Declarative knowledge

<h2 id="definition-and-semantic-field">Definition and semantic field</h2>
Declarative knowledge is an <a href="/facts/Awareness/PazhgWFC">awareness</a> or <a href="/facts/Understanding/D8UXbWuJ">understanding</a> of <a href="/facts/Fact/vNPzHxtf">facts</a>. It can be expressed through spoken and written language using declarative sentences and can thus be acquired through <a href="/facts/Verbal_communication/oQuamvf2">verbal communication</a>.<a class="footnote-ref" id="fnref:1" href="#fn:1">1</a> Examples of declarative knowledge are knowing "that <a href="/facts/Princess_Diana/nNq36PRL">Princess Diana</a> died in 1997" or "that <a href="/facts/Goethe/k5hW4Tw5">Goethe</a> was 83 when he finished writing <a href="/facts/Faust/hV4GKH1s">Faust</a>".<a class="footnote-ref" id="fnref:2" href="#fn:2">2</a> Declarative knowledge involves <a href="/facts/Mental_state/sHsDj380">mental representations</a> in the form of <a href="/facts/Concept/VWB6yhQp">concepts</a>, ideas, theories, and general rules. Through these representations, the person stands in a relationship to a particular aspect of reality by depicting what it is like. Declarative knowledge tends to be context-independent: it is not tied to any specific use and may be employed for many tasks.<a class="footnote-ref" id="fnref:3" href="#fn:3">3</a><a class="footnote-ref" id="fnref:4" href="#fn:4">4</a><a class="footnote-ref" id="fnref:5" href="#fn:5">5</a> It includes a wide range of phenomena and encompasses both knowledge of individual facts and general laws. An example for individual facts is knowing that the atomic mass of gold is 196.97 <a href="/facts/Dalton_(unit)/IMATU3vf">u</a>. Knowing that the color of leaves of some trees changes in autumn, on the other hand, belongs to general laws.<a class="footnote-ref" id="fnref:6" href="#fn:6">6</a> Due to its verbal nature, declarative knowledge can be stored in <a href="/facts/Media_(communication)/uflm14CI">media</a> like books and <a href="/facts/Harddisk/kekLSGSE">harddisks</a>. It may also be processed using computers and plays a key role in various forms of <a href="/facts/Artificial_intelligence/lJGauQwX">artificial intelligence</a>, for example, in the <a href="/facts/Knowledge_base/zKXdqQjH">knowledge base</a> of <a href="/facts/Expert_systems/CUCzSEaX">expert systems</a>.<a class="footnote-ref" id="fnref:7" href="#fn:7">7</a>
Terms like theoretical knowledge, descriptive knowledge, propositional knowledge, and knowledge-that are used as synonyms of declarative knowledge and express its different aspects. Theoretical knowledge is knowledge of what is the case, in the past, present, or future independent of a practical outlook concerning how to achieve a specific goal. Descriptive knowledge is knowledge that involves <a href="/facts/Description/X2AGERdY">descriptions</a> of actual or speculative objects, events, or concepts. Propositional knowledge asserts that a <a href="/facts/Proposition/0877MFMD">proposition</a> or claim about the world is true. This is often expressed using a that-clause, as in "knowing that kangaroos hop" or "knowing that 2 + 2 = 4". For this reason, it is also referred to as knowledge-that.<a class="footnote-ref" id="fnref:8" href="#fn:8">8</a> Declarative knowledge contrasts with non-declarative knowledge, which does not concern the explicit comprehension of factual <a href="/facts/Information/3LdrzXtJ">information</a> regarding the world. In this regard, <a href="/facts/Practical_knowledge/gYBuANxo">practical knowledge</a> in the form of <a href="/facts/Skill/XKyAfgBg">skills</a> and <a href="/facts/Knowledge_by_acquaintance/mIjvledD">knowledge by acquaintance</a> as a type of experiential familiarity are not forms of declarative knowledge.<a class="footnote-ref" id="fnref:9" href="#fn:9">9</a><a class="footnote-ref" id="fnref:10" href="#fn:10">10</a><a class="footnote-ref" id="fnref:11" href="#fn:11">11</a> The main discipline investigating declarative knowledge is called <a href="/facts/Epistemology/NsDwpcYH">epistemology</a>. It tries to determine its nature, how it arises, what value it has, and what its limits are.<a class="footnote-ref" id="fnref:12" href="#fn:12">12</a><a class="footnote-ref" id="fnref:13" href="#fn:13">13</a><a class="footnote-ref" id="fnref:14" href="#fn:14">14</a>

<h2 id="components">Components</h2>
A central issue in epistemology is to determine the components or essential features of declarative knowledge. This field of inquiry is called the analysis of knowledge. It aims to provide the conditions that are <a href="/facts/Necessary_and_sufficient_conditions/G45aDCY9">individually necessary and jointly sufficient</a> for a state to amount to declarative knowledge. In this regard, it is similar to how a chemist breaks down a sample by identifying all the chemical elements composing it.<a class="footnote-ref" id="fnref:15" href="#fn:15">15</a><a class="footnote-ref" id="fnref:16" href="#fn:16">16</a><a class="footnote-ref" id="fnref:17" href="#fn:17">17</a>

A traditionally influential view states that declarative knowledge has three essential features: it is (1) a <a href="/facts/Belief/HbPvkGT6">belief</a> that is (2) <a href="/facts/Truth/NyQmBtUC">true</a> and (3) <a href="/facts/Justification_(epistemology)/CxWaj0pY">justified</a>.<a class="footnote-ref" id="fnref:18" href="#fn:18">18</a><a class="footnote-ref" id="fnref:19" href="#fn:19">19</a><a class="footnote-ref" id="fnref:20" href="#fn:20">20</a> This position is referred to as the justified-true-belief theory of knowledge and is often seen as the standard view.<a class="footnote-ref" id="fnref:21" href="#fn:21">21</a><a class="footnote-ref" id="fnref:22" href="#fn:22">22</a> This view faced significant criticism following a series of counterexamples given by <a href="/facts/Edmund_Gettier/m2xoRfAt">Edmund Gettier</a> in the latter half of the 20th century. In response, various alternative theories of the elements of declarative knowledge have been suggested. Some see justified true belief as a necessary condition that is not sufficient by itself and discuss additional components that are needed. Another response is to deny that justification is needed and seek a different component to replace it.<a class="footnote-ref" id="fnref:23" href="#fn:23">23</a><a class="footnote-ref" id="fnref:24" href="#fn:24">24</a><a class="footnote-ref" id="fnref:25" href="#fn:25">25</a> Some theorists, like <a href="/facts/Timothy_Williamson/152ylgUd">Timothy Williamson</a>, reject the idea that declarative knowledge can be deconstructed into various constituent parts. They argue instead that it is a basic and unanalyzable epistemological state.<a class="footnote-ref" id="fnref:26" href="#fn:26">26</a>

<h3>Belief</h3>
One commonly accepted component of knowledge is belief. In this sense, whoever knows that whales are animals automatically also believes that whales are animals. A belief is a mental state that affirms that something is the case. As an attitude toward a proposition, it belongs to the subjective side of knowledge. Some theorists, like Luis Villoro, distinguish between weak and strong beliefs. Having a weak belief implies that the person merely presumes that something is the case. They guess that the claim is probably correct while acknowledging at the same time that they might very well be mistaken about it. This contrasts with strong belief, which implies a substantial commitment to the believed claim. It involves <a href="/facts/Certainty/rKcz7Upd">certainty</a> in the form of being sure about it. For declarative knowledge, this stronger sense of belief is relevant.<a class="footnote-ref" id="fnref:27" href="#fn:27">27</a>
A few epistemologists, like <a href="/facts/Katalin_Farkas/HdRGCnRy">Katalin Farkas</a>, claim that, at least in some cases, knowledge is not a form of belief but a different type of mental state. One argument for this position is based on statements like "I don't believe it, I know it", which may be used to express that the person is very certain and has good reason to affirm this claim. However, this argument is not generally accepted since knowing something does not imply that the person disbelieves the claim. A further explanation is to hold that this statement is a linguistic tool to emphasize that the person is well-informed. In this regard, it only denies that a weak belief exists without rejecting that a stronger form of belief is involved.<a class="footnote-ref" id="fnref:28" href="#fn:28">28</a>

<h3>Truth</h3>
Beliefs are either true or false depending on whether they accurately represent reality. Truth is usually seen as one of the essential components of knowledge. This means that it is impossible to know a claim that is false. For example, it is possible to believe that <a href="/facts/Hillary_Clinton/dPzm9ru4">Hillary Clinton</a> won the <a href="/facts/2016_US_Presidential_election/Bs9DUEoc">2016 US Presidential election</a> but nobody can know it because this event did not occur. That a proposition is true does not imply that it is <a href="/facts/Common_knowledge/PUKpL9K6">common knowledge</a>, that an irrefutable <a href="/facts/Proof_(truth)/NeJUyrWX">proof</a> exists, or that someone is thinking about it. Instead, it only means that it presents things as they are. For example, when flipping a coin, it may be true that it will land heads even if it is not possible to predict this with certainty. Truth is an objective factor of knowledge that goes beyond the mental sphere of belief since it usually depends on what the world outside the person's <a href="/facts/Mind/Y5JhtFj4">mind</a> is like.<a class="footnote-ref" id="fnref:29" href="#fn:29">29</a><a class="footnote-ref" id="fnref:30" href="#fn:30">30</a><a class="footnote-ref" id="fnref:31" href="#fn:31">31</a>
Some epistemologists hold that there are at least some forms of knowledge that do not require truth. For example, Joseph Thomas Tolliver argues that some mental states amount to knowledge only because of the causes and effects they have. This is the case even if they do not represent anything and are therefore neither true nor false.<a class="footnote-ref" id="fnref:32" href="#fn:32">32</a><a class="footnote-ref" id="fnref:33" href="#fn:33">33</a> A different outlook is found in the field of the <a href="/facts/Knowledge/joozoaup">anthropology of knowledge</a>, which studies how knowledge is acquired, stored, retrieved, and communicated. In this discipline, knowledge is often understood in a very wide sense that is roughly equivalent to understanding and <a href="/facts/Culture/c5JgMqpX">culture</a>. In this regard, the main interest is usually about how people ascribe truth values to meaning-contents, like when affirming an assertion, independent of whether this assertion is true or false.<a class="footnote-ref" id="fnref:34" href="#fn:34">34</a><a class="footnote-ref" id="fnref:35" href="#fn:35">35</a><a class="footnote-ref" id="fnref:36" href="#fn:36">36</a> Despite these positions, it is widely accepted in epistemology that truth is an essential component of declarative knowledge.<a class="footnote-ref" id="fnref:37" href="#fn:37">37</a>

<h3>Justification</h3>
In epistemology, justification means that a claim is supported by <a href="/facts/Evidence/d5IGUK0U">evidence</a> or that a person has good reasons for believing it. This implies some form of appraisal in relation to an evaluative standard of <a href="/facts/Rationality/ueS0w9lk">rationality</a>.<a class="footnote-ref" id="fnref:38" href="#fn:38">38</a><a class="footnote-ref" id="fnref:39" href="#fn:39">39</a> For example, a person who just checked their bank account and saw that their balance is 500 dollars has a good reason to believe that they have 500 dollars in their bank account.<a class="footnote-ref" id="fnref:40" href="#fn:40">40</a> However, justification by itself does not imply that a belief is true. For example, if someone reads the time from their clock they may form a justified belief about the current time even if the clock stopped a while ago and shows a false time now.<a class="footnote-ref" id="fnref:41" href="#fn:41">41</a> If a person has a justified belief then they are often able to articulate what this belief is and to provide arguments stating the reasons supporting it. However, this ability to articulate one's reasons is not an essential requirement of justification.<a class="footnote-ref" id="fnref:42" href="#fn:42">42</a>
Justification is usually included as a component of knowledge to exclude lucky guesses. For example, a compulsive gambler flipping a coin may be certain that it will land heads this time without a good reason for this belief. In this case, the belief does not amount to knowledge even if it turns out that it was true. This observation can be easily explained by including justification as an essential component. This implies that the gambler's belief does not amount to knowledge because it lacks justification. In this regard, mere true opinion is not enough to establish knowledge. A central issue in epistemology concerns the standards of justification, i.e., what conditions have to be fulfilled for a belief to be justified. <a href="/facts/Internalism_and_externalism/TcqV9gQn">Internalists</a> understand justification as a purely subjective component, akin to belief. They claim that a belief is justified if it stands in the right relation to other mental states of the believer. For example, perceptual experiences can justify beliefs about the perceived object. This contrasts with externalists, who claim that justification involves objective factors that are external to the person's mind. Such factors can include <a href="/facts/Causality/Swh496X7">causal</a> relations with the object of the belief or that reliable cognitive processes are responsible for the formation of the belief.<a class="footnote-ref" id="fnref:43" href="#fn:43">43</a><a class="footnote-ref" id="fnref:44" href="#fn:44">44</a>

