OSCE Special Monitoring Mission to Ukraine

<h2 id="background">Background</h2>
Main article: <a href="/facts/Euromaidan/m41YETnk">Euromaidan</a>

In late 2013 <a href="/facts/Euromaidan/m41YETnk">protests</a> began in <a href="/facts/Kyiv/uVAMxK8R">Kyiv</a> as a response to the decision of the then-President of Ukraine, <a href="/facts/Viktor_Yanukovych/LNrIwXwx">Viktor Yanukovych</a>, to abandon the planned <a href="/facts/Ukraine%E2%80%93European_Union_Association_Agreement/nu3VolCx">Ukraine–European Union Association Agreement</a>.<a class="footnote-ref" id="fnref:3" href="#fn:3">3</a> After months of protests, the government <a href="/facts/Revolution_of_Dignity/p48oSXW9">fell</a> in early 2014 and <a href="/facts/2014_pro-Russian_unrest_in_Ukraine/maR0wq73">unrest</a> spread to other regions in Ukraine, in particular the Russian-speaking eastern and southern regions.
On 1 March 2014, in response to the developing crisis, the Chairman-in-Office of the OSCE, <a href="/facts/Didier_Burkhalter/heWCDYoc">Didier Burkhalter</a>, proposed establishing a diplomatic contact group and an international observer mission during an address to the <a href="/facts/United_Nations_Human_Rights_Council/JRGJgtSc">United Nations Human Rights Council</a> in order to support Ukraine in facilitating a diplomatic solution to the crisis.<a class="footnote-ref" id="fnref:4" href="#fn:4">4</a><a class="footnote-ref" id="fnref:5" href="#fn:5">5</a>

<h2 id="mandate-and-structure">Mandate and structure</h2>
The mission was mandated to: 

<ol><li>Gather information and report on the situation in the area of operation;</li>
<li>Establish and report facts in response to specific incidents and reports of incidents, including those concerning alleged violations of fundamental OSCE principles and commitments;</li>
<li>Monitor and support respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms, including the rights of persons belonging to national minorities;</li>
<li>Establish contact with local, region and national authorities, ethnic and religious groups, and representatives of the local population;</li>
<li>Facilitate dialogue on the ground in order to reduce tensions and promote normalisation of the situation;</li>
<li>Report on restrictions of the mission's freedom of movement or other impediments to fulfilment of its mandate;</li>
<li>Coordinate with and support the work of other OSCE bodies, including the High Commissioner on National Minorities, the OSCE Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights and the OSCE Representative on Freedom of the Media, as well as cooperate with the United Nations, the Council of Europe and other international bodies.<a class="footnote-ref" id="fnref:6" href="#fn:6">6</a></li></ol>
The mandate of the mission covered the territory of Ukraine within its internationally recognized borders. In 2020, the SMM consisted of around 700 Observers from 53 OSCE member states and additional local and international staff.<a class="footnote-ref" id="fnref:7" href="#fn:7">7</a>
The headquarters was located in Kyiv and the mission was headed by the Turkish diplomat <a href="/facts/Ya%C5%9Far_Halit_%C3%87evik/xKGmhNId">Yaşar Halit Çevik</a> who followed <a href="/facts/Ertu%C4%9Frul_Apakan/Dr9jSWj7">Ertuğrul Apakan</a> in this post.<a class="footnote-ref" id="fnref:8" href="#fn:8">8</a><a class="footnote-ref" id="fnref:9" href="#fn:9">9</a>
The SMM used modern equipment to monitor the adherence of the parties to the ceasefire including drones and stationary cameras.<a class="footnote-ref" id="fnref:10" href="#fn:10">10</a><a class="footnote-ref" id="fnref:11" href="#fn:11">11</a>
The mission shared its observations publicly in different formats. This included daily reports, spot reports on specific incidents and thematic reports about general trends in their area of operation e.g. on the effect of the conflict on the access to education.<a class="footnote-ref" id="fnref:12" href="#fn:12">12</a><a class="footnote-ref" id="fnref:13" href="#fn:13">13</a> The mission also has its own YouTube channel where it shares videos of its observations. The most popular of those videos shows a Russian convoy clandestinely entering Ukraine and has amassed over 300.000 views.<a class="footnote-ref" id="fnref:14" href="#fn:14">14</a>

