Value theory

<h2 id="definition">Definition</h2>
Value theory, also known as axiology and theory of values, is the systematic study of <a href="/facts/Value_(ethics_and_social_sciences)/f2RW9TXW">values</a>. As a branch of <a href="/facts/Philosophy/zAH5PVD6">philosophy</a>, it examines which things are good and what it means for something to be good. It distinguishes different types of values and explores how they can be measured and compared. This field also studies whether values are a fundamental aspect of reality and how they influence phenomena such as <a href="/facts/Emotion/kvAr22wa">emotion</a>, <a href="/facts/Desire/wGGhA9G8">desire</a>, decision, and <a href="/facts/Action_(philosophy)/AHXKoq1V">action</a>.<a class="footnote-ref" id="fnref:1" href="#fn:1">1</a> Value theory is relevant to many human endeavors because values are guiding principles that underlie the political, economic, scientific, and personal spheres.<a class="footnote-ref" id="fnref:2" href="#fn:2">2</a> It analyzes and evaluates phenomena such as <a href="/facts/Well-being/h1dsU4VU">well-being</a>, <a href="/facts/Utility/wlMDG74L">utility</a>, <a href="/facts/Beauty/AQTx8lL2">beauty</a>, human life, <a href="/facts/Knowledge/joozoaup">knowledge</a>, <a href="/facts/Wisdom/6Pqq0nAA">wisdom</a>, <a href="/facts/Freedom/JB85nHGR">freedom</a>, <a href="/facts/Love/H183DM4w">love</a>, and <a href="/facts/Justice/9mLpoA6B">justice</a>.<a class="footnote-ref" id="fnref:3" href="#fn:3">3</a>
The precise definition of value theory is debated and some theorists rely on alternative characterizations. In a broad sense, value theory is a catch-all label that encompasses all philosophical disciplines studying evaluative and normative topics. According to this view, value theory is one of the main branches of philosophy and includes <a href="/facts/Ethics/wNVNgL5q">ethics</a>, <a href="/facts/Aesthetics/FSD8f7oF">aesthetics</a>, <a href="/facts/Social_philosophy/JuLBNdAX">social philosophy</a>, <a href="/facts/Political_philosophy/JuLBNdAX">political philosophy</a>, and <a href="/facts/Philosophy_of_religion/1yI4cqMx">philosophy of religion</a>.<a class="footnote-ref" id="fnref:4" href="#fn:4">4</a> A similar broad characterization sees value theory as a multidisciplinary area of inquiry that integrates research from fields like <a href="/facts/Sociology/d2Fd0N87">sociology</a>, <a href="/facts/Anthropology/W6WK1C3a">anthropology</a>, <a href="/facts/Psychology/duoqW7Sz">psychology</a>, and <a href="/facts/Economics/HYctA2Dn">economics</a> alongside philosophy.<a class="footnote-ref" id="fnref:5" href="#fn:5">5</a> In a narrow sense, value theory is a subdiscipline of ethics that is particularly relevant to the school of <a href="/facts/Consequentialism/kprB3wDt">consequentialism</a> since it determines how to assess the value of consequences.<a class="footnote-ref" id="fnref:6" href="#fn:6">6</a>
The word axiology has its origin in the <a href="/facts/Ancient_Greek/LIK7NlUh">ancient Greek</a> terms ἄξιος (axios, meaning 'worthy' or 'of value') and λόγος (logos, meaning 'study' or 'theory of').<a class="footnote-ref" id="fnref:7" href="#fn:7">7</a> Even though the roots of value theory reach back to the <a href="/facts/Ancient_period/P0fFQ8z5">ancient period</a>, this area of thought was only conceived as a distinct discipline in the late 19th and early 20th centuries, when the term axiology was coined.<a class="footnote-ref" id="fnref:8" href="#fn:8">8</a> The terms value theory and axiology are usually used as synonyms, but some philosophers distinguish between them. According to one characterization, axiology is a subfield of value theory that limits itself to theories about which things are valuable and how valuable they are.<a class="footnote-ref" id="fnref:9" href="#fn:9">9</a><a class="footnote-ref" id="fnref:10" href="#fn:10">10</a> The term timology is an older and less common synonym.<a class="footnote-ref" id="fnref:11" href="#fn:11">11</a>

<h2 id="value">Value</h2>
Main article: <a href="/facts/Value_(ethics_and_social_sciences)/f2RW9TXW">Value (ethics and social sciences)</a>
Value is the worth, usefulness, or merit of something.<a class="footnote-ref" id="fnref:12" href="#fn:12">12</a> Value theorists examine the expressions used to describe and compare values, called evaluative terms.<a class="footnote-ref" id="fnref:13" href="#fn:13">13</a> They are further interested in the types or categories of values. The proposed classifications overlap and are based on factors like the source, beneficiary, and function of the value.<a class="footnote-ref" id="fnref:14" href="#fn:14">14</a>

<h3>Evaluative terms</h3>
Values are expressed through evaluative terms. For example, the words good, best, great, and excellent convey positive values, whereas words like bad and terrible indicate negative values.<a class="footnote-ref" id="fnref:15" href="#fn:15">15</a> Value theorists distinguish between thin and <a href="/facts/Thick_concept/HoMhChmg">thick evaluative terms</a>. Thin evaluative terms, like good and bad, express pure evaluations without any additional descriptive content.<a class="footnote-ref" id="fnref:16" href="#fn:16">16</a> They contrast with thick evaluative terms, like <a href="/facts/Courage/CLqC790Y">courageous</a> and <a href="/facts/Cruel/nfNatpbQ">cruel</a>, which provide more information by expressing other qualities, such as <a href="/facts/Character_trait/Iun5UFdX">character traits</a>, in addition to the evaluation.<a class="footnote-ref" id="fnref:17" href="#fn:17">17</a> Values are often understood as degrees that cover positive and negative magnitudes corresponding to good and bad. The term value is sometimes restricted to positive degrees to contrast with the term disvalue for negative degrees. The words better and worse are used to compare degrees, but it is controversial whether a quantitative comparison is always possible.<a class="footnote-ref" id="fnref:18" href="#fn:18">18</a> <a href="/facts/Evaluation/AygKGGVo">Evaluation</a> is the assessment or measurement of value, often employed to compare the benefits of different options to find the most advantageous choice.<a class="footnote-ref" id="fnref:19" href="#fn:19">19</a>
Evaluative terms are sometimes distinguished from <a href="/facts/Normativity/CgTa03KU">normative</a> or deontic terms. Normative or deontic terms, like right, wrong, and obligation, prescribe actions or other states by expressing what ought to be done or what is required.<a class="footnote-ref" id="fnref:20" href="#fn:20">20</a> Evaluative terms have a wider scope because they are not limited to what people can control or are responsible for. For instance, involuntary events like digestion and earthquakes can have a positive or negative value even if they are not right or wrong in a strict sense.<a class="footnote-ref" id="fnref:21" href="#fn:21">21</a> Despite the distinction, evaluative and normative concepts are closely related. For example, the value of the consequences of an action may influence its normative status—whether the action is right or wrong.<a class="footnote-ref" id="fnref:22" href="#fn:22">22</a>

<h3>Types</h3>
<h4>Intrinsic and instrumental</h4>
Main article: <a href="/facts/Instrumental_and_intrinsic_value/V6WnBobo">Instrumental and intrinsic value</a>

A thing has intrinsic or final value if it is good in itself or good for its own sake, independent of external factors or outcomes. A thing has extrinsic or instrumental value if it is useful or leads to other good things, serving as a means to bring about a desirable end. For example, tools like microwaves or money have instrumental value due to the useful functions they perform.<a class="footnote-ref" id="fnref:23" href="#fn:23">23</a> In some cases, the thing produced this way has itself instrumental value, like when using money to buy a microwave. This can result in a chain of instrumentally valuable things in which each link gets its value by causing the following link. Intrinsically valuable things stand at the endpoint of these chains and ground the value of all the preceding links.<a class="footnote-ref" id="fnref:24" href="#fn:24">24</a> 
One suggestion to distinguish between intrinsic and instrumental value, proposed by <a href="/facts/G._E._Moore/JBPw5mT0">G. E. Moore</a>, relies on a <a href="/facts/Thought_experiment/GXlr0lz9">thought experiment</a> that imagines the valuable thing in isolation from everything else. In such a situation, purely instrumentally valuable things lose their value since they serve no purpose while purely intrinsically valuable things remain valuable.<a class="footnote-ref" id="fnref:25" href="#fn:25">25</a><a class="footnote-ref" id="fnref:26" href="#fn:26">26</a> According to a common view, <a href="/facts/Pleasure/rkU6McmK">pleasure</a> is one of the sources of intrinsic value. Other suggested sources include <a href="/facts/Desire/wGGhA9G8">desire</a> satisfaction, <a href="/facts/Virtue/XT1frQVu">virtue</a>, <a href="/facts/Life/DNw7NUId">life</a>, <a href="/facts/Health/jjTlJf6m">health</a>, <a href="/facts/Beauty/AQTx8lL2">beauty</a>, <a href="/facts/Freedom/JB85nHGR">freedom</a>, and <a href="/facts/Knowledge/joozoaup">knowledge</a>.<a class="footnote-ref" id="fnref:27" href="#fn:27">27</a>

Intrinsic and instrumental value are not exclusive categories. As a result, a thing can have both intrinsic and instrumental value if it is both good in itself while also leading to other good things.<a class="footnote-ref" id="fnref:28" href="#fn:28">28</a> In a similar sense, a thing can have different instrumental values at the same time, both positive and negative ones. This is the case if some of its consequences are good while others are bad. The total instrumental value of a thing is the value balance of all its consequences.<a class="footnote-ref" id="fnref:29" href="#fn:29">29</a>
Because instrumental value depends on other values, it is an open question whether it should be understood as a value in a strict sense. For example, the overall value of a chain of causes leading to an intrinsically valuable thing remains the same if instrumentally valuable links are added or removed without affecting the intrinsically valuable thing. The observation that the overall value does not change is sometimes used as an argument that the things added or removed do not have value.<a class="footnote-ref" id="fnref:30" href="#fn:30">30</a>
Traditionally, value theorists have used the terms intrinsic value and final value interchangeably, just like the terms extrinsic value and instrumental value. This practice has been questioned in the 20th century based on the idea that they are similar but not identical concepts. According to this view, a thing has intrinsic value if the source of its value is an <a href="/facts/Intrinsic_property/5WJ1zN7q">intrinsic property</a>, meaning that the value does not depend on how the thing is related to other objects. Extrinsic value, by contrast, depends on <a href="/facts/Relation_(philosophy)/bCmKhlr1">external relations</a>. This view sees instrumental value as one type of extrinsic value based on external <a href="/facts/Causality/Swh496X7">causal relations</a>. At the same time, it allows that there are other types of non-instrumental extrinsic value that result from external non-causal relations. Final value is understood as what is valued for its own sake, independent of whether intrinsic or extrinsic properties are responsible.<a class="footnote-ref" id="fnref:31" href="#fn:31">31</a><a class="footnote-ref" id="fnref:32" href="#fn:32">32</a>

<h4>Absolute and relative</h4>
Another distinction relies on the contrast between absolute and relative value. Absolute value, also called value simpliciter, is a form of unconditional value. A thing has relative value if its value is relative to other things or limited to certain considerations or viewpoints.<a class="footnote-ref" id="fnref:33" href="#fn:33">33</a>
One form of relative value is restricted to the type of an entity, expressed in sentences like "That is a good knife" or "Jack is a good thief". This form is known as <a href="/facts/Attributive_expression/4oB5vWT1">attributive</a> goodness since the word "good" modifies the meaning of another term. To be attributively good as a certain type means to possess qualities characteristic of that type. For instance, a good knife is sharp and a good thief has the skill of stealing without getting caught. Attributive goodness contrasts with <a href="/facts/Predicative_expression/rFaVNWcJ">predicative</a> goodness. The sentence "Pleasure is good" is an example since the word good is used as a predicate to talk about the unqualified value of pleasure.<a class="footnote-ref" id="fnref:34" href="#fn:34">34</a> Attributive and predicative goodness can accompany each other, but this is not always the case. For instance, being a good thief is not necessarily a good thing.<a class="footnote-ref" id="fnref:35" href="#fn:35">35</a>
Another type of relative value restricts goodness to a specific person. Known as personal value,<a class="footnote-ref" id="fnref:36" href="#fn:36">36</a> it expresses what benefits a particular person, promotes their <a href="/facts/Welfare_spending/awUwQxkd">welfare</a>, or is in their interest. For example, a poem written by a child may have personal value for the parents even if the poem lacks value for others. Impersonal value, by contrast, is good in general without restriction to any specific person or viewpoint.<a class="footnote-ref" id="fnref:37" href="#fn:37">37</a> Some philosophers, like Moore, reject the existence of personal values, holding that all values are impersonal. Others have proposed theories about the relation between personal and impersonal value. The agglomerative theory says that impersonal value is nothing but the sum of all personal values. Another view understands impersonal value as a specific type of personal value taken from the perspective of the universe as a whole.<a class="footnote-ref" id="fnref:38" href="#fn:38">38</a>
Agent-relative value is sometimes contrasted with personal value as another person-specific limitation of the evaluative outlook. Agent-relative values affect moral considerations about what a person is responsible for or guilty of. For example, if Mei promises to pick Pedro up from the airport then an agent-relative value obligates Mei to drive to the airport. This obligation is in place even if it does not benefit Mei, in which case there is an agent-relative value without a personal value. In <a href="/facts/Consequentialism/kprB3wDt">consequentialism</a>,<a class="footnote-ref" id="fnref:39" href="#fn:39">39</a> agent-relative values are often discussed in relation to <a href="/facts/Ethical_dilemmas/6Id718Lk">ethical dilemmas</a>. One dilemma revolves around the question of whether an individual should murder an innocent person if this prevents the murder of two innocent people by a different perpetrator. The agent-neutral perspective tends to affirm this idea since one murder is preferable to two. The agent-relative perspective tends to reject this conclusion, arguing that the initial murder should be avoided since it negatively impacts the agent-relative value of the individual committing it.<a class="footnote-ref" id="fnref:40" href="#fn:40">40</a>
Traditionally, most value theorists see absolute value as the main topic of value theory and focus their attention on this type. Nonetheless, some philosophers, like <a href="/facts/Peter_Geach/FmYBsP7z">Peter Geach</a> and <a href="/facts/Philippa_Foot/gpwJcI1a">Philippa Foot</a>, have argued that the concept of absolute value by itself is meaningless and should be understood as one form of relative value.<a class="footnote-ref" id="fnref:41" href="#fn:41">41</a>

<h4>Other distinctions</h4>
Other categorizations of values have been proposed following diverse classification principles without a single approach widely accepted by all theorists.<a class="footnote-ref" id="fnref:42" href="#fn:42">42</a> Some focus on the types of entities that have value. They include distinct categories for entities like individuals, groups, society, the environment, and inert things. Another subdivision pays attention to the type of benefit involved and encompasses material, economic, moral, social, political, aesthetic, and religious values. Classifications by the beneficiary of the value distinguish between self- and other-oriented values.<a class="footnote-ref" id="fnref:43" href="#fn:43">43</a>
A historically influential approach identifies three spheres of value: <a href="/facts/Truth/NyQmBtUC">truth</a>, goodness, and beauty.<a class="footnote-ref" id="fnref:44" href="#fn:44">44</a> For example, the <a href="/facts/Neo-Kantian/2RdeEucp">neo-Kantian</a> philosopher <a href="/facts/Wilhelm_Windelband/BDtuGYu0">Wilhelm Windelband</a> characterizes them as the highest goals of <a href="/facts/Consciousness/IAxmgt6c">consciousness</a>, with <a href="/facts/Thought/loD3aFv9">thought</a> aiming at truth, <a href="/facts/Will_(philosophy)/cLDa60FT">will</a> aiming at goodness, and <a href="/facts/Emotion/kvAr22wa">emotion</a> aiming at beauty. A similar view, proposed by the <a href="/facts/Chinese_philosophy/Tx4ruDzB">Chinese philosopher</a> Zhang Dainian, says that the value of truth belongs to knowledge, the value of goodness belongs to behavior, and the value of beauty belongs to art.<a class="footnote-ref" id="fnref:45" href="#fn:45">45</a> This three-fold distinction also plays a central role in the philosophies of <a href="/facts/Franz_Brentano/XQRFJvMd">Franz Brentano</a> and <a href="/facts/J%25C3%25BCrgen_Habermas/R4mKqACW">Jürgen Habermas</a>.<a class="footnote-ref" id="fnref:46" href="#fn:46">46</a> Other suggested types of values include objective, subjective, potential, actual, contingent, necessary, inherent, and constitutive values.<a class="footnote-ref" id="fnref:47" href="#fn:47">47</a>

<h2 id="schools-of-thought">Schools of thought</h2>
<h3>Realism and anti-realism</h3>
Value <a href="/facts/Philosophical_realism/cPo2pK16">realism</a> is the view that values have mind-independent existence.<a class="footnote-ref" id="fnref:48" href="#fn:48">48</a><a class="footnote-ref" id="fnref:49" href="#fn:49">49</a> This means that <a href="/facts/Subjectivity_and_objectivity_(philosophy)/YhXxVe8g">objective</a> facts determine what has value, irrespective of subjective beliefs and preferences.<a class="footnote-ref" id="fnref:50" href="#fn:50">50</a> According to this view, the evaluative statement "That act is bad" is as objectively true or false as the empirical statement "That act causes distress".<a class="footnote-ref" id="fnref:51" href="#fn:51">51</a>
Realists often analyze values as <a href="/facts/Property_(philosophy)/mejP0slr">properties</a> of valuable things.<a class="footnote-ref" id="fnref:52" href="#fn:52">52</a> For example, stating that kindness is good asserts that kindness possesses the property of goodness. Value realists disagree about what type of property is involved. <a href="/facts/Ethical_naturalism/0JD9H4Bs">Naturalists</a> say that value is a natural property. Natural properties, like size and shape, can be known through <a href="/facts/Empirical_evidence/JUaYSGJc">empirical observation</a> and are studied by the natural sciences. <a href="/facts/Ethical_non-naturalism/cWnIR6Ud">Non-naturalists</a> reject this view but agree that values are real. They say that values differ significantly from empirical properties and belong to another domain of reality. According to one view, they are known through rational or emotional intuition rather than empirical observation.<a class="footnote-ref" id="fnref:53" href="#fn:53">53</a>
Another disagreement among realists is about whether the entity carrying the value is a concrete <a href="/facts/Particular/AwbfD8jx">individual</a> or a <a href="/facts/State_of_affairs_(philosophy)/v7LE6ozJ">state of affairs</a>.<a class="footnote-ref" id="fnref:54" href="#fn:54">54</a> For instance, the name "Bill" refers to an individual while the sentence "Bill is pleased" refers to a state of affairs, which combines the individual "Bill" with the property "pleased". Some value theorists hold that the value is a property directly of Bill while others contend that it is a property of the state of affairs that Bill is pleased.<a class="footnote-ref" id="fnref:55" href="#fn:55">55</a> This distinction affects various disputes in value theory. In some cases, a value is intrinsic according to one view and extrinsic according to the other.<a class="footnote-ref" id="fnref:56" href="#fn:56">56</a>
Value realism contrasts with <a href="/facts/Anti-realism/cAezj0SC">anti-realism</a>, which comes in various forms. In its strongest version, anti-realism rejects the existence of values in any form, claiming that value statements are meaningless.<a class="footnote-ref" id="fnref:57" href="#fn:57">57</a><a class="footnote-ref" id="fnref:58" href="#fn:58">58</a> There are various intermediate views between this position and realism. Some anti-realists accept that value claims have meaning but deny that they have a <a href="/facts/Truth_value/SY4e2w8l">truth value</a>,<a class="footnote-ref" id="fnref:59" href="#fn:59">59</a> a position known as <a href="/facts/Non-cognitivism/KmkHpvsX">non-cognitivism</a>. For example, <a href="/facts/Emotivism/lEcWIoz4">emotivists</a> say that value claims express emotional attitudes, similar to how exclamations like "Yay!" or "Boo!" express emotions rather than stating facts.<a class="footnote-ref" id="fnref:60" href="#fn:60">60</a><a class="footnote-ref" id="fnref:61" href="#fn:61">61</a>
<a href="/facts/Cognitivism_(ethics)/fa9kVXvJ">Cognitivists</a> contend that value statements have a truth value, meaning that sentences like "knowledge is intrinsically good" are either true or false. Following this view, <a href="/facts/Error_theory/EjoR2pu5">error theorists</a> defend anti-realism by stating that all value statements are false because there are no values.<a class="footnote-ref" id="fnref:62" href="#fn:62">62</a> Another view accepts the existence of values but denies that they are mind-independent. According to this view, the <a href="/facts/Mental_state/sHsDj380">mental states</a> of individuals determine whether an object has value, for instance, because individuals desire it.<a class="footnote-ref" id="fnref:63" href="#fn:63">63</a> A similar view is defended by <a href="/facts/Existentialism/ylQ1HF6b">existentialists</a> like <a href="/facts/Jean-Paul_Sartre/aRWvzA8U">Jean-Paul Sartre</a>, who argued that values are human creations that endow the world with meaning.<a class="footnote-ref" id="fnref:64" href="#fn:64">64</a> Subjectivist theories say that values are relative to each subject, whereas more objectivist outlooks hold that values depend on <a href="/facts/Mind/Y5JhtFj4">mind</a> in general rather than on the individual mind.<a class="footnote-ref" id="fnref:65" href="#fn:65">65</a>
A different position accepts that values are mind-independent but holds that they are reducible to other facts, meaning that they are not a fundamental part of reality. One form of <a href="/facts/Reductionism/tc2aWaza">reductionism</a> maintains that a thing is good if it is fitting to favor this thing, regardless of whether people actually favor it, a position known as the fitting-attitude theory of value. The buck-passing account, a closely related reductive view, argues that a thing is valuable if people have reasons to treat the thing in certain ways. These reasons come from other features of the valuable thing. According to some views, reductionism is a form of realism, but the strongest form of realism says that value is a fundamental part of reality and cannot be reduced to other aspects.<a class="footnote-ref" id="fnref:66" href="#fn:66">66</a>