A closely related issue concerns the question of how the different mental states have to be related to each other to be justified. For example, one belief may be supported by another belief. However, it is questionable whether this is sufficient for justification if the second belief is itself not justified. For example, a person may believe that Ford cars are cheaper than BMWs because they heard this from a friend. However, this belief may not be justified if there is no good reason to think that the friend is a reliable source of information. This can lead to an <a href="/facts/Infinite_regress/Y3rk8wQe">infinite regress</a> since whatever reason is provided for the friend's reliability may itself lack justification. Three popular responses to this problem are <a href="/facts/Foundationalism/2hlTEXTg">foundationalism</a>, <a href="/facts/Coherentism/7JRS1DLe">coherentism</a>, and <a href="/facts/Infinitism/87Tap3aI">infinitism</a>. According to foundationalists, some reasons are foundational and do not depend on other reasons for their justification. Coherentists also reject the idea that an infinite chain of reasons is needed and argue that different beliefs can mutually support each other without one being more basic than the others. Infinitists, on the other hand, accept the idea that an infinite chain of reasons is required.<a class="footnote-ref" id="fnref:45" href="#fn:45">45</a>
Many debates concerning the nature of declarative knowledge focus on the role of justification, specifically whether it is needed at all and what else might be needed to complement it. Influential in this regard was a series of <a href="/facts/Thought_experiments/GXlr0lz9">thought experiments</a> by Edmund Gettier. They present concrete cases of justified true beliefs that fail to amount to knowledge. The reason for their failure is a type of <a href="/facts/Epistemic_luck/bBQT9H7o">epistemic luck</a>. This means that the justification is not relevant to whether the belief is true. In one thought experiment, Smith and Jones apply for a job and before officially declaring the result, the company president tells Smith that Jones will get the job. Smith saw that Jones has 10 coins in his pocket so he comes to form the justified belief that the successful candidate has 10 coins in his pocket. In the end, it turns out that Smith gets the job after all. By lucky coincidence, Smith also has 10 coins in his pocket. Gettier claims that, because of this coincidence, Smith's belief that the successful candidate has 10 coins in his pocket does not amount to knowledge. The belief is justified and true but the justification is not relevant to the truth.<a class="footnote-ref" id="fnref:46" href="#fn:46">46</a><a class="footnote-ref" id="fnref:47" href="#fn:47">47</a>

<h3>Others</h3>

In response to <a href="/facts/Gettier_problem/bBQT9H7o">Gettier's thought experiments</a>, various further components of declarative knowledge have been suggested. Some of them are intended as additional elements besides belief, truth, and justification while others are understood as replacements for justification.<a class="footnote-ref" id="fnref:48" href="#fn:48">48</a><a class="footnote-ref" id="fnref:49" href="#fn:49">49</a><a class="footnote-ref" id="fnref:50" href="#fn:50">50</a>
According to defeasibility theory, an additional factor besides having evidence in favor of the belief is that no <a href="/facts/Defeater/C0Qt3a3l">defeating evidence</a> is present. Defeating evidence of a belief is evidence that undermines the justification of the belief. For example, if a person looks outside the window and sees a rainbow then this impression justifies their belief that there is a rainbow. However, if the person just ate a <a href="/facts/Psychedelic_drug/aj9GNANW">psychedelic drug</a> then this is defeating evidence since it undermines the reliability of their experiences. Defeasibility theorists claim that, in this case, the belief does not amount to knowledge because defeating evidence is present. As an additional component of knowledge, they require that the person has no defeating evidence of the belief.<a class="footnote-ref" id="fnref:51" href="#fn:51">51</a><a class="footnote-ref" id="fnref:52" href="#fn:52">52</a><a class="footnote-ref" id="fnref:53" href="#fn:53">53</a> Some theorists demand the stronger requirement that there is no true proposition that would defeat the belief, independent of whether the person is aware of this proposition or not.<a class="footnote-ref" id="fnref:54" href="#fn:54">54</a> A closely related theory holds that beliefs can only amount to knowledge if they are not inferred from a falsehood.<a class="footnote-ref" id="fnref:55" href="#fn:55">55</a>
A further theory is based on the idea that knowledge states should be responsive to what the world is like. One suggested component in this regard is that the belief is safe or sensitive. This means that the person has the belief because it is true but that they would not hold the belief if it was false. In this regard, the person's belief tracks the state of the world.<a class="footnote-ref" id="fnref:56" href="#fn:56">56</a>
Some theories do not try to provide additional requirements but instead propose replacing justification with alternative components. For example, according to some forms of <a href="/facts/Reliabilism/QH4fM0yk">reliabilism</a>, a true belief amounts to knowledge if it was formed through a reliable cognitive process. A cognitive process is reliable if it produces mostly true beliefs in actual situations and would also do so in <a href="/facts/Counterfactual/GdfYSv1k">counterfactual</a> situations.
<a class="footnote-ref" id="fnref:57" href="#fn:57">57</a><a class="footnote-ref" id="fnref:58" href="#fn:58">58</a><a class="footnote-ref" id="fnref:59" href="#fn:59">59</a> Examples of reliable processes are perception and reasoning.<a class="footnote-ref" id="fnref:60" href="#fn:60">60</a> An outcome of reliabilism is that knowledge is not restricted to humans. The reason is that reliable belief-formation processes may also be present in other animals, like dogs, apes, or rats, even if they do not possess justification for their beliefs.<a class="footnote-ref" id="fnref:61" href="#fn:61">61</a> <a href="/facts/Virtue_epistemology/MwDTtdRk">Virtue epistemology</a> is a closely related approach that understands knowledge as the manifestation of <a href="/facts/Epistemic_virtue/1hrnEG10">epistemic virtues</a>. It agrees with regular forms of reliabilism that knowledge is not a matter of luck but puts additional emphasis on the evaluative aspect of knowledge and the underlying skills responsible for it.<a class="footnote-ref" id="fnref:62" href="#fn:62">62</a><a class="footnote-ref" id="fnref:63" href="#fn:63">63</a><a class="footnote-ref" id="fnref:64" href="#fn:64">64</a>
According to causal theories of knowledge, a necessary element of knowing a fact is that this fact somehow caused the knowledge of it. This is the case, for example, if a belief about the color of a house is based on a perceptual experience, which causally connects the house to the belief. This causal connection does not have to be direct and can be mediated through steps like activating memories and drawing <a href="/facts/Inference/RBbe95bP">inferences</a>.<a class="footnote-ref" id="fnref:65" href="#fn:65">65</a><a class="footnote-ref" id="fnref:66" href="#fn:66">66</a>
In many cases, the goal of suggesting additional components is to avoid cases of epistemic luck. In this regard, some theorists have argued that the additional component would have to ensure that the belief is true. This approach is reflected in the idea that knowledge implies a form of certainty. But it sets the standards of knowledge very high and may require that a belief has to be <a href="/facts/Infallible/XhMSj9Al">infallible</a> to amount to knowledge. This means that the justification ensures that the belief is true. For example, <a href="/facts/Richard_Kirkham/CVVuAw2I">Richard Kirkham</a> argues that the justification required for knowledge must be based on <a href="/facts/Self-evidence/I9WhGuT5">self-evident</a> premises that <a href="/facts/Deductive_reasoning/HadA1zWS">deductively</a> entail the held belief. Such a position leads to a form of <a href="/facts/Skepticism/qXAgbbVT">skepticism</a> about knowledge since the great majority of regular beliefs do not live up to these requirements. It would imply that people know very little and that most who claim to know a certain fact are mistaken. However, a more common view among epistemologists is that knowledge does not require infallibility and that many knowledge claims in everyday life are true.<a class="footnote-ref" id="fnref:67" href="#fn:67">67</a>

