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Strong programme
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<h2 id="characteristics">Characteristics</h2> <p>As formulated by David Bloor,<a class="footnote-ref" id="fnref:3" href="#fn:3"><sup>3</sup></a> the strong programme has four indispensable components: </p> <ol><li><i><a href="/facts/Causality/Swh496X7">Causality</a></i>: it examines the conditions (psychological, social, and cultural) that bring about claims to a certain kind of knowledge.</li> <li><i><a href="/facts/Impartiality/8kSHvpV9">Impartiality</a></i>: it examines successful as well as unsuccessful knowledge claims.</li> <li><i>Symmetry</i>: the same types of explanations are used for successful and unsuccessful knowledge claims alike.</li> <li><i><a href="/facts/Reflexive_relation/NzTytEg9">Reflexivity</a></i>: it must be applicable to sociology itself.</li></ol> <h2 id="history">History</h2> <p>Because the strong programme originated at the 'Science Studies Unit,' <a href="/facts/University_of_Edinburgh/L69HscH9">University of Edinburgh</a>, it is sometimes termed the <a href="/facts/Sociology_of_scientific_knowledge/WWKlHN8A">Edinburgh School</a>. However, there is also a Bath School associated with <a href="/facts/Harry_Collins/EGw6dh0P">Harry Collins</a> that makes similar proposals. In contrast to the Edinburgh School, which emphasizes historical approaches, the Bath School emphasizes microsocial studies of laboratories and experiments.<a class="footnote-ref" id="fnref:4" href="#fn:4"><sup>4</sup></a> The Bath school, however, does depart from the strong programme on some fundamental issues. In the <a href="/facts/Social_construction_of_technology/z770nHcA">social construction of technology</a> (SCOT) approach developed by Collins' student <a href="/facts/Trevor_Pinch/yeLt4FWP">Trevor Pinch</a>, as well as by the Dutch sociologist <a href="/facts/Wiebe_Bijker/8xRbH1f7">Wiebe Bijker</a>, the strong programme was extended to technology. There are SSK-influenced scholars working in <a href="/facts/Science_and_technology_studies/gaxMPc6b">science and technology studies</a> programs throughout the world.<a class="footnote-ref" id="fnref:5" href="#fn:5"><sup>5</sup></a> </p> <h2 id="criticism">Criticism</h2> <p>In order to study scientific knowledge from a sociological point of view, the strong programme has adhered to a form of radical <a href="/facts/Relativism/a6s6dGtw">relativism</a>. In other words, it argues that – in the social study of institutionalised beliefs about "<a href="/facts/Truth/NyQmBtUC">truth</a>" – it would be unwise to use "truth" as an explanatory resource. To do so would (according to the relativist view) include the answer as part of the question (Barnes 1992), and propound a "<a href="/facts/Whig_history/kuwoQxcS">whiggish</a>" approach towards the study of history – a narrative of human history as an inevitable march towards truth and enlightenment. Physicists <a href="/facts/Alan_Sokal/vFGuJzJN">Alan Sokal</a> and <a href="/facts/Jean_Bricmont/QN829m3u">Jean Bricmont</a> wrote a scathing critique <a href="/facts/Fashionable_Nonsense/BSFCnw8o">Fashionable Nonsense</a> of the Strong Programme in 1997 and its reliance on <a href="/facts/Social_constructionism/NeGDLvKL">social constructionism</a>.<a class="footnote-ref" id="fnref:6" href="#fn:6"><sup>6</sup></a> Sokal in particular has criticised radical relativism as part of the <a href="/facts/Science_wars/66GnbD9o">science wars</a>, on the basis that such an understanding will lead inevitably towards <a href="/facts/Solipsism/pjG8cu08">solipsism</a> and <a href="/facts/Postmodernism/aBgbw8QJ">postmodernism</a>. has criticised radical relativism as part of the <a href="/facts/Science_wars/66GnbD9o">science wars</a>, on the basis that such an understanding will lead inevitably towards <a href="/facts/Solipsism/pjG8cu08">solipsism</a> and <a href="/facts/Postmodernism/aBgbw8QJ">postmodernism</a>. Markus Seidel attacks the main arguments – <a href="/facts/Underdetermination/UyKo0zJs">underdetermination</a> and norm-circularity – provided by Strong Programme proponents for their relativism.<a class="footnote-ref" id="fnref:7" href="#fn:7"><sup>7</sup></a> It has also been argued that the strong programme has incited <a href="/facts/Climate_denial/uEz4S5qL">climate denial</a>.<a class="footnote-ref" id="fnref:8" href="#fn:8"><sup>8</sup></a> </p> <h2 id="notes">Notes</h2> <h2 id="see-also">See also</h2> <ul><li><a href="/facts/Sociology_of_Scientific_Knowledge/WWKlHN8A">Sociology of Scientific Knowledge</a> – Study of science as a social activityPages displaying short descriptions of redirect targets</li> <li><a href="/facts/Philosophy_of_science/aonsfhTY">Philosophy of science</a></li> <li><a href="/facts/Science_studies/F8vkm3TM">Science studies</a> – Research area analyzing scientific expertise</li> <li><a href="/facts/Social_constructivism/cxjjul8l">Social constructivism</a> – Sociological theory of knowledge</li> <li><a href="/facts/Sokal_affair/aNmQ1dk6">Sokal affair</a> – 1996 scholarly publishing sting accepted by an academic journal</li></ul> <h2 id="bibliography">Bibliography</h2> <ul><li>Barnes, B. (1977). <i>Interests and the Growth of Knowledge</i>. London: Routledge & Kegan Paul.