<h3>Sources of value</h3>
Various theories about the sources of value have been proposed. They aim to clarify what kinds of things are intrinsically good.<a class="footnote-ref" id="fnref:67" href="#fn:67">67</a> The historically influential theory of <a href="/facts/Hedonism/AGw0FGFN">hedonism</a><a class="footnote-ref" id="fnref:68" href="#fn:68">68</a> states that how people feel is the only source of value. More specifically, it says that <a href="/facts/Pleasure/rkU6McmK">pleasure</a> is the only intrinsic good and <a href="/facts/Pain/70E79oUn">pain</a> is the only intrinsic evil.<a class="footnote-ref" id="fnref:69" href="#fn:69">69</a> According to this view, everything else only has instrumental value to the extent that it leads to pleasure or pain, including knowledge, health, and justice. Hedonists usually understand the term pleasure in a broad sense that covers all kinds of enjoyable experiences, including bodily pleasures of food and sex as well as more intellectual or abstract pleasures, like the joy of reading a book or happiness about a friend's promotion. Pleasurable experiences come in degrees, and hedonists usually associate their intensity and duration with the magnitude of value they have.<a class="footnote-ref" id="fnref:70" href="#fn:70">70</a><a class="footnote-ref" id="fnref:71" href="#fn:71">71</a>
Many hedonists identify pleasure and pain as symmetric opposites, meaning that the value of pleasure balances out the disvalue of pain if they have the same intensity. However, some hedonists reject this symmetry and give more weight to avoiding pain than to experiencing pleasure.<a class="footnote-ref" id="fnref:72" href="#fn:72">72</a> Although it is widely accepted that pleasure is valuable, the hedonist claim that it is the only source of value is controversial.<a class="footnote-ref" id="fnref:73" href="#fn:73">73</a> <a href="/facts/Welfarism/UC6jhhQ1">Welfarism</a>, a closely related theory, understands <a href="/facts/Well-being/h1dsU4VU">well-being</a> as the only source of value. Well-being is what is ultimately good for a person, which can include other aspects besides pleasure, such as health, <a href="/facts/Personal_growth/spUlNcqT">personal growth</a>, meaningful <a href="/facts/Interpersonal_relationship/rxgcYdBC">relationships</a>, and a sense of purpose in life.<a class="footnote-ref" id="fnref:74" href="#fn:74">74</a>
Desire theories offer a slightly different account, stating that desire satisfaction<a class="footnote-ref" id="fnref:75" href="#fn:75">75</a> is the only source of value.<a class="footnote-ref" id="fnref:76" href="#fn:76">76</a> This theory overlaps with hedonism because many people desire pleasure and because desire satisfaction is often accompanied by pleasure. Nonetheless, there are important differences: people desire a variety of other things as well, like knowledge, achievement, and respect; additionally, desire satisfaction may not always result in pleasure.<a class="footnote-ref" id="fnref:77" href="#fn:77">77</a> Some desire theorists hold that value is a property of desire satisfaction itself, while others say that it is a property of the objects that satisfy a desire.<a class="footnote-ref" id="fnref:78" href="#fn:78">78</a> One debate in desire theory concerns whether every desire is a source of value. For example, if a person has a false belief that money makes them happy, it is questionable whether the satisfaction of their desire for money is a source of value. To address this consideration, some desire theorists say that a desire can only provide value if a fully informed and rational person would have it, thereby excluding misguided desires from being a source of value.<a class="footnote-ref" id="fnref:79" href="#fn:79">79</a>
<a href="/facts/Perfectionism_(philosophy)/1TLB7efd">Perfectionism</a> identifies the realization of <a href="/facts/Human_nature/yq4UXSdP">human nature</a> and the cultivation of characteristic human abilities as the source of intrinsic goodness. It covers capacities and character traits belonging to the bodily, emotional, volitional, cognitive, social, artistic, and religious fields. Perfectionists disagree about which human excellences are the most important. Many are pluralistic in recognizing a diverse array of human excellences, such as knowledge, creativity, health, beauty, free agency, and moral virtues like benevolence and courage.<a class="footnote-ref" id="fnref:80" href="#fn:80">80</a> According to one suggestion, there are two main fields of human goods: theoretical abilities responsible for understanding the world and practical abilities responsible for interacting with it.<a class="footnote-ref" id="fnref:81" href="#fn:81">81</a> Some perfectionists provide an ideal characterization of human nature as the goal of human flourishing, holding that human excellences are those aspects that promote the realization of this goal. This view is exemplified in <a href="/facts/Aristotle/U2bDlBFW">Aristotle</a>'s focus on <a href="/facts/Rationality/ueS0w9lk">rationality</a> as the nature and ideal state of human beings.<a class="footnote-ref" id="fnref:82" href="#fn:82">82</a> Non-humanistic versions extend perfectionism to the natural world in general, arguing that excellence as a source of intrinsic value is not limited to the human realm.<a class="footnote-ref" id="fnref:83" href="#fn:83">83</a>

<h3>Monism and pluralism</h3>
<a href="/facts/Monism/eskX5hbg">Monist</a> theories of value assert that there is only a single source of intrinsic value. They agree that various things have value but maintain that all fundamentally good things belong to the same type. For example, hedonists hold that nothing but pleasure has intrinsic value, while desire theorists argue that desire satisfaction is the only source of fundamental goodness. <a href="/facts/Pluralism_(philosophy)/4QIzRRew">Pluralists</a> reject this view, contending that a simple single-value system is too crude to capture the complexity of the sphere of values. They say that diverse sources of value exist independently of one another, each contributing to the overall value of the world.<a class="footnote-ref" id="fnref:84" href="#fn:84">84</a>
One motivation for value pluralism is the observation that people value diverse types of things, including happiness, friendship, success, and knowledge.<a class="footnote-ref" id="fnref:85" href="#fn:85">85</a> This diversity becomes particularly prominent when people face difficult decisions between competing values, such as choosing between friendship and career success.<a class="footnote-ref" id="fnref:86" href="#fn:86">86</a> In such cases, value pluralists can argue that the different items have different types of values. Since monists accept only one source of intrinsic value, they may provide a different explanation by proposing that some of the valuable items only have instrumental value but lack intrinsic value.<a class="footnote-ref" id="fnref:87" href="#fn:87">87</a>

Pluralists have proposed various accounts of how their view affects practical decisions. Rational decisions often rely on value comparisons to determine which course of action should be pursued.<a class="footnote-ref" id="fnref:88" href="#fn:88">88</a> Some pluralists discuss a hierarchy of values reflecting the relative importance and weight of different value types to help people promote higher values when faced with difficult choices.<a class="footnote-ref" id="fnref:89" href="#fn:89">89</a> For example, philosopher <a href="/facts/Max_Scheler/UQFTGT9W">Max Scheler</a> ranks values based on how enduring and fulfilling they are into the levels of pleasure, utility, vitality, culture, and holiness. He asserts that people should not promote lower values, like pleasure, if this comes at the expense of higher values.<a class="footnote-ref" id="fnref:90" href="#fn:90">90</a><a class="footnote-ref" id="fnref:91" href="#fn:91">91</a>
Radical pluralists reject this approach, putting more emphasis on diversity by holding that different types of values are not comparable with each other. This means that each value type is unique, making it impossible to determine which one is superior.<a class="footnote-ref" id="fnref:92" href="#fn:92">92</a><a class="footnote-ref" id="fnref:93" href="#fn:93">93</a> Some value theorists use radical pluralism to argue that value conflicts are inevitable, that the gain of one value cannot always compensate for the loss of another, and that some <a href="/facts/Ethical_dilemmas/6Id718Lk">ethical dilemmas</a> are irresolvable.<a class="footnote-ref" id="fnref:94" href="#fn:94">94</a> For example, philosopher <a href="/facts/Isaiah_Berlin/7v1FEtQY">Isaiah Berlin</a> applied this idea to the values of <a href="/facts/Liberty/fHvkBVSv">liberty</a> and <a href="/facts/Social_equality/z9HzjDqI">equality</a>, arguing that a gain in one cannot make up for a loss in the other. Similarly, philosopher <a href="/facts/Joseph_Raz/ukkLWV7K">Joseph Raz</a> said that it is often impossible to compare the values of career paths, like when choosing between becoming a <a href="/facts/Lawyer/SETgVQHu">lawyer</a> or a <a href="/facts/Clarinetist/C92xEYaR">clarinetist</a>.<a class="footnote-ref" id="fnref:95" href="#fn:95">95</a> The terms incomparability and incommensurability are often used as synonyms in this context. However, philosophers like <a href="/facts/Ruth_Chang/myuWlxWh">Ruth Chang</a> distinguish them. According to this view, incommensurability means that there is no common measure to quantify values of different types. Incommensurable values may or may not be comparable. If they are, it is possible to say that one value is better than another, but it is not possible to quantify how much better it is.<a class="footnote-ref" id="fnref:96" href="#fn:96">96</a>

<h3>Others</h3>
Several controversies surround the question of how the intrinsic value of a <a href="/facts/Mereology/WwzUjB95">whole</a> is determined by the intrinsic values of its parts. According to the additivity principle, the intrinsic value of a whole is simply the sum of the intrinsic values of its parts. For example, if a virtuous person becomes happy then the intrinsic value of the happiness is simply added to the intrinsic value of the virtue, thereby increasing the overall value.<a class="footnote-ref" id="fnref:97" href="#fn:97">97</a>

Various counterexamples to the additivity principle have been proposed, suggesting that the relation between parts and wholes is more complex. For instance, <a href="/facts/Immanuel_Kant/vIxjdy6I">Immanuel Kant</a> argued that if a vicious person becomes happy, this happiness, though good in itself, does not increase the overall value. On the contrary, it makes things worse, according to Kant, since viciousness should not be rewarded with happiness. This situation is known as an organic unity—a whole whose intrinsic value differs from the sum of the intrinsic values of its parts.<a class="footnote-ref" id="fnref:98" href="#fn:98">98</a> Another perspective, called holism about value, asserts that the intrinsic value of a thing depends on its context. Holists can argue that happiness has positive intrinsic value in the context of virtue and negative intrinsic value in the context of vice. Atomists reject this view, saying that intrinsic value is context-independent.<a class="footnote-ref" id="fnref:99" href="#fn:99">99</a>
Theories of value aggregation provide concrete principles for calculating the overall value of an outcome based on how positively or negatively each individual is affected by it. For example, if a government implements a new policy that affects some people positively and others negatively, theories of value aggregation can be used to determine whether the overall value of the policy is positive or negative. Axiological <a href="/facts/Utilitarianism/CVw8Dmmt">utilitarianism</a> accepts the additivity principle, saying that the total value is simply the sum of all individual values.<a class="footnote-ref" id="fnref:100" href="#fn:100">100</a> Axiological <a href="/facts/Egalitarianism/ggyw0hYI">egalitarians</a> are not only interested in the sum total of value but also in how the values are distributed. They argue that an outcome with a balanced advantage distribution is better than an outcome where some benefit a lot while others benefit little, even if the two outcomes have the same sum total.<a class="footnote-ref" id="fnref:101" href="#fn:101">101</a> Axiological <a href="/facts/Prioritarianism/L4Y5ATtB">prioritarians</a> are particularly concerned with the benefits of individuals who are worse off. They say that providing advantages to people in need has more value than providing the same advantages to others.<a class="footnote-ref" id="fnref:102" href="#fn:102">102</a>
Another debate addresses the <a href="/facts/Meaning_of_life/YxbldkPE">meaning of life</a>, investigating whether life or existence as a whole has a higher meaning or purpose.<a class="footnote-ref" id="fnref:103" href="#fn:103">103</a> <a href="/facts/Ethical_naturalism/0JD9H4Bs">Naturalist</a> views argue that the meaning of life is found within the physical world, either as objective values that are true for everyone or as subjective values that vary according to individual preferences. Suggested fields where humans find meaning include exercising <a href="/facts/Freedom/JB85nHGR">freedom</a>, committing oneself to a cause, practicing <a href="/facts/Altruism/ztvkVwW1">altruism</a>, engaging in positive <a href="/facts/Social_relationships/DU3HW2Ah">social relationships</a>, or pursuing personal <a href="/facts/Happiness/bNL2Kfp1">happiness</a>.<a class="footnote-ref" id="fnref:104" href="#fn:104">104</a> <a href="/facts/Supernatural/qSlTK0Ss">Supernaturalists</a>, by contrast, propose that meaning lies beyond the natural world. For example, various religions teach that <a href="/facts/God/KAykGr3G">God</a> created the world for a higher purpose, imbuing existence with meaning. A related outlook argues that immortal <a href="/facts/Soul/DJl01SxP">souls</a> serve as sources of meaning by being connected to a <a href="/facts/Transcendent_reality/7XP571KV">transcendent reality</a> and evolving <a href="/facts/Spirituality/o2neYDkN">spiritually</a>.<a class="footnote-ref" id="fnref:105" href="#fn:105">105</a> <a href="/facts/Existential_nihilism/wb91aVTx">Existential nihilists</a> reject both naturalist and supernaturalist explanations by asserting that there is no higher purpose. They suggest that life is meaningless, with the consequence that there is no higher reason to continue living and that all efforts, achievements, happiness, and suffering are ultimately pointless.<a class="footnote-ref" id="fnref:106" href="#fn:106">106</a>
Formal axiology is a theory of value initially developed by philosopher <a href="/facts/Robert_S._Hartman/Kn9mKRre">Robert S. Hartman</a>. This approach treats axiology as a <a href="/facts/Formal_science/U0MaCPB0">formal science</a>, akin to <a href="/facts/Logic/8JnpJLtt">logic</a> and <a href="/facts/Mathematics/pxTouaz4">mathematics</a>. It uses <a href="/facts/Axiom/mLjP14Mc">axioms</a> to give an abstract definition of value, understanding it not as a property of things but as a property of concepts. Value measures the extent to which an entity fulfills its concept. For example, a good car has all the desirable qualities of cars, like a reliable engine and effective brakes, whereas a bad car lacks many. Formal axiology distinguishes between three fundamental value types: intrinsic values apply to people; extrinsic values apply to things, actions, and social roles; systemic values apply to conceptual constructs. Formal axiology examines how these value types form a hierarchy and how they can be measured.<a class="footnote-ref" id="fnref:107" href="#fn:107">107</a>

<h2 id="methods">Methods</h2>
Value theorists employ various <a href="/facts/Methodology/dk5X9Hxx">methods</a> to conduct their inquiries, justify theories, and measure values. <a href="/facts/Ethical_intuitionism/LuScuKCG">Intuitionists</a> rely on <a href="/facts/Intuition/Mshu0Vxb">intuitions</a> to assess evaluative claims. In this context, an intuition is an immediate apprehension or understanding of a <a href="/facts/Self-evident/I9WhGuT5">self-evident</a> claim, meaning that its truth can be assessed without <a href="/facts/Inference/RBbe95bP">inferring</a> it from another observation.<a class="footnote-ref" id="fnref:108" href="#fn:108">108</a> Value theorists often rely on <a href="/facts/Thought_experiments/GXlr0lz9">thought experiments</a> to gain this type of understanding. Thought experiments are imagined scenarios that exemplify philosophical problems. Philosophers use <a href="/facts/Counterfactual_thinking/dAkwvLIB">counterfactual reasoning</a> to evaluate possible consequences and gain insight into underlying problems.<a class="footnote-ref" id="fnref:109" href="#fn:109">109</a> For example, philosopher <a href="/facts/Robert_Nozick/WXNoFABG">Robert Nozick</a> imagines an <a href="/facts/Experience_machine/1zLNA7Jy">experience machine</a> that can virtually simulate an ideal life. Based on his contention that people would not want to spend the rest of their lives in this pleasurable simulation, Nozick argues against the <a href="/facts/Hedonism/AGw0FGFN">hedonist</a> claim that pleasure is the only source of intrinsic value. According to him, the thought experiment shows that the value of an authentic connection to reality is not reducible to pleasure.<a class="footnote-ref" id="fnref:110" href="#fn:110">110</a><a class="footnote-ref" id="fnref:111" href="#fn:111">111</a>
<a href="/facts/Phenomenology_(philosophy)/AILzLkKx">Phenomenologists</a> provide a detailed first-person description of the <a href="/facts/Experience/1LeXy1DW">experience</a> of values. They closely examine emotional experiences, ranging from desire, interest, and preference to feelings in the form of love and hate. However, they do not limit their inquiry to these phenomena, asserting that values permeate experience at large.<a class="footnote-ref" id="fnref:112" href="#fn:112">112</a> A key aspect of the phenomenological method is to <a href="/facts/Epoche/K8mK5L27">suspend preconceived ideas and judgments</a> to understand the essence of experiences as they present themselves to consciousness.<a class="footnote-ref" id="fnref:113" href="#fn:113">113</a>
The analysis of concepts and <a href="/facts/Ordinary_language_philosophy/pA43hoje">ordinary language</a> is another method of inquiry. By examining terms and sentences used to talk about values, value theorists aim to clarify their meanings, uncover crucial distinctions, and formulate arguments for and against axiological theories.<a class="footnote-ref" id="fnref:114" href="#fn:114">114</a> For instance, a prominent dispute between <a href="/facts/Naturalism_(philosophy)/Glvu6ASA">naturalists</a> and <a href="/facts/Ethical_non-naturalism/cWnIR6Ud">non-naturalists</a> hinges on the <a href="/facts/Conceptual_analysis/5mFCG4UP">conceptual analysis</a> of the term <a href="/facts/Good/nc3NR8V8">good</a>, in particular, whether its meaning can be analyzed through natural terms, like <a href="/facts/Pleasure/rkU6McmK">pleasure</a>.<a class="footnote-ref" id="fnref:115" href="#fn:115">115</a><a class="footnote-ref" id="fnref:116" href="#fn:116">116</a>

In the <a href="/facts/Social_sciences/hAbm1xtD">social sciences</a>, value theorists face the challenge of measuring the evaluative outlook of individuals and groups. Specifically, they aim to determine personal value hierarchies, for example, whether a person gives more weight to truth than to moral goodness or beauty.<a class="footnote-ref" id="fnref:117" href="#fn:117">117</a> They distinguish between direct and indirect measurement methods. Direct methods involve asking people straightforward questions about what things they value and which value priorities they have. This approach assumes that people are aware of their evaluative outlook and able to articulate it accurately. Indirect methods do not share this assumption, asserting instead that values guide behavior and choices on an unconscious level. Consequently, they observe how people decide and act, seeking to infer the underlying value attitudes responsible for picking one course of action rather than another.<a class="footnote-ref" id="fnref:118" href="#fn:118">118</a>
Various catalogs or <a href="/facts/Values_scale/Gn0oSm9n">scales of values</a> have been proposed in psychology and related social sciences to measure value priorities. The <a href="/facts/Rokeach_Value_Survey/m3LsSv4u">Rokeach Value Survey</a> considers a total of 36 values divided into two groups: instrumental values, like honesty and capability, which serve as means to promote terminal values, such as freedom and family security. It asks participants to rank the values based on their impact on the participants' lives, aiming to understand the relative importance assigned to each of them. The <a href="/facts/Theory_of_basic_human_values/wURbMh8s">Schwartz theory of basic human values</a> is a modification of the Rokeach Value Survey that seeks to provide a more cross-cultural and universal assessment. It arranges the values in a circular manner to reflect that neighboring values are compatible with each other, such as openness to change and self-enhancement, while values on opposing sides may conflict with each other, such as openness to change and conservation.<a class="footnote-ref" id="fnref:119" href="#fn:119">119</a>