<h2 id="types">Types</h2>
Declarative knowledge arises in many forms. It is possible to distinguish between them based on the type of content of what is known. For example, empirical knowledge is knowledge of <a href="/facts/Observation/NTodmzCo">observable</a> facts while conceptual knowledge is an <a href="/facts/Understanding/D8UXbWuJ">understanding</a> of general categorizations and theories as well as the relations between them.<a class="footnote-ref" id="fnref:68" href="#fn:68">68</a><a class="footnote-ref" id="fnref:69" href="#fn:69">69</a><a class="footnote-ref" id="fnref:70" href="#fn:70">70</a> Other examples are <a href="/facts/Ethical/wNVNgL5q">ethical</a>, <a href="/facts/Religious/cxntrD0R">religious</a>, <a href="/facts/Scientific/IJoaD7rs">scientific</a>, <a href="/facts/Mathematical/pxTouaz4">mathematical</a>, and <a href="/facts/Logical/8JnpJLtt">logical</a> knowledge as well as <a href="/facts/Self-knowledge_(psychology)/ckF1RPfN">self-knowledge</a>. A further distinction focuses on the mode of how something is known. On a causal level, different sources of knowledge correspond to different types of declarative knowledge. Examples are knowledge through <a href="/facts/Perception/xLK0n2q4">perception</a>, <a href="/facts/Introspection/X8rBdaR0">introspection</a>, <a href="/facts/Memory/zucwQIEX">memory</a>, reasoning, and <a href="/facts/Testimony/dxgk0txp">testimony</a>.<a class="footnote-ref" id="fnref:71" href="#fn:71">71</a><a class="footnote-ref" id="fnref:72" href="#fn:72">72</a><a class="footnote-ref" id="fnref:73" href="#fn:73">73</a>
On a logical level, forms of knowledge can be distinguished based on how a knowledge claim is supported by its premises. This classification corresponds to the different forms of <a href="/facts/Logical_reasoning/NwR4hQva">logical reasoning</a>, such as deductive and <a href="/facts/Inductive_reasoning/EJ992JJ9">inductive reasoning</a>.<a class="footnote-ref" id="fnref:74" href="#fn:74">74</a><a class="footnote-ref" id="fnref:75" href="#fn:75">75</a><a class="footnote-ref" id="fnref:76" href="#fn:76">76</a> A closely related categorization focuses on the strength of the source of the justification. It distinguishes between <a href="/facts/Probabilistic/fgYvMhwb">probabilistic</a> and <a href="/facts/Apodictic/xFt8QI1e">apodictic</a> knowledge. The distinction between <a href="/facts/A_priori_and_a_posteriori/C567SkcV">a priori and a posteriori</a> knowledge, on the other hand, focuses on the type of the source. These classifications overlap with each other at various points. For example, a priori knowledge is closely connected to apodictic, conceptual, deductive, and logical knowledge. A posteriori knowledge, on the other hand, is linked to probabilistic, empirical, inductive, and scientific knowledge. Self-knowledge may be identified with introspective knowledge.<a class="footnote-ref" id="fnref:77" href="#fn:77">77</a><a class="footnote-ref" id="fnref:78" href="#fn:78">78</a>
The distinction between a priori and a posteriori knowledge is determined by the role of <a href="/facts/Experience/1LeXy1DW">experience</a> and matches the contrast between empirical and non-empirical knowledge. A posteriori knowledge is knowledge from experience. This means that experience, like regular perception, is responsible for its formation and justification. Knowing that the door of one's house is green is one example of a posteriori knowledge since some form of sensory observation is required. For a priori knowledge, on the other hand, no experience is required. It is based on pure rational reflection and can neither be verified nor falsified through experience. Examples are knowing that 7 + 5 = 12 or that whatever is red everywhere is not blue everywhere.<a class="footnote-ref" id="fnref:79" href="#fn:79">79</a> In this context, experience means primarily sensory observation but can also include related processes, like introspection and memory. However, it does not include all <a href="/facts/Consciousness/IAxmgt6c">conscious</a> phenomena. For example, having a <a href="/facts/Intuition/Mshu0Vxb">rational insight</a> into the solution of a mathematical problem does not mean that the resulting knowledge is a posteriori. And knowing that 7 + 5 = 12 is a priori knowledge even though some form of consciousness is involved in learning what symbols like "7" and "+" mean and in becoming aware of the associated concepts.<a class="footnote-ref" id="fnref:80" href="#fn:80">80</a><a class="footnote-ref" id="fnref:81" href="#fn:81">81</a><a class="footnote-ref" id="fnref:82" href="#fn:82">82</a>
One classification distinguishes between knowledge of facts, concepts, and principles. Knowledge of facts pertains to the association of concrete information, for example, that the red color on a traffic light means stop or that <a href="/facts/Christopher_Columbus/8hLAb46S">Christopher Columbus</a> sailed in 1492 from Spain to America. Knowledge of concepts applies to more abstract and general ideas that group together many individual phenomena. For example, knowledge of the concept of <a href="/facts/Jogging/XQeTpmTt">jogging</a> implies knowing how it differs from walking and running as well as being able to apply this concept to concrete cases. Knowledge of principles is an awareness of general patterns of cause and effect, including <a href="/facts/Rules_of_thumb/RopfGsJ0">rules of thumb</a>. It is a form of understanding how things work and being aware of the explanation of why something happened the way it did. Examples are that if there is <a href="/facts/Lightning/dLTuxz8n">lightning</a> then there will be <a href="/facts/Thunder/maTSnAY5">thunder</a> or if a person robs a bank then they may go to jail.<a class="footnote-ref" id="fnref:83" href="#fn:83">83</a><a class="footnote-ref" id="fnref:84" href="#fn:84">84</a> Similar classifications distinguish between declarative knowledge of persons, events, principles, <a href="/facts/Maxim_(philosophy)/uPaQwmtW">maxims</a>, and <a href="/facts/Norm_(philosophy)/3k0uMUx7">norms</a>.<a class="footnote-ref" id="fnref:85" href="#fn:85">85</a><a class="footnote-ref" id="fnref:86" href="#fn:86">86</a><a class="footnote-ref" id="fnref:87" href="#fn:87">87</a>
Declarative knowledge is traditionally identified with <a href="/facts/Explicit_knowledge/6avUzfHv">explicit knowledge</a> and contrasted with tacit or <a href="/facts/Implicit_knowledge/20CNaqW5">implicit knowledge</a>. Explicit knowledge is knowledge of which the person is aware and which can be articulated. It is stored in <a href="/facts/Explicit_memory/vrjuSCDG">explicit memory</a>. Implicit knowledge, on the other hand, is a form of embodied knowledge that the person cannot articulate. The traditional association of declarative knowledge with explicit knowledge is not always accepted in the contemporary literature. Some theorists argue that there are forms of implicit declarative knowledge. A putative example is a person who has learned a concept and is now able to correctly classify objects according to this concept even though they are not able to provide a verbal rationale for their decision.<a class="footnote-ref" id="fnref:88" href="#fn:88">88</a><a class="footnote-ref" id="fnref:89" href="#fn:89">89</a><a class="footnote-ref" id="fnref:90" href="#fn:90">90</a>
A further contrast is between domain-specific and <a href="/facts/General_knowledge/3RQG8QMJ">general knowledge</a>. Domain-specific knowledge applies to a narrow subject or a particular task but is useless outside this focus. General knowledge, on the other hand, concerns wide topics or has general applications. For example, declarative knowledge of the rules of <a href="/facts/Grammar/vprQsHIR">grammar</a> belongs to general knowledge while having memorized the lines of the poem <a href="/facts/The_Raven/IN6APAv9">The Raven</a> is domain-specific knowledge. This distinction is based on a continuum of cases that are more or less general without a clear-cut line between the types.<a class="footnote-ref" id="fnref:91" href="#fn:91">91</a><a class="footnote-ref" id="fnref:92" href="#fn:92">92</a> According to Paul Kurtz, there are six types of descriptive knowledge: knowledge of available means, of consequences, of particular facts, of general causal laws, of established values, and of basic needs.<a class="footnote-ref" id="fnref:93" href="#fn:93">93</a> Another classification distinguishes between structural knowledge and perceptual knowledge.<a class="footnote-ref" id="fnref:94" href="#fn:94">94</a>

<h2 id="contrast-with-other-forms-of-knowledge">Contrast with other forms of knowledge</h2>

Declarative knowledge is often contrasted with other types of knowledge. A common classification in epistemology distinguishes it from practical knowledge<a class="footnote-ref" id="fnref:95" href="#fn:95">95</a> and knowledge by acquaintance. All of them can be expressed with the verb "to know" but their differences are reflected in the grammatical structures used to articulate them. Declarative knowledge is usually expressed with a that-clause, as in "Ann knows that koalas sleep most of the time". For practical knowledge, a how-clause is used instead, for example, "Dave knows how to read the time on a clock". Knowledge by acquaintance can be articulated using a <a href="/facts/Direct_object/wybTVzna">direct object</a> without a <a href="/facts/Preposition/Bhz0tAMI">preposition</a>, as in "Emily knows Obama personally".<a class="footnote-ref" id="fnref:96" href="#fn:96">96</a>
Practical knowledge consists of skills. Knowing how to ride a horse or how to play the guitar are forms of practical knowledge. The terms "procedural knowledge" and "knowledge-how" are often used as synonyms.<a class="footnote-ref" id="fnref:97" href="#fn:97">97</a><a class="footnote-ref" id="fnref:98" href="#fn:98">98</a><a class="footnote-ref" id="fnref:99" href="#fn:99">99</a> It differs from declarative knowledge in various aspects. It is usually imprecise and cannot be proven by deducing it from premises. It is non-propositional and, for the most part, cannot be taught in abstract without concrete exercise. In this regard, it is a form of non-intellectual knowledge.<a class="footnote-ref" id="fnref:100" href="#fn:100">100</a><a class="footnote-ref" id="fnref:101" href="#fn:101">101</a> It is tied to a specific goal and its value lies not in being true, but rather in how effective it is to accomplish its goal.<a class="footnote-ref" id="fnref:102" href="#fn:102">102</a> Practical knowledge can be present without any beliefs and may even involve false beliefs. For example, an experienced ball player may know how to catch a ball despite having false beliefs. They may believe that their eyes continuously track the ball. But, in truth, their <a href="/facts/Saccade/0YxQJpk2">eyes perform a series of abrupt movements</a> that anticipate the ball's trajectory rather than following it.<a class="footnote-ref" id="fnref:103" href="#fn:103">103</a> Another difference is that declarative knowledge is commonly only ascribed to animals with highly developed minds, like humans. Practical knowledge, on the other hand, is more prevalent in the animal kingdom. For example, <a href="/facts/Ant/CyxckAAE">ants</a> know how to walk through the kitchen despite presumably lacking the mental capacity for the declarative knowledge that they are walking through the kitchen.<a class="footnote-ref" id="fnref:104" href="#fn:104">104</a>

Declarative knowledge is also different from knowledge by acquaintance, which is also known as objectual knowledge, and knowledge-of. Knowledge by acquaintance is a form of familiarity or direct awareness that a person has with another person, a thing, or a place. For example, a person who has tasted the flavor of <a href="/facts/Chocolate/4drs8ryf">chocolate</a> knows chocolate in this sense, just like a person who visited <a href="/facts/Lake_Taup%C5%8D/lnJKDySC">Lake Taupō</a> knows Lake Taupō. Knowledge by acquaintance does not imply that the person can provide factual information about the object. It is a form of non-inferential knowledge that depends on first-hand experience. For example, a person who has never left their home country may acquire much declarative knowledge about other countries by reading books without any knowledge by acquaintance.<a class="footnote-ref" id="fnref:105" href="#fn:105">105</a><a class="footnote-ref" id="fnref:106" href="#fn:106">106</a><a class="footnote-ref" id="fnref:107" href="#fn:107">107</a>
Knowledge by acquaintance plays a central role in the epistemology of <a href="/facts/Bertrand_Russell/SRpwNX2U">Bertrand Russell</a>. He holds that it is more basic than other forms of knowledge since to understand a proposition, one has to be acquainted with its constituents. According to Russell, knowledge by acquaintance covers a wide range of phenomena, such as <a href="/facts/Thought/loD3aFv9">thoughts</a>, <a href="/facts/Feeling/RJgeFMo1">feelings</a>, <a href="/facts/Desire/wGGhA9G8">desires</a>, memory, introspection, and <a href="/facts/Sense_data/BSwNwBv0">sense data</a>. It can happen in relation to <a href="/facts/Particular/AwbfD8jx">particular</a> things and <a href="/facts/Universal_(metaphysics)/8cCB0YnK">universals</a>. Knowledge of physical objects, on the other hand, belongs to declarative knowledge, which he calls knowledge by description. It also has a central role to play since it extends the realm of knowledge to things that lie beyond the personal sphere of experience.<a class="footnote-ref" id="fnref:108" href="#fn:108">108</a>
Some theorists, like Anita Woolfolk et. al., contrast declarative knowledge and procedural knowledge with conditional knowledge. According to this view, conditional knowledge is about knowing when and why to use declarative and procedural knowledge. For many issues, like solving math problems and learning a <a href="/facts/Foreign_language/gdYbMzts">foreign language</a>, it is not sufficient to know facts and general procedures if the person does not know under which situations to use them. To master a language, for example, it is not enough to acquire declarative knowledge of <a href="/facts/Grammatical_conjugation/z1j65HK8">verb forms</a> if one lacks conditional knowledge of when it is appropriate to use them. Some theorists understand conditional knowledge as one type of declarative knowledge and not as a distinct category.<a class="footnote-ref" id="fnref:109" href="#fn:109">109</a>
A further distinction is between declarative or descriptive knowledge in contrast to prescriptive knowledge. Descriptive knowledge represents what the world is like. It describes and classifies what phenomena are there and in what relations they stand toward each other. It is interested in what is true independently of what people want. Prescriptive knowledge is not about what things actually are like but what they should be like. This concerns specifically the question of what purposes people should follow and how they should act. It guides <a href="/facts/Action_(philosophy)/AHXKoq1V">action</a> by showing what people should do to fulfill their <a href="/facts/Needs/s7hd9Xc5">needs</a> and desires. In this regard, it has a more subjective component since it depends on what people want. Some theorists equate prescriptive knowledge with procedural knowledge. But others distinguish them based on the claim that prescriptive knowledge is about what should be done while procedural knowledge is about how to do it.<a class="footnote-ref" id="fnref:110" href="#fn:110">110</a> Other classifications contrast declarative knowledge with structural knowledge, meta knowledge, heuristic knowledge, control knowledge, case knowledge, and strategic knowledge.<a class="footnote-ref" id="fnref:111" href="#fn:111">111</a><a class="footnote-ref" id="fnref:112" href="#fn:112">112</a><a class="footnote-ref" id="fnref:113" href="#fn:113">113</a>
Some theorists argue that one type of knowledge is more basic than others. For example, Robert E. Haskell claims that declarative knowledge is the basic form of knowledge since it constitutes a general framework of understanding. According to him, it is a precondition for acquiring other forms of knowledge.<a class="footnote-ref" id="fnref:114" href="#fn:114">114</a> However, this position is not generally accepted and philosophers like <a href="/facts/Gilbert_Ryle/eLBe8IXB">Gilbert Ryle</a> defend the opposing thesis that declarative knowledge presupposes procedural knowledge.<a class="footnote-ref" id="fnref:115" href="#fn:115">115</a><a class="footnote-ref" id="fnref:116" href="#fn:116">116</a>