<h2 id="timeline-of-events">Timeline of events</h2>

The crisis deteriorated further with the <a href="/facts/Russo-Ukrainian_War/kE7cHvoQ">intervention</a> of the <a href="/facts/Russian_Federation/jfkCwyxn">Russian Federation</a> and its <a href="/facts/Annexation_of_Crimea_by_the_Russian_Federation/8r8zGRyf">annexation</a> of <a href="/facts/Crimea/GkM1qNVC">Crimea</a> in March 2014.<a class="footnote-ref" id="fnref:15" href="#fn:15">15</a> The unrest in the industrial, Russian-speaking <a href="/facts/Donbas/R0SRLmoj">Donbas</a> region of eastern Ukraine would later escalate<a class="footnote-ref" id="fnref:16" href="#fn:16">16</a> into the <a href="/facts/War_in_Donbas_(2014%E2%80%932022)/h8WDdxa4">war in Donbas</a> between Ukrainian government forces and separatist pro-Russian forces, <a href="/facts/Russo-Ukrainian_War/kE7cHvoQ">including</a> regular Russian troops.<a class="footnote-ref" id="fnref:17" href="#fn:17">17</a>

In an attempt to calm the situation, the OSCE decided to send the first one hundred observers of the Special Monitoring Mission on 21 March 2014.<a class="footnote-ref" id="fnref:18" href="#fn:18">18</a> The conflict, however, continued to escalate regardless until on 5 September 2014 when the first <a href="/facts/Minsk_Protocol/tMjcIKwG">Minsk Protocol</a> was signed between parties to the conflict, including Ukraine and the Russian Federation. This established a ceasefire and included provisions that the Special Monitoring Mission would monitor the ceasefire.<a class="footnote-ref" id="fnref:19" href="#fn:19">19</a>
This ceasefire was never fully implemented e.g. the separatists in eastern Ukraine refused to give up control of the border to Ukraine.<a class="footnote-ref" id="fnref:20" href="#fn:20">20</a> Accordingly, the ceasefire only held for a limited time and in early 2015 the war escalated again<a class="footnote-ref" id="fnref:21" href="#fn:21">21</a> until the <a href="/facts/Package_of_Measures_for_the_Implementation_of_the_Minsk_Protocol/FKxXoaAq">Package of Measures for the Implementation of the Minsk Protocol</a> was signed on 12. February 2015 by the <a href="/facts/Normandy_Format/pbxMnRew">Normandy Format</a> and reaffirmed the monitoring role of the Special Monitoring Mission.<a class="footnote-ref" id="fnref:22" href="#fn:22">22</a>
Following this, the mandated maximum strength of the mission was extended to 1000 on March 12, 2015.<a class="footnote-ref" id="fnref:23" href="#fn:23">23</a>
Since then the conflict had stabilized but ceasefire violations still regularly occurred and were reported by the SMM.
In 2017 one monitor was killed and two more wounded when their vehicle struck a landmine.<a class="footnote-ref" id="fnref:24" href="#fn:24">24</a> Subsequently, SMM patrolling was limited to asphalt and concrete roads. SMM monitoring effectiveness suffers from the presence of mines, unexploded ordinances and the low rate at which they are cleared, and from shelling by artillery and threatening behavior of armed personnel. This hinders SMM's ability to monitor the implementation of Minsk Protocol effectively because it restricts their access to areas and presents big risks to the security of SMM's civilian monitors.<a class="footnote-ref" id="fnref:25" href="#fn:25">25</a>
On 13 February 2022, a number of countries including the United States, United Kingdom, Netherlands, Canada, Slovakia and Albania began withdrawing their observers from the non-Ukrainian government controlled areas of eastern Ukraine.<a class="footnote-ref" id="fnref:26" href="#fn:26">26</a> The United States withdrew its observers from Ukraine entirely.<a class="footnote-ref" id="fnref:27" href="#fn:27">27</a> The final daily report including mapping of ceasefire violations was made on 23 February 2022, which recorded the observation of 1,420 explosions the previous day. The report recorded that in the previous year the mission had observed "36,686 explosions, 26,605 projectiles in flight, 491 muzzle flashes, 524 illumination flares, and at least 54,330 bursts and shots".<a class="footnote-ref" id="fnref:28" href="#fn:28">28</a>
On 24 February 2022, following the <a href="/facts/2022_Russian_invasion_of_Ukraine/TTeQCgSl">Russian invasion of Ukraine</a>, Secretary General <a href="/facts/Helga_Schmid/bejYgor2">Helga Schmid</a> announced the temporary evacuation of SMM staff, with a view to resuming work as soon as circumstances on the ground permit.<a class="footnote-ref" id="fnref:29" href="#fn:29">29</a>
On 31 March 2022 consensus for the extension of the Mission's mandate was not reached, due to Russian opposition.<a class="footnote-ref" id="fnref:30" href="#fn:30">30</a> The mission subsequently discontinued its operations on the same day.<a class="footnote-ref" id="fnref:31" href="#fn:31">31</a>
On 19 September 2022, Russian-backed separatists in eastern Ukraine sentenced two former OSCE staff members to 13 years in prison on charges of treason. The OSCE regional authority body, consisting of Ukrainian and Russian representatives, protested the sentencing and urged "their immediate and unconditional release". The arrests came after the OSCE invoked the <a href="/facts/Moscow_Mechanism/21DyfDEq">Moscow Mechanism</a>, condemning Russia's human rights violations.<a class="footnote-ref" id="fnref:32" href="#fn:32">32</a>

