ACEVAL/AIMVAL

<h2 id="purpose-and-findings">Purpose and Findings</h2>
<p>ACEVAL looked at the effectiveness of the tactics utilized by high-performance U. S. aircraft against simpler, threat-type aircraft equipped with <a href="/facts/All-aspect/wIIyLJjQ">all-aspect</a> missiles.
The conclusion was that a cheaper fighter such as an F-5 could engage the more expensive jets like F-14 or F-15 that carried big radar and <a href="/facts/Semi-active_radar_homing/zHGSAe2V">SARH</a> missiles such as the <a href="/facts/AIM-7_Sparrow/n44FypfL">AIM-7 Sparrow</a>.
The high-tech jets could easily fire a Sparrow against the F-5 but, because of the requirement to maintain the lock from launch till impact, the cheaper fighter could fire an all-aspect <a href="/facts/Infrared_homing/shTBbEmn">heat-seeker</a> missile before it was shot down by the Sparrow.
And because the heat seeker was <a href="/facts/Fire-and-forget/WBESmTMX">fire-and-forget</a>, in reality the expensive, high-tech jet was taken out by a much cheaper F-5.  However, this situation occurred because the F-15's and F-14's larger and longer range radars could not be used to their full advantage due to the engagement rule that a pilot must visually identify its target before firing a missile.
ACEVAL as such set the requirement for an true active homing, fire-and-forget missile, which became the <a href="/facts/AIM-120_AMRAAM/VghWWfM9">AIM-120 AMRAAM</a> series.
</p><p>AIMVAL examined five missile concepts under consideration as replacements for the <a href="/facts/AIM-9_Sidewinder/LPm7nQTT">AIM-9L Sidewinder</a>. AIMVAL findings were that the new missiles were no better than the AIM-9L, resulting in termination of the Navy <a href="/facts/AIM-95_Agile/qjnb55sg">AIM-95 Agile</a> off-boresight/<a href="/facts/Thrust_vectoring/B0KeV8Wu">thrust vectoring</a> <a href="/facts/Air-to-air_missile/82Dccmul">air-to-air missile</a> program, which was under development at the time. Actual seeker hardware was utilized in AIMVAL.
</p>
<h2 id="implications">Implications</h2>
<p>ACEVAL/AIMVAL resulted in development of AMRAAM, but did not recommend development of a high off-boresight short-range missile, opting instead for a European-led effort to develop <a href="/facts/ASRAAM/E0gL2z0k">ASRAAM</a>. However, the <a href="/facts/Soviet_Union/m7wWsPto">Soviet Union</a> did develop such a missile and fielded the <a href="/facts/Vympel_R-73/Ic2pIXYE">Vympel R-73</a> by 1985, taking the lead in short-range missile technology and performance for the first time since the Sidewinder entered service. This caused a number of countries to develop short-range missile programs to counter it, such as <a href="/facts/Python_(missile)/fFUKN3E2">Python-4</a> in <a href="/facts/Israel/dEe3IcaY">Israel</a>, <a href="/facts/ASRAAM/E0gL2z0k">ASRAAM</a> in <a href="/facts/United_Kingdom/kuPAILt2">Britain</a>, <a href="/facts/MBDA_MICA/XY1Yht69">MBDA MICA</a> in <a href="/facts/France/CxIeIKM3">France</a>, <a href="/facts/AIM-9_Sidewinder/LPm7nQTT">AIM-9X</a> in the <a href="/facts/United_States/P0sCdLe5">United States</a>, and <a href="/facts/IRIS-T/oTUMD8WP">IRIS-T</a> in <a href="/facts/Germany/paluuWBX">Germany</a>. It was claimed that the Soviet Union benefited more from ACEVAL/AIMVAL than did its Western counterparts.
</p><p>Additionally, part of the evaluation was to determine if the technology of the day had progressed to such a point that <a href="/facts/Situational_awareness/0EMpWgTa">situational awareness</a> was no longer a factor in air-to-air combat. The natural expectation in the <a href="/facts/Beyond-visual-range_missile/slVWIIqr">beyond-visual-range missile</a> trials was that hardware advantages would drive engagement outcomes. Actual test results, however, proved otherwise. As in both historical combat experience and AIMVAL/ACEVAL, situational awareness proved to be "the single most important factor affecting engagement outcomes." For both sides, being aware of and avoiding adversaries' weapons envelopes while trying to maneuver adversaries into their own weapons envelopes proved as important and dominant as it had been in ACEVAL.
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<ul><li><a href="https://web.archive.org/web/20120224090901/http://combatace.com/blog/5/entry-33-acevalaimval-lessons-learned/">"ACEVAL/AIMVAL Lessons Learned"</a>. 5 October 2009. Archived from <a href="http://combatace.com/blog/5/entry-33-acevalaimval-lessons-learned/">the original</a> on 24 February 2012.</li>
<li>Tomcat-sunrise.org, Hoser Chronicles</li>
<li><a href="http://www.airforcemag.com/magazinearchive/pages/2008/february%202008/0208reformers.aspx?signon=false">The Reformers (Air Force Magazine, February 2008)</a></li>
<li><a href="https://krex.k-state.edu/dspace/bitstream/handle/2097/15506/BrianLaslie2013.pdf">RED FLAG: HOW THE RISE OF “REALISTIC TRAINING” AFTER VIETNAM CHANGED THE AIR FORCE’S WAY OF WAR, 1975-1999</a> by BRIAN DANIEL LASLIE, PhD Dissertation, Kansas State University</li></ul>

ACEVAL/AIMVAL open-in-new

ACEVAL/AIMVAL