<h2 id="value">Value</h2>
Declarative knowledge plays a central role in human understanding of the world. It underlies activities such as labeling phenomena, describing them, explaining them, and communicating with others about them.<a class="footnote-ref" id="fnref:117" href="#fn:117">117</a> The value of declarative knowledge depends in part on its usefulness in helping people achieve their objectives. For example, to treat a disease, knowledge of its symptoms and possible cures is beneficial. Or if a person has applied for a new job then knowing where and when the interview takes place is important.<a class="footnote-ref" id="fnref:118" href="#fn:118">118</a><a class="footnote-ref" id="fnref:119" href="#fn:119">119</a><a class="footnote-ref" id="fnref:120" href="#fn:120">120</a> Due to its context-independence, declarative knowledge can be used for a great variety of tasks and because of its compact nature, it can be easily stored and retrieved.<a class="footnote-ref" id="fnref:121" href="#fn:121">121</a><a class="footnote-ref" id="fnref:122" href="#fn:122">122</a> Declarative knowledge can be useful for procedural knowledge, for example, by knowing the list of steps needed to execute a skill. It also has a key role in understanding and <a href="/facts/Problem_solving/9cuLz5pH">solving problems</a> and can guide the process of <a href="/facts/Decision-making/NbJYprSw">decision-making</a>.<a class="footnote-ref" id="fnref:123" href="#fn:123">123</a><a class="footnote-ref" id="fnref:124" href="#fn:124">124</a><a class="footnote-ref" id="fnref:125" href="#fn:125">125</a> A related issue in the field of epistemology concerns the question of whether declarative knowledge is more valuable than true belief. This is not obvious since, for many purposes, true belief is as useful as knowledge to achieve one's goals.<a class="footnote-ref" id="fnref:126" href="#fn:126">126</a><a class="footnote-ref" id="fnref:127" href="#fn:127">127</a><a class="footnote-ref" id="fnref:128" href="#fn:128">128</a>
Declarative knowledge is primarily desired in cases where it is immediately useful.<a class="footnote-ref" id="fnref:129" href="#fn:129">129</a> But not all forms of knowledge are useful. For example, indiscriminately memorizing phone numbers found in a foreign phone book is unlikely to result in useful declarative knowledge.<a class="footnote-ref" id="fnref:130" href="#fn:130">130</a> However, it is often difficult to assess the value of knowledge if one does not foresee a situation where it would be useful. In this regard, it can happen that the value of apparently useless knowledge is only discovered much later. For example, <a href="/facts/Maxwell%27s_equations/LfJ1drHS">Maxwell's equations</a> linking <a href="/facts/Magnetism/eo75vApl">magnetism</a> to <a href="/facts/Electricity/hNC8D65W">electricity</a> were considered useless at the time of discovery until experimental scientists discovered how to detect electromagnetic waves.<a class="footnote-ref" id="fnref:131" href="#fn:131">131</a> Occasionally, knowledge may have a negative value, for example, when it hinders someone to do what would be needed because their knowledge of associated dangers paralyzes them.<a class="footnote-ref" id="fnref:132" href="#fn:132">132</a>

<h2 id="learning">Learning</h2>

The value of knowledge is specifically relevant in the field of <a href="/facts/Education/WIwsQKF9">education</a>. It is needed to decide which of the vast amount of knowledge should become part of the <a href="/facts/Curriculum/FEAlV1PH">curriculum</a> to be passed on to students.<a class="footnote-ref" id="fnref:133" href="#fn:133">133</a> Many types of <a href="/facts/Learning/lehEKRjC">learning</a> at school involve the acquisition of declarative knowledge.<a class="footnote-ref" id="fnref:134" href="#fn:134">134</a> One form of declarative knowledge learning is so-called <a href="/facts/Rote_learning/jGJ9BCY4">rote learning</a>. It is a <a href="/facts/Mnemonic/6HfDn0ks">memorization technique</a> in which the claim to be learned is repeated again and again until it is fully memorized. Other forms of declarative knowledge learning focus more on developing an understanding of the subject. This means that the learner should not only be able to repeat the claim but also to explain, describe, and summarize it. For declarative knowledge to be useful, it is often advantageous if it is embedded in a meaningful structure. For example, learning about new concepts and ideas involves developing an understanding of how they are related to each other and to what is already known.<a class="footnote-ref" id="fnref:135" href="#fn:135">135</a>
According to Ellen Gagné, learning declarative knowledge happens in four steps. In the first step, the learner comes into contact with the material to be learned and apprehends it. Next, they translate this information into propositions. Following that, the learner's memory triggers and activates related propositions. As the last step, new connections are established and inferences are drawn.<a class="footnote-ref" id="fnref:136" href="#fn:136">136</a> A similar process is described by John V. Dempsey, who stresses that the new information must be organized, divided, and linked to existing knowledge. He distinguishes between learning that involves recalling information in contrast to learning that only requires being able to recognize patterns.<a class="footnote-ref" id="fnref:137" href="#fn:137">137</a> A related theory is defended by Anthony J. Rhem. He holds that the process of learning declarative knowledge involves organizing new information into groups. Next, links between the groups are drawn and the new information is connected to pre-existing knowledge.<a class="footnote-ref" id="fnref:138" href="#fn:138">138</a>
Some theorists, like Robert Gagné and Leslie Briggs, distinguish between types of declarative knowledge learning based on the cognitive processes involved: learning of labels and names, of facts and lists, and of organized discourse. Learning labels and names requires forming a mental connection between two elements. Examples include memorizing foreign vocabulary and learning the <a href="/facts/Capital_city/p06rGdJC">capital city</a> of each <a href="/facts/State_(polity)/7ggBzTSk">state</a>. Learning facts involves relationships between concepts, for example, that "Ann Richards was the governor of Texas in 1991". This process is usually easier if the person is not dealing with isolated facts but possesses a network of information into which the new fact is integrated. The case for learning lists is similar since it involves the association of many items. Learning organized discourse encompasses not discrete facts or items but a wider comprehension of the meaning present in an extensive body of information.<a class="footnote-ref" id="fnref:139" href="#fn:139">139</a><a class="footnote-ref" id="fnref:140" href="#fn:140">140</a><a class="footnote-ref" id="fnref:141" href="#fn:141">141</a>
Various sources of declarative knowledge are discussed in epistemology. They include perception, introspection, memory, reasoning, and testimony.<a class="footnote-ref" id="fnref:142" href="#fn:142">142</a><a class="footnote-ref" id="fnref:143" href="#fn:143">143</a><a class="footnote-ref" id="fnref:144" href="#fn:144">144</a> Perception is usually understood as the main source of empirical knowledge. It is based on the <a href="/facts/Senses/n9kYQ3rf">senses</a>, like seeing that it is raining when looking out the window.<a class="footnote-ref" id="fnref:145" href="#fn:145">145</a><a class="footnote-ref" id="fnref:146" href="#fn:146">146</a><a class="footnote-ref" id="fnref:147" href="#fn:147">147</a> Introspection is similar to perception but provides knowledge of the internal sphere and not of external objects.<a class="footnote-ref" id="fnref:148" href="#fn:148">148</a> An example is directing one's attention to a pain in one's toe to assess whether it has intensified.<a class="footnote-ref" id="fnref:149" href="#fn:149">149</a>
Memory differs from perception and introspection in that it does not produce new knowledge but merely stores and retrieves pre-existing knowledge. As such, it depends on other sources.<a class="footnote-ref" id="fnref:150" href="#fn:150">150</a><a class="footnote-ref" id="fnref:151" href="#fn:151">151</a><a class="footnote-ref" id="fnref:152" href="#fn:152">152</a> It is similar to reasoning in this regard, which starts from a known fact and arrives at new knowledge by drawing inferences from it. <a href="/facts/Empiricists/f68IpCeE">Empiricists</a> hold that this is the only way how reason can arrive at knowledge while <a href="/facts/Rationalists/MNk171TG">rationalists</a> contend that some claims can be known by pure reason independent of additional sources.<a class="footnote-ref" id="fnref:153" href="#fn:153">153</a><a class="footnote-ref" id="fnref:154" href="#fn:154">154</a><a class="footnote-ref" id="fnref:155" href="#fn:155">155</a> Testimony is different from the other sources since it does not have its own cognitive faculty. Rather, it is grounded in the notion that people can acquire knowledge through <a href="/facts/Communication/EGEkchsT">communication</a> with others, for example, by speaking to someone or by reading a newspaper.<a class="footnote-ref" id="fnref:156" href="#fn:156">156</a><a class="footnote-ref" id="fnref:157" href="#fn:157">157</a><a class="footnote-ref" id="fnref:158" href="#fn:158">158</a> Some religious philosophers include <a href="/facts/Religious_experience/QY5LYzon">religious experiences</a> (through the so-called <a href="/facts/Sensus_divinitatis/VtoTlnLa">sensus divinitatis</a>) as a source of knowledge of the divine. However, such claims are controversial.<a class="footnote-ref" id="fnref:159" href="#fn:159">159</a><a class="footnote-ref" id="fnref:160" href="#fn:160">160</a>

