Truth-conditional semantics

<h2 id="history">History</h2>
<p>The first truth-conditional semantics was developed by Donald Davidson in <i><a href="/facts/Donald_Davidson_(philosopher)/WSv0romH">Truth and Meaning</a></i> (1967). It applied <a href="/facts/Alfred_Tarski/7h6NySAj">Tarski's</a> <a href="/facts/Semantic_theory_of_truth/BtXbu5nt">semantic theory of truth</a> to a problem it was not intended to solve, that of giving the meaning of a sentence.
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<h2 id="criticism">Criticism</h2>
<h3>Refutation from necessary truths</h3>
<p><a href="/facts/Scott_Soames/mvdrWokC">Scott Soames</a> has harshly criticized truth-conditional semantics on the grounds that it is either wrong or uselessly circular.
</p><p>Under its traditional formulation, truth-conditional semantics gives every <a href="/facts/Logical_truth/N0bUYhUW">necessary truth</a> precisely the same meaning, for all of them are true under precisely the same conditions (namely, all of them). And since the truth conditions of any unnecessarily true sentence are equivalent to the conjunction of those truth conditions and any necessary truth, any sentence means the same as its meaning plus a necessary truth. For example, if <i>"snow is white" is true if and only if snow is white</i>, then it is trivially the case that <i>"snow is white" is true if and only if snow is white and 2+2=4</i>, therefore under truth-conditional semantics "snow is white" means both that snow is white and that 2+2=4.
</p><p><a href="/facts/Scott_Soames/mvdrWokC">Soames</a> argues further that reformulations that attempt to account for this problem must beg the question. In specifying precisely <i>which</i> of the infinite number of truth-conditions for a sentence will count towards its meaning, one must take the meaning of the sentence as a guide. However, we wanted to specify meaning with truth-conditions, whereas now we are specifying truth-conditions with meaning, rendering the entire process fruitless.<a class="footnote-ref" id="fnref:2" href="#fn:2"><sup>2</sup></a>
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<h3>Refutation from deficiency</h3>
<p><a href="/facts/Michael_Dummett/MUpejyUX">Michael Dummett</a> (1975) has objected to Davidson's program on the grounds that such a theory of meaning will not explain what it is a speaker has to know in order for them to understand a sentence. Dummett believes a speaker must know three components of a sentence to understand its meaning: a theory of <a href="/facts/Sense_and_reference/Je4PEFQJ">sense</a>, indicating the part of the meaning that the speaker grasps; a theory of <a href="/facts/Sense_and_reference/Je4PEFQJ">reference</a>, which indicates what claims about the world are made by the sentence, and a theory of force, which indicates what kind of <a href="/facts/Speech_act/l11PGwQu">speech act</a> the expression performs. Dummett further argues that a theory based on inference, such as <a href="/facts/Proof-theoretic_semantics/qo68D5Py">proof-theoretic semantics</a>, provides a better foundation for this model than truth-conditional semantics does.
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<h3>Pragmatic intrusion</h3>
<p>Some authors working within the field of <a href="/facts/Pragmatics/KkK08yyI">pragmatics</a> have argued that linguistic meaning, understood as the output of a purely formal analysis of a sentence-type, underdetermines truth-conditions.<a class="footnote-ref" id="fnref:3" href="#fn:3"><sup>3</sup></a><a class="footnote-ref" id="fnref:4" href="#fn:4"><sup>4</sup></a> These authors, sometimes labeled 'contextualists',<a class="footnote-ref" id="fnref:5" href="#fn:5"><sup>5</sup></a> argue that the role of pragmatic processes is not just pre-semantic (disambiguation or reference assignment) or post-semantic (drawing <a href="/facts/Implicature/8AaB72xS">implicatures</a>, determining <a href="/facts/Speech_act/l11PGwQu">speech acts</a>), but is also key to determining the truth-conditions of an utterance. That is why some contextualists prefer to talk about 'truth-conditional pragmatics' instead of semantics.<a class="footnote-ref" id="fnref:6" href="#fn:6"><sup>6</sup></a><a class="footnote-ref" id="fnref:7" href="#fn:7"><sup>7</sup></a>
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<h2 id="see-also">See also</h2>
<ul><li><a href="/facts/Formal_semantics_(linguistics)/FlWb7Hxp">Formal semantics</a></li>
<li><a href="/facts/Montague_grammar/6jFRwH5E">Montague grammar</a></li>
<li><a href="/facts/Proof-theoretic_semantics/qo68D5Py">Proof-theoretic semantics</a></li>
<li><a href="/facts/Dynamic_semantics/QQvanPx6">Dynamic semantics</a></li>
<li><a href="/facts/Inquisitive_semantics/E5LzcPAe">Inquisitive semantics</a></li>
<li><a href="/facts/Alfred_Tarski/7h6NySAj">Alfred Tarski</a></li></ul>
<h2 id="notes">Notes</h2>

<ul><li>M. A. E. Dummett (1975). ‘What is a Theory of Meaning’. In S. Guttenplan (ed.), <i>Mind and Language</i>, CUP. Reprinted in Dummett, <i>The Seas of Language</i>, OUP, 1993.</li></ul>

<h2 id="references">References</h2>

<ol>
<li id="fn:1"><p>Davidson, Donald (1967). "Truth and meaning". Synthese. 17 (3): 304–323. doi:10.1007/BF00485035. S2CID 14720789. <a href="/wiki/Synthese" target="_blank">/wiki/Synthese</a> <a href="#fnref:1" class="footnote-back-ref">↩</a></p></li>
<li id="fn:2"><p>Soames, Scott. "Truth, Meaning and Understanding." Philosophical Studies 65(1-2):17-35. <a href="#fnref:2" class="footnote-back-ref">↩</a></p></li>
<li id="fn:3"><p>Recanati, François (2001). "What is said". Synthese. 128 (1/2): 75–91. doi:10.1023/A:1010383405105. S2CID 46235399. <a href="/wiki/Fran%C3%A7ois_Recanati" target="_blank">/wiki/Fran%C3%A7ois_Recanati</a> <a href="#fnref:3" class="footnote-back-ref">↩</a></p></li>
<li id="fn:4"><p>Dan Sperber; Deirdre Wilson (1986). Relevance: Communication and Cognition. Wiley-Blackwell. ISBN 978-0-631-19878-9. <a href="978-0-631-19878-9" target="_blank">978-0-631-19878-9</a> <a href="#fnref:4" class="footnote-back-ref">↩</a></p></li>
<li id="fn:5"><p>Hermann Cappelen; Ernst Lepore (2005). Insensitive Semantics: a Defence of Semantic Minimalism and Speech Act Pluralism. Wiley-Blackwell. ISBN 9781405126748. <a href="9781405126748" target="_blank">9781405126748</a> <a href="#fnref:5" class="footnote-back-ref">↩</a></p></li>
<li id="fn:6"><p>François Recanati (2004). Literal Meaning. Cambridge University Press. ISBN 9780511615382. <a href="9780511615382" target="_blank">9780511615382</a> <a href="#fnref:6" class="footnote-back-ref">↩</a></p></li>
<li id="fn:7"><p>François Recanati (2011). Truth-conditional pragmatics. Oxford University Press. ISBN 9780199226986. <a href="9780199226986" target="_blank">9780199226986</a> <a href="#fnref:7" class="footnote-back-ref">↩</a></p></li>
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Truth-conditional semantics open-in-new

Truth-conditional semantics