting from technological innovation: Implications for integration, collaboration, licensing and public policy". Research Policy. 15 (6): 285–305. doi:10.1016/0048-7333(86)90027-2 – via Elsevier Science Publishers B.V. /wiki/Doi_(identifier) ↩
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