<h3>Notes</h3>

<h3>Citations</h3>

<h3>Sources</h3>

<ul><li>Allwood, Carl Martin (17 October 2013). "Anthropology of Knowledge". <a href="https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/abs/10.1002/9781118339893.wbeccp025">The Encyclopedia of Cross-Cultural Psychology</a>. John Wiley & Sons, Inc. pp. 69–72. <a href="/facts/Doi_(identifier)/muM9Etpq">doi</a>:<a href="https://doi.org/10.1002%2F9781118339893.wbeccp025">10.1002/9781118339893.wbeccp025</a>. <a href="/facts/ISBN_(identifier)/15AdSPa9">ISBN</a> 978-1-118-33989-3. <a href="https://web.archive.org/web/20220926085332/https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/abs/10.1002/9781118339893.wbeccp025">Archived</a> from the original on 26 September 2022. Retrieved 16 April 2023.</li>
<li>Alter, Torin; Nagasawa, Yujin (1 April 2015). Consciousness in the Physical World: Perspectives on Russellian Monism. Oxford University Press. pp. 93–94. <a href="/facts/ISBN_(identifier)/15AdSPa9">ISBN</a> 978-0-19-992736-4.</li>
<li>Audi, Robert (20 June 2005). Epistemology: A Contemporary Introduction to the Theory of Knowledge. Routledge. p. 315. <a href="/facts/ISBN_(identifier)/15AdSPa9">ISBN</a> 978-1-134-79181-1.</li>
<li>Audi, Robert (2002). "The Sources of Knowledge". <a href="https://philpapers.org/rec/AUDTSO-3">The Oxford Handbook of Epistemology</a>. Oxford University Press. pp. 71–94. <a href="/facts/ISBN_(identifier)/15AdSPa9">ISBN</a> 978-0-19-513005-8. <a href="https://web.archive.org/web/20220612112116/https://philpapers.org/rec/AUDTSO-3">Archived</a> from the original on 12 June 2022. Retrieved 12 June 2022.</li>
<li>Baehr, Jason S. <a href="https://iep.utm.edu/apriori/">"A Priori and A Posteriori"</a>. Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy. 1. An Initial Characterization. <a href="https://web.archive.org/web/20210807213522/https://iep.utm.edu/apriori/">Archived</a> from the original on 7 August 2021. Retrieved 17 September 2022.</li>
<li>Baehr, Jason S. <a href="https://iep.utm.edu/virtue-epistemology/">"Virtue Epistemology"</a>. Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy. introduction; 2. Virtue Reliabilism. <a href="https://web.archive.org/web/20230401155028/https://iep.utm.edu/virtue-epistemology/">Archived</a> from the original on 1 April 2023. Retrieved 31 March 2023.</li>
<li>Barber, Alex; Stainton, Robert J. (6 April 2010). Concise Encyclopedia of Philosophy of Language and Linguistics. Elsevier. p. 11. <a href="/facts/ISBN_(identifier)/15AdSPa9">ISBN</a> 978-0-08-096501-7.</li>
<li>Barth, Fredrik (February 2002). "An Anthropology of Knowledge". Current Anthropology. 43 (1): 1–18. <a href="/facts/Doi_(identifier)/muM9Etpq">doi</a>:<a href="https://doi.org/10.1086%2F324131">10.1086/324131</a>. <a href="/facts/Hdl_(identifier)/rdebSxmC">hdl</a>:<a href="https://hdl.handle.net/1956%2F4191">1956/4191</a>. <a href="/facts/ISSN_(identifier)/DPAflDvU">ISSN</a> <a href="https://search.worldcat.org/issn/0011-3204">0011-3204</a>.</li>
<li>Battaly, Heather (4 September 2018). The Routledge Handbook of Virtue Epistemology. Routledge. p. 772. <a href="/facts/ISBN_(identifier)/15AdSPa9">ISBN</a> 978-1-317-49528-4.</li>
<li>Becker, Kelly (13 May 2013). Epistemology Modalized. Routledge. p. 12. <a href="/facts/ISBN_(identifier)/15AdSPa9">ISBN</a> 978-1-136-78632-7.</li>
<li>Bengson, John; Moffett, Marc A. (6 January 2012). Knowing How: Essays on Knowledge, Mind, and Action. Oxford University Press. p. 328. <a href="/facts/ISBN_(identifier)/15AdSPa9">ISBN</a> 978-0-19-045283-4.</li>
<li>Bernecker, Sven; Pritchard, Duncan (19 January 2011). The Routledge Companion to Epistemology. Routledge. p. 266. <a href="/facts/ISBN_(identifier)/15AdSPa9">ISBN</a> 978-1-136-88200-5.</li>
<li>Bishop, M. J.; Boling, Elizabeth; Elen, Jan; Svihla, Vanessa (21 September 2020). Handbook of Research in Educational Communications and Technology: Learning Design. Springer Nature. p. 74. <a href="/facts/ISBN_(identifier)/15AdSPa9">ISBN</a> 978-3-030-36119-8. We follow Markauskaite and Goodyear (2017) and Dohn (2017) in distinguishing between three knowledge types. Declarative knowledge is knowledge expressible in propositional statements, often also termed propositional knowledge or know-that (e.g., "President Donald Trump was inaugurated on 20.01.2017," "Karl Marx wrote Capital,' "Force = Mass x Acceleration'). Procedural knowledge is often called practical knowledge, skill, or know-how (e.g., riding a bicycle, performing surgery, carrying out a logical deduction). Relational knowledge, comprising experiential and contextual knowledge, sometimes just called experiential knowledge, knowledge-by-acquaintance, or know-of (e.g., knowing what kangaroo tastes like, what red looks like, and how local, cultural norms delimit what it is appropriate to say in a given context).</li>
<li>Blaauw, Martijn (31 March 2020). Epistemology A-Z. Edinburgh University Press. p. 49. <a href="/facts/ISBN_(identifier)/15AdSPa9">ISBN</a> 978-0-7486-8082-5.</li>
<li>Black, C. (1 April 1971). "Knowledge without belief". Analysis. 31 (5): 152–158. <a href="/facts/Doi_(identifier)/muM9Etpq">doi</a>:<a href="https://doi.org/10.1093%2Fanalys%2F31.5.152">10.1093/analys/31.5.152</a>.</li>
<li>Borges, Rodrigo; Almeida, Claudio de; Klein, Peter D. (1 December 2017). Explaining Knowledge: New Essays on the Gettier Problem. Oxford University Press. p. 180. <a href="/facts/ISBN_(identifier)/15AdSPa9">ISBN</a> 978-0-19-103682-8.</li>
<li>Broadbent, Alex (5 February 2016). Philosophy for Graduate Students: Metaphysics and Epistemology. Routledge. p. 128. <a href="/facts/ISBN_(identifier)/15AdSPa9">ISBN</a> 978-1-317-39714-4.</li>
<li>Bronkhorst, Hugo; Roorda, Gerrit; Suhre, Cor; Goedhart, Martin (December 2020). <a href="https://doi.org/10.1007%2Fs10763-019-10039-8">"Logical Reasoning in Formal and Everyday Reasoning Tasks"</a>. International Journal of Science and Mathematics Education. 18 (8): 1673–6. <a href="/facts/Bibcode_(identifier)/9HtdQSGB">Bibcode</a>:<a href="https://ui.adsabs.harvard.edu/abs/2020IJSME..18.1673B">2020IJSME..18.1673B</a>. <a href="/facts/Doi_(identifier)/muM9Etpq">doi</a>:<a href="https://doi.org/10.1007%2Fs10763-019-10039-8">10.1007/s10763-019-10039-8</a>. <a href="/facts/S2CID_(identifier)/ldJsHa2Y">S2CID</a> <a href="https://api.semanticscholar.org/CorpusID:254541202">254541202</a>.</li>
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<li>Lilley, Simon; Lightfoot, Geoffrey; Amaral, Paulo (2004). Representing Organization: Knowledge, Management, and the Information Age. Oxford University Press. pp. 162–163. <a href="/facts/ISBN_(identifier)/15AdSPa9">ISBN</a> 978-0-19-877541-6. In its more modern forms epistemology has taken the analysis of meaning and the status of claims to knowledge as its quarry. Consequently, writers such as Bertrand Arthur William Russell (also known as the third Earl Russell, 1872–1970), George Edward Moore (1873–1958), and Ludwig Joseph Johann Wittgenstein (1889–1951) have attempted to delineate three kinds of knowledge: 1. Knowledge that, or 'factual knowledge' ... 2. Knowledge how, or 'practical knowledge' ... 3. Knowledge of people, places, and things, or 'knowledge by acquaintance'</li>
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<li>Nguyen, Van Tham; Nguyen, Ngoc Thanh; Tran, Trong Hieu (30 December 2022). Knowledge Integration Methods for Probabilistic Knowledge-based Systems. CRC Press. pp. 33–34. <a href="/facts/ISBN_(identifier)/15AdSPa9">ISBN</a> 978-1-000-80999-2.</li>
<li>O’Brien, Daniel. <a href="https://iep.utm.edu/epis-per/">"The Epistemology of Perception"</a>. Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy. <a href="https://web.archive.org/web/20090508190020/http://iep.utm.edu/e/epis-per.htm">Archived</a> from the original on 8 May 2009. Retrieved 25 October 2022.</li>
<li>Olsson, Erik J (December 2011). "The Value of Knowledge: The Value of Knowledge". Philosophy Compass. 6 (12): 874–883. <a href="/facts/Doi_(identifier)/muM9Etpq">doi</a>:<a href="https://doi.org/10.1111%2Fj.1747-9991.2011.00425.x">10.1111/j.1747-9991.2011.00425.x</a>. <a href="/facts/S2CID_(identifier)/ldJsHa2Y">S2CID</a> <a href="https://api.semanticscholar.org/CorpusID:143034920">143034920</a>.</li>
<li>Pavese, Carlotta (2022). <a href="https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/knowledge-how/">"Knowledge How"</a>. The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Metaphysics Research Lab, Stanford University. <a href="https://web.archive.org/web/20230327152902/https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/knowledge-how/">Archived</a> from the original on 27 March 2023. Retrieved 31 March 2023.</li>
<li>Peels, Rik (2023). Ignorance: A Philosophical Study. Oxford University Press. p. 28. <a href="/facts/ISBN_(identifier)/15AdSPa9">ISBN</a> 978-0-19-765451-4.</li>
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<li>Pritchard, Duncan (18 May 2023). What is this thing called Knowledge?. Taylor & Francis. <a href="/facts/ISBN_(identifier)/15AdSPa9">ISBN</a> 978-1-000-87480-8.</li>
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<li>Reif, Frederick (2008). Applying Cognitive Science to Education: Thinking and Learning in Scientific and Other Complex Domains. MIT Press. <a href="/facts/ISBN_(identifier)/15AdSPa9">ISBN</a> 978-0-262-18263-8.</li>
<li>Rhem, Anthony J. (21 November 2005). UML for Developing Knowledge Management Systems. CRC Press. p. 42-3. <a href="/facts/ISBN_(identifier)/15AdSPa9">ISBN</a> 978-1-135-48553-5.</li>
<li>Russell, Bruce (2020). <a href="https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/apriori/">"A Priori Justification and Knowledge"</a>. The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Metaphysics Research Lab, Stanford University. <a href="https://web.archive.org/web/20210812143105/https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/apriori/">Archived</a> from the original on 12 August 2021. Retrieved 18 September 2022.</li>
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<li>Samaržija, Snježana Prijić (2020). "Epistemic Virtues of Institutions". In Andina, Tiziana; Bojanić, Petar (eds.). <a href="https://books.google.com/books?id=vQTaDwAAQBAJ&pg=PA32">Institutions in Action: The Nature and the Role of Institutions in the Real World</a>. Springer Nature. pp. 21–36. <a href="/facts/ISBN_(identifier)/15AdSPa9">ISBN</a> 978-3-030-32618-0.</li>
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<li>Tolliver, Joseph Thomas (May 1989). "Knowledge without truth". Philosophical Studies. 56 (1): 29–51. <a href="/facts/Doi_(identifier)/muM9Etpq">doi</a>:<a href="https://doi.org/10.1007%2Fbf00646208">10.1007/bf00646208</a>. <a href="/facts/S2CID_(identifier)/ldJsHa2Y">S2CID</a> <a href="https://api.semanticscholar.org/CorpusID:170980707">170980707</a>.</li>
<li>Truncellito, David A. <a href="https://iep.utm.edu/epistemo/">"Epistemology"</a>. Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy. <a href="https://web.archive.org/web/20220113223803/https://iep.utm.edu/epistemo/">Archived</a> from the original on 13 January 2022. Retrieved 8 March 2023.</li>
<li>Turri, John; Alfano, Mark; Greco, John (2021). <a href="https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/epistemology-virtue/#Know">"Virtue Epistemology"</a>. The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Metaphysics Research Lab, Stanford University. 5. Knowledge. <a href="https://web.archive.org/web/20230326030005/https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/epistemology-virtue/#Know">Archived</a> from the original on 2023-03-26. Retrieved 2023-04-16.</li>
<li>Villoro, Luis (1998). Belief, personal, and propositional knowledge. Amsterdam: Rodopi. <a href="/facts/ISBN_(identifier)/15AdSPa9">ISBN</a> 9042007427.</li>
<li><a href="/facts/Douglas_N._Walton/rpEBcYxf">Walton, Douglas N.</a> (January 2005). "Pragmatic and idealized models of knowledge and ignorance". <a href="/facts/American_Philosophical_Quarterly/r8QYIUGq">American Philosophical Quarterly</a>. 42 (1): 59–69 (59, 64). <a href="/facts/JSTOR_(identifier)/YTeVmaJ7">JSTOR</a> <a href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/20010182">20010182</a>. It is a pervasive assumption in recent analytical philosophy that knowledge can be defined as a modality representing a rational agent's true and consistent beliefs. Such views are based on rationality assumptions. One is that knowledge can only consist of true propositions. This way of speaking is sharply at odds with the way we speak about knowledge, for example, in computing, where a so-called knowledge base can be a database, that is, a set of data that has been collected and is thought to consist of true propositions, even though, realistically speaking, many of them might later be shown to be false or untenable. ... The pragmatic account of knowledge starts with a knowledge system, meaning a working system with an agent having a database. ... The notion of a search can be a social one, in many instances. A group of agents can be engaged in the search, and some of them can know things that others do not know.</li>
<li>Watson, Jamie Carlin. <a href="https://iep.utm.edu/epi-just/">"Justification, Epistemic"</a>. Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Introduction. <a href="https://web.archive.org/web/20230314230936/https://iep.utm.edu/epi-just/">Archived</a> from the original on 14 March 2023. Retrieved 30 March 2023.</li>
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<li>Woolfolk, Anita E.; Hughes, Malcolm; Walkup, Vivienne (2008). Psychology in Education. Pearson Longman. p. 307. <a href="/facts/ISBN_(identifier)/15AdSPa9">ISBN</a> 978-1-4058-3541-1.</li>
<li>Yamamoto, Sakae (4 July 2016). Human Interface and the Management of Information: Information, Design and Interaction: 18th International Conference, HCI International 2016 Toronto, Canada, July 17–22, 2016, Proceedings, Part I. Springer. p. 61. <a href="/facts/ISBN_(identifier)/15AdSPa9">ISBN</a> 978-3-319-40349-6.</li>
<li><a href="/facts/Linda_Zagzebski/mRuUJnUv">Zagzebski, Linda</a> (1999). <a href="https://philpapers.org/rec/ZAGWIK">"What Is Knowledge?"</a>. In Greco, John; Sosa, Ernest (eds.). The Blackwell Guide to Epistemology. Malden, MA: Blackwell. pp. 92–116. <a href="/facts/Doi_(identifier)/muM9Etpq">doi</a>:<a href="https://doi.org/10.1002%2F9781405164863.ch3">10.1002/9781405164863.ch3</a>. <a href="/facts/ISBN_(identifier)/15AdSPa9">ISBN</a> 978-0-631-20290-5. <a href="/facts/OCLC_(identifier)/Yqad8waq">OCLC</a> <a href="https://search.worldcat.org/oclc/39269507">39269507</a>. <a href="/facts/S2CID_(identifier)/ldJsHa2Y">S2CID</a> <a href="https://api.semanticscholar.org/CorpusID:158886670">158886670</a>. <a href="https://web.archive.org/web/20220602215147/https://philpapers.org/rec/ZAGWIK">Archived</a> from the original on 2 June 2022. Retrieved 12 June 2022.</li></ul>