<h2 id="in-various-fields">In various fields</h2>
<h3>Ethics</h3>
Main article: <a href="/facts/Ethics/wNVNgL5q">Ethics</a>
Ethics and value theory are overlapping fields of inquiry. Ethics studies <a href="/facts/Morality/CSjHHvff">moral</a> phenomena, focusing on how people should act or which behaviors are morally right.<a class="footnote-ref" id="fnref:120" href="#fn:120">120</a> Value theory investigates the nature, sources, and types of values in general.<a class="footnote-ref" id="fnref:121" href="#fn:121">121</a> Some philosophers understand value theory as a subdiscipline of ethics. This is based on the idea that what people should do is affected by value considerations but not necessarily limited to them.<a class="footnote-ref" id="fnref:122" href="#fn:122">122</a> Another view sees ethics as a subdiscipline of value theory. This outlook follows the idea that ethics is concerned with moral values affecting what people can control, whereas value theory examines a broader range of values, including those beyond anyone's control.<a class="footnote-ref" id="fnref:123" href="#fn:123">123</a> Some perspectives contrast ethics and value theory, asserting that the <a href="/facts/Normativity/CgTa03KU">normative</a> concepts examined by ethics are distinct from the evaluative concepts examined by value theory.<a class="footnote-ref" id="fnref:124" href="#fn:124">124</a> <a href="/facts/Axiological_ethics/GFuvwn6y">Axiological ethics</a> is a subfield of ethics examining the nature and role of values from a moral perspective, with particular interest in determining which ends are worth pursuing.<a class="footnote-ref" id="fnref:125" href="#fn:125">125</a>
The ethical theory of <a href="/facts/Consequentialism/kprB3wDt">consequentialism</a> combines the perspectives of ethics and value theory, asserting that the rightness of an action depends on the value of its consequences. Consequentialists compare possible courses of action, saying that people should follow the one leading to the best overall consequences.<a class="footnote-ref" id="fnref:126" href="#fn:126">126</a> The overall consequences of an action are the totality of its effects, or how it impacts the world by starting a causal chain of events that would not have occurred otherwise.<a class="footnote-ref" id="fnref:127" href="#fn:127">127</a> Distinct versions of consequentialism rely on different theories of the sources of value. <a href="/facts/Classical_utilitarianism/CVw8Dmmt">Classical utilitarianism</a>, a prominent form of consequentialism, says that moral actions produce the greatest amount of <a href="/facts/Pleasure/rkU6McmK">pleasure</a> for the greatest number of people. It combines a consequentialist outlook on right action with a <a href="/facts/Hedonism/AGw0FGFN">hedonist</a> outlook on pleasure as the only source of intrinsic value.<a class="footnote-ref" id="fnref:128" href="#fn:128">128</a>

<h3>Economics</h3>
Main article: <a href="/facts/Economics/HYctA2Dn">Economics</a>
Economics is a <a href="/facts/Social_science/hAbm1xtD">social science</a> studying how goods and services are produced, distributed, and consumed, both from the perspective of individual agents and societal systems.<a class="footnote-ref" id="fnref:129" href="#fn:129">129</a> Economists view evaluations as a driving force underlying economic activity. They use the notion of <a href="/facts/Economic_value/76jsyB6X">economic value</a> and related evaluative concepts to understand decision-making processes, resource allocation, and the impact of policies. The economic value or benefit of a <a href="/facts/Commodity/zD0Em9v7">commodity</a> is the advantage it provides to an <a href="/facts/Economic_agent/9dTPUnFk">economic agent</a>, often measured in terms of what people are <a href="/facts/Willingness_to_pay/wdUycuSo">willing to pay</a> for it.<a class="footnote-ref" id="fnref:130" href="#fn:130">130</a>
Economic theories of value are frameworks to explain how economic value arises and which factors influence it. Prominent frameworks include the classical <a href="/facts/Labor_theory_of_value/N01J0w3j">labor theory of value</a> and the neo-classical <a href="/facts/Marginal_theory_of_value/ElXNboxy">marginal theory of value</a>.<a class="footnote-ref" id="fnref:131" href="#fn:131">131</a> The labor theory, initially developed by the economists <a href="/facts/Adam_Smith/sj2Tt18r">Adam Smith</a> and <a href="/facts/David_Ricardo/uaTMV5Tj">David Ricardo</a>, distinguishes between <a href="/facts/Use_value/kGRYyczR">use value</a>—the utility or satisfaction a commodity provides—and <a href="/facts/Exchange_value/Xl2lU16R">exchange value</a>—the proportion at which one commodity can be exchanged with another.<a class="footnote-ref" id="fnref:132" href="#fn:132">132</a> It focuses on exchange value, which it says is determined by the <a href="/facts/Socially_necessary_labour_time/1yl091dT">amount of labor required to produce the commodity</a>. In its simplest form, it directly correlates exchange value to labor time. For example, if the time needed to hunt a deer is twice the time needed to hunt a beaver then one deer is worth two beavers.<a class="footnote-ref" id="fnref:133" href="#fn:133">133</a> The philosopher <a href="/facts/Karl_Marx/CXYTK95X">Karl Marx</a> extended the labor theory of value in various ways. He introduced the concept of <a href="/facts/Surplus_value/0wkzGCFm">surplus value</a>, which goes beyond the time and resources invested to explain how <a href="/facts/Capitalism/FbPc6TTw">capitalists</a> can profit from the labor of their employees.<a class="footnote-ref" id="fnref:134" href="#fn:134">134</a>
The marginal theory of value focuses on consumption rather than production. It says that the utility of a commodity is the source of its value. Specifically, it is interested in <a href="/facts/Marginal_utility/ElXNboxy">marginal utility</a>, the additional satisfaction gained from consuming one more unit of the commodity. Marginal utility often diminishes if many units have already been consumed, leading to a decrease in the exchange value of commodities that are abundantly available.<a class="footnote-ref" id="fnref:135" href="#fn:135">135</a> Both the labor theory and the marginal theory were later challenged by the <a href="/facts/Piero_Sraffa/EIvAXWV4">Sraffian theory of value</a>, which considers diverse forms of production costs, including but not limited to the quantity of labor.<a class="footnote-ref" id="fnref:136" href="#fn:136">136</a>

<h3>Sociology</h3>
Main article: <a href="/facts/Sociology/d2Fd0N87">Sociology</a>
Sociology studies social behavior, relationships, institutions, and society at large.<a class="footnote-ref" id="fnref:137" href="#fn:137">137</a> In their analyses and explanations of these phenomena, some sociologists use the concept of values to understand issues like <a href="/facts/Social_cohesion/bAWLQ7rI">social cohesion</a> and <a href="/facts/Social_conflict/9lGHyRW6">conflict</a>, the norms and practices people follow, and <a href="/facts/Collective_action/dQVaLvdn">collective action</a>. They usually understand values as subjective attitudes possessed by individuals and shared in social groups. According to this view, values are beliefs or priorities about goals worth pursuing that guide people to act in certain ways. For example, societies that value education may invest substantial resources to ensure high-quality schooling. This subjective conception of values as aspects of individuals and social groups contrasts with the objective conceptions of values more prominent in economics, which understand values as aspects of commodities.<a class="footnote-ref" id="fnref:138" href="#fn:138">138</a>
Shared values can help unite people in the pursuit of a common cause, fostering social cohesion. Value differences, by contrast, may divide people into antagonistic groups that promote conflicting projects. Some sociologists employ value research to predict how people will behave. Given the observation that someone values the environment, they may conclude that this person is more likely to <a href="/facts/Recycle/x9X7GAzz">recycle</a> or support pro-environmental legislation.<a class="footnote-ref" id="fnref:139" href="#fn:139">139</a> One approach to this type of research uses <a href="/facts/Values_scale/Gn0oSm9n">value scales</a>, such as the <a href="/facts/Rokeach_Value_Survey/m3LsSv4u">Rokeach Value Survey</a> and the <a href="/facts/Theory_of_basic_human_values/wURbMh8s">Schwartz theory of basic human values</a>, to measure the value outlook of individuals and groups.<a class="footnote-ref" id="fnref:140" href="#fn:140">140</a>

<h3>Anthropology</h3>
Main article: <a href="/facts/Anthropology/W6WK1C3a">Anthropology</a>
Anthropology also studies human behavior and societies but does not limit itself to contemporary social structures, extending its focus to humanity both past and present.<a class="footnote-ref" id="fnref:141" href="#fn:141">141</a> Similar to sociologists, many anthropologists understand values as social representations of goals worth pursuing. For them, values are embedded in mental structures associated with culture and ideology about what is desirable. A slightly different approach in anthropology focuses on the practical side of values, holding that values are constantly created through human activity.<a class="footnote-ref" id="fnref:142" href="#fn:142">142</a>
<a href="/facts/Anthropological_theories_of_value/CtjlAHWw">Anthropological value theorists</a> use values to compare cultures.<a class="footnote-ref" id="fnref:143" href="#fn:143">143</a> They can be employed to examine similarities as universal concerns present in every society. For example, anthropologist <a href="/facts/Clyde_Kluckhohn/IFAkTcDa">Clyde Kluckhohn</a> and sociologist <a href="/facts/Fred_Strodtbeck/qx0Kcqjw">Fred Strodtbeck</a> proposed a set of value orientations found in every culture. These orientations are centered on the topics of human nature, human activity, social organization, relation to nature, and a focus on past, present, or future.<a class="footnote-ref" id="fnref:144" href="#fn:144">144</a> Values can also be used to analyze differences between cultures and value changes within a culture. Anthropologist <a href="/facts/Louis_Dumont/WAkpyKAs">Louis Dumont</a> followed this idea, suggesting that the cultural meaning systems in distinct societies differ in their value priorities. He argued that values are ordered hierarchically around a set of paramount values that trump all other values. For example, Dumont analyzed the <a href="/facts/Caste_system_in_India/WceUIyoX">traditional Indian caste system</a> as a cultural hierarchy based on the value of purity, extending from the pure <a href="/facts/Brahmins/V3qxzHAP">Brahmins</a> to the "<a href="/facts/Untouchability/E2cCjrVY">untouchable</a>" <a href="/facts/Dalits/Hfr6AtzY">Dalits</a>.<a class="footnote-ref" id="fnref:145" href="#fn:145">145</a>
The contrast between <a href="/facts/Individualism_and_collectivism/EDpvow0U">individualism and collectivism</a> is an influential topic in cross-cultural value research. Individualism promotes values associated with the <a href="/facts/Autonomy/5ne4C7N8">autonomy</a> of individuals, such as <a href="/facts/Self-directedness/JSA9RfRt">self-directedness</a>, independence, and the fulfillment of personal goals. Collectivism gives priority to group-related values, like cooperation, <a href="/facts/Conformity/AHpHbocb">conformity</a>, and foregoing personal advantages for the sake of collective benefits. As a rough simplification, it is often suggested that individualism is more prominent in <a href="/facts/Western_culture/rPbgAhzI">Western cultures</a>, whereas collectivism is more commonly observed in <a href="/facts/Eastern_culture/at6GLs4l">Eastern cultures</a>.<a class="footnote-ref" id="fnref:146" href="#fn:146">146</a>

<h3>Psychology</h3>
Main article: <a href="/facts/Psychology/duoqW7Sz">Psychology</a>
As the study of <a href="/facts/Mind/Y5JhtFj4">mental phenomena</a> and behavior, psychology contrasts with sociology and anthropology by focusing more on the perspective of individuals than the broader social and cultural contexts.<a class="footnote-ref" id="fnref:147" href="#fn:147">147</a> Psychologists tend to understand values as abstract <a href="/facts/Motivation/uqLMfLKq">motivational</a> goals or general principles about what matters.<a class="footnote-ref" id="fnref:148" href="#fn:148">148</a> From this perspective, values differ from specific plans and <a href="/facts/Intention/ahzUpq2G">intentions</a> since they are stable evaluative tendencies not bound to concrete situations.<a class="footnote-ref" id="fnref:149" href="#fn:149">149</a>
Various psychological theories of values establish a close link between an individual's evaluative outlook and their <a href="/facts/Personality/zdkhBU5V">personality</a>.<a class="footnote-ref" id="fnref:150" href="#fn:150">150</a> An early theory, formulated by psychologists <a href="/facts/Philip_E._Vernon/1mt6QARN">Philip E. Vernon</a> and <a href="/facts/Gordon_Allport/AC75tDkl">Gordon Allport</a>, understands personality as a collection of aspects unified by a coherent <a href="/facts/Value_system/f2RW9TXW">value system</a>. It distinguishes between six personality types corresponding to the value spheres of theory, economy, aesthetics, society, politics, and religion. For example, people with theoretical personalities place special importance on the <a href="/facts/Value_of_knowledge/TppLrqjs">value of knowledge</a> and the discovery of <a href="/facts/Truth/NyQmBtUC">truth</a>.<a class="footnote-ref" id="fnref:151" href="#fn:151">151</a> Influenced by Vernon and Allport, psychologist <a href="/facts/Milton_Rokeach/506zwKaJ">Milton Rokeach</a> conceptualized values as enduring beliefs about what goals and conduct are preferable. He divided values into the categories of instrumental and terminal values. He thought that a central aspect of personality lies in how people prioritize the values within each category.<a class="footnote-ref" id="fnref:152" href="#fn:152">152</a> Psychologist <a href="/facts/Shalom_Schwartz/nFcEKb6X">Shalom Schwartz</a> refined this approach by linking values to emotion and motivation. He explored how value rankings affect decisions in which the values of different options conflict.<a class="footnote-ref" id="fnref:153" href="#fn:153">153</a>

<h2 id="history">History</h2>
The origin of value theory lies in the <a href="/facts/Ancient_period/P0fFQ8z5">ancient period</a>, with early reflections on the good life and the ends worth pursuing.<a class="footnote-ref" id="fnref:154" href="#fn:154">154</a> <a href="/facts/Socrates/djIKjImv">Socrates</a> (c. 469–399 BCE)<a class="footnote-ref" id="fnref:155" href="#fn:155">155</a> identified the highest good as the right combination of <a href="/facts/Knowledge/joozoaup">knowledge</a>, <a href="/facts/Pleasure/rkU6McmK">pleasure</a>, and <a href="/facts/Virtue/XT1frQVu">virtue</a>, holding that active inquiry is associated with pleasure while knowledge of the Good leads to virtuous action.<a class="footnote-ref" id="fnref:156" href="#fn:156">156</a> <a href="/facts/Plato/sPedMo74">Plato</a> (c. 428–347 BCE)<a class="footnote-ref" id="fnref:157" href="#fn:157">157</a> conceived <a href="/facts/The_Good/Evon5uL5">the Good</a> as a universal and changeless idea. It is the highest form in his <a href="/facts/Theory_of_forms/e0zj3JR2">theory of forms</a>, acting as the source of all other forms and the foundation of reality and knowledge.<a class="footnote-ref" id="fnref:158" href="#fn:158">158</a> <a href="/facts/Aristotle/U2bDlBFW">Aristotle</a> (384–322 BCE)<a class="footnote-ref" id="fnref:159" href="#fn:159">159</a> saw <a href="/facts/Eudaimonia/wGWdwPL3">eudaimonia</a> as the highest good and ultimate goal of human life. He understood eudaimonia as a form of happiness or flourishing achieved through the exercise of virtues in accordance with <a href="/facts/Reason/tcBImN8J">reason</a>, leading to the full realization of human potential.<a class="footnote-ref" id="fnref:160" href="#fn:160">160</a> <a href="/facts/Epicurus/ww2teSaQ">Epicurus</a> (c. 341–271 BCE) proposed a nuanced <a href="/facts/Egoistic/dag5EW6E">egoistic</a> hedonism, stating that personal pleasure is the greatest good while recommending moderation to avoid the negative effects of excessive desires and anxiety about the future.<a class="footnote-ref" id="fnref:161" href="#fn:161">161</a> According to the <a href="/facts/Stoicism/hQu81X5x">Stoics</a>, a virtuous life following nature and reason is the highest good. They thought that self-mastery and <a href="/facts/Rationality/ueS0w9lk">rationality</a> lead to a pleasant <a href="/facts/Apatheia/8j5d4TgN">equanimity</a> independent of external circumstances.<a class="footnote-ref" id="fnref:162" href="#fn:162">162</a> Influenced by Plato, <a href="/facts/Plotinus/BQDNMGDA">Plotinus</a> (c. 204/5–270 CE) held that the Good is the ultimate principle of reality from which everything emanates. For him, <a href="/facts/Evil/dWbPnzRF">evil</a> is not a distinct opposing principle but merely a deficiency or absence of <a href="/facts/Being/zwJ4I8Bc">being</a> resulting from a missing connection to the Good.<a class="footnote-ref" id="fnref:163" href="#fn:163">163</a>