<h2 id="monitoring-restrictions">Monitoring restrictions</h2>
OSCE monitoring frequently faces access restrictions and signal jamming of the monitoring UAVs. In 2021 OSCE reported that 62.5% long-range UAV flights "encountered <a href="/facts/Radio_jamming/j4xyPQsQ">GPS signal interference</a>" with jamming so strong, it occasionally prevented UAV from even taking off.<a class="footnote-ref" id="fnref:33" href="#fn:33">33</a> OSCE has on numerous occasions reported presence of Russian <a href="/facts/Electronic_warfare/c6XGz9y0">electronic warfare</a> equipment in the separatist-controlled areas<a class="footnote-ref" id="fnref:34" href="#fn:34">34</a><a class="footnote-ref" id="fnref:35" href="#fn:35">35</a><a class="footnote-ref" id="fnref:36" href="#fn:36">36</a> including specifically anti-UAV <a href="/facts/Repellent-1/amm0T4sK">Repellent-1</a> systems.<a class="footnote-ref" id="fnref:37" href="#fn:37">37</a> On 30 April 2021 OSCE further reported two members of armed formations approaching the monitor team as it prepared to launch an UAV and threatening it will be shot down if launched.<a class="footnote-ref" id="fnref:38" href="#fn:38">38</a>

<h2 id="see-also">See also</h2>
<ul><li><a href="/facts/UN_Human_Rights_Monitoring_Mission_in_Ukraine/oHURleJS">UN Human Rights Monitoring Mission in Ukraine</a></li>
<li><a href="/facts/Trilateral_Contact_Group_on_Ukraine/IdCNr75X">Trilateral Contact Group on Ukraine</a></li>
<li><a href="/facts/Minsk_Protocol/tMjcIKwG">Minsk Protocol</a></li>
<li><a href="/facts/OSCE/Lo5lUrA6">OSCE</a></li></ul>