<h2 id="references">References</h2>

<ol>
<li id="fn:1">Colman 2009a, declarative knowledgeWoolfolk, Hughes & Walkup 2008, p. 307Strube & Wender 1993, p. 354Tokuhama-Espinosa 2011, p. 255Holyoak & Morrison 2005, p. 371 - Colman, Andrew M. (1 January 2009a). "declarative knowledge". A Dictionary of Psychology. Oxford University Press. ISBN 978-0-19-953406-7. Archived from the original on 30 March 2023. Retrieved 16 April 2023. <a href="https://www.oxfordreference.com/display/10.1093/oi/authority.20110803095705926;jsessionid=A19D30BFCF6E02A0F21A87B805F10DEE" target="_blank">https://www.oxfordreference.com/display/10.1093/oi/authority.20110803095705926;jsessionid=A19D30BFCF6E02A0F21A87B805F10DEE</a> <a href="#fnref:1" class="footnote-back-ref">↩</a></li>
<li id="fn:2">Colman 2009a, declarative knowledge. - Colman, Andrew M. (1 January 2009a). "declarative knowledge". A Dictionary of Psychology. Oxford University Press. ISBN 978-0-19-953406-7. Archived from the original on 30 March 2023. Retrieved 16 April 2023. <a href="https://www.oxfordreference.com/display/10.1093/oi/authority.20110803095705926;jsessionid=A19D30BFCF6E02A0F21A87B805F10DEE" target="_blank">https://www.oxfordreference.com/display/10.1093/oi/authority.20110803095705926;jsessionid=A19D30BFCF6E02A0F21A87B805F10DEE</a> <a href="#fnref:2" class="footnote-back-ref">↩</a></li>
<li id="fn:3">Morrison 2005, p. 371. - Morrison, Robert (18 April 2005). The Cambridge Handbook of Thinking and Reasoning. Cambridge University Press. p. 371. ISBN 978-0-521-82417-0. <a href="#fnref:3" class="footnote-back-ref">↩</a></li>
<li id="fn:4">Reif 2008. - Reif, Frederick (2008). Applying Cognitive Science to Education: Thinking and Learning in Scientific and Other Complex Domains. MIT Press. ISBN 978-0-262-18263-8. <a href="#fnref:4" class="footnote-back-ref">↩</a></li>
<li id="fn:5">Zagzebski 1999, p. 93. - Zagzebski, Linda (1999). "What Is Knowledge?". In Greco, John; Sosa, Ernest (eds.). The Blackwell Guide to Epistemology. Malden, MA: Blackwell. pp. 92–116. doi:10.1002/9781405164863.ch3. ISBN 978-0-631-20290-5. OCLC 39269507. S2CID 158886670. Archived from the original on 2 June 2022. Retrieved 12 June 2022. <a href="https://philpapers.org/rec/ZAGWIK" target="_blank">https://philpapers.org/rec/ZAGWIK</a> <a href="#fnref:5" class="footnote-back-ref">↩</a></li>
<li id="fn:6">Woolfolk & Margetts 2012, p. 251. - Woolfolk, Anita; Margetts, Kay (25 July 2012). Educational Psychology Australian Edition. Pearson Higher Education AU. p. 251. ISBN 978-1-4425-5145-9. <a href="#fnref:6" class="footnote-back-ref">↩</a></li>
<li id="fn:7">HarperCollins staffMagee & Popper 1971, pp. 74–75, Conversation with Karl PopperWalton 2005, pp. 59, 64Leondes 2001, p. 804Kent & Williams 1993, p. 295 - HarperCollins staff. "knowledge". The American Heritage Dictionary. HarperCollins. Archived from the original on 29 November 2022. Retrieved 25 October 2022. <a href="https://www.ahdictionary.com/word/search.html?q=knowledge" target="_blank">https://www.ahdictionary.com/word/search.html?q=knowledge</a> <a href="#fnref:7" class="footnote-back-ref">↩</a></li>
<li id="fn:8">Sadegh-Zadeh 2011, pp. 450–451, 470, 475Burstein & Holsapple 2008, pp. 44–45Hetherington 2023, 1b. Knowledge-ThatBurgin 2016, p. 48 - Sadegh-Zadeh, Kazem (28 September 2011). Handbook of Analytic Philosophy of Medicine. Springer Science & Business Media. pp. 450–1, 470, 475. ISBN 978-94-007-2260-6. <a href="#fnref:8" class="footnote-back-ref">↩</a></li>
<li id="fn:9">Colman 2009b, non-declarative knowledge. - Colman, Andrew M. (1 January 2009b). "non-declarative knowledge". A Dictionary of Psychology. Oxford University Press. ISBN 978-0-19-953406-7. Archived from the original on 30 March 2023. Retrieved 16 April 2023. <a href="https://www.oxfordreference.com/display/10.1093/oi/authority.20110803100237349" target="_blank">https://www.oxfordreference.com/display/10.1093/oi/authority.20110803100237349</a> <a href="#fnref:9" class="footnote-back-ref">↩</a></li>
<li id="fn:10">Pavese 2022, introduction. - Pavese, Carlotta (2022). "Knowledge How". The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Metaphysics Research Lab, Stanford University. Archived from the original on 27 March 2023. Retrieved 31 March 2023. <a href="https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/knowledge-how/" target="_blank">https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/knowledge-how/</a> <a href="#fnref:10" class="footnote-back-ref">↩</a></li>
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<li id="fn:88">Bengson & Moffett 2012, p. 328. - Bengson, John; Moffett, Marc A. (6 January 2012). Knowing How: Essays on Knowledge, Mind, and Action. Oxford University Press. p. 328. ISBN 978-0-19-045283-4. <a href="#fnref:88" class="footnote-back-ref">↩</a></li>
<li id="fn:89">Kikoski & Kikoski 2004, pp. 62, 65–66. - Kikoski, Catherine Kano; Kikoski, John F. (2004). The Inquiring Organization: Tacit Knowledge, Conversation, and Knowledge Creation : Skills for 21st-century Organizations. Greenwood Publishing Group. pp. 62, 65–66. ISBN 978-1-56720-490-2. <a href="#fnref:89" class="footnote-back-ref">↩</a></li>
<li id="fn:90">Reber & Allen 2022, p. 281. - Reber, Arthur S.; Allen, Rhianon (2022). The Cognitive Unconscious: The First Half Century. Oxford University Press. p. 281. ISBN 978-0-19-750157-3. <a href="#fnref:90" class="footnote-back-ref">↩</a></li>
<li id="fn:91">Woolfolk & Margetts 2012, p. 251. - Woolfolk, Anita; Margetts, Kay (25 July 2012). Educational Psychology Australian Edition. Pearson Higher Education AU. p. 251. ISBN 978-1-4425-5145-9. <a href="#fnref:91" class="footnote-back-ref">↩</a></li>
<li id="fn:92">Finlay 2020, p. 13. - Finlay, Janet (29 October 2020). An Introduction To Artificial Intelligence. CRC Press. p. 13. ISBN 978-1-000-15403-0. <a href="#fnref:92" class="footnote-back-ref">↩</a></li>
<li id="fn:93">Fischer 2019, p. 66. - Fischer, Frank (4 June 2019). Politics, Values, And Public Policy: The Problem Of Methodology. Routledge. p. 66. ISBN 978-1-000-30762-7. <a href="#fnref:93" class="footnote-back-ref">↩</a></li>
<li id="fn:94">Yamamoto 2016, p. 61. - Yamamoto, Sakae (4 July 2016). Human Interface and the Management of Information: Information, Design and Interaction: 18th International Conference, HCI International 2016 Toronto, Canada, July 17–22, 2016, Proceedings, Part I. Springer. p. 61. ISBN 978-3-319-40349-6. <a href="#fnref:94" class="footnote-back-ref">↩</a></li>
<li id="fn:95">A similar contrast is found in ancient Greek philosophy, which distinguishes between the theoretical epistēmē and the practical tékhnē.[84] <a href="/wiki/Ancient_Greek_philosophy" target="_blank">/wiki/Ancient_Greek_philosophy</a> <a href="#fnref:95" class="footnote-back-ref">↩</a></li>
<li id="fn:96">Bishop et al. 2020, p. 74Lilley, Lightfoot & Amaral 2004, pp. 162–163Pavese 2022, introductionKlauer et al. 2016, pp. 105–106Hetherington 2023, 1. Kinds of Knowledge - Bishop, M. J.; Boling, Elizabeth; Elen, Jan; Svihla, Vanessa (21 September 2020). Handbook of Research in Educational Communications and Technology: Learning Design. Springer Nature. p. 74. ISBN 978-3-030-36119-8. We follow Markauskaite and Goodyear (2017) and Dohn (2017) in distinguishing between three knowledge types. Declarative knowledge is knowledge expressible in propositional statements, often also termed propositional knowledge or know-that (e.g., "President Donald Trump was inaugurated on 20.01.2017," "Karl Marx wrote Capital,' "Force = Mass x Acceleration'). Procedural knowledge is often called practical knowledge, skill, or know-how (e.g., riding a bicycle, performing surgery, carrying out a logical deduction). Relational knowledge, comprising experiential and contextual knowledge, sometimes just called experiential knowledge, knowledge-by-acquaintance, or know-of (e.g., knowing what kangaroo tastes like, what red looks like, and how local, cultural norms delimit what it is appropriate to say in a given context). <a href="#fnref:96" class="footnote-back-ref">↩</a></li>
<li id="fn:97">Klauer et al. 2016, pp. 105–106. - Klauer, Bernd; Manstetten, Reiner; Petersen, Thomas; Schiller, Johannes (1 September 2016). Sustainability and the Art of Long-Term Thinking. Taylor & Francis. pp. 105–106. ISBN 978-1-134-98618-7. <a href="#fnref:97" class="footnote-back-ref">↩</a></li>
<li id="fn:98">Gaskins 2005, p. 51. - Gaskins, Irene West (3 May 2005). Success with Struggling Readers: The Benchmark School Approach. Guilford Press. p. 51. ISBN 978-1-59385-169-9. <a href="#fnref:98" class="footnote-back-ref">↩</a></li>
<li id="fn:99">Peels 2023, p. 28. - Peels, Rik (2023). Ignorance: A Philosophical Study. Oxford University Press. p. 28. ISBN 978-0-19-765451-4. <a href="#fnref:99" class="footnote-back-ref">↩</a></li>
<li id="fn:100">Klauer et al. 2016, p. 105–6. - Klauer, Bernd; Manstetten, Reiner; Petersen, Thomas; Schiller, Johannes (1 September 2016). Sustainability and the Art of Long-Term Thinking. Taylor & Francis. pp. 105–106. ISBN 978-1-134-98618-7. <a href="#fnref:100" class="footnote-back-ref">↩</a></li>
<li id="fn:101">Pavese 2022, introduction. - Pavese, Carlotta (2022). "Knowledge How". The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Metaphysics Research Lab, Stanford University. Archived from the original on 27 March 2023. Retrieved 31 March 2023. <a href="https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/knowledge-how/" target="_blank">https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/knowledge-how/</a> <a href="#fnref:101" class="footnote-back-ref">↩</a></li>