In ancient <a href="/facts/Indian_philosophy/ddnT7Vec">Indian philosophy</a>, the idea that people are trapped in a <a href="/facts/Samsara/Iwy5Ukmq">cycle of rebirths</a> arose around 600 BCE.<a class="footnote-ref" id="fnref:164" href="#fn:164">164</a> Many traditions adopted it, arguing that liberation from this cycle is the highest good.<a class="footnote-ref" id="fnref:165" href="#fn:165">165</a> <a href="/facts/Hindu_philosophy/rudCa0wA">Hindu philosophy</a> distinguishes the <a href="/facts/Puru%25E1%25B9%25A3%25C4%2581rtha/qyp4pL2g">four fundamental values</a> of <a href="/facts/Dharma/q7MFlJPp">duty</a>, <a href="/facts/Artha/aKNDBVv5">economic wealth</a>, <a href="/facts/K%25C4%2581ma/zlTz4H6H">sensory pleasure</a>, and <a href="/facts/Mok%25E1%25B9%25A3a/b3uuA7jI">liberation</a>.<a class="footnote-ref" id="fnref:166" href="#fn:166">166</a> Many <a href="/facts/%25C4%2580stika/Hc14oDK2">Hindu schools of thought</a> prioritize the value of liberation.<a class="footnote-ref" id="fnref:167" href="#fn:167">167</a> A similar outlook is found in ancient <a href="/facts/Buddhist_philosophy/sp0HbHm7">Buddhist philosophy</a>, starting between the sixth and the fifth centuries BCE, where the cessation of <a href="/facts/Du%25E1%25B8%25A5kha/d6eRFcXo">suffering</a> through the attainment of <a href="/facts/Nirvana/cjEVeoo6">Nirvana</a> is considered the ultimate goal.<a class="footnote-ref" id="fnref:168" href="#fn:168">168</a> In <a href="/facts/Ancient_China/TNqRSvQ4">ancient China</a>, <a href="/facts/Confucius/HrrVtjJp">Confucius</a> (c. 551–479 BCE)<a class="footnote-ref" id="fnref:169" href="#fn:169">169</a> explored the role of <a href="/facts/Self-cultivation/kfjwUsaV">self-cultivation</a> in leading a virtuous life, viewing <a href="/facts/Ren_(philosophy)/9zBycPx6">general benevolence towards humanity</a> as the supreme virtue.<a class="footnote-ref" id="fnref:170" href="#fn:170">170</a> In comparing the highest virtue to water, <a href="/facts/Laozi/H5PsnoQG">Laozi</a> (6th century BCE)<a class="footnote-ref" id="fnref:171" href="#fn:171">171</a> emphasized the importance of living in harmony with the <a href="/facts/Tao/E3tbsky5">natural order of the universe</a>.<a class="footnote-ref" id="fnref:172" href="#fn:172">172</a>
Religious teachings influenced value theory in the <a href="/facts/Medieval_period/RqzEKB9v">medieval period</a>. Early <a href="/facts/Christian_philosophy/Tbbcl5yv">Christian thinkers</a>, such as <a href="/facts/Augustine_of_Hippo/RJI1otNA">Augustine of Hippo</a> (354–430 CE),<a class="footnote-ref" id="fnref:173" href="#fn:173">173</a> adapted the theories of Plato and Plotinus into a religious framework. They identified God as the ultimate source of existence and goodness, seeing evil as a mere lack or privation of good.<a class="footnote-ref" id="fnref:174" href="#fn:174">174</a> Drawing on <a href="/facts/Aristotelianism/wEhHXC5B">Aristotelianism</a>, Christian philosopher <a href="/facts/Thomas_Aquinas/h2vN2VkX">Thomas Aquinas</a> (1224–1274 CE)<a class="footnote-ref" id="fnref:175" href="#fn:175">175</a> said that communion with the divine, achieved through a <a href="/facts/Beatific_vision/53YJrvHM">beatific vision</a> of God, is the <a href="/facts/Summum_bonum/tUeYPDe9">highest end</a> of humans.<a class="footnote-ref" id="fnref:176" href="#fn:176">176</a> In <a href="/facts/Islamic_philosophy/QSzAKr2j">Arabic–Persian philosophy</a>, <a href="/facts/Avicenna/EYKG4Vez">Avicenna</a> (980–1037 CE)<a class="footnote-ref" id="fnref:177" href="#fn:177">177</a> regarded the intellect as the highest human faculty. He thought that a contemplative life prepares humans for the greatest good, which is only attained in the afterlife when humans are free from bodily distractions.<a class="footnote-ref" id="fnref:178" href="#fn:178">178</a> In Chinese thought, the early <a href="/facts/Neo-Confucian/PCkHarML">neo-Confucian</a> philosopher <a href="/facts/Han_Yu/WSRkcKDu">Han Yu</a> (768–824 CE) identified the sage as an ideal role model who, through self-cultivation, achieves personal integrity expressed in harmony between theory and action in daily life.<a class="footnote-ref" id="fnref:179" href="#fn:179">179</a>
In the <a href="/facts/Early_modern_philosophy/3Y2MLqr3">early modern period</a>, <a href="/facts/Thomas_Hobbes/VUGt3jNW">Thomas Hobbes</a> (1588–1679)<a class="footnote-ref" id="fnref:180" href="#fn:180">180</a> understood values as subjective phenomena that depend on a person's interests and examined mutual interests and benefits as a key principle of political decisions.<a class="footnote-ref" id="fnref:181" href="#fn:181">181</a> <a href="/facts/David_Hume/aTwlJ80V">David Hume</a> (1711–1776)<a class="footnote-ref" id="fnref:182" href="#fn:182">182</a> agreed with Hobbes's subjectivism, exploring <a href="/facts/Is%25E2%2580%2593ought_problem/81PPQxE4">how values differ from objective facts</a>.<a class="footnote-ref" id="fnref:183" href="#fn:183">183</a> <a href="/facts/Immanuel_Kant/vIxjdy6I">Immanuel Kant</a> (1724–1804)<a class="footnote-ref" id="fnref:184" href="#fn:184">184</a> asserted that the highest good is happiness in proportion to moral virtue. He emphasized the primacy of virtue by respecting the moral law and the inherent value of people, adding that moral virtue is ideally, but not always, accompanied by personal happiness.<a class="footnote-ref" id="fnref:185" href="#fn:185">185</a> <a href="/facts/Jeremy_Bentham/P2n90Uhx">Jeremy Bentham</a> (1748–1832)<a class="footnote-ref" id="fnref:186" href="#fn:186">186</a> and <a href="/facts/John_Stuart_Mill/0QxUR9l7">John Stuart Mill</a> (1806–1873)<a class="footnote-ref" id="fnref:187" href="#fn:187">187</a> formulated <a href="/facts/Classical_utilitarianism/CVw8Dmmt">classical utilitarianism</a>, combining a <a href="/facts/Hedonist/AGw0FGFN">hedonist</a> theory about value with a <a href="/facts/Consequentialist/kprB3wDt">consequentialist</a> theory about right action.<a class="footnote-ref" id="fnref:188" href="#fn:188">188</a> <a href="/facts/Hermann_Lotze/8an0JbIy">Hermann Lotze</a> (1817–1881)<a class="footnote-ref" id="fnref:189" href="#fn:189">189</a> developed a philosophy of values, holding that values make the world meaningful as an ordered whole centered around goodness.<a class="footnote-ref" id="fnref:190" href="#fn:190">190</a> Influenced by Lotze, the <a href="/facts/Neo-Kantian/2RdeEucp">neo-Kantian</a> philosopher <a href="/facts/Wilhelm_Windelband/BDtuGYu0">Wilhelm Windelband</a> (1848–1915)<a class="footnote-ref" id="fnref:191" href="#fn:191">191</a> understood philosophy as a theory of values, claiming that universal values determine the principles that all subjects should follow, including the norms of knowledge and action.<a class="footnote-ref" id="fnref:192" href="#fn:192">192</a> <a href="/facts/Friedrich_Nietzsche/u7VdQ5sg">Friedrich Nietzsche</a> (1844–1900)<a class="footnote-ref" id="fnref:193" href="#fn:193">193</a> held that values are human creations. He criticized traditional values in general and Christian values in particular, calling for a <a href="/facts/Transvaluation_of_values/e1ggENpm">revaluation of all values</a> centered on life-affirmation, power, and excellence.<a class="footnote-ref" id="fnref:194" href="#fn:194">194</a>

In the early 20th century, <a href="/facts/Pragmatism/v1zMTt3m">Pragmatist</a> philosopher <a href="/facts/John_Dewey/ljz3mzpf">John Dewey</a> (1859–1952)<a class="footnote-ref" id="fnref:195" href="#fn:195">195</a> defended axiological <a href="/facts/Naturalism_(philosophy)/Glvu6ASA">naturalism</a>. He distinguished values from value judgments, adding that the skill of correct value assessment must be learned through experience.<a class="footnote-ref" id="fnref:196" href="#fn:196">196</a><a class="footnote-ref" id="fnref:197" href="#fn:197">197</a> <a href="/facts/G._E._Moore/JBPw5mT0">G. E. Moore</a> (1873–1958)<a class="footnote-ref" id="fnref:198" href="#fn:198">198</a> developed and refined various axiological concepts, such as organic unity and the contrast between intrinsic and extrinsic value. He defended <a href="/facts/Ethical_non-naturalism/cWnIR6Ud">non-naturalism</a> about the nature of values and <a href="/facts/Ethical_intuitionism/LuScuKCG">intuitionism</a> about the knowledge of values.<a class="footnote-ref" id="fnref:199" href="#fn:199">199</a> <a href="/facts/W._D._Ross/SRXlfr3S">W. D. Ross</a> (1877–1971)<a class="footnote-ref" id="fnref:200" href="#fn:200">200</a> accepted and further elaborated on Moore's intuitionism, using it to formulate an axiological pluralism.<a class="footnote-ref" id="fnref:201" href="#fn:201">201</a><a class="footnote-ref" id="fnref:202" href="#fn:202">202</a> <a href="/facts/R._B._Perry/0fWK8Xsb">R. B. Perry</a> (1876–1957)<a class="footnote-ref" id="fnref:203" href="#fn:203">203</a> and <a href="/facts/David_Prall/7WjAJFjC">D. W. Prall</a> (1886–1940)<a class="footnote-ref" id="fnref:204" href="#fn:204">204</a> articulated systematic theories of value based on the idea that values originate in affective states such as interest and liking.<a class="footnote-ref" id="fnref:205" href="#fn:205">205</a> <a href="/facts/Robert_S._Hartman/Kn9mKRre">Robert S. Hartman</a> (1910–1973)<a class="footnote-ref" id="fnref:206" href="#fn:206">206</a> developed formal axiology, saying that values measure the level to which a thing embodies its ideal concept.<a class="footnote-ref" id="fnref:207" href="#fn:207">207</a> <a href="/facts/A._J._Ayer/sRo5jQsp">A. J. Ayer</a> (1910–1989)<a class="footnote-ref" id="fnref:208" href="#fn:208">208</a> proposed anti-realism about values, arguing that <a href="/facts/Expressivism/IX0EDDI4">value statements merely express</a> the speaker's approval or disapproval.<a class="footnote-ref" id="fnref:209" href="#fn:209">209</a> A different type of anti-realism, introduced by <a href="/facts/J._L._Mackie/RKlzGm6e">J. L. Mackie</a> (1917–1981),<a class="footnote-ref" id="fnref:210" href="#fn:210">210</a> suggests that <a href="/facts/Error_theory/EjoR2pu5">all value assertions are false</a> since no values exist.<a class="footnote-ref" id="fnref:211" href="#fn:211">211</a> <a href="/facts/G._H._von_Wright/DhbcXybG">G. H. von Wright</a> (1916–2003)<a class="footnote-ref" id="fnref:212" href="#fn:212">212</a> provided a <a href="/facts/Conceptual_analysis/5mFCG4UP">conceptual analysis</a> of the term good by distinguishing different meanings or varieties of goodness, such as the technical goodness of a good driver and the hedonic goodness of a good meal.<a class="footnote-ref" id="fnref:213" href="#fn:213">213</a>
In <a href="/facts/Continental_philosophy/uVbXljJo">continental philosophy</a>, <a href="/facts/Franz_Brentano/XQRFJvMd">Franz Brentano</a> (1838–1917)<a class="footnote-ref" id="fnref:214" href="#fn:214">214</a> formulated an early version of the fitting-attitude theory of value, saying that a thing is good if it is fitting to have a positive attitude towards it, such as love.<a class="footnote-ref" id="fnref:215" href="#fn:215">215</a> In the 1890s, his students <a href="/facts/Alexius_Meinong/AIrFc5vh">Alexius Meinong</a> (1853–1920)<a class="footnote-ref" id="fnref:216" href="#fn:216">216</a> and <a href="/facts/Christian_von_Ehrenfels/YvnYvdkS">Christian von Ehrenfels</a> (1859–1932)<a class="footnote-ref" id="fnref:217" href="#fn:217">217</a> conceived the idea of a general theory of values.<a class="footnote-ref" id="fnref:218" href="#fn:218">218</a> <a href="/facts/Edmund_Husserl/xKlMH2KN">Edmund Husserl</a> (1859–1938),<a class="footnote-ref" id="fnref:219" href="#fn:219">219</a> another of Brentano's students, developed <a href="/facts/Phenomenology_(philosophy)/AILzLkKx">phenomenology</a> and applied this approach to the study of values.<a class="footnote-ref" id="fnref:220" href="#fn:220">220</a> Following Husserl's approach, <a href="/facts/Max_Scheler/UQFTGT9W">Max Scheler</a> (1874–1928) and <a href="/facts/Nicolai_Hartmann/d5sN90WL">Nicolai Hartmann</a> (1882–1950) each proposed a comprehensive system of <a href="/facts/Axiological_ethics/GFuvwn6y">axiological ethics</a>.<a class="footnote-ref" id="fnref:221" href="#fn:221">221</a> Asserting that values have objective reality, they explored how different value types form a hierarchy and examined the problems of value conflicts and right decisions from this hierarchical perspective.<a class="footnote-ref" id="fnref:222" href="#fn:222">222</a> <a href="/facts/Martin_Heidegger/VSvHqhcj">Martin Heidegger</a> (1889–1976)<a class="footnote-ref" id="fnref:223" href="#fn:223">223</a> criticized value theory, claiming that it rests on a mistaken <a href="/facts/Metaphysical/fSFt6SHe">metaphysical</a> perspective by understanding values as aspects of things.<a class="footnote-ref" id="fnref:224" href="#fn:224">224</a> <a href="/facts/Existentialist/ylQ1HF6b">Existentialist</a> philosopher <a href="/facts/Jean-Paul_Sartre/aRWvzA8U">Jean-Paul Sartre</a> (1905–1980)<a class="footnote-ref" id="fnref:225" href="#fn:225">225</a> suggested that values do not exist by themselves but are actively created, emphasizing the role of human <a href="/facts/Freedom/JB85nHGR">freedom</a>, responsibility, and <a href="/facts/Authenticity_(philosophy)/3NKFAFks">authenticity</a> in the process.<a class="footnote-ref" id="fnref:226" href="#fn:226">226</a>

<h3>Notes</h3>

<h3>Citations</h3>

<h3>Sources</h3>

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<li>Zimmerman, Michael J. (2001). <a href="https://books.google.com/books?id=9pqECJM08rkC&pg=PA1">The Nature of Intrinsic Value</a>. Rowman & Littlefield. pp. 135–144. <a href="/facts/ISBN_(identifier)/15AdSPa9">ISBN</a> 978-0-7425-1263-4.</li>
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<h2 id="references">References</h2>