<h2 id="further-reading">Further reading</h2>

<ul><li>OSCE (2021). <a href="https://www.osce.org/files/f/documents/4/6/491220_0.pdf">A Peaceful presence. The First Five Years of the OSCE Special Monitoring Mission to Ukraine</a> (PDF). Vienna: OSCE.</li></ul>

<h2 id="external-links">External links</h2>
<ul><li><a href="https://www.osce.org/special-monitoring-mission-to-ukraine">Official website</a> of the OSCE Special Monitoring Mission to Ukraine</li></ul>

<h2 id="references">References</h2>

<ol>
<li id="fn:1">"OSCE Special Monitoring Mission to Ukraine - The Facts". OSCE. Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe. Archived from the original on 9 October 2020. Retrieved 6 October 2020. <a href="https://www.osce.org/ukraine-smm/116879" target="_blank">https://www.osce.org/ukraine-smm/116879</a> <a href="#fnref:1" class="footnote-back-ref">↩</a></li>
<li id="fn:2">von Twickel, Nikolaus (2017). "Zwischen den Fronten: Was die OSZE Beobachter in der Ukraine leisten können, und was nicht" [Between the Fronts: What OSCE Observers Can and Cannot Do in Ukraine]. Internationale Politik. 2 (15): 48–53. <a href="#fnref:2" class="footnote-back-ref">↩</a></li>
<li id="fn:3">Zelinska, Oksana. "Ukrainian protesters flood Kiev after president pulls out of EU deal". The Guardian. Archived from the original on 11 November 2020. Retrieved 6 October 2020. <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/nov/24/ukraine-protesters-yanukovych-aborts-eu-deal-russia" target="_blank">https://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/nov/24/ukraine-protesters-yanukovych-aborts-eu-deal-russia</a> <a href="#fnref:3" class="footnote-back-ref">↩</a></li>
<li id="fn:4">"OSZE-Vorsitzender Burkhalter schlägt Ukraine-Kontaktgruppe vor" [OSCE Chairman Burkhalter proposes Ukraine Contact Group]. Blick. 24 February 2014. Retrieved 19 December 2020.[dead link‍] <a href="https://www.blick.ch/schweiz/vereinte-nationen-ukraine-osze-vorsitzender-burkhalter-schlaegt-ukraine-kontaktgruppe-vor-id2699528.html" target="_blank">https://www.blick.ch/schweiz/vereinte-nationen-ukraine-osze-vorsitzender-burkhalter-schlaegt-ukraine-kontaktgruppe-vor-id2699528.html</a> <a href="#fnref:4" class="footnote-back-ref">↩</a></li>
<li id="fn:5">Bradley, Simon (3 March 2014). "Swiss push OSCE 'contact group' to defuse crisis". swissinfo. Archived from the original on 16 November 2020. Retrieved 19 December 2020. <a href="https://www.swissinfo.ch/eng/ukrainian-security_swiss-push-osce--contact-group--to-defuse-crisis/38079850" target="_blank">https://www.swissinfo.ch/eng/ukrainian-security_swiss-push-osce--contact-group--to-defuse-crisis/38079850</a> <a href="#fnref:5" class="footnote-back-ref">↩</a></li>
<li id="fn:6">"Permanent Council Decision No. 1117". OSCE. Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe. Archived from the original on 26 October 2020. Retrieved 6 October 2020. <a href="https://www.osce.org/pc/116747" target="_blank">https://www.osce.org/pc/116747</a> <a href="#fnref:6" class="footnote-back-ref">↩</a></li>
<li id="fn:7">"As of 21 September 2020 Status Report" (PDF). OSCE. Archived (PDF) from the original on 15 October 2020. Retrieved 6 October 2020. <a href="https://www.osce.org/files/f/documents/e/e/464754.pdf" target="_blank">https://www.osce.org/files/f/documents/e/e/464754.pdf</a> <a href="#fnref:7" class="footnote-back-ref">↩</a></li>