<li id="fn:102">Merriënboer 1997, p. 32. - Merriënboer, Jeroen J. G. van (1997). Training Complex Cognitive Skills: A Four-Component Instructional Design Model for Technical Training. Educational Technology. p. 32. ISBN 978-0-87778-298-8. <a href="#fnref:102" class="footnote-back-ref">↩</a></li>
<li id="fn:103">Pavese 2022, 6.1 Knowledge-how and Belief. - Pavese, Carlotta (2022). "Knowledge How". The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Metaphysics Research Lab, Stanford University. Archived from the original on 27 March 2023. Retrieved 31 March 2023. <a href="https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/knowledge-how/" target="_blank">https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/knowledge-how/</a> <a href="#fnref:103" class="footnote-back-ref">↩</a></li>
<li id="fn:104">Pritchard 2023, 1 Some preliminaries. - Pritchard, Duncan (18 May 2023). What is this thing called Knowledge?. Taylor & Francis. ISBN 978-1-000-87480-8. <a href="#fnref:104" class="footnote-back-ref">↩</a></li>
<li id="fn:105">Peels 2023, p. 28. - Peels, Rik (2023). Ignorance: A Philosophical Study. Oxford University Press. p. 28. ISBN 978-0-19-765451-4. <a href="#fnref:105" class="footnote-back-ref">↩</a></li>
<li id="fn:106">Heydorn & Jesudason 2013, p. 10. - Heydorn, Wendy; Jesudason, Susan (18 July 2013). Decoding Theory of Knowledge for the IB Diploma. Cambridge University Press. p. 10. ISBN 978-1-107-62842-7. <a href="#fnref:106" class="footnote-back-ref">↩</a></li>
<li id="fn:107">Foxall 2017, p. 75. - Foxall, Gordon (16 October 2017). Context and Cognition in Consumer Psychology: How Perception and Emotion Guide Action. Routledge. p. 75. ISBN 978-1-317-67738-3. <a href="#fnref:107" class="footnote-back-ref">↩</a></li>
<li id="fn:108">Hasan & Fumerton 2020, introductionHaymes & Özdalga 2016, pp. 26–28Miah 2006, pp. 19–20Alter & Nagasawa 2015, pp. 93–94 - Hasan, Ali; Fumerton, Richard (2020). "Knowledge by Acquaintance vs. Description". The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Metaphysics Research Lab, Stanford University. introduction. Archived from the original on 31 May 2022. Retrieved 31 March 2023. <a href="https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/knowledge-acquaindescrip/" target="_blank">https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/knowledge-acquaindescrip/</a> <a href="#fnref:108" class="footnote-back-ref">↩</a></li>
<li id="fn:109">Woolfolk, Hughes & Walkup 2008, p. 307Dunlap 2004, pp. 144–145Earley & Ang 2003, p. 109Woolfolk & Margetts 2012, p. 251 - Woolfolk, Anita E.; Hughes, Malcolm; Walkup, Vivienne (2008). Psychology in Education. Pearson Longman. p. 307. ISBN 978-1-4058-3541-1. <a href="#fnref:109" class="footnote-back-ref">↩</a></li>
<li id="fn:110">Maedche, Brocke & Hevner 2017, p. 403Goldberg 2006, pp. 121–122Lalanda, McCann & Diaconescu 2013, pp. 187–188Chen & Terken 2022, p. 49 - Maedche, Alexander; Brocke, Jan vom; Hevner, Alan (22 May 2017). Designing the Digital Transformation: 12th International Conference, DESRIST 2017, Karlsruhe, Germany, May 30 – June 1, 2017, Proceedings. Springer. p. 403. ISBN 978-3-319-59144-5. <a href="#fnref:110" class="footnote-back-ref">↩</a></li>
<li id="fn:111">Nguyen, Nguyen & Tran 2022, pp. 33–34. - Nguyen, Van Tham; Nguyen, Ngoc Thanh; Tran, Trong Hieu (30 December 2022). Knowledge Integration Methods for Probabilistic Knowledge-based Systems. CRC Press. pp. 33–34. ISBN 978-1-000-80999-2. <a href="#fnref:111" class="footnote-back-ref">↩</a></li>
<li id="fn:112">Jankowski & Marshall 2016, p. 70. - Jankowski, Natasha A.; Marshall, David W. (11 January 2016). Partners in Advancing Student Learning: Degree Qualifications Profile and Tuning: New Directions for Institutional Research, Number 165. John Wiley & Sons. p. 70. ISBN 978-1-119-24064-8. <a href="#fnref:112" class="footnote-back-ref">↩</a></li>
<li id="fn:113">Scott, Gallacher & Parry 2017, p. 97. - Scott, Peter; Gallacher, Jim; Parry, Gareth (2017). New Languages and Landscapes of Higher Education. Oxford University Press. p. 97. ISBN 978-0-19-878708-2. <a href="#fnref:113" class="footnote-back-ref">↩</a></li>
<li id="fn:114">Haskell 2001, pp. 101–103. - Haskell, Robert E. (2001). Transfer of Learning: Cognition and Instruction. Academic Press. p. 101-3. ISBN 978-0-12-330595-4. <a href="#fnref:114" class="footnote-back-ref">↩</a></li>
<li id="fn:115">Stillings et al. 1995, p. 370. - Stillings, Neil A.; Chase, Christopher H.; Weisler, Steven E.; Feinstein, Mark H.; Rissland, Edwina L. (1995). Cognitive Science: An Introduction. MIT Press. p. 370. ISBN 978-0-262-69175-8. <a href="#fnref:115" class="footnote-back-ref">↩</a></li>
<li id="fn:116">Cornelis, Smets & Bendegem 2013, p. 37. - Cornelis, Gustaaf C.; Smets, Sonja; Bendegem, Jean-Paul van (11 November 2013). Metadebates on Science: The Blue Book of "Einstein Meets Magritte". Springer Science & Business Media. p. 37. ISBN 978-94-017-2245-2. <a href="#fnref:116" class="footnote-back-ref">↩</a></li>
<li id="fn:117">Murphy & Alexander 2005, pp. 38–39. - Murphy, P. Karen; Alexander, Patricia A. (7 October 2005). Understanding How Students Learn: A Guide for Instructional Leaders. Corwin Press. pp. 38–39. ISBN 978-1-4833-6347-9. <a href="#fnref:117" class="footnote-back-ref">↩</a></li>
<li id="fn:118">Degenhardt 2019, pp. 1–6. - Degenhardt, M. A. B. (13 August 2019). Education and the Value of Knowledge. Routledge. p. 1-6. ISBN 978-1-000-62799-2. <a href="#fnref:118" class="footnote-back-ref">↩</a></li>
<li id="fn:119">Pritchard 2023, 2 The value of knowledge. - Pritchard, Duncan (18 May 2023). What is this thing called Knowledge?. Taylor & Francis. ISBN 978-1-000-87480-8. <a href="#fnref:119" class="footnote-back-ref">↩</a></li>
<li id="fn:120">Olsson 2011, pp. 874–883. - Olsson, Erik J (December 2011). "The Value of Knowledge: The Value of Knowledge". Philosophy Compass. 6 (12): 874–883. doi:10.1111/j.1747-9991.2011.00425.x. S2CID 143034920. <a href="https://doi.org/10.1111%2Fj.1747-9991.2011.00425.x" target="_blank">https://doi.org/10.1111%2Fj.1747-9991.2011.00425.x</a> <a href="#fnref:120" class="footnote-back-ref">↩</a></li>
<li id="fn:121">Reif 2008. - Reif, Frederick (2008). Applying Cognitive Science to Education: Thinking and Learning in Scientific and Other Complex Domains. MIT Press. ISBN 978-0-262-18263-8. <a href="#fnref:121" class="footnote-back-ref">↩</a></li>
<li id="fn:122">Morrison 2005, p. 371. - Morrison, Robert (18 April 2005). The Cambridge Handbook of Thinking and Reasoning. Cambridge University Press. p. 371. ISBN 978-0-521-82417-0. <a href="#fnref:122" class="footnote-back-ref">↩</a></li>
<li id="fn:123">Smith & Ragan 2004, pp. 152–154. - Smith, Patricia L.; Ragan, Tillman J. (7 December 2004). Instructional Design. John Wiley & Sons. pp. 152–154. ISBN 978-0-471-39353-5. <a href="#fnref:123" class="footnote-back-ref">↩</a></li>
<li id="fn:124">Soled 1995, p. 49. - Soled, Suzanne Wegener (1995). Assessment, Testing, and Evaluation in Teacher Education. Greenwood Publishing Group. p. 49. ISBN 978-1-56750-153-7. <a href="#fnref:124" class="footnote-back-ref">↩</a></li>
<li id="fn:125">Leung 2019, p. 210. - Leung, Yee (29 November 2019). International Encyclopedia of Human Geography. Elsevier. p. 210. ISBN 978-0-08-102296-2. <a href="#fnref:125" class="footnote-back-ref">↩</a></li>
<li id="fn:126">Olsson 2011, pp. 874–883. - Olsson, Erik J (December 2011). "The Value of Knowledge: The Value of Knowledge". Philosophy Compass. 6 (12): 874–883. doi:10.1111/j.1747-9991.2011.00425.x. S2CID 143034920. <a href="https://doi.org/10.1111%2Fj.1747-9991.2011.00425.x" target="_blank">https://doi.org/10.1111%2Fj.1747-9991.2011.00425.x</a> <a href="#fnref:126" class="footnote-back-ref">↩</a></li>
<li id="fn:127">Pritchard, Turri & Carter 2022, introduction. - Pritchard, Duncan; Turri, John; Carter, J. Adam (2022). "The Value of Knowledge". The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Metaphysics Research Lab, Stanford University. introduction. Archived from the original on 10 July 2022. Retrieved 19 September 2022. <a href="https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/knowledge-value/" target="_blank">https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/knowledge-value/</a> <a href="#fnref:127" class="footnote-back-ref">↩</a></li>
<li id="fn:128">Plato 2002, p. 89–90; 97b–98a. - Plato (2002). Five Dialogues. Indianapolis, IN: Hackett Pub. Co. pp. 89–90, 97b–98a. ISBN 978-0-87220-633-5. <a href="https://archive.org/details/fivedialogueseut00plat/page/89" target="_blank">https://archive.org/details/fivedialogueseut00plat/page/89</a> <a href="#fnref:128" class="footnote-back-ref">↩</a></li>
<li id="fn:129">Haskell 2001, pp. 101–103. - Haskell, Robert E. (2001). Transfer of Learning: Cognition and Instruction. Academic Press. p. 101-3. ISBN 978-0-12-330595-4. <a href="#fnref:129" class="footnote-back-ref">↩</a></li>
<li id="fn:130">Pritchard 2023, 2 The value of knowledge. - Pritchard, Duncan (18 May 2023). What is this thing called Knowledge?. Taylor & Francis. ISBN 978-1-000-87480-8. <a href="#fnref:130" class="footnote-back-ref">↩</a></li>
<li id="fn:131">Haskell 2001, pp. 101–103. - Haskell, Robert E. (2001). Transfer of Learning: Cognition and Instruction. Academic Press. p. 101-3. ISBN 978-0-12-330595-4. <a href="#fnref:131" class="footnote-back-ref">↩</a></li>
<li id="fn:132">Pritchard 2023, 2 The value of knowledge. - Pritchard, Duncan (18 May 2023). What is this thing called Knowledge?. Taylor & Francis. ISBN 978-1-000-87480-8. <a href="#fnref:132" class="footnote-back-ref">↩</a></li>