<ol>
<li id="fn:1">Smith & Thomas 1998, Lead sectionHirose & Olson 2015, pp. 1–2Schroeder 2021, Lead section - Smith, Barry; Thomas, Alan (1998). "Axiology". Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Routledge. doi:10.4324/9780415249126-L120-1. ISBN 978-0-415-25069-6. Archived from the original on 2023-11-30. Retrieved 2024-08-27. <a href="https://www.rep.routledge.com/articles/thematic/axiology/v-1" target="_blank">https://www.rep.routledge.com/articles/thematic/axiology/v-1</a> <a href="#fnref:1" class="footnote-back-ref">↩</a></li>
<li id="fn:2">Bahm 1993, pp. 1, 4–6Li 2014, pp. 67–68 - Bahm, Archie J. (1993). Axiology: The Science of Values. Rodopi. ISBN 978-90-5183-519-9. <a href="https://books.google.com/books?id=jqSRrmtQ_WoC&pg=PA104" target="_blank">https://books.google.com/books?id=jqSRrmtQ_WoC&pg=PA104</a> <a href="#fnref:2" class="footnote-back-ref">↩</a></li>
<li id="fn:3">Hiles 2008, pp. 52–53Li 2014, pp. 67–68Bahm 1993, pp. 4–5 - Hiles, David R. (2008). "Axiology". In Given, Lisa M. (ed.). The Sage Encyclopedia of Qualitative Research Methods: A-L. Vol. 1. Sage. pp. 52–56. ISBN 978-1-4129-4163-1. <a href="#fnref:3" class="footnote-back-ref">↩</a></li>
<li id="fn:4">Schroeder 2021, Lead sectionOrsi 2015, pp. 6–7Bahm 1993, p. 4Cowan 2020, p. 4 - Schroeder, Mark (2021). "Value Theory". The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Metaphysics Research Lab, Stanford University. Archived from the original on 27 June 2013. Retrieved 26 August 2024. <a href="https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/value-theory/" target="_blank">https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/value-theory/</a> <a href="#fnref:4" class="footnote-back-ref">↩</a></li>
<li id="fn:5">Steinert 2023, p. 1Hirose & Olson 2015, pp. 1–2Bahm 1993, pp. 4–5 - Steinert, Steffen (2023). Interdisciplinary Value Theory. Springer. ISBN 978-3-031-10733-7. <a href="https://books.google.com/books?id=ADG4EAAAQBAJ&pg=PA1" target="_blank">https://books.google.com/books?id=ADG4EAAAQBAJ&pg=PA1</a> <a href="#fnref:5" class="footnote-back-ref">↩</a></li>
<li id="fn:6">Schroeder 2021, Lead sectionOrsi 2015, pp. 6–7Hurka 2006, p. 357 - Schroeder, Mark (2021). "Value Theory". The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Metaphysics Research Lab, Stanford University. Archived from the original on 27 June 2013. Retrieved 26 August 2024. <a href="https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/value-theory/" target="_blank">https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/value-theory/</a> <a href="#fnref:6" class="footnote-back-ref">↩</a></li>
<li id="fn:7">Taliaferro 2010, p. 24Arneson 2009, pp. 69–70 - Taliaferro, Charles (2010). A Dictionary of Philosophy of Religion. Bloomsbury Publishing. ISBN 978-1-4411-8504-4. <a href="https://books.google.com/books?id=CfWoAwAAQBAJ&pg=PA25" target="_blank">https://books.google.com/books?id=CfWoAwAAQBAJ&pg=PA25</a> <a href="#fnref:7" class="footnote-back-ref">↩</a></li>
<li id="fn:8">Grünberg 2000, pp. 11–12Hart 1971, p. 29 - Grünberg, Ludwig (2000). The Mystery of Values: Studies in Axiology. Rodopi. ISBN 978-90-420-0670-6. <a href="https://books.google.com/books?id=cFsiNrHfN1AC&pg=PA11" target="_blank">https://books.google.com/books?id=cFsiNrHfN1AC&pg=PA11</a> <a href="#fnref:8" class="footnote-back-ref">↩</a></li>
<li id="fn:9">Schroeder 2021, Lead sectionOrsi 2015, pp. 6–7 - Schroeder, Mark (2021). "Value Theory". The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Metaphysics Research Lab, Stanford University. Archived from the original on 27 June 2013. Retrieved 26 August 2024. <a href="https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/value-theory/" target="_blank">https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/value-theory/</a> <a href="#fnref:9" class="footnote-back-ref">↩</a></li>
<li id="fn:10">Another view sees axiology as the wider field and restricts value theory to questions concerning the nature of value.[11] <a href="#fnref:10" class="footnote-back-ref">↩</a></li>
<li id="fn:11">Grünberg 2000, pp. 11–12 - Grünberg, Ludwig (2000). The Mystery of Values: Studies in Axiology. Rodopi. ISBN 978-90-420-0670-6. <a href="https://books.google.com/books?id=cFsiNrHfN1AC&pg=PA11" target="_blank">https://books.google.com/books?id=cFsiNrHfN1AC&pg=PA11</a> <a href="#fnref:11" class="footnote-back-ref">↩</a></li>
<li id="fn:12">The term value has other meanings as well, such as the value of a mathematical variable expressing the information or quantity that this variable carries.[13] Value theory is only interested in the evaluative sense of the term about being good or bad in a certain respect.[14] <a href="/wiki/Mathematical" target="_blank">/wiki/Mathematical</a> <a href="#fnref:12" class="footnote-back-ref">↩</a></li>
<li id="fn:13">Orsi 2015, p. 1Rescher 1969, p. 1 - Orsi, Francesco (2015). Value Theory. Bloomsbury Publishing. ISBN 978-1-4725-2408-9. <a href="https://books.google.com/books?id=cc3cBAAAQBAJ&pg=PA1" target="_blank">https://books.google.com/books?id=cc3cBAAAQBAJ&pg=PA1</a> <a href="#fnref:13" class="footnote-back-ref">↩</a></li>
<li id="fn:14">Li 2014, p. 70Schroeder 2021, § 1.1 Varieties of GoodnessOrsi 2015, pp. 22–23Rescher 1969, pp. 13–14, 18 - Li, Deshun (2014). Value Theory: A Research into Subjectivity. Springer. ISBN 978-3-642-25617-2. <a href="https://books.google.com/books?id=W2a4BAAAQBAJ&pg=PA67" target="_blank">https://books.google.com/books?id=W2a4BAAAQBAJ&pg=PA67</a> <a href="#fnref:14" class="footnote-back-ref">↩</a></li>
<li id="fn:15">Orsi 2015, p. 1Rescher 1969, p. 1 - Orsi, Francesco (2015). Value Theory. Bloomsbury Publishing. ISBN 978-1-4725-2408-9. <a href="https://books.google.com/books?id=cc3cBAAAQBAJ&pg=PA1" target="_blank">https://books.google.com/books?id=cc3cBAAAQBAJ&pg=PA1</a> <a href="#fnref:15" class="footnote-back-ref">↩</a></li>
<li id="fn:16">Some philosophers, such as G. E. M. Anscombe, Philippa Foot, and Iris Murdoch, have argued that there are no pure thin evaluative terms.[17] <a href="/wiki/G._E._M._Anscombe" target="_blank">/wiki/G._E._M._Anscombe</a> <a href="#fnref:16" class="footnote-back-ref">↩</a></li>
<li id="fn:17">Orsi 2015, pp. 2–3Hirose & Olson 2015, p. 3 - Orsi, Francesco (2015). Value Theory. Bloomsbury Publishing. ISBN 978-1-4725-2408-9. <a href="https://books.google.com/books?id=cc3cBAAAQBAJ&pg=PA1" target="_blank">https://books.google.com/books?id=cc3cBAAAQBAJ&pg=PA1</a> <a href="#fnref:17" class="footnote-back-ref">↩</a></li>
<li id="fn:18">Schroeder 2021, § 1.2 Good, Better, Bad, § 2.3 Incommensurability/IncomparabilityOrsi 2015, pp. 122–123Tappolet 2015, p. 82Frankena 2006, pp. 636–637 - Schroeder, Mark (2021). "Value Theory". The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Metaphysics Research Lab, Stanford University. Archived from the original on 27 June 2013. Retrieved 26 August 2024. <a href="https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/value-theory/" target="_blank">https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/value-theory/</a> <a href="#fnref:18" class="footnote-back-ref">↩</a></li>
<li id="fn:19">Rescher 1969, pp. 61–62Frankena 2006, pp. 636–637 - Rescher, Nicholas (1969). Introduction to Value Theory. Prentice-Hall. OCLC 1070925450. <a href="https://search.worldcat.org/oclc/1070925450" target="_blank">https://search.worldcat.org/oclc/1070925450</a> <a href="#fnref:19" class="footnote-back-ref">↩</a></li>
<li id="fn:20">Orsi 2015, pp. 8–9Schroeder 2021, § 3. Relation to the Deontic - Orsi, Francesco (2015). Value Theory. Bloomsbury Publishing. ISBN 978-1-4725-2408-9. <a href="https://books.google.com/books?id=cc3cBAAAQBAJ&pg=PA1" target="_blank">https://books.google.com/books?id=cc3cBAAAQBAJ&pg=PA1</a> <a href="#fnref:20" class="footnote-back-ref">↩</a></li>
<li id="fn:21">Hurka 2006, pp. 357–358 - Hurka, Thomas (2006). "13. Value Theory". In Copp, David (ed.). The Oxford Handbook of Ethical Theory. Oxford University Press. pp. 357–379. ISBN 978-0-19-514779-7. <a href="https://books.google.com/books?id=K44RDAAAQBAJ&pg=PA1" target="_blank">https://books.google.com/books?id=K44RDAAAQBAJ&pg=PA1</a> <a href="#fnref:21" class="footnote-back-ref">↩</a></li>
<li id="fn:22">Orsi 2015, pp. 8–9Schroeder 2021, § 3. Relation to the DeonticHurka 2006, pp. 357–358 - Orsi, Francesco (2015). Value Theory. Bloomsbury Publishing. ISBN 978-1-4725-2408-9. <a href="https://books.google.com/books?id=cc3cBAAAQBAJ&pg=PA1" target="_blank">https://books.google.com/books?id=cc3cBAAAQBAJ&pg=PA1</a> <a href="#fnref:22" class="footnote-back-ref">↩</a></li>
<li id="fn:23">Hurka 2006a, pp. 719–720Schroeder 2021, § 2.1 Intrinsic ValueRønnow-Rasmussen 2015, pp. 29–30Zimmerman & Bradley 2019, Lead section - Hurka, Thomas (2006a). "Intrinsic Value". In Borchert, Donald M. (ed.). Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Vol. 4 (2nd ed.). Macmillan. pp. 719–720. ISBN 978-0-02-866072-1. <a href="#fnref:23" class="footnote-back-ref">↩</a></li>
<li id="fn:24">Hurka 2006a, pp. 719–720Zimmerman & Bradley 2019, § 6. What Is Extrinsic Value? - Hurka, Thomas (2006a). "Intrinsic Value". In Borchert, Donald M. (ed.). Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Vol. 4 (2nd ed.). Macmillan. pp. 719–720. ISBN 978-0-02-866072-1. <a href="#fnref:24" class="footnote-back-ref">↩</a></li>
<li id="fn:25">Zimmerman & Bradley 2019, § 2. What Is Intrinsic Value?Rønnow-Rasmussen 2015, pp. 30–31 - Zimmerman, Michael J.; Bradley, Ben (2019). "Intrinsic vs. Extrinsic Value". The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Metaphysics Research Lab, Stanford University. Archived from the original on 22 September 2024. Retrieved 29 August 2024. <a href="https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/value-intrinsic-extrinsic/" target="_blank">https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/value-intrinsic-extrinsic/</a> <a href="#fnref:25" class="footnote-back-ref">↩</a></li>
<li id="fn:26">Critics of this thought experiment argue that it depends on controversial assumptions about the nature of intrinsic value and is not applicable to all cases.[27] <a href="#fnref:26" class="footnote-back-ref">↩</a></li>
<li id="fn:27">Zimmerman & Bradley 2019, § 1. What Has Intrinsic Value?Schroeder 2021, § 2.1 Intrinsic ValueHeathwood 2015, p. 140 - Zimmerman, Michael J.; Bradley, Ben (2019). "Intrinsic vs. Extrinsic Value". The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Metaphysics Research Lab, Stanford University. Archived from the original on 22 September 2024. Retrieved 29 August 2024. <a href="https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/value-intrinsic-extrinsic/" target="_blank">https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/value-intrinsic-extrinsic/</a> <a href="#fnref:27" class="footnote-back-ref">↩</a></li>
<li id="fn:28">Schellekens 2010, p. 38Vilkka 2021, p. 32 - Schellekens, Elisabeth (2010). Aesthetics and Morality. Bloomsbury Publishing. ISBN 978-1-4411-2298-8. <a href="https://books.google.com/books?id=LB4SBwAAQBAJ&pg=PA38" target="_blank">https://books.google.com/books?id=LB4SBwAAQBAJ&pg=PA38</a> <a href="#fnref:28" class="footnote-back-ref">↩</a></li>
<li id="fn:29">Zimmerman & Bradley 2019, § 6. What Is Extrinsic Value?Zimmerman 2001, p. 253 - Zimmerman, Michael J.; Bradley, Ben (2019). "Intrinsic vs. Extrinsic Value". The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Metaphysics Research Lab, Stanford University. Archived from the original on 22 September 2024. Retrieved 29 August 2024. <a href="https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/value-intrinsic-extrinsic/" target="_blank">https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/value-intrinsic-extrinsic/</a> <a href="#fnref:29" class="footnote-back-ref">↩</a></li>
<li id="fn:30">Zimmerman & Bradley 2019, § 6. What Is Extrinsic Value?Zimmerman 2001, p. 252 - Zimmerman, Michael J.; Bradley, Ben (2019). "Intrinsic vs. Extrinsic Value". The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Metaphysics Research Lab, Stanford University. Archived from the original on 22 September 2024. Retrieved 29 August 2024. <a href="https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/value-intrinsic-extrinsic/" target="_blank">https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/value-intrinsic-extrinsic/</a> <a href="#fnref:30" class="footnote-back-ref">↩</a></li>
<li id="fn:31">Schroeder 2021, § 2.1 Intrinsic ValueZimmerman & Bradley 2019, § 3. Is There Such a Thing As Intrinsic Value At All?, § 6. What Is Extrinsic Value?Rønnow-Rasmussen 2015, pp. 29–30 - Schroeder, Mark (2021). "Value Theory". The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Metaphysics Research Lab, Stanford University. Archived from the original on 27 June 2013. Retrieved 26 August 2024. <a href="https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/value-theory/" target="_blank">https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/value-theory/</a> <a href="#fnref:31" class="footnote-back-ref">↩</a></li>
<li id="fn:32">In the social sciences, some works rely on the concept of relational value to understand the value of the relationship between humans and nature. According to this view, relational value is a unique type of value that is neither intrinsic nor instrumental.[33] <a href="/wiki/Social_sciences" target="_blank">/wiki/Social_sciences</a> <a href="#fnref:32" class="footnote-back-ref">↩</a></li>
<li id="fn:33">Orsi 2015, pp. 45–46Schroeder 2021, § 1. Basic Questions - Orsi, Francesco (2015). Value Theory. Bloomsbury Publishing. ISBN 978-1-4725-2408-9. <a href="https://books.google.com/books?id=cc3cBAAAQBAJ&pg=PA1" target="_blank">https://books.google.com/books?id=cc3cBAAAQBAJ&pg=PA1</a> <a href="#fnref:33" class="footnote-back-ref">↩</a></li>
<li id="fn:34">Orsi 2015, pp. 3–4Schroeder 2021, § 1. Basic QuestionsZimmerman 2015, pp. 13–14 - Orsi, Francesco (2015). Value Theory. Bloomsbury Publishing. ISBN 978-1-4725-2408-9. <a href="https://books.google.com/books?id=cc3cBAAAQBAJ&pg=PA1" target="_blank">https://books.google.com/books?id=cc3cBAAAQBAJ&pg=PA1</a> <a href="#fnref:34" class="footnote-back-ref">↩</a></li>
<li id="fn:35">Silverstein 2016, p. 227 - Silverstein, Matthew (2016). "Teleology and Normativity". In Shafer-Landau, Russ (ed.). Oxford Studies in Metaethics 11. Oxford University Press. pp. 214–240. ISBN 978-0-19-878464-7. <a href="https://books.google.com/books?id=96qkDAAAQBAJ&pg=PA227" target="_blank">https://books.google.com/books?id=96qkDAAAQBAJ&pg=PA227</a> <a href="#fnref:35" class="footnote-back-ref">↩</a></li>
<li id="fn:36">Prudential value is a closely related concept signifying what is good for a person.[37] <a href="/wiki/Prudential_value" target="_blank">/wiki/Prudential_value</a> <a href="#fnref:36" class="footnote-back-ref">↩</a></li>
<li id="fn:37">Orsi 2015, pp. 63–64Schroeder 2021, § 1. Basic QuestionsRønnow-Rasmussen 2011, pp. 1–2 - Orsi, Francesco (2015). Value Theory. Bloomsbury Publishing. ISBN 978-1-4725-2408-9. <a href="https://books.google.com/books?id=cc3cBAAAQBAJ&pg=PA1" target="_blank">https://books.google.com/books?id=cc3cBAAAQBAJ&pg=PA1</a> <a href="#fnref:37" class="footnote-back-ref">↩</a></li>
<li id="fn:38">Schroeder 2021, § 1.1.1 Good Simpliciter and Good ForOrsi 2015, pp. 63–65 - Schroeder, Mark (2021). "Value Theory". The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Metaphysics Research Lab, Stanford University. Archived from the original on 27 June 2013. Retrieved 26 August 2024. <a href="https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/value-theory/" target="_blank">https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/value-theory/</a> <a href="#fnref:38" class="footnote-back-ref">↩</a></li>
<li id="fn:39">Consequentialism is a theory in normative ethics. It says that whether an act is right depends on its consequences.[40] <a href="/wiki/Normative_ethics" target="_blank">/wiki/Normative_ethics</a> <a href="#fnref:39" class="footnote-back-ref">↩</a></li>
<li id="fn:40">Orsi 2015, pp. 73–74Schroeder 2021, § 3.3 Agent-Relative Value?Cullity 2015, pp. 96–97 - Orsi, Francesco (2015). Value Theory. Bloomsbury Publishing. ISBN 978-1-4725-2408-9. <a href="https://books.google.com/books?id=cc3cBAAAQBAJ&pg=PA1" target="_blank">https://books.google.com/books?id=cc3cBAAAQBAJ&pg=PA1</a> <a href="#fnref:40" class="footnote-back-ref">↩</a></li>
<li id="fn:41">Orsi 2015, pp. 45–46, 61Schroeder 2021, § 1.1.2 Attributive Good - Orsi, Francesco (2015). Value Theory. Bloomsbury Publishing. ISBN 978-1-4725-2408-9. <a href="https://books.google.com/books?id=cc3cBAAAQBAJ&pg=PA1" target="_blank">https://books.google.com/books?id=cc3cBAAAQBAJ&pg=PA1</a> <a href="#fnref:41" class="footnote-back-ref">↩</a></li>
<li id="fn:42">Rescher 1969, pp. 13–14 - Rescher, Nicholas (1969). Introduction to Value Theory. Prentice-Hall. OCLC 1070925450. <a href="https://search.worldcat.org/oclc/1070925450" target="_blank">https://search.worldcat.org/oclc/1070925450</a> <a href="#fnref:42" class="footnote-back-ref">↩</a></li>
<li id="fn:43">Rescher 1969, pp. 15–16, 18Pradhan 2024, p. 142Hartman 2011, p. 306 - Rescher, Nicholas (1969). Introduction to Value Theory. Prentice-Hall. OCLC 1070925450. <a href="https://search.worldcat.org/oclc/1070925450" target="_blank">https://search.worldcat.org/oclc/1070925450</a> <a href="#fnref:43" class="footnote-back-ref">↩</a></li>
<li id="fn:44">In scholastic philosophy, they are known as transcendentals and considered fundamental aspects of being.[45] <a href="/wiki/Scholastic_philosophy" target="_blank">/wiki/Scholastic_philosophy</a> <a href="#fnref:44" class="footnote-back-ref">↩</a></li>
<li id="fn:45">Li 2014, pp. 80–81Ollig 1998, Lead sectionMartin 2016, pp. 3–5, 42–43 - Li, Deshun (2014). Value Theory: A Research into Subjectivity. Springer. ISBN 978-3-642-25617-2. <a href="https://books.google.com/books?id=W2a4BAAAQBAJ&pg=PA67" target="_blank">https://books.google.com/books?id=W2a4BAAAQBAJ&pg=PA67</a> <a href="#fnref:45" class="footnote-back-ref">↩</a></li>
<li id="fn:46">Martin 2016, pp. 4–5Kriegel 2018, pp. 96–97, 149, 253, 288 - Martin, John Levi (2016). "The Birth of the True, the Good, and the Beautiful: Toward an Investigation of the Structures of Social Thought". Current Perspectives in Social Theory. 35: 3–56. doi:10.1108/S0278-120420160000035001. ISBN 978-1-78635-470-9. <a href="https://doi.org/10.1108%2FS0278-120420160000035001" target="_blank">https://doi.org/10.1108%2FS0278-120420160000035001</a> <a href="#fnref:46" class="footnote-back-ref">↩</a></li>
<li id="fn:47">Orsi 2015, p. 44Bahm 1993, pp. 60–63Schroeder 2021, § 2.1.1 What is Intrinsic Value?Rønnow-Rasmussen 2015, pp. 39–40 - Orsi, Francesco (2015). Value Theory. Bloomsbury Publishing. ISBN 978-1-4725-2408-9. <a href="https://books.google.com/books?id=cc3cBAAAQBAJ&pg=PA1" target="_blank">https://books.google.com/books?id=cc3cBAAAQBAJ&pg=PA1</a> <a href="#fnref:47" class="footnote-back-ref">↩</a></li>
<li id="fn:48">Zagzebski 2004, p. 11Oddie 2013, Lead section - Zagzebski, Linda (2004). Divine Motivation Theory. Cambridge University Press. ISBN 978-0-521-53576-2. <a href="https://books.google.com/books?id=KhqPito92b8C&pg=PA11" target="_blank">https://books.google.com/books?id=KhqPito92b8C&pg=PA11</a> <a href="#fnref:48" class="footnote-back-ref">↩</a></li>
<li id="fn:49">If this position limits itself to the moral realm, it is known as moral realism, an influential position in ethics.[49] <a href="/wiki/Moral_realism" target="_blank">/wiki/Moral_realism</a> <a href="#fnref:49" class="footnote-back-ref">↩</a></li>