<li id="fn:8">"Ambassador Yaşar Halit Çevik". OSCE. Archived from the original on 10 October 2020. Retrieved 6 October 2020. <a href="https://www.osce.org/special-monitoring-mission-to-ukraine/chief-monitor" target="_blank">https://www.osce.org/special-monitoring-mission-to-ukraine/chief-monitor</a> <a href="#fnref:8" class="footnote-back-ref">↩</a></li>
<li id="fn:9">"New OSCE SMM chief monitor in Ukraine to take up office". UNIAN Information Agency. 31 May 2015. Archived from the original on 27 February 2021. Retrieved 19 December 2020. <a href="https://www.unian.info/war/10570029-new-osce-smm-chief-monitor-in-ukraine-to-take-up-office.html" target="_blank">https://www.unian.info/war/10570029-new-osce-smm-chief-monitor-in-ukraine-to-take-up-office.html</a> <a href="#fnref:9" class="footnote-back-ref">↩</a></li>
<li id="fn:10">"News OSCE drone shot down while spotting Russian surface-to-air missile in Ukraine". Deutsche Welle. Deutsche Welle. 1 November 2018. Archived from the original on 13 October 2020. Retrieved 6 October 2020. <a href="https://www.dw.com/en/osce-drone-shot-down-while-spotting-russian-surface-to-air-missile-in-ukraine/a-46125199" target="_blank">https://www.dw.com/en/osce-drone-shot-down-while-spotting-russian-surface-to-air-missile-in-ukraine/a-46125199</a> <a href="#fnref:10" class="footnote-back-ref">↩</a></li>
<li id="fn:11">Gricius, Gabriella (25 April 2018). "OSCE Drones Reintroduced into Ukraine's Donbass and Donetsk Warzones". Global Security Review. Global Security Review. Archived from the original on 1 December 2020. Retrieved 19 December 2020. <a href="https://globalsecurityreview.com/osce-drones-reintroduced-ukraine-donbass-warzone/" target="_blank">https://globalsecurityreview.com/osce-drones-reintroduced-ukraine-donbass-warzone/</a> <a href="#fnref:11" class="footnote-back-ref">↩</a></li>
<li id="fn:12">"THEMATIC REPORT IMPACT OF THE CONFLICT ON EDUCATIONAL FACILITIES AND CHILDREN'S ACCESS TO EDUCATION IN EASTERN UKRAINE" (PDF). OSCE.org. OSCE. Archived (PDF) from the original on 4 October 2020. Retrieved 15 December 2020. <a href="https://www.osce.org/files/f/documents/4/1/457690.pdf" target="_blank">https://www.osce.org/files/f/documents/4/1/457690.pdf</a> <a href="#fnref:12" class="footnote-back-ref">↩</a></li>
<li id="fn:13">"New OSCE Report: Firing Increasing in Eastern Ukraine". Glasnost gone. Glasnost gone. 17 October 2020. Archived from the original on 16 November 2020. Retrieved 19 December 2020. <a href="https://glasnostgone.org/2020/10/17/new-osce-report-firing-increasing-in-eastern-ukraine/" target="_blank">https://glasnostgone.org/2020/10/17/new-osce-report-firing-increasing-in-eastern-ukraine/</a> <a href="#fnref:13" class="footnote-back-ref">↩</a></li>
<li id="fn:14">"OSCE SMM spotted convoys of trucks entering and exiting Ukraine in Donetsk region". YouTube. OSCE Special Monitoring Mission to Ukraine. Archived from the original on 11 January 2021. Retrieved 25 January 2021. <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Ani2YWDLXl0" target="_blank">https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Ani2YWDLXl0</a> <a href="#fnref:14" class="footnote-back-ref">↩</a></li>
<li id="fn:15">Salmen, Harriet; Walker, Shaun. "Kiev announces plans to withdraw Ukrainian troops from Crimea". The Guardian. Archived from the original on 26 October 2014. Retrieved 6 October 2020. <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/mar/19/ukraine-plans-troop-withdrawal-from-crimea" target="_blank">https://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/mar/19/ukraine-plans-troop-withdrawal-from-crimea</a> <a href="#fnref:15" class="footnote-back-ref">↩</a></li>
