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Basic belief
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<h2 id="categories-of-beliefs">Categories of beliefs</h2> <p>Foundationalism holds that all <a href="/facts/Belief/HbPvkGT6">beliefs</a> must be <a href="/facts/Theory_of_justification/CxWaj0pY">justified</a> in order to be known. Beliefs therefore fall into two categories: </p> <ul><li>Beliefs that are properly basic, in that they do not depend upon justification of other beliefs, but on something outside the realm of belief (a "non-<a href="/facts/Doxastic/fAQM342I">doxastic</a> justification").</li> <li>Beliefs that derive from one or more basic beliefs, and therefore depend on the basic beliefs for their validity.</li></ul> <h2 id="description">Description</h2> <p>Within this basic framework of foundationalism exist a number of views regarding which types of beliefs qualify as <i>properly</i> basic; that is, what sorts of beliefs can be justifiably held without the justification of other beliefs. </p><p>In <a href="/facts/Foundationalism/2hlTEXTg">classical foundationalism</a>, beliefs are held to be properly basic if they are either <a href="/facts/Self-evidence/I9WhGuT5">self-evident</a> <a href="/facts/Axiom/mLjP14Mc">axioms</a>, or evident to the senses (<a href="/facts/Empiricism/f68IpCeE">empiricism</a>).<a class="footnote-ref" id="fnref:1" href="#fn:1"><sup>1</sup></a> However <a href="/facts/Anthony_Kenny/rJI51wK0">Anthony Kenny</a> and others have argued that this is a <a href="/facts/Self-refuting_idea/FRd20Ytb">self-refuting idea</a>.<a class="footnote-ref" id="fnref:2" href="#fn:2"><sup>2</sup></a> </p> <ul><li>In modern foundationalism, beliefs are held to be properly basic if they were either self-evident axiom or <a href="/facts/Incorrigibility/xXLARf9J">incorrigible</a>.<a class="footnote-ref" id="fnref:3" href="#fn:3"><sup>3</sup></a> One such axiom is René Descartes's axiom, <i><a href="/facts/Cogito_ergo_sum/43EhppDy">Cogito ergo sum</a></i> ("I think, therefore I am"). Incorrigible (lit. <i>uncorrectable</i>) beliefs are those one can believe without possibly being proven wrong. Notably, the evidence of the senses is not seen as properly basic because, Descartes argued, all our sensory experience could be an illusion.</li> <li>In what <a href="/facts/Keith_Lehrer/sXGPmamw">Keith Lehrer</a> has called "fallible foundationalism",<a class="footnote-ref" id="fnref:4" href="#fn:4"><sup>4</sup></a> also known as "moderate foundationalism", the division between <a href="/facts/Inference/RBbe95bP">inferential</a> and non-inferential belief is retained, but the requirement of incorrigibility is dropped. This, it is claimed, allows the senses to resume their traditional role as the basis of non-inferential belief despite their fallibility.<a class="footnote-ref" id="fnref:5" href="#fn:5"><sup>5</sup></a></li> <li>In <a href="/facts/Reformed_epistemology/2kUtA03D">Reformed epistemology</a>, beliefs are held to be properly basic if they are reasonable and consistent with a sensible <a href="/facts/World_view/ppdl5PhI">world view</a>.</li></ul> <p><a href="/facts/Anti-foundationalism/ay8mz05I">Anti-foundationalism</a> rejects foundationalism and denies there is some fundamental belief or principle which is the basic ground or foundation of inquiry and knowledge.<a class="footnote-ref" id="fnref:6" href="#fn:6"><sup>6</sup></a> </p> <h2 id="see-also">See also</h2> <ul><li><a href="/facts/Doxastic_logic/fAQM342I">Doxastic logic</a></li> <li><a href="/facts/First_principle/1kJp5tbC">First principle</a></li> <li><a href="/facts/Mental_model/ErV8WY6h">Mental model</a></li> <li><a href="/facts/Mental_representation/dlny9gvs">Mental representation</a></li> <li><a href="/facts/Mindset/WNWNaQz0">Mindset</a></li> <li><a href="/facts/Paradigm/HXpK3X7a">Paradigm</a></li> <li><a href="/facts/Set_(psychology)/AQjqG4hU">Set (psychology)</a></li> <li><a href="/facts/Schema_(psychology)/QW1j9wL8">Schema (psychology)</a></li> <li><a href="/facts/Worldview/ppdl5PhI">Worldview</a></li></ul> <h2 id="notes-and-references">Notes and references</h2> <h2 id="references">References</h2> <ol> <li id="fn:1"><p>Alvin Plantinga, Faith and Rationality, (London Notre Dame, 1983) pp. 39-44. Here Plantinga is basing his analysis on the ideas of Aristotle and Aquinas. <a href="/wiki/Alvin_Plantinga" target="_blank">/wiki/Alvin_Plantinga</a> <a href="#fnref:1" class="footnote-back-ref">↩</a></p></li> <li id="fn:2"><p>Anthony Kenny, What is Faith? Oxford: OUP 1992 ISBN 0-19-283067-8 pp. 9-10. This particular chapter is based on a 1982 lecture, which may explain the shift in the meaning of the term "foundationalism" since then. <a href="/wiki/Anthony_Kenny" target="_blank">/wiki/Anthony_Kenny</a> <a href="#fnref:2" class="footnote-back-ref">↩</a></p></li> <li id="fn:3"><p>Alvin Plantinga, Faith and Rationality, (London Notre Dame, 1983) pp. 58-59. Here Plantinga references John Locke and René Descartes. <a href="/wiki/Alvin_Plantinga" target="_blank">/wiki/Alvin_Plantinga</a> <a href="#fnref:3" class="footnote-back-ref">↩</a></p></li> <li id="fn:4"><p>Keith Lehrer, Theory of Knowledge (Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1990). See also "Archived copy" (PDF). Archived from the original (PDF) on 2006-09-08. Retrieved 2007-03-31.{{cite web}}: CS1 maint: archived copy as title (link) <a href="https://web.archive.org/web/20060908034204/http://www.ac.wwu.edu/~howardd/onlehrererkenntnis.pdf" target="_blank">https://web.archive.org/web/20060908034204/http://www.ac.wwu.edu/~howardd/onlehrererkenntnis.pdf</a> <a href="#fnref:4" class="footnote-back-ref">↩</a></p></li> <li id="fn:5"><p>"It makes sense for people to believe what they perceive through their experience and therefore, individuals are justified in those beliefs. "Truth Awakens on Foundationalism Archived February 28, 2007, at the Wayback Machine <a href="http://www.truthawakens.com/foundationalism.asp" target="_blank">http://www.truthawakens.com/foundationalism.asp</a> <a href="#fnref:5" class="footnote-back-ref">↩</a></p></li> <li id="fn:6"><p>J. Childers/G. Hentzi, The Columbia Dictionary of Modern Literary and Cultural Criticism (1995) p. 100 <a href="#fnref:6" class="footnote-back-ref">↩</a></p></li> </ol>