<li id="fn:50">Frankena 2006, pp. 639–640Oddie 2013, Lead section - Frankena, William K. (2006). "Value and Valuation". In Borchert, Donald M. (ed.). Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Vol. 9 (2nd ed.). Macmillan. pp. 636–641. ISBN 978-0-02-865789-9. <a href="#fnref:50" class="footnote-back-ref">↩</a></li>
<li id="fn:51">Zagzebski 2004, pp. 11–12 - Zagzebski, Linda (2004). Divine Motivation Theory. Cambridge University Press. ISBN 978-0-521-53576-2. <a href="https://books.google.com/books?id=KhqPito92b8C&pg=PA11" target="_blank">https://books.google.com/books?id=KhqPito92b8C&pg=PA11</a> <a href="#fnref:51" class="footnote-back-ref">↩</a></li>
<li id="fn:52">Frankena 2006, pp. 639–640Oddie 2013, Lead section, § Do Value Claims Have Truth Makers?Oliver 1998 - Frankena, William K. (2006). "Value and Valuation". In Borchert, Donald M. (ed.). Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Vol. 9 (2nd ed.). Macmillan. pp. 636–641. ISBN 978-0-02-865789-9. <a href="#fnref:52" class="footnote-back-ref">↩</a></li>
<li id="fn:53">Frankena 2006, pp. 639–640Lutz 2023, Lead section, § 1. What Is Moral Naturalism?DeLapp, § 4a. Moral RealismsFitzPatrick 2011, pp. 7–8Ridge 2019, Lead sectionOliver 1998 - Frankena, William K. (2006). "Value and Valuation". In Borchert, Donald M. (ed.). Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Vol. 9 (2nd ed.). Macmillan. pp. 636–641. ISBN 978-0-02-865789-9. <a href="#fnref:53" class="footnote-back-ref">↩</a></li>
<li id="fn:54">Orsi 2015, p. 35Oddie 2013, Lead sectionBradley 2006, pp. 111–112Oliveira 2016, § 1. Introduction - Orsi, Francesco (2015). Value Theory. Bloomsbury Publishing. ISBN 978-1-4725-2408-9. <a href="https://books.google.com/books?id=cc3cBAAAQBAJ&pg=PA1" target="_blank">https://books.google.com/books?id=cc3cBAAAQBAJ&pg=PA1</a> <a href="#fnref:54" class="footnote-back-ref">↩</a></li>
<li id="fn:55">Orsi 2015, p. 35Oddie 2013, Lead sectionBradley 2006, pp. 111–112, 115Oliveira 2016, § 1. Introduction - Orsi, Francesco (2015). Value Theory. Bloomsbury Publishing. ISBN 978-1-4725-2408-9. <a href="https://books.google.com/books?id=cc3cBAAAQBAJ&pg=PA1" target="_blank">https://books.google.com/books?id=cc3cBAAAQBAJ&pg=PA1</a> <a href="#fnref:55" class="footnote-back-ref">↩</a></li>
<li id="fn:56">Orsi 2015, pp. 35–36, 130–131Bradley 2006, pp. 111–112 - Orsi, Francesco (2015). Value Theory. Bloomsbury Publishing. ISBN 978-1-4725-2408-9. <a href="https://books.google.com/books?id=cc3cBAAAQBAJ&pg=PA1" target="_blank">https://books.google.com/books?id=cc3cBAAAQBAJ&pg=PA1</a> <a href="#fnref:56" class="footnote-back-ref">↩</a></li>
<li id="fn:57">Oddie 2013, Lead section, § Are Value Claims Truth Evaluable?, § Value Realism by Degrees: a Flow Chart - Oddie, Graham (2013). "Value Realism". The International Encyclopedia of Ethics (1st ed.). Wiley. doi:10.1002/9781444367072.wbiee588. ISBN 978-1-4051-8641-4. Archived from the original on 2024-09-22. Retrieved 2024-09-09. <a href="https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/abs/10.1002/9781444367072.wbiee588" target="_blank">https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/abs/10.1002/9781444367072.wbiee588</a> <a href="#fnref:57" class="footnote-back-ref">↩</a></li>
<li id="fn:58">This view is sometimes called radical nihilism.[58] <a href="/wiki/Nihilism" target="_blank">/wiki/Nihilism</a> <a href="#fnref:58" class="footnote-back-ref">↩</a></li>
<li id="fn:59">This means that value statements are neither true nor false.[59] <a href="#fnref:59" class="footnote-back-ref">↩</a></li>
<li id="fn:60">Oddie 2013, § Are Value Claims Truth Evaluable?Tappolet 2015, p. 80DeNicola 2019, p. 267Oliver 1998 - Oddie, Graham (2013). "Value Realism". The International Encyclopedia of Ethics (1st ed.). Wiley. doi:10.1002/9781444367072.wbiee588. ISBN 978-1-4051-8641-4. Archived from the original on 2024-09-22. Retrieved 2024-09-09. <a href="https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/abs/10.1002/9781444367072.wbiee588" target="_blank">https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/abs/10.1002/9781444367072.wbiee588</a> <a href="#fnref:60" class="footnote-back-ref">↩</a></li>
<li id="fn:61">Projectivism is a closely related view holding that values are projections of emotions onto the world.[61] <a href="/wiki/Projectivism" target="_blank">/wiki/Projectivism</a> <a href="#fnref:61" class="footnote-back-ref">↩</a></li>
<li id="fn:62">Oddie 2013, § Do Value Claims Have Truth Makers?Sayre-McCord 1988, p. 10Zagzebski 2004, p. 14Oliver 1998 - Oddie, Graham (2013). "Value Realism". The International Encyclopedia of Ethics (1st ed.). Wiley. doi:10.1002/9781444367072.wbiee588. ISBN 978-1-4051-8641-4. Archived from the original on 2024-09-22. Retrieved 2024-09-09. <a href="https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/abs/10.1002/9781444367072.wbiee588" target="_blank">https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/abs/10.1002/9781444367072.wbiee588</a> <a href="#fnref:62" class="footnote-back-ref">↩</a></li>
<li id="fn:63">Oddie 2013, § Are the Value Facts Mind Independent?Oddie 2015, pp. 60–62Mander 2016, § 2.3 An Overview - Oddie, Graham (2013). "Value Realism". The International Encyclopedia of Ethics (1st ed.). Wiley. doi:10.1002/9781444367072.wbiee588. ISBN 978-1-4051-8641-4. Archived from the original on 2024-09-22. Retrieved 2024-09-09. <a href="https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/abs/10.1002/9781444367072.wbiee588" target="_blank">https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/abs/10.1002/9781444367072.wbiee588</a> <a href="#fnref:63" class="footnote-back-ref">↩</a></li>
<li id="fn:64">Onof, §6c. An Ethical DimensionLandau 2012, pp. 1–2 - Onof, Christian J. "Sartre, Jean Paul: Existentialism". Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Archived from the original on 26 June 2024. Retrieved 5 September 2024. <a href="https://iep.utm.edu/sartre-ex/" target="_blank">https://iep.utm.edu/sartre-ex/</a> <a href="#fnref:64" class="footnote-back-ref">↩</a></li>
<li id="fn:65">Oddie 2013, § Are the Value Facts Mind Independent?Oddie 2015, pp. 60–62 - Oddie, Graham (2013). "Value Realism". The International Encyclopedia of Ethics (1st ed.). Wiley. doi:10.1002/9781444367072.wbiee588. ISBN 978-1-4051-8641-4. Archived from the original on 2024-09-22. Retrieved 2024-09-09. <a href="https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/abs/10.1002/9781444367072.wbiee588" target="_blank">https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/abs/10.1002/9781444367072.wbiee588</a> <a href="#fnref:65" class="footnote-back-ref">↩</a></li>
<li id="fn:66">Oddie 2013, Lead section, § Are the Value Facts Irreducible?, § Value Realism by Degrees: a Flow ChartOddie 2015, pp. 67–68Oliver 1998Howard 2023, Lead section, § 1.5 Buck PassingSuikkanen 2009, pp. 768–769 - Oddie, Graham (2013). "Value Realism". The International Encyclopedia of Ethics (1st ed.). Wiley. doi:10.1002/9781444367072.wbiee588. ISBN 978-1-4051-8641-4. Archived from the original on 2024-09-22. Retrieved 2024-09-09. <a href="https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/abs/10.1002/9781444367072.wbiee588" target="_blank">https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/abs/10.1002/9781444367072.wbiee588</a> <a href="#fnref:66" class="footnote-back-ref">↩</a></li>
<li id="fn:67">Hurka 2006, p. 357Oliveira 2016, § 1. IntroductionKershnar 2010, p. 37Heathwood 2015, p. 140 - Hurka, Thomas (2006). "13. Value Theory". In Copp, David (ed.). The Oxford Handbook of Ethical Theory. Oxford University Press. pp. 357–379. ISBN 978-0-19-514779-7. <a href="https://books.google.com/books?id=K44RDAAAQBAJ&pg=PA1" target="_blank">https://books.google.com/books?id=K44RDAAAQBAJ&pg=PA1</a> <a href="#fnref:67" class="footnote-back-ref">↩</a></li>
<li id="fn:68">This view is sometimes called axiological hedonism to distinguish it from related theories under this label.[68] <a href="#fnref:68" class="footnote-back-ref">↩</a></li>
<li id="fn:69">Hurka 2006, p. 359Heathwood 2015, p. 140 - Hurka, Thomas (2006). "13. Value Theory". In Copp, David (ed.). The Oxford Handbook of Ethical Theory. Oxford University Press. pp. 357–379. ISBN 978-0-19-514779-7. <a href="https://books.google.com/books?id=K44RDAAAQBAJ&pg=PA1" target="_blank">https://books.google.com/books?id=K44RDAAAQBAJ&pg=PA1</a> <a href="#fnref:69" class="footnote-back-ref">↩</a></li>
<li id="fn:70">Hurka 2006, pp. 359–360Moore 2019, § 2. Ethical Hedonism - Hurka, Thomas (2006). "13. Value Theory". In Copp, David (ed.). The Oxford Handbook of Ethical Theory. Oxford University Press. pp. 357–379. ISBN 978-0-19-514779-7. <a href="https://books.google.com/books?id=K44RDAAAQBAJ&pg=PA1" target="_blank">https://books.google.com/books?id=K44RDAAAQBAJ&pg=PA1</a> <a href="#fnref:70" class="footnote-back-ref">↩</a></li>
<li id="fn:71">Qualitative hedonists argue that the quality of pleasure is an additional factor influencing its value besides intensity and duration. Some distinguish higher pleasures of the mind, like enjoying fine art and philosophy, from lower pleasures of the body, like enjoying food and drink.[71] <a href="#fnref:71" class="footnote-back-ref">↩</a></li>
<li id="fn:72">Hurka 2006, p. 360 - Hurka, Thomas (2006). "13. Value Theory". In Copp, David (ed.). The Oxford Handbook of Ethical Theory. Oxford University Press. pp. 357–379. ISBN 978-0-19-514779-7. <a href="https://books.google.com/books?id=K44RDAAAQBAJ&pg=PA1" target="_blank">https://books.google.com/books?id=K44RDAAAQBAJ&pg=PA1</a> <a href="#fnref:72" class="footnote-back-ref">↩</a></li>
<li id="fn:73">Hurka 2006, p. 361Moore 2019, § 2.3 Other Arguments Against Ethical Hedonism - Hurka, Thomas (2006). "13. Value Theory". In Copp, David (ed.). The Oxford Handbook of Ethical Theory. Oxford University Press. pp. 357–379. ISBN 978-0-19-514779-7. <a href="https://books.google.com/books?id=K44RDAAAQBAJ&pg=PA1" target="_blank">https://books.google.com/books?id=K44RDAAAQBAJ&pg=PA1</a> <a href="#fnref:73" class="footnote-back-ref">↩</a></li>
<li id="fn:74">Crisp 2021, Lead section, § 5.1 WelfarismHall & Tiberius 2015, pp. 175–176Nebel 2024, § IntroductionHooker 2015, pp. 15–16 - Crisp, Roger (2021). "Well-Being". The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Metaphysics Research Lab, Stanford University. Retrieved 15 December 2024. <a href="https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/well-being/" target="_blank">https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/well-being/</a> <a href="#fnref:74" class="footnote-back-ref">↩</a></li>
<li id="fn:75">Some theorists use the terms desire satisfaction and desire fulfillment as synonyms while others distinguish between them. According to the latter view, desire satisfaction is a subjective state involving a possibly false belief that a desire is satisfied. Desire fulfillment is an objective state present if the desired outcome actually exists, even if the person does not know about it.[75] <a href="#fnref:75" class="footnote-back-ref">↩</a></li>
<li id="fn:76">Some desire theories aim to explain goodness in general while others restrict themselves to goodness for a person.[76] <a href="#fnref:76" class="footnote-back-ref">↩</a></li>
<li id="fn:77">Hurka 2006, pp. 361–362, 364Heathwood 2015, p. 140 - Hurka, Thomas (2006). "13. Value Theory". In Copp, David (ed.). The Oxford Handbook of Ethical Theory. Oxford University Press. pp. 357–379. ISBN 978-0-19-514779-7. <a href="https://books.google.com/books?id=K44RDAAAQBAJ&pg=PA1" target="_blank">https://books.google.com/books?id=K44RDAAAQBAJ&pg=PA1</a> <a href="#fnref:77" class="footnote-back-ref">↩</a></li>
<li id="fn:78">Hurka 2006, pp. 362–363 - Hurka, Thomas (2006). "13. Value Theory". In Copp, David (ed.). The Oxford Handbook of Ethical Theory. Oxford University Press. pp. 357–379. ISBN 978-0-19-514779-7. <a href="https://books.google.com/books?id=K44RDAAAQBAJ&pg=PA1" target="_blank">https://books.google.com/books?id=K44RDAAAQBAJ&pg=PA1</a> <a href="#fnref:78" class="footnote-back-ref">↩</a></li>
<li id="fn:79">Hurka 2006, pp. 362–363Heathwood 2016, pp. 138–140Schroeder 2021, § 3.2 Fitting AttitudesScanlon 1993, pp. 186–187 - Hurka, Thomas (2006). "13. Value Theory". In Copp, David (ed.). The Oxford Handbook of Ethical Theory. Oxford University Press. pp. 357–379. ISBN 978-0-19-514779-7. <a href="https://books.google.com/books?id=K44RDAAAQBAJ&pg=PA1" target="_blank">https://books.google.com/books?id=K44RDAAAQBAJ&pg=PA1</a> <a href="#fnref:79" class="footnote-back-ref">↩</a></li>
<li id="fn:80">Shea & Kintz 2022, p. 461Hurka 2006, pp. 364–366Wall 2021, Lead sectionHeathwood 2015, p. 140 - Shea, Matthew; Kintz, James (2022). "A Thomistic Solution to the Deep Problem for Perfectionism". Utilitas. 34 (4): 461–477. doi:10.1017/S0953820822000346. <a href="https://doi.org/10.1017%2FS0953820822000346" target="_blank">https://doi.org/10.1017%2FS0953820822000346</a> <a href="#fnref:80" class="footnote-back-ref">↩</a></li>
<li id="fn:81">Hurka 2006, p. 364 - Hurka, Thomas (2006). "13. Value Theory". In Copp, David (ed.). The Oxford Handbook of Ethical Theory. Oxford University Press. pp. 357–379. ISBN 978-0-19-514779-7. <a href="https://books.google.com/books?id=K44RDAAAQBAJ&pg=PA1" target="_blank">https://books.google.com/books?id=K44RDAAAQBAJ&pg=PA1</a> <a href="#fnref:81" class="footnote-back-ref">↩</a></li>
<li id="fn:82">Hurka 2006, pp. 365–366Wall 2021, § 1. Perfectionism and Value Theory - Hurka, Thomas (2006). "13. Value Theory". In Copp, David (ed.). The Oxford Handbook of Ethical Theory. Oxford University Press. pp. 357–379. ISBN 978-0-19-514779-7. <a href="https://books.google.com/books?id=K44RDAAAQBAJ&pg=PA1" target="_blank">https://books.google.com/books?id=K44RDAAAQBAJ&pg=PA1</a> <a href="#fnref:82" class="footnote-back-ref">↩</a></li>
<li id="fn:83">Wall 2021, § 1. Perfectionism and Value TheoryGill 2024, p. 85 - Wall, Steven (2021). "Perfectionism in Moral and Political Philosophy". The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Metaphysics Research Lab, Stanford University. Archived from the original on 22 September 2024. Retrieved 6 September 2024. <a href="https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/perfectionism-moral/" target="_blank">https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/perfectionism-moral/</a> <a href="#fnref:83" class="footnote-back-ref">↩</a></li>
<li id="fn:84">Heathwood 2015, pp. 136–137, 139–140Mason 2023, Lead sectionSchroeder 2021, § 2.2 Monism/PluralismHurka 2006, pp. 358–359 - Heathwood, Chris (2015). "Monism and Pluralism about Value". In Hirose, Iwao; Olson, Jonas (eds.). The Oxford Handbook of Value Theory. Oxford University Press. pp. 136–157. ISBN 978-0-19-022143-0. <a href="https://books.google.com/books?id=uvzVBgAAQBAJ&pg=PA1" target="_blank">https://books.google.com/books?id=uvzVBgAAQBAJ&pg=PA1</a> <a href="#fnref:84" class="footnote-back-ref">↩</a></li>
<li id="fn:85">Mason 2023, Lead sectionSchroeder 2021, § 2.2 Monism/PluralismHeathwood 2015, pp. 145–146 - Mason, Elinor (2023). "Value Pluralism". The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Metaphysics Research Lab, Stanford University. Archived from the original on 23 June 2023. Retrieved 6 September 2024. <a href="https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/value-pluralism/" target="_blank">https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/value-pluralism/</a> <a href="#fnref:85" class="footnote-back-ref">↩</a></li>
<li id="fn:86">Mason 2023, § 2. The Attraction of PluralismSchroeder 2021, § 2.2 Monism/Pluralism - Mason, Elinor (2023). "Value Pluralism". The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Metaphysics Research Lab, Stanford University. Archived from the original on 23 June 2023. Retrieved 6 September 2024. <a href="https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/value-pluralism/" target="_blank">https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/value-pluralism/</a> <a href="#fnref:86" class="footnote-back-ref">↩</a></li>
<li id="fn:87">Schroeder 2021, § 2.2.2 Revisionary Commitments? - Schroeder, Mark (2021). "Value Theory". The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Metaphysics Research Lab, Stanford University. Archived from the original on 27 June 2013. Retrieved 26 August 2024. <a href="https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/value-theory/" target="_blank">https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/value-theory/</a> <a href="#fnref:87" class="footnote-back-ref">↩</a></li>
<li id="fn:88">Mason 2023, § 4. Pluralism and Rational ChoiceHsieh & Andersson 2021, Lead section, § 4. Deliberation and Choice - Mason, Elinor (2023). "Value Pluralism". The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Metaphysics Research Lab, Stanford University. Archived from the original on 23 June 2023. Retrieved 6 September 2024. <a href="https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/value-pluralism/" target="_blank">https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/value-pluralism/</a> <a href="#fnref:88" class="footnote-back-ref">↩</a></li>
<li id="fn:89">Kinneging 2011, pp. 206–207Perrin 1991, pp. 69, 73–74, 76 - Kinneging, Andreas (2011). "Hartmann's Platonic Ethics". In Poli, Roberto; Scognamiglio, Carlo; Tremblay, Frederic (eds.). The Philosophy of Nicolai Hartmann. Walter de Gruyter. pp. 195–220. ISBN 978-3-11-025418-1. <a href="https://books.google.com/books?id=1Qya55bssVQC&pg=PA1" target="_blank">https://books.google.com/books?id=1Qya55bssVQC&pg=PA1</a> <a href="#fnref:89" class="footnote-back-ref">↩</a></li>
<li id="fn:90">Perrin 1991, pp. 69, 73–74, 76–80Davis & Steinbock 2024, § 3. Value Personalism - Perrin, Ron (1991). Max Scheler's Concept of the Person: An Ethics Of Humanism. Springer. ISBN 978-1-349-21399-3. <a href="https://books.google.com/books?id=-6ewCwAAQBAJ&pg=PA1" target="_blank">https://books.google.com/books?id=-6ewCwAAQBAJ&pg=PA1</a> <a href="#fnref:90" class="footnote-back-ref">↩</a></li>
<li id="fn:91">In some places, Scheler talks about four levels instead of five: sensory, vital, spiritual, and holy.[92] <a href="#fnref:91" class="footnote-back-ref">↩</a></li>
<li id="fn:92">Heathwood 2015, pp. 142–143Hsieh & Andersson 2021, § 1.2 Incommensurable or Incomparable? - Heathwood, Chris (2015). "Monism and Pluralism about Value". In Hirose, Iwao; Olson, Jonas (eds.). The Oxford Handbook of Value Theory. Oxford University Press. pp. 136–157. ISBN 978-0-19-022143-0. <a href="https://books.google.com/books?id=uvzVBgAAQBAJ&pg=PA1" target="_blank">https://books.google.com/books?id=uvzVBgAAQBAJ&pg=PA1</a> <a href="#fnref:92" class="footnote-back-ref">↩</a></li>
<li id="fn:93">More specifically, this implies that one value is not better than the other, not worse than the other, and not as good as the other.[94] <a href="#fnref:93" class="footnote-back-ref">↩</a></li>
<li id="fn:94">Mason 2023, § 4.4 Accepting IncomparabilityHsieh & Andersson 2021, § 3.2 Moral Dilemmas?Heathwood 2015, pp. 142–143 - Mason, Elinor (2023). "Value Pluralism". The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Metaphysics Research Lab, Stanford University. Archived from the original on 23 June 2023. Retrieved 6 September 2024. <a href="https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/value-pluralism/" target="_blank">https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/value-pluralism/</a> <a href="#fnref:94" class="footnote-back-ref">↩</a></li>