<li id="fn:16">Salem, Harriet. "Deep divisions split Donetsk as tensions simmer across Ukraine". The Guardian. Archived from the original on 9 April 2016. Retrieved 6 October 2020. <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/mar/04/ukraine-russia-protesters-donetsk-separate-by-force" target="_blank">https://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/mar/04/ukraine-russia-protesters-donetsk-separate-by-force</a> <a href="#fnref:16" class="footnote-back-ref">↩</a></li>
<li id="fn:17">Sutyagin, Igor. "Russian Forces in Ukraine" (PDF). Royal United Services Institute. RUSI. Archived from the original (PDF) on 11 January 2021. Retrieved 12 January 2021. <a href="https://web.archive.org/web/20210111112810/https://rusi.org/sites/default/files/201503_bp_russian_forces_in_ukraine.pdf" target="_blank">https://web.archive.org/web/20210111112810/https://rusi.org/sites/default/files/201503_bp_russian_forces_in_ukraine.pdf</a> <a href="#fnref:17" class="footnote-back-ref">↩</a></li>
<li id="fn:18">"Permanent Council Decision No. 1117". OSCE. Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe. Archived from the original on 26 October 2020. Retrieved 6 October 2020. <a href="https://www.osce.org/pc/116747" target="_blank">https://www.osce.org/pc/116747</a> <a href="#fnref:18" class="footnote-back-ref">↩</a></li>
<li id="fn:19">"Protocol on the results of consultations of the Trilateral Contact Group (Minsk Agreement)". United Nations Peacemaker. United Nations. Archived from the original on 24 September 2020. Retrieved 6 October 2020. <a href="https://peacemaker.un.org/UA-ceasefire-2014" target="_blank">https://peacemaker.un.org/UA-ceasefire-2014</a> <a href="#fnref:19" class="footnote-back-ref">↩</a></li>
<li id="fn:20">"Donesk and Luhansk People's Republics refuse to cede control over Border with Russia to Ukraine". Kiyv Post. 30 June 2014. Retrieved 6 October 2020. <a href="https://www.kyivpost.com/article/content/war-against-ukraine/donetsk-and-luhansk-peoples-republics-refuse-to-cede-control-over-border-with-russia-to-ukraine-370148.html" target="_blank">https://www.kyivpost.com/article/content/war-against-ukraine/donetsk-and-luhansk-peoples-republics-refuse-to-cede-control-over-border-with-russia-to-ukraine-370148.html</a> <a href="#fnref:20" class="footnote-back-ref">↩</a></li>
<li id="fn:21">Walker, Shaun (23 January 2015). "Pro-Russian rebels in Donetsk keep on the attack as war of words intensifies". The Guardian. Archived from the original on 8 November 2020. Retrieved 6 October 2020. <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/jan/23/rebels-donetsk-attack-putin-ukraine-violence" target="_blank">https://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/jan/23/rebels-donetsk-attack-putin-ukraine-violence</a> <a href="#fnref:21" class="footnote-back-ref">↩</a></li>
<li id="fn:22">"Package of measures for the implementation of the Minsk agreements" (PDF). UN Peacemaker. United Nations. Archived (PDF) from the original on 18 October 2020. Retrieved 6 October 2020. <a href="https://peacemaker.un.org/sites/peacemaker.un.org/files/UA_150212_MinskAgreement_en.pdf" target="_blank">https://peacemaker.un.org/sites/peacemaker.un.org/files/UA_150212_MinskAgreement_en.pdf</a> <a href="#fnref:22" class="footnote-back-ref">↩</a></li>