<li id="fn:133">Degenhardt 2019, pp. 1–6. - Degenhardt, M. A. B. (13 August 2019). Education and the Value of Knowledge. Routledge. p. 1-6. ISBN 978-1-000-62799-2. <a href="#fnref:133" class="footnote-back-ref">↩</a></li>
<li id="fn:134">Murphy & Alexander 2005, pp. 38–39. - Murphy, P. Karen; Alexander, Patricia A. (7 October 2005). Understanding How Students Learn: A Guide for Instructional Leaders. Corwin Press. pp. 38–39. ISBN 978-1-4833-6347-9. <a href="#fnref:134" class="footnote-back-ref">↩</a></li>
<li id="fn:135">Smith & Ragan 2004, pp. 152–154. - Smith, Patricia L.; Ragan, Tillman J. (7 December 2004). Instructional Design. John Wiley & Sons. pp. 152–154. ISBN 978-0-471-39353-5. <a href="#fnref:135" class="footnote-back-ref">↩</a></li>
<li id="fn:136">Smith & Ragan 2004, pp. 152–154. - Smith, Patricia L.; Ragan, Tillman J. (7 December 2004). Instructional Design. John Wiley & Sons. pp. 152–154. ISBN 978-0-471-39353-5. <a href="#fnref:136" class="footnote-back-ref">↩</a></li>
<li id="fn:137">Dempsey 1993, pp. 80–81. - Dempsey, John V. (1993). Interactive Instruction and Feedback. Educational Technology. pp. 80–81. ISBN 978-0-87778-260-5. <a href="#fnref:137" class="footnote-back-ref">↩</a></li>
<li id="fn:138">Rhem 2005, pp. 42–43. - Rhem, Anthony J. (21 November 2005). UML for Developing Knowledge Management Systems. CRC Press. p. 42-3. ISBN 978-1-135-48553-5. <a href="#fnref:138" class="footnote-back-ref">↩</a></li>
<li id="fn:139">Smith & Ragan 2004, pp. 152–154. - Smith, Patricia L.; Ragan, Tillman J. (7 December 2004). Instructional Design. John Wiley & Sons. pp. 152–154. ISBN 978-0-471-39353-5. <a href="#fnref:139" class="footnote-back-ref">↩</a></li>
<li id="fn:140">Dempsey 1993, pp. 80–81. - Dempsey, John V. (1993). Interactive Instruction and Feedback. Educational Technology. pp. 80–81. ISBN 978-0-87778-260-5. <a href="#fnref:140" class="footnote-back-ref">↩</a></li>
<li id="fn:141">Rhem 2005, pp. 42–43. - Rhem, Anthony J. (21 November 2005). UML for Developing Knowledge Management Systems. CRC Press. p. 42-3. ISBN 978-1-135-48553-5. <a href="#fnref:141" class="footnote-back-ref">↩</a></li>
<li id="fn:142">Steup & Neta 2020, 5. Sources of Knowledge and Justification. - Steup, Matthias; Neta, Ram (2020). "Epistemology". Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Metaphysics Research Lab, Stanford University. Archived from the original on 21 July 2020. Retrieved 22 May 2022. <a href="https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/epistemology/" target="_blank">https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/epistemology/</a> <a href="#fnref:142" class="footnote-back-ref">↩</a></li>
<li id="fn:143">Blaauw 2020, p. 49. - Blaauw, Martijn (31 March 2020). Epistemology A-Z. Edinburgh University Press. p. 49. ISBN 978-0-7486-8082-5. <a href="#fnref:143" class="footnote-back-ref">↩</a></li>
<li id="fn:144">Campbell, O'Rourke & Silverstein 2010, p. 10. - Campbell, Joseph Keim; O'Rourke, Michael; Silverstein, Harry S. (21 May 2010). Knowledge and Skepticism. MIT Press. p. 10. ISBN 978-0-262-01408-3. <a href="#fnref:144" class="footnote-back-ref">↩</a></li>
<li id="fn:145">Hetherington 2023, 3b. Observational Knowledge. - Hetherington, Stephen (2023). "Knowledge". Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Archived from the original on 2 June 2022. Retrieved 31 March 2023. <a href="https://iep.utm.edu/knowledg/" target="_blank">https://iep.utm.edu/knowledg/</a> <a href="#fnref:145" class="footnote-back-ref">↩</a></li>
<li id="fn:146">O’Brien. - O’Brien, Daniel. "The Epistemology of Perception". Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Archived from the original on 8 May 2009. Retrieved 25 October 2022. <a href="https://iep.utm.edu/epis-per/" target="_blank">https://iep.utm.edu/epis-per/</a> <a href="#fnref:146" class="footnote-back-ref">↩</a></li>
<li id="fn:147">Martinich & Stroll, Rationalism and empiricism. - Martinich, A. P.; Stroll, Ayrum. "Epistemology – Knowledge and certainty". www.britannica.com. Rationalism and empiricism. Archived from the original on 5 April 2023. Retrieved 5 April 2023. <a href="https://www.britannica.com/topic/epistemology/Knowledge-and-certainty#ref247960" target="_blank">https://www.britannica.com/topic/epistemology/Knowledge-and-certainty#ref247960</a> <a href="#fnref:147" class="footnote-back-ref">↩</a></li>
<li id="fn:148">Steup & Neta 2020, 5.2 Introspection. - Steup, Matthias; Neta, Ram (2020). "Epistemology". Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Metaphysics Research Lab, Stanford University. Archived from the original on 21 July 2020. Retrieved 22 May 2022. <a href="https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/epistemology/" target="_blank">https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/epistemology/</a> <a href="#fnref:148" class="footnote-back-ref">↩</a></li>
<li id="fn:149">Hohwy 2013, p. 245. - Hohwy, Jakob (November 2013). The Predictive Mind. Oxford University Press. p. 245. ISBN 978-0-19-968273-7. <a href="#fnref:149" class="footnote-back-ref">↩</a></li>
<li id="fn:150">Blaauw 2020, p. 49. - Blaauw, Martijn (31 March 2020). Epistemology A-Z. Edinburgh University Press. p. 49. ISBN 978-0-7486-8082-5. <a href="#fnref:150" class="footnote-back-ref">↩</a></li>
<li id="fn:151">Audi 2002, pp. 71–94, The Sources of Knowledge. - Audi, Robert (2002). "The Sources of Knowledge". The Oxford Handbook of Epistemology. Oxford University Press. pp. 71–94. ISBN 978-0-19-513005-8. Archived from the original on 12 June 2022. Retrieved 12 June 2022. <a href="https://philpapers.org/rec/AUDTSO-3" target="_blank">https://philpapers.org/rec/AUDTSO-3</a> <a href="#fnref:151" class="footnote-back-ref">↩</a></li>
<li id="fn:152">Gardiner 2001, pp. 1351–1361. - Gardiner, J. M. (29 September 2001). "Episodic memory and autonoetic consciousness: a first-person approach". Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society of London. Series B, Biological Sciences. 356 (1413): 1351–1361. doi:10.1098/rstb.2001.0955. ISSN 0962-8436. PMC 1088519. PMID 11571027. <a href="https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC1088519" target="_blank">https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC1088519</a> <a href="#fnref:152" class="footnote-back-ref">↩</a></li>
<li id="fn:153">Martinich & Stroll, Rationalism and empiricism. - Martinich, A. P.; Stroll, Ayrum. "Epistemology – Knowledge and certainty". www.britannica.com. Rationalism and empiricism. Archived from the original on 5 April 2023. Retrieved 5 April 2023. <a href="https://www.britannica.com/topic/epistemology/Knowledge-and-certainty#ref247960" target="_blank">https://www.britannica.com/topic/epistemology/Knowledge-and-certainty#ref247960</a> <a href="#fnref:153" class="footnote-back-ref">↩</a></li>
<li id="fn:154">Steup & Neta 2020, 5.4 Reason. - Steup, Matthias; Neta, Ram (2020). "Epistemology". Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Metaphysics Research Lab, Stanford University. Archived from the original on 21 July 2020. Retrieved 22 May 2022. <a href="https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/epistemology/" target="_blank">https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/epistemology/</a> <a href="#fnref:154" class="footnote-back-ref">↩</a></li>
<li id="fn:155">Audi 2005, p. 315. - Audi, Robert (20 June 2005). Epistemology: A Contemporary Introduction to the Theory of Knowledge. Routledge. p. 315. ISBN 978-1-134-79181-1. <a href="#fnref:155" class="footnote-back-ref">↩</a></li>
<li id="fn:156">Steup & Neta 2020, 5.5 Testimony. - Steup, Matthias; Neta, Ram (2020). "Epistemology". Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Metaphysics Research Lab, Stanford University. Archived from the original on 21 July 2020. Retrieved 22 May 2022. <a href="https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/epistemology/" target="_blank">https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/epistemology/</a> <a href="#fnref:156" class="footnote-back-ref">↩</a></li>
<li id="fn:157">Leonard 2021, introduction. - Leonard, Nick (2021). "Epistemological Problems of Testimony". Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Metaphysics Research Lab, Stanford University. introduction. Archived from the original on 10 July 2022. Retrieved 8 June 2022. <a href="https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/testimony-episprob/" target="_blank">https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/testimony-episprob/</a> <a href="#fnref:157" class="footnote-back-ref">↩</a></li>
<li id="fn:158">Green, introduction. - Green, Christopher R. "Epistemology of Testimony". Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy. introduction. Archived from the original on 7 March 2022. Retrieved 8 June 2022. <a href="https://iep.utm.edu/ep-testi/" target="_blank">https://iep.utm.edu/ep-testi/</a> <a href="#fnref:158" class="footnote-back-ref">↩</a></li>
<li id="fn:159">Blaauw 2020, p. 49. - Blaauw, Martijn (31 March 2020). Epistemology A-Z. Edinburgh University Press. p. 49. ISBN 978-0-7486-8082-5. <a href="#fnref:159" class="footnote-back-ref">↩</a></li>
<li id="fn:160">Plantinga 2000, pp. 182–183. - Plantinga, Alvin (27 January 2000). Warranted Christian Belief. Oxford University Press. pp. 182–183. ISBN 978-0-19-803024-9. <a href="#fnref:160" class="footnote-back-ref">↩</a></li>
</ol>

Declarative knowledge open-in-new

Declarative knowledge