</li> <li>Barnes, B. (1982). <i>T. S. Kuhn and Social Science</i>. London: Macmillan.</li> <li>Barnes, B. (1985). <i>About Science</i>. Oxford: Blackwell.</li> <li>Barnes, B. (1987). 'Concept Application as Social Activity', Critica 19: 19–44.</li> <li>Barnes, B. (1992). "Realism, relativism and finitism". Pp. 131–147 in <i>Cognitive Relativism and Social Science</i>, eds. D. Raven, L. van Vucht Tijssen, and J. de Wolf.</li> <li>Barnes, B., D. Bloor, and J. Henry. (1996), <i>Scientific Knowledge: A Sociological Analysis</i>. University of Chicago Press. [An introduction and summary of strong sociology]</li> <li>Bijker, Wiebe E., et al. <i>The social construction of technological systems: New directions in the sociology and history of technology</i> (MIT press, 2012)</li> <li>Bloor, D. (1991 [1976]), <i>Knowledge and Social Imagery</i>, 2nd ed. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. [outlines the strong programme]</li> <li>Bloor, D. (1997). <i>Wittgenstein, Rules and Institutions</i>. London: Routledge.</li> <li>Bloor, D. (1999). "Anti-Latour," <i>Studies in the History and Philosophy of Science Part A</i> 20#1 pp: 81–112.</li> <li>Collins, Harry, and Trevor Pinch. <i>The Golem at large: What you should know about technology</i> (Cambridge University Press, 2014)</li> <li><a href="https://web.archive.org/web/20061130125504/http://www.ensmp.fr/~latour/poparticles/poparticle/p075.html">Latour, B. (1999). "For David Bloor and Beyond ... a reply to David Bloor's 'Anti-Latour',"</a> <i>Studies in History & Philosophy of Science Part A</i> 30(1): 113–129.</li></ul> <h2 id="external-links">External links</h2> <ul><li><a href="http://www.stswiki.org">STS Wiki</a></li> <li><a href="https://web.archive.org/web/20081121075527/http://www.wtmc.net/wiki">WTMC Wiki</a></li> <li><a href="https://www.cbc.ca/radio/ideas/how-to-think-about-science-part-1-1.464989">Historical sociologist Simon Schaffer is interviewed on SSK</a></li> <li><a href="https://www.cbc.ca/radio/ideas/how-to-think-about-science-part-16-1.464997">Historical sociologist Steven Shapin is interviewed on SSK</a></li> <li><a href="https://acervodigital.ufpr.br/xmlui/bitstream/handle/1884/60904/R%20-%20T%20-%20DANIEL%20LASKOWSKI%20TOZZINI.pdf?sequence=1&isAllowed=y">Strong Programme in Sociology of Knowledge and Actor-Network Theory: The Debate within Science Studies (includes questions posed to David Bloor and Bruno Latour, in Appendix)</a></li></ul> <h2 id="references">References</h2> <ol> <li id="fn:1"><p>David Bloor, "The strengths of the strong programme." Scientific rationality: The sociological turn (Springer Netherlands, 1984) pp. 75-94. <a href="#fnref:1" class="footnote-back-ref">↩</a></p></li> <li id="fn:2"><p>Donald MacKenzie, "Notes on the science and social relations debate." Capital & Class 5.2 (1981): 47-60. <a href="#fnref:2" class="footnote-back-ref">↩</a></p></li> <li id="fn:3"><p>David Bloor, Knowledge and Social Imagery (1976) <a href="#fnref:3" class="footnote-back-ref">↩</a></p></li> <li id="fn:4"><p>Harry M. Collins, "Introduction: Stages in the empirical programme of relativism." Social studies of science (1981): 3-10. in JSTOR <a href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/284733" target="_blank">https://www.jstor.org/stable/284733</a> <a href="#fnref:4" class="footnote-back-ref">↩</a></p></li> <li id="fn:5"><p>Wiebe E. Bijker, et al. The social construction of technological systems: New directions in the sociology and history of technology (MIT press, 2012) <a href="#fnref:5" class="footnote-back-ref">↩</a></p></li> <li id="fn:6"><p>Galaty, David (2022). Modern European Intellectual History: Individuals, Groupings and Technological Change 1800-2000. Bloomsbury Academic. p. 336. ISBN 978-1-350-10539-3. <a href="978-1-350-10539-3" target="_blank">978-1-350-10539-3</a> <a href="#fnref:6" class="footnote-back-ref">↩</a></p></li> <li id="fn:7"><p>Markus Seidel Epistemic Relativism. A Constructive Critique, 2014, Palgrave Macmillan <a href="#fnref:7" class="footnote-back-ref">↩</a></p></li> <li id="fn:8"><p>Hansson, Sven Ove (29 August 2020). "Social constructionism and climate science denial". European Journal for Philosophy of Science. 10 (3): 37. doi:10.1007/s13194-020-00305-w. ISSN 1879-4920. <a href="https://doi.org/10.1007%2Fs13194-020-00305-w" target="_blank">https://doi.org/10.1007%2Fs13194-020-00305-w</a> <a href="#fnref:8" class="footnote-back-ref">↩</a></p></li> </ol>