<li id="fn:23">"DECISION No. 1162 EXTENSION OF THE MANDATE OF THE OSCE SPECIAL MONITORING MISSION TO UKRAINE" (PDF). OSCE. OSCE Permanent Council. Archived (PDF) from the original on 17 January 2021. Retrieved 21 January 2021. <a href="https://www.osce.org/files/f/documents/3/b/144996.pdf" target="_blank">https://www.osce.org/files/f/documents/3/b/144996.pdf</a> <a href="#fnref:23" class="footnote-back-ref">↩</a></li>
<li id="fn:24">"OSCE SMM car damaged in anti-tank mine blast in Donbas, casualties reported". UNIAN information agency. UNIAN information agency. Archived from the original on 26 February 2021. Retrieved 15 December 2020. <a href="https://www.unian.info/war/1889801-osce-smm-car-damaged-in-anti-tank-mine-blast-in-donbas-casualties-reported.html" target="_blank">https://www.unian.info/war/1889801-osce-smm-car-damaged-in-anti-tank-mine-blast-in-donbas-casualties-reported.html</a> <a href="#fnref:24" class="footnote-back-ref">↩</a></li>
<li id="fn:25">Haug, Hilde (2016-09-09). "The Minsk Agreements and the osce Special Monitoring Mission". Security and Human Rights. 27 (3–4): 342–357. doi:10.1163/18750230-02703004. ISSN 1874-7337. S2CID 168698517. Archived from the original on 2021-01-22. Retrieved 2021-03-19. <a href="https://brill.com/view/journals/shrs/27/3-4/article-p342_342.xml" target="_blank">https://brill.com/view/journals/shrs/27/3-4/article-p342_342.xml</a> <a href="#fnref:25" class="footnote-back-ref">↩</a></li>
<li id="fn:26">Zverev, Anton (13 February 2022). "OSCE monitoring mission staff pull out from eastern Ukraine". Reuters. Retrieved 15 June 2022. <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/us/us-staff-osce-begins-pullout-donetsk-eastern-ukraine-2022-02-13/" target="_blank">https://www.reuters.com/world/us/us-staff-osce-begins-pullout-donetsk-eastern-ukraine-2022-02-13/</a> <a href="#fnref:26" class="footnote-back-ref">↩</a></li>
<li id="fn:27">Choi, Joseph (13 February 2022). "US staff at OSCE withdraw from rebel-held eastern Ukraine city: report". The Hill. Washington DC. Retrieved 15 June 2022. <a href="https://thehill.com/policy/international/594064-us-staff-at-osce-withdraw-from-rebel-held-eastern-ukraine-city-report/" target="_blank">https://thehill.com/policy/international/594064-us-staff-at-osce-withdraw-from-rebel-held-eastern-ukraine-city-report/</a> <a href="#fnref:27" class="footnote-back-ref">↩</a></li>
<li id="fn:28">"Daily Report 42/2022" (PDF). Special Monitoring Mission to Ukraine. OSCE. 23 February 2022. Retrieved 16 June 2022. <a href="https://www.osce.org/files/2022-02-23%20Daily%20Report_ENG.pdf?itok=57816" target="_blank">https://www.osce.org/files/2022-02-23%20Daily%20Report_ENG.pdf?itok=57816</a> <a href="#fnref:28" class="footnote-back-ref">↩</a></li>
<li id="fn:29">"Statement of the Secretary General on the temporary evacuation of OSCE staff from Ukraine". www.osce.org. Retrieved 2022-03-09. <a href="https://www.osce.org/secretary-general/512953" target="_blank">https://www.osce.org/secretary-general/512953</a> <a href="#fnref:29" class="footnote-back-ref">↩</a></li>
<li id="fn:30">"Chairman-in-Office and Secretary General expressed regret that no consensus reached on extension of mandate of Special Monitoring Mission to Ukraine". www.osce.org. Retrieved 2022-03-31. <a href="https://www.osce.org/chairmanship/514958" target="_blank">https://www.osce.org/chairmanship/514958</a> <a href="#fnref:30" class="footnote-back-ref">↩</a></li>