<li id="fn:95">Mason 2023, § 4.4 Accepting IncomparabilityHsieh & Andersson 2021, § 1.2 Incommensurable or Incomparable?Cherniss & Hardy 2023, § 4.1 Berlin’s Definition of Value Pluralism - Mason, Elinor (2023). "Value Pluralism". The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Metaphysics Research Lab, Stanford University. Archived from the original on 23 June 2023. Retrieved 6 September 2024. <a href="https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/value-pluralism/" target="_blank">https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/value-pluralism/</a> <a href="#fnref:95" class="footnote-back-ref">↩</a></li>
<li id="fn:96">Mason 2023, § 4. Pluralism and Rational ChoiceHsieh & Andersson 2021, § 1.2 Incommensurable or Incomparable? - Mason, Elinor (2023). "Value Pluralism". The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Metaphysics Research Lab, Stanford University. Archived from the original on 23 June 2023. Retrieved 6 September 2024. <a href="https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/value-pluralism/" target="_blank">https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/value-pluralism/</a> <a href="#fnref:96" class="footnote-back-ref">↩</a></li>
<li id="fn:97">Oddie 2001, pp. 313, 318Dancy 2004, p. 188 - Oddie, G. (2001). "Axiological Atomism". Australasian Journal of Philosophy. 79 (3): 313–332. doi:10.1080/713659262. <a href="https://doi.org/10.1080%2F713659262" target="_blank">https://doi.org/10.1080%2F713659262</a> <a href="#fnref:97" class="footnote-back-ref">↩</a></li>
<li id="fn:98">Oddie 2001, pp. 313, 318Dancy 2004, pp. 176–177 - Oddie, G. (2001). "Axiological Atomism". Australasian Journal of Philosophy. 79 (3): 313–332. doi:10.1080/713659262. <a href="https://doi.org/10.1080%2F713659262" target="_blank">https://doi.org/10.1080%2F713659262</a> <a href="#fnref:98" class="footnote-back-ref">↩</a></li>
<li id="fn:99">Orsi 2015, pp. 98–100Schroeder 2021aDancy 2004, pp. 176–177 - Orsi, Francesco (2015). Value Theory. Bloomsbury Publishing. ISBN 978-1-4725-2408-9. <a href="https://books.google.com/books?id=cc3cBAAAQBAJ&pg=PA1" target="_blank">https://books.google.com/books?id=cc3cBAAAQBAJ&pg=PA1</a> <a href="#fnref:99" class="footnote-back-ref">↩</a></li>
<li id="fn:100">Holtug 2015, pp. 267–268Peterson 2013, p. 147Hirose 2015, pp. 25–27 - Holtug, Nils (2015). "Theories of Value Aggregation: Utilitarianism, Egalitarianism, Prioritarianism". In Hirose, Iwao; Olson, Jonas (eds.). The Oxford Handbook of Value Theory. Oxford University Press. pp. 267–284. ISBN 978-0-19-022143-0. <a href="https://books.google.com/books?id=uvzVBgAAQBAJ&pg=PA1" target="_blank">https://books.google.com/books?id=uvzVBgAAQBAJ&pg=PA1</a> <a href="#fnref:100" class="footnote-back-ref">↩</a></li>
<li id="fn:101">Holtug 2015, p. 273Peterson 2013, p. 147Hirose 2015, pp. 25–27 - Holtug, Nils (2015). "Theories of Value Aggregation: Utilitarianism, Egalitarianism, Prioritarianism". In Hirose, Iwao; Olson, Jonas (eds.). The Oxford Handbook of Value Theory. Oxford University Press. pp. 267–284. ISBN 978-0-19-022143-0. <a href="https://books.google.com/books?id=uvzVBgAAQBAJ&pg=PA1" target="_blank">https://books.google.com/books?id=uvzVBgAAQBAJ&pg=PA1</a> <a href="#fnref:101" class="footnote-back-ref">↩</a></li>
<li id="fn:102">Holtug 2015, p. 273Peterson 2013, p. 147Hirose 2015, pp. 25–27 - Holtug, Nils (2015). "Theories of Value Aggregation: Utilitarianism, Egalitarianism, Prioritarianism". In Hirose, Iwao; Olson, Jonas (eds.). The Oxford Handbook of Value Theory. Oxford University Press. pp. 267–284. ISBN 978-0-19-022143-0. <a href="https://books.google.com/books?id=uvzVBgAAQBAJ&pg=PA1" target="_blank">https://books.google.com/books?id=uvzVBgAAQBAJ&pg=PA1</a> <a href="#fnref:102" class="footnote-back-ref">↩</a></li>
<li id="fn:103">Metz 2023, Lead sectionCowan 2020, pp. 25–26Groothuis 2020, pp. 160–162 - Metz, Thaddeus (2023). "The Meaning of Life". The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Metaphysics Research Lab, Stanford University. Retrieved 12 February 2025. <a href="https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/life-meaning/" target="_blank">https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/life-meaning/</a> <a href="#fnref:103" class="footnote-back-ref">↩</a></li>
<li id="fn:104">Metz 2023, § 3. NaturalismCowan 2020, pp. 25–26Yalom 2020, pp. 431–435 - Metz, Thaddeus (2023). "The Meaning of Life". The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Metaphysics Research Lab, Stanford University. Retrieved 12 February 2025. <a href="https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/life-meaning/" target="_blank">https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/life-meaning/</a> <a href="#fnref:104" class="footnote-back-ref">↩</a></li>
<li id="fn:105">Metz 2023, § 2. SupernaturalismGroothuis 2020, pp. 162–164Seachris, § 3. Theories of Meaning in Life - Metz, Thaddeus (2023). "The Meaning of Life". The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Metaphysics Research Lab, Stanford University. Retrieved 12 February 2025. <a href="https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/life-meaning/" target="_blank">https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/life-meaning/</a> <a href="#fnref:105" class="footnote-back-ref">↩</a></li>
<li id="fn:106">Metz 2023, 4. NihilismPratt, § 3. Existential NihilismCrosby 1998, § Existential NihilismGroothuis 2020, pp. 165–169Crosby 1988, pp. 30–32 - Metz, Thaddeus (2023). "The Meaning of Life". The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Metaphysics Research Lab, Stanford University. Retrieved 12 February 2025. <a href="https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/life-meaning/" target="_blank">https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/life-meaning/</a> <a href="#fnref:106" class="footnote-back-ref">↩</a></li>
<li id="fn:107">Edwards 2021, pp. 2–4Hartman 2011, pp. 104–105, 305–306 - Edwards, Rem B. (2021). "1. Introduction". Formal Axiology and Its Critics. Brill. pp. 1–8. ISBN 978-90-04-49596-8. JSTOR 10.1163/j.ctv20dsb9p.5. Archived from the original on 2024-09-08. Retrieved 2024-09-09. <a href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/10.1163/j.ctv20dsb9p.5" target="_blank">https://www.jstor.org/stable/10.1163/j.ctv20dsb9p.5</a> <a href="#fnref:107" class="footnote-back-ref">↩</a></li>
<li id="fn:108">Stratton-Lake 2020, § 1.1 IntuitionAudi 2004, pp. 2, 5Martin 2002, p. 166Li 2014, pp. 4–5Dabbagh 2022, p. 53 - Stratton-Lake, Philip (2020). "Intuitionism in Ethics". The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Metaphysics Research Lab, Stanford University. Archived from the original on 22 September 2024. Retrieved 14 September 2024. <a href="https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/intuitionism-ethics/" target="_blank">https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/intuitionism-ethics/</a> <a href="#fnref:108" class="footnote-back-ref">↩</a></li>
<li id="fn:109">Martin 2002, p. 166Zaibert 2018, pp. 37–38Brown & Fehige 2019, Lead SectionGoffi & Roux 2011, pp. 165, 168–169 - Martin, Robert M. (2002). The Philosopher's Dictionary (3rd ed.). Broadview Press. ISBN 978-1-55111-494-1. <a href="https://books.google.com/books?id=vNvXkFUbfM8C&pg=PA166" target="_blank">https://books.google.com/books?id=vNvXkFUbfM8C&pg=PA166</a> <a href="#fnref:109" class="footnote-back-ref">↩</a></li>
<li id="fn:110">Heathwood 2015, pp. 146–147Tiberius 2015, pp. 163–164 - Heathwood, Chris (2015). "Monism and Pluralism about Value". In Hirose, Iwao; Olson, Jonas (eds.). The Oxford Handbook of Value Theory. Oxford University Press. pp. 136–157. ISBN 978-0-19-022143-0. <a href="https://books.google.com/books?id=uvzVBgAAQBAJ&pg=PA1" target="_blank">https://books.google.com/books?id=uvzVBgAAQBAJ&pg=PA1</a> <a href="#fnref:110" class="footnote-back-ref">↩</a></li>
<li id="fn:111">Moore's isolation test is another influential thought experiment about intrinsic value.[26] <a href="#fnref:111" class="footnote-back-ref">↩</a></li>
<li id="fn:112">Davis & Steinbock 2024, § 3. Value PersonalismDirek 2014, pp. 371–372Grünberg 1990, pp. 199–201Hart 1997, pp. 1–2, 6–7 - Davis, Zachary; Steinbock, Anthony (2024). "Max Scheler". The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Metaphysics Research Lab, Stanford University. Archived from the original on 22 September 2024. Retrieved 8 September 2024. <a href="https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/scheler/" target="_blank">https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/scheler/</a> <a href="#fnref:112" class="footnote-back-ref">↩</a></li>
<li id="fn:113">Smith, § b. Phenomenological ReductionStaiti 2020, pp. 368–369 - Smith, Joel. "Phenomenology". Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Archived from the original on 25 May 2020. Retrieved 15 September 2024. <a href="https://iep.utm.edu/phenom/" target="_blank">https://iep.utm.edu/phenom/</a> <a href="#fnref:113" class="footnote-back-ref">↩</a></li>
<li id="fn:114">Moritz 1972, pp. 33–46Schroeder 2021, § Basic Questions - Moritz, Manfred (1972). "Axiology and Analysis". In Kuypers, K. (ed.). Human Sciences and the Problem of Values / Les Sciences Humaines et le Problème des Valeurs. Springer. pp. 33–46. doi:10.1007/978-94-010-2424-2_3. ISBN 978-94-010-2424-2. Archived from the original on 2024-09-15. Retrieved 2024-09-16. <a href="https://link.springer.com/chapter/10.1007/978-94-010-2424-2_3" target="_blank">https://link.springer.com/chapter/10.1007/978-94-010-2424-2_3</a> <a href="#fnref:114" class="footnote-back-ref">↩</a></li>
<li id="fn:115">Laskowski & Finlay 2017, pp. 537–539Chrisman 2016, p. 79 - Laskowski, Nicholas; Finlay, Stephen (2017). "34. Conceptual Analysis in Metaethics". In McPherson, Tristram; Plunkett, David (eds.). The Routledge Handbook of Metaethics. Routledge. pp. 536–551. ISBN 978-1-351-81791-2. <a href="https://philarchive.org/archive/LASCAI" target="_blank">https://philarchive.org/archive/LASCAI</a> <a href="#fnref:115" class="footnote-back-ref">↩</a></li>
<li id="fn:116">This problem is the main topic of Moore's controversial open-question argument.[115] <a href="/wiki/Open-question_argument" target="_blank">/wiki/Open-question_argument</a> <a href="#fnref:116" class="footnote-back-ref">↩</a></li>
<li id="fn:117">Schwartz & Cieciuch 2016, pp. 106, 108Hiles 2008, p. 53Karp 2000, Lead section - Schwartz, S. H.; Cieciuch, J. (2016). "Values". In Leong, F. T. L.; Bartram, D.; Cheung, F. M.; Geisinger, K. F.; Iliescu, D. (eds.). The ITC International Handbook of Testing and Assessment. Oxford University Press. ISBN 978-0-19-935694-2. <a href="#fnref:117" class="footnote-back-ref">↩</a></li>
<li id="fn:118">Schwartz & Cieciuch 2016, pp. 106–107Powe 2007, p. 123 - Schwartz, S. H.; Cieciuch, J. (2016). "Values". In Leong, F. T. L.; Bartram, D.; Cheung, F. M.; Geisinger, K. F.; Iliescu, D. (eds.). The ITC International Handbook of Testing and Assessment. Oxford University Press. ISBN 978-0-19-935694-2. <a href="#fnref:118" class="footnote-back-ref">↩</a></li>
<li id="fn:119">Schwartz & Cieciuch 2016, pp. 109–113Karp 2000, § The Rokeach tradition, § The Schwartz Scale of Values - Schwartz, S. H.; Cieciuch, J. (2016). "Values". In Leong, F. T. L.; Bartram, D.; Cheung, F. M.; Geisinger, K. F.; Iliescu, D. (eds.). The ITC International Handbook of Testing and Assessment. Oxford University Press. ISBN 978-0-19-935694-2. <a href="#fnref:119" class="footnote-back-ref">↩</a></li>
<li id="fn:120">Norman 2005, p. 622Nagel 2006, Lead sectionCrisp 2011, § 1. Ethics and Metaethics - Norman, Richard (2005). "Moral Philosophy, History of". In Honderich, Ted (ed.). The Oxford Companion to Philosophy. Oxford University Press. pp. 622–627. ISBN 978-0-19-926479-7. Archived from the original on January 29, 2021. Retrieved December 19, 2023. <a href="https://philpapers.org/rec/HONTOC-2" target="_blank">https://philpapers.org/rec/HONTOC-2</a> <a href="#fnref:120" class="footnote-back-ref">↩</a></li>
<li id="fn:121">Smith & Thomas 1998, Lead sectionHirose & Olson 2015, pp. 1–2Schroeder 2021, Lead section - Smith, Barry; Thomas, Alan (1998). "Axiology". Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Routledge. doi:10.4324/9780415249126-L120-1. ISBN 978-0-415-25069-6. Archived from the original on 2023-11-30. Retrieved 2024-08-27. <a href="https://www.rep.routledge.com/articles/thematic/axiology/v-1" target="_blank">https://www.rep.routledge.com/articles/thematic/axiology/v-1</a> <a href="#fnref:121" class="footnote-back-ref">↩</a></li>
<li id="fn:122">Schroeder 2021, Lead sectionOrsi 2015, pp. 6–7Hurka 2006, p. 357 - Schroeder, Mark (2021). "Value Theory". The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Metaphysics Research Lab, Stanford University. Archived from the original on 27 June 2013. Retrieved 26 August 2024. <a href="https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/value-theory/" target="_blank">https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/value-theory/</a> <a href="#fnref:122" class="footnote-back-ref">↩</a></li>
<li id="fn:123">Schroeder 2021, Lead sectionOrsi 2015, pp. 6–7Bahm 1993, p. 4Cowan 2020, p. 4Hurka 2006, pp. 357–358 - Schroeder, Mark (2021). "Value Theory". The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Metaphysics Research Lab, Stanford University. Archived from the original on 27 June 2013. Retrieved 26 August 2024. <a href="https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/value-theory/" target="_blank">https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/value-theory/</a> <a href="#fnref:123" class="footnote-back-ref">↩</a></li>
<li id="fn:124">Orsi 2015, pp. 8–9Schroeder 2021, § 3. Relation to the DeonticHurka 2006, pp. 357–358 - Orsi, Francesco (2015). Value Theory. Bloomsbury Publishing. ISBN 978-1-4725-2408-9. <a href="https://books.google.com/books?id=cc3cBAAAQBAJ&pg=PA1" target="_blank">https://books.google.com/books?id=cc3cBAAAQBAJ&pg=PA1</a> <a href="#fnref:124" class="footnote-back-ref">↩</a></li>
<li id="fn:125">Findlay 1970, pp. 1–2, 4Kupperman 2005, pp. 73–74 - Findlay, John Niemeyer (1970). Axiological Ethics. Macmillan. ISBN 978-0-333-00269-8. <a href="#fnref:125" class="footnote-back-ref">↩</a></li>
<li id="fn:126">Sinnott-Armstrong 2023, Lead sectionCrisp 2005, pp. 200–201Alexander & Moore 2021, § 1. Deontology's Foil: Consequentialism - Sinnott-Armstrong, Walter (2023). "Consequentialism". The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Metaphysics Research Lab, Stanford University. Archived from the original on June 18, 2023. Retrieved 28 December 2023. <a href="https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/consequentialism/" target="_blank">https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/consequentialism/</a> <a href="#fnref:126" class="footnote-back-ref">↩</a></li>
<li id="fn:127">Dorsey 2020, pp. 97–98 - Dorsey, Dale (2020). "Consequences". In Portmore, Douglas W. (ed.). The Oxford Handbook of Consequentialism. Oxford University Press. pp. 93–112. ISBN 978-0-19-090534-7. Retrieved January 3, 2024. <a href="https://books.google.com/books?id=d0D8DwAAQBAJ&pg=PA95" target="_blank">https://books.google.com/books?id=d0D8DwAAQBAJ&pg=PA95</a> <a href="#fnref:127" class="footnote-back-ref">↩</a></li>
<li id="fn:128">Sinnott-Armstrong 2023, § 1. Classic UtilitarianismChenneville 2017, p. 5Hearn 1971, p. 2 - Sinnott-Armstrong, Walter (2023). "Consequentialism". The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Metaphysics Research Lab, Stanford University. Archived from the original on June 18, 2023. Retrieved 28 December 2023. <a href="https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/consequentialism/" target="_blank">https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/consequentialism/</a> <a href="#fnref:128" class="footnote-back-ref">↩</a></li>
<li id="fn:129">Pape 2000, p. 7Welch & Welch 2009, p. 4Mukherjee, Mukherjee & Ghose 2013, p. 17 - Pape, John (2000). Economics: An Introduction for South African Learners. Juta and Company Ltd. ISBN 978-0-7021-5206-1. <a href="https://books.google.com/books?id=fYzMz3UlyaMC&pg=PA7" target="_blank">https://books.google.com/books?id=fYzMz3UlyaMC&pg=PA7</a> <a href="#fnref:129" class="footnote-back-ref">↩</a></li>
<li id="fn:130">Pirgmaier 2021, p. 1Young & Loomis 2014, p. 289Turner et al. 2004, p. 50 - Pirgmaier, Elke (2021). "The Value of Value Theory for Ecological Economics". Ecological Economics. 179. Bibcode:2021EcoEc.17906790P. doi:10.1016/j.ecolecon.2020.106790. PMC 7445139. PMID 32863580. <a href="https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC7445139" target="_blank">https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC7445139</a> <a href="#fnref:130" class="footnote-back-ref">↩</a></li>
<li id="fn:131">Pirgmaier 2021, pp. 1, 8–9Ayres 2023, p. 104 - Pirgmaier, Elke (2021). "The Value of Value Theory for Ecological Economics". Ecological Economics. 179. Bibcode:2021EcoEc.17906790P. doi:10.1016/j.ecolecon.2020.106790. PMC 7445139. PMID 32863580. <a href="https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC7445139" target="_blank">https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC7445139</a> <a href="#fnref:131" class="footnote-back-ref">↩</a></li>
<li id="fn:132">Pirgmaier 2021, p. 2Fraser 2009Rogers, Castree & Kitchin 2013 - Pirgmaier, Elke (2021). "The Value of Value Theory for Ecological Economics". Ecological Economics. 179. Bibcode:2021EcoEc.17906790P. doi:10.1016/j.ecolecon.2020.106790. PMC 7445139. PMID 32863580. <a href="https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC7445139" target="_blank">https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC7445139</a> <a href="#fnref:132" class="footnote-back-ref">↩</a></li>
<li id="fn:133">Pirgmaier 2021, pp. 2–3Ayres 2023, p. 104 - Pirgmaier, Elke (2021). "The Value of Value Theory for Ecological Economics". Ecological Economics. 179. Bibcode:2021EcoEc.17906790P. doi:10.1016/j.ecolecon.2020.106790. PMC 7445139. PMID 32863580. <a href="https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC7445139" target="_blank">https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC7445139</a> <a href="#fnref:133" class="footnote-back-ref">↩</a></li>
<li id="fn:134">Moseley 2023, p. 48Pirgmaier 2021, pp. 7–8 - Moseley, Fred (2023). Marx's Theory of Value in Chapter 1 of Capital: A Critique of Heinrich's Value-Form Interpretation. Palgrave Macmillan. ISBN 978-3-031-13210-0. <a href="https://books.google.com/books?id=43m-EAAAQBAJ&pg=PA48" target="_blank">https://books.google.com/books?id=43m-EAAAQBAJ&pg=PA48</a> <a href="#fnref:134" class="footnote-back-ref">↩</a></li>
<li id="fn:135">Pirgmaier 2021, p. 3Black, Hashimzade & Myles 2009 - Pirgmaier, Elke (2021). "The Value of Value Theory for Ecological Economics". Ecological Economics. 179. Bibcode:2021EcoEc.17906790P. doi:10.1016/j.ecolecon.2020.106790. PMC 7445139. PMID 32863580. <a href="https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC7445139" target="_blank">https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC7445139</a> <a href="#fnref:135" class="footnote-back-ref">↩</a></li>
<li id="fn:136">Ayres 2023, p. 104Oka 2017, pp. 77–78 - Ayres, Robert U. (2023). The History and Future of Economics. Springer. ISBN 978-3-031-26208-1. <a href="https://books.google.com/books?id=GW28EAAAQBAJ&pg=PA104" target="_blank">https://books.google.com/books?id=GW28EAAAQBAJ&pg=PA104</a> <a href="#fnref:136" class="footnote-back-ref">↩</a></li>
<li id="fn:137">Bhushan & Sachdeva 2012, p. 4Sharma 1996, p. 10 - Bhushan, Vidya; Sachdeva, D. R. (2012). Fundamentals of Sociology. Pearson Education India. ISBN 978-81-317-9967-3. <a href="https://books.google.com/books?id=qgZFB3UOuNkC&pg=PA4" target="_blank">https://books.google.com/books?id=qgZFB3UOuNkC&pg=PA4</a> <a href="#fnref:137" class="footnote-back-ref">↩</a></li>