<li id="fn:31">"OSCE Special Monitoring Mission to Ukraine (Closed)". <a href="https://www.osce.org/special-monitoring-mission-to-ukraine-closed" target="_blank">https://www.osce.org/special-monitoring-mission-to-ukraine-closed</a> <a href="#fnref:31" class="footnote-back-ref">↩</a></li>
<li id="fn:32">"Russian separatists in Luhansk convict ex-OSCE staff of treason". aljazeera.com. Retrieved 2022-09-20. <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2022/9/19/russian-separatists-in-luhansk-convict-ex-osce-staff-of-treason" target="_blank">https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2022/9/19/russian-separatists-in-luhansk-convict-ex-osce-staff-of-treason</a> <a href="#fnref:32" class="footnote-back-ref">↩</a></li>
<li id="fn:33">"Spot Report 6/2021: SMM long-range UAV unable to take off due to dual GPS signal interference". www.osce.org. Archived from the original on 15 April 2021. Retrieved 15 April 2021. <a href="https://www.osce.org/special-monitoring-mission-to-ukraine/483008" target="_blank">https://www.osce.org/special-monitoring-mission-to-ukraine/483008</a> <a href="#fnref:33" class="footnote-back-ref">↩</a></li>
<li id="fn:34">"Latest from OSCE Special Monitoring Mission (SMM) to Ukraine based on information received as of 19:30 (Kyiv time), 16 August 2015". www.osce.org. Archived from the original on 9 June 2021. Retrieved 16 April 2021. <a href="https://www.osce.org/ukraine-smm/177826" target="_blank">https://www.osce.org/ukraine-smm/177826</a> <a href="#fnref:34" class="footnote-back-ref">↩</a></li>
<li id="fn:35">"Latest from OSCE Special Monitoring Mission (SMM) to Ukraine, based on information received as of 19:30, 15 June 2016". www.osce.org. Archived from the original on 16 April 2021. Retrieved 16 April 2021. <a href="https://www.osce.org/ukraine-smm/247216" target="_blank">https://www.osce.org/ukraine-smm/247216</a> <a href="#fnref:35" class="footnote-back-ref">↩</a></li>
<li id="fn:36">"OSCE Special Monitoring Mission to Ukraine (SMM) Daily Report 60/2020 issued on 12 March 2020". www.osce.org. 12 March 2020. Archived from the original on 16 April 2021. Retrieved 16 April 2021. <a href="https://www.osce.org/special-monitoring-mission-to-ukraine/448393" target="_blank">https://www.osce.org/special-monitoring-mission-to-ukraine/448393</a> <a href="#fnref:36" class="footnote-back-ref">↩</a></li>
<li id="fn:37">"Latest from the OSCE Special Monitoring Mission to Ukraine (SMM), based on information received as of 19:30, 10 August 2018". www.osce.org. Archived from the original on 15 February 2022. Retrieved 16 April 2021. <a href="https://www.osce.org/special-monitoring-mission-to-ukraine/390236" target="_blank">https://www.osce.org/special-monitoring-mission-to-ukraine/390236</a> <a href="#fnref:37" class="footnote-back-ref">↩</a></li>
<li id="fn:38">"Daily Report 99/2021" (PDF). OSCE. Archived (PDF) from the original on 2021-05-02. Retrieved 2021-05-07. <a href="https://www.osce.org/files/2021-04-30%20Daily%20Report.pdf" target="_blank">https://www.osce.org/files/2021-04-30%20Daily%20Report.pdf</a> <a href="#fnref:38" class="footnote-back-ref">↩</a></li>
</ol>

OSCE Special Monitoring Mission to Ukraine open-in-new

OSCE Special Monitoring Mission to Ukraine