<li id="fn:138">Karp 2000, Lead sectionSteinert 2023, pp. 33–34, 37, 39–40Tormos 2019, p. 11 - Karp, David R. (2000). "Values Theory and Research". In Borgatta, Edgar F.; Montgomery, Rhonda J. V. (eds.). Encyclopedia of Sociology (2nd ed.). Macmillan. ISBN 978-0-02-864853-8. Archived from the original on 2024-09-12. Retrieved 2024-09-14. <a href="https://www.encyclopedia.com/social-sciences/encyclopedias-almanacs-transcripts-and-maps/values-theory-and-research" target="_blank">https://www.encyclopedia.com/social-sciences/encyclopedias-almanacs-transcripts-and-maps/values-theory-and-research</a> <a href="#fnref:138" class="footnote-back-ref">↩</a></li>
<li id="fn:139">Karp 2000, Lead section, § Social ValuesSteinert 2023, pp. 39–40, 47 - Karp, David R. (2000). "Values Theory and Research". In Borgatta, Edgar F.; Montgomery, Rhonda J. V. (eds.). Encyclopedia of Sociology (2nd ed.). Macmillan. ISBN 978-0-02-864853-8. Archived from the original on 2024-09-12. Retrieved 2024-09-14. <a href="https://www.encyclopedia.com/social-sciences/encyclopedias-almanacs-transcripts-and-maps/values-theory-and-research" target="_blank">https://www.encyclopedia.com/social-sciences/encyclopedias-almanacs-transcripts-and-maps/values-theory-and-research</a> <a href="#fnref:139" class="footnote-back-ref">↩</a></li>
<li id="fn:140">Karp 2000, Lead section, § The Rokeach Tradition, § The Schwartz Scale of ValuesTormos 2019, pp. 13–15 - Karp, David R. (2000). "Values Theory and Research". In Borgatta, Edgar F.; Montgomery, Rhonda J. V. (eds.). Encyclopedia of Sociology (2nd ed.). Macmillan. ISBN 978-0-02-864853-8. Archived from the original on 2024-09-12. Retrieved 2024-09-14. <a href="https://www.encyclopedia.com/social-sciences/encyclopedias-almanacs-transcripts-and-maps/values-theory-and-research" target="_blank">https://www.encyclopedia.com/social-sciences/encyclopedias-almanacs-transcripts-and-maps/values-theory-and-research</a> <a href="#fnref:140" class="footnote-back-ref">↩</a></li>
<li id="fn:141">Sutton 2021, p. 5Fluehr-Lobban 2013, p. 158 - Sutton, Mark Q. (2021). Archaeology: The Science of the Human Past. Routledge. ISBN 978-1-000-35113-2. <a href="https://books.google.com/books?id=pjAXEAAAQBAJ&pg=PA5" target="_blank">https://books.google.com/books?id=pjAXEAAAQBAJ&pg=PA5</a> <a href="#fnref:141" class="footnote-back-ref">↩</a></li>
<li id="fn:142">Robbins 2023, § Foundations of Value Theory, § A Third Approach to ValueSteinert 2023, pp. 53–54, 56, 58 - Robbins, Joel (2023). "Values". The Open Encyclopedia of Anthropology. Cambridge University Press. Archived from the original on 2024-09-12. Retrieved 2024-09-14. <a href="https://www.anthroencyclopedia.com/entry/values" target="_blank">https://www.anthroencyclopedia.com/entry/values</a> <a href="#fnref:142" class="footnote-back-ref">↩</a></li>
<li id="fn:143">Steinert 2023, pp. 3, 55Robbins 2023, § Foundations of Value TheorySykes 2016, § Introduction - Steinert, Steffen (2023). Interdisciplinary Value Theory. Springer. ISBN 978-3-031-10733-7. <a href="https://books.google.com/books?id=ADG4EAAAQBAJ&pg=PA1" target="_blank">https://books.google.com/books?id=ADG4EAAAQBAJ&pg=PA1</a> <a href="#fnref:143" class="footnote-back-ref">↩</a></li>
<li id="fn:144">Steinert 2023, p. 54Robbins 2023, § Foundations of Value Theory - Steinert, Steffen (2023). Interdisciplinary Value Theory. Springer. ISBN 978-3-031-10733-7. <a href="https://books.google.com/books?id=ADG4EAAAQBAJ&pg=PA1" target="_blank">https://books.google.com/books?id=ADG4EAAAQBAJ&pg=PA1</a> <a href="#fnref:144" class="footnote-back-ref">↩</a></li>
<li id="fn:145">Robbins 2023, § Foundations of Value TheorySykes 2016, § Introduction, § General OverviewsSteinert 2023, pp. 3, 61–62 - Robbins, Joel (2023). "Values". The Open Encyclopedia of Anthropology. Cambridge University Press. Archived from the original on 2024-09-12. Retrieved 2024-09-14. <a href="https://www.anthroencyclopedia.com/entry/values" target="_blank">https://www.anthroencyclopedia.com/entry/values</a> <a href="#fnref:145" class="footnote-back-ref">↩</a></li>
<li id="fn:146">Karp 2000, § Individualism and CollectivismFatehi, Priestley & Taasoobshirazi 2020, pp. 7–9Kim 2002, p. 22Serna & Martínez 2022, p. 423 - Karp, David R. (2000). "Values Theory and Research". In Borgatta, Edgar F.; Montgomery, Rhonda J. V. (eds.). Encyclopedia of Sociology (2nd ed.). Macmillan. ISBN 978-0-02-864853-8. Archived from the original on 2024-09-12. Retrieved 2024-09-14. <a href="https://www.encyclopedia.com/social-sciences/encyclopedias-almanacs-transcripts-and-maps/values-theory-and-research" target="_blank">https://www.encyclopedia.com/social-sciences/encyclopedias-almanacs-transcripts-and-maps/values-theory-and-research</a> <a href="#fnref:146" class="footnote-back-ref">↩</a></li>
<li id="fn:147">Steinert 2023, p. 4Woodworth & Marquis 2014, p. 5 - Steinert, Steffen (2023). Interdisciplinary Value Theory. Springer. ISBN 978-3-031-10733-7. <a href="https://books.google.com/books?id=ADG4EAAAQBAJ&pg=PA1" target="_blank">https://books.google.com/books?id=ADG4EAAAQBAJ&pg=PA1</a> <a href="#fnref:147" class="footnote-back-ref">↩</a></li>
<li id="fn:148">Steinert 2023, pp. 7–8Schwartz & Cieciuch 2016, pp. 106–107 - Steinert, Steffen (2023). Interdisciplinary Value Theory. Springer. ISBN 978-3-031-10733-7. <a href="https://books.google.com/books?id=ADG4EAAAQBAJ&pg=PA1" target="_blank">https://books.google.com/books?id=ADG4EAAAQBAJ&pg=PA1</a> <a href="#fnref:148" class="footnote-back-ref">↩</a></li>
<li id="fn:149">Steinert 2023, pp. 14, 19–20 - Steinert, Steffen (2023). Interdisciplinary Value Theory. Springer. ISBN 978-3-031-10733-7. <a href="https://books.google.com/books?id=ADG4EAAAQBAJ&pg=PA1" target="_blank">https://books.google.com/books?id=ADG4EAAAQBAJ&pg=PA1</a> <a href="#fnref:149" class="footnote-back-ref">↩</a></li>
<li id="fn:150">Steinert 2023, pp. 4, 11–12Schwartz & Cieciuch 2016, p. 106 - Steinert, Steffen (2023). Interdisciplinary Value Theory. Springer. ISBN 978-3-031-10733-7. <a href="https://books.google.com/books?id=ADG4EAAAQBAJ&pg=PA1" target="_blank">https://books.google.com/books?id=ADG4EAAAQBAJ&pg=PA1</a> <a href="#fnref:150" class="footnote-back-ref">↩</a></li>
<li id="fn:151">Steinert 2023, pp. 11–12Schwartz & Cieciuch 2016, p. 106 - Steinert, Steffen (2023). Interdisciplinary Value Theory. Springer. ISBN 978-3-031-10733-7. <a href="https://books.google.com/books?id=ADG4EAAAQBAJ&pg=PA1" target="_blank">https://books.google.com/books?id=ADG4EAAAQBAJ&pg=PA1</a> <a href="#fnref:151" class="footnote-back-ref">↩</a></li>
<li id="fn:152">Steinert 2023, pp. 12–13Schwartz & Cieciuch 2016, pp. 106–107 - Steinert, Steffen (2023). Interdisciplinary Value Theory. Springer. ISBN 978-3-031-10733-7. <a href="https://books.google.com/books?id=ADG4EAAAQBAJ&pg=PA1" target="_blank">https://books.google.com/books?id=ADG4EAAAQBAJ&pg=PA1</a> <a href="#fnref:152" class="footnote-back-ref">↩</a></li>
<li id="fn:153">Steinert 2023, pp. 13–15Schwartz & Cieciuch 2016, pp. 107–108 - Steinert, Steffen (2023). Interdisciplinary Value Theory. Springer. ISBN 978-3-031-10733-7. <a href="https://books.google.com/books?id=ADG4EAAAQBAJ&pg=PA1" target="_blank">https://books.google.com/books?id=ADG4EAAAQBAJ&pg=PA1</a> <a href="#fnref:153" class="footnote-back-ref">↩</a></li>
<li id="fn:154">Frankena 2006, pp. 636–637Li 2014, p. 3Chang 2001, pp. 68–69 - Frankena, William K. (2006). "Value and Valuation". In Borchert, Donald M. (ed.). Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Vol. 9 (2nd ed.). Macmillan. pp. 636–641. ISBN 978-0-02-865789-9. <a href="#fnref:154" class="footnote-back-ref">↩</a></li>
<li id="fn:155">Dehsen 2013, p. 178 - Dehsen, Christian von (2013). Philosophers and Religious Leaders. Routledge. ISBN 978-1-135-95102-3. <a href="https://books.google.com/books?id=cU7cAAAAQBAJ" target="_blank">https://books.google.com/books?id=cU7cAAAAQBAJ</a> <a href="#fnref:155" class="footnote-back-ref">↩</a></li>
<li id="fn:156">Sharma 1991, pp. 27–28Devettere 2002, pp. 33–34Heinaman 2016, pp. 123–124Heathwood 2015, p. 153 - Sharma, Ram Nath (1991). Plato: An Interdisciplinary Perspective. Atlantic Publishers & Distributors. ISBN 978-81-7156-166-7. <a href="https://books.google.com/books?id=5tSOV8W1aCUC&pg=PA27" target="_blank">https://books.google.com/books?id=5tSOV8W1aCUC&pg=PA27</a> <a href="#fnref:156" class="footnote-back-ref">↩</a></li>
<li id="fn:157">Dehsen 2013, p. 156 - Dehsen, Christian von (2013). Philosophers and Religious Leaders. Routledge. ISBN 978-1-135-95102-3. <a href="https://books.google.com/books?id=cU7cAAAAQBAJ" target="_blank">https://books.google.com/books?id=cU7cAAAAQBAJ</a> <a href="#fnref:157" class="footnote-back-ref">↩</a></li>
<li id="fn:158">Honderich 2005, p. 349Bahm 1993, p. 112 - Honderich, Ingrid Coggin (2005). "Good, Form of the". In Honderich, Ted (ed.). The Oxford Companion to Philosophy. Oxford University Press. p. 349. ISBN 978-0-19-926479-7. <a href="#fnref:158" class="footnote-back-ref">↩</a></li>
<li id="fn:159">Dehsen 2013, p. 13 - Dehsen, Christian von (2013). Philosophers and Religious Leaders. Routledge. ISBN 978-1-135-95102-3. <a href="https://books.google.com/books?id=cU7cAAAAQBAJ" target="_blank">https://books.google.com/books?id=cU7cAAAAQBAJ</a> <a href="#fnref:159" class="footnote-back-ref">↩</a></li>
<li id="fn:160">Hiles 2008, pp. 52–53Frankena 2006, p. 639Crisp 2005a, p. 349 - Hiles, David R. (2008). "Axiology". In Given, Lisa M. (ed.). The Sage Encyclopedia of Qualitative Research Methods: A-L. Vol. 1. Sage. pp. 52–56. ISBN 978-1-4129-4163-1. <a href="#fnref:160" class="footnote-back-ref">↩</a></li>
<li id="fn:161">O'Keefe, § 5. EthicsGaskin 2005, p. 258Frankena 2006, p. 639 - O'Keefe, Tim. "Epicurus". Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Archived from the original on 19 September 2024. Retrieved 19 September 2024. <a href="https://iep.utm.edu/epicur/" target="_blank">https://iep.utm.edu/epicur/</a> <a href="#fnref:161" class="footnote-back-ref">↩</a></li>
<li id="fn:162">Durand, Shogry & Baltzly 2023, § 4. EthicsPigliucci, § 3. The Third Topos: Ethics, § 4. Apatheia and the Stoic Treatment of EmotionsMcDonald 2021, p. 38 - Durand, Marion; Shogry, Simon; Baltzly, Dirk (2023). "Stoicism". The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Metaphysics Research Lab, Stanford University. Archived from the original on 29 September 2018. Retrieved 20 September 2024. <a href="https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/stoicism/" target="_blank">https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/stoicism/</a> <a href="#fnref:162" class="footnote-back-ref">↩</a></li>
<li id="fn:163">Bahm 1993, p. 103Darr 2023, p. 108Emilsson 1998, Lead section - Bahm, Archie J. (1993). Axiology: The Science of Values. Rodopi. ISBN 978-90-5183-519-9. <a href="https://books.google.com/books?id=jqSRrmtQ_WoC&pg=PA104" target="_blank">https://books.google.com/books?id=jqSRrmtQ_WoC&pg=PA104</a> <a href="#fnref:163" class="footnote-back-ref">↩</a></li>
<li id="fn:164">Borgolte 2019, p. 97 - Borgolte, Michael (2019). World History as the History of Foundations, 3000 BCE to 1500 CE. Brill. ISBN 978-90-04-41508-9. <a href="https://books.google.com/books?id=8cy8DwAAQBAJ&pg=PA97" target="_blank">https://books.google.com/books?id=8cy8DwAAQBAJ&pg=PA97</a> <a href="#fnref:164" class="footnote-back-ref">↩</a></li>
<li id="fn:165">Sharma 1999, p. 230Bartley 2020, pp. 37–38, 136 - Sharma, Arvind (1999). "The Purusārthas: An Axiological Exploration of Hinduism". Journal of Religious Ethics. 27 (2): 223–256. doi:10.1111/0384-9694.00016. <a href="https://doi.org/10.1111%2F0384-9694.00016" target="_blank">https://doi.org/10.1111%2F0384-9694.00016</a> <a href="#fnref:165" class="footnote-back-ref">↩</a></li>
<li id="fn:166">Ranganathan, § 1a.iii. Puruṣārthas : dharma, artha, kāma and mokṣaSharma 1999, pp. 223–225, 230Bailey 2011 - Ranganathan, Shyam. "Hindu Philosophy". Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Archived from the original on 30 June 2024. Retrieved 17 September 2024. <a href="https://iep.utm.edu/hindu-ph/" target="_blank">https://iep.utm.edu/hindu-ph/</a> <a href="#fnref:166" class="footnote-back-ref">↩</a></li>
<li id="fn:167">Sharma 1999, p. 230 - Sharma, Arvind (1999). "The Purusārthas: An Axiological Exploration of Hinduism". Journal of Religious Ethics. 27 (2): 223–256. doi:10.1111/0384-9694.00016. <a href="https://doi.org/10.1111%2F0384-9694.00016" target="_blank">https://doi.org/10.1111%2F0384-9694.00016</a> <a href="#fnref:167" class="footnote-back-ref">↩</a></li>
<li id="fn:168">Wilson 2010Lougheed 2020, pp. 243–244Prasad 2007, pp. xiii–xiv, 21, 23 - Wilson, Jeff (2010). "Saṃsāra and Rebirth". Oxford Bibliographies. Oxford University Press. doi:10.1093/obo/9780195393521-0141. Archived from the original on 22 September 2024. Retrieved 20 September 2024. <a href="https://www.oxfordbibliographies.com/display/document/obo-9780195393521/obo-9780195393521-0141.xml" target="_blank">https://www.oxfordbibliographies.com/display/document/obo-9780195393521/obo-9780195393521-0141.xml</a> <a href="#fnref:168" class="footnote-back-ref">↩</a></li>
<li id="fn:169">Littlejohn, § 1b. Confucius (551-479 B.C.E.) of the Analects - Littlejohn, Ronnie. "Chinese Philosophy: Overview of History". Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Archived from the original on 1 June 2023. Retrieved 20 September 2024. <a href="https://iep.utm.edu/chinese-philosophy-overview-of-history/" target="_blank">https://iep.utm.edu/chinese-philosophy-overview-of-history/</a> <a href="#fnref:169" class="footnote-back-ref">↩</a></li>
<li id="fn:170">Ebrey 2010, p. 43Sim 2015, pp. 64, 74Richey, § 6. Self-cultivationLittlejohn, § 1b. Confucius (551-479 B.C.E.) of the Analects - Ebrey, Patricia Buckley (2010). The Cambridge Illustrated History of China. Cambridge University Press. ISBN 978-0-521-12433-1. <a href="https://books.google.com/books?id=vr81YoYK0c4C&pg=PA43" target="_blank">https://books.google.com/books?id=vr81YoYK0c4C&pg=PA43</a> <a href="#fnref:170" class="footnote-back-ref">↩</a></li>
<li id="fn:171">This period is given in traditional sources. Some contemporary scholars have suggested later dates or questioned whether there was a single person by that name.[168] <a href="#fnref:171" class="footnote-back-ref">↩</a></li>
<li id="fn:172">Assandri 2021, pp. 70–71Slingerland 2007, p. 77Chan 2018, Lead sectionLobel 2017, p. 297 - Assandri, Friederike (2021). The Daode Jing Commentary of Cheng Xuanying: Daoism, Buddhism, and the Laozi in the Tang Dynasty. Oxford University Press. ISBN 978-0-19-087645-6. <a href="https://books.google.com/books?id=Ui5CEAAAQBAJ&pg=PA70" target="_blank">https://books.google.com/books?id=Ui5CEAAAQBAJ&pg=PA70</a> <a href="#fnref:172" class="footnote-back-ref">↩</a></li>
<li id="fn:173">Dehsen 2013, p. 16 - Dehsen, Christian von (2013). Philosophers and Religious Leaders. Routledge. ISBN 978-1-135-95102-3. <a href="https://books.google.com/books?id=cU7cAAAAQBAJ" target="_blank">https://books.google.com/books?id=cU7cAAAAQBAJ</a> <a href="#fnref:173" class="footnote-back-ref">↩</a></li>
<li id="fn:174">Bahm 1993, p. 112Frankena 2006, p. 639Darr 2023, p. 108 - Bahm, Archie J. (1993). Axiology: The Science of Values. Rodopi. ISBN 978-90-5183-519-9. <a href="https://books.google.com/books?id=jqSRrmtQ_WoC&pg=PA104" target="_blank">https://books.google.com/books?id=jqSRrmtQ_WoC&pg=PA104</a> <a href="#fnref:174" class="footnote-back-ref">↩</a></li>
<li id="fn:175">Dehsen 2013, p. 185 - Dehsen, Christian von (2013). Philosophers and Religious Leaders. Routledge. ISBN 978-1-135-95102-3. <a href="https://books.google.com/books?id=cU7cAAAAQBAJ" target="_blank">https://books.google.com/books?id=cU7cAAAAQBAJ</a> <a href="#fnref:175" class="footnote-back-ref">↩</a></li>
<li id="fn:176">Wieland 2002, p. 59Zagzebski 2004a, p. 350Peterson 2008, p. 235 - Wieland, Georg (2002). "Happiness (Ia IIae, qq. 1–5)". In Pope, Stephen J. (ed.). The Ethics of Aquinas. Translated by Kaplan, Grant. Georgetown University Press. pp. 57–68. ISBN 978-0-87840-888-7. <a href="https://books.google.com/books?id=PtLyH02x60MC&pg=PA59" target="_blank">https://books.google.com/books?id=PtLyH02x60MC&pg=PA59</a> <a href="#fnref:176" class="footnote-back-ref">↩</a></li>
<li id="fn:177">Dehsen 2013, p. 19 - Dehsen, Christian von (2013). Philosophers and Religious Leaders. Routledge. ISBN 978-1-135-95102-3. <a href="https://books.google.com/books?id=cU7cAAAAQBAJ" target="_blank">https://books.google.com/books?id=cU7cAAAAQBAJ</a> <a href="#fnref:177" class="footnote-back-ref">↩</a></li>
<li id="fn:178">McGinnis 2010, pp. 209–210 - McGinnis, Jon (2010). Avicenna. Oxford University Press. ISBN 978-0-19-533147-9. <a href="https://books.google.com/books?id=M28EjkCdFecC&pg=PA209" target="_blank">https://books.google.com/books?id=M28EjkCdFecC&pg=PA209</a> <a href="#fnref:178" class="footnote-back-ref">↩</a></li>
<li id="fn:179">Berthrong, § 3. The Emergence of Neo-ConfucianismHartman 1998 - Berthrong, John H. "Neo-Confucian Philosophy". Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Archived from the original on 6 February 2024. Retrieved 17 September 2024. <a href="https://iep.utm.edu/neo-confucian-philosophy/" target="_blank">https://iep.utm.edu/neo-confucian-philosophy/</a> <a href="#fnref:179" class="footnote-back-ref">↩</a></li>
<li id="fn:180">Dehsen 2013, p. 88 - Dehsen, Christian von (2013). Philosophers and Religious Leaders. Routledge. ISBN 978-1-135-95102-3. <a href="https://books.google.com/books?id=cU7cAAAAQBAJ" target="_blank">https://books.google.com/books?id=cU7cAAAAQBAJ</a> <a href="#fnref:180" class="footnote-back-ref">↩</a></li>
<li id="fn:181">Hardin 2009, pp. 6–7, 12, 16, 173, 177–179Abelson & Nielsen 2006, § HobbesCowan 2020, pp. 197, 210–211, 220 - Hardin, Russell (2009). David Hume: Moral and Political Theorist. Oxford University Press. ISBN 978-0-19-161013-4. <a href="https://books.google.com/books?id=hud0ZH-heB0C&pg=PA1" target="_blank">https://books.google.com/books?id=hud0ZH-heB0C&pg=PA1</a> <a href="#fnref:181" class="footnote-back-ref">↩</a></li>
<li id="fn:182">Dehsen 2013, p. 91 - Dehsen, Christian von (2013). Philosophers and Religious Leaders. Routledge. ISBN 978-1-135-95102-3. <a href="https://books.google.com/books?id=cU7cAAAAQBAJ" target="_blank">https://books.google.com/books?id=cU7cAAAAQBAJ</a> <a href="#fnref:182" class="footnote-back-ref">↩</a></li>
<li id="fn:183">Hardin 2009, pp. 29, 51, 173, 177Li 2014, p. 3 - Hardin, Russell (2009). David Hume: Moral and Political Theorist. Oxford University Press. ISBN 978-0-19-161013-4. <a href="https://books.google.com/books?id=hud0ZH-heB0C&pg=PA1" target="_blank">https://books.google.com/books?id=hud0ZH-heB0C&pg=PA1</a> <a href="#fnref:183" class="footnote-back-ref">↩</a></li>
<li id="fn:184">Dehsen 2013, p. 105 - Dehsen, Christian von (2013). Philosophers and Religious Leaders. Routledge. ISBN 978-1-135-95102-3. <a href="https://books.google.com/books?id=cU7cAAAAQBAJ" target="_blank">https://books.google.com/books?id=cU7cAAAAQBAJ</a> <a href="#fnref:184" class="footnote-back-ref">↩</a></li>
<li id="fn:185">Engstrom 1992, p. 747Johnson & Cureton 2024, § 1. Aims and Methods of Moral Philosophy, § 2. Good Will, Moral Worth and DutyDirek 2014, pp. 373–374 - Engstrom, Stephen (1992). "The Concept of the Highest Good in Kant's Moral Theory". Philosophy and Phenomenological Research. 52 (4): 747–780. doi:10.2307/2107910. JSTOR 2107910. <a href="https://doi.org/10.2307%2F2107910" target="_blank">https://doi.org/10.2307%2F2107910</a> <a href="#fnref:185" class="footnote-back-ref">↩</a></li>
<li id="fn:186">Dehsen 2013, p. 25 - Dehsen, Christian von (2013). Philosophers and Religious Leaders. Routledge. ISBN 978-1-135-95102-3. <a href="https://books.google.com/books?id=cU7cAAAAQBAJ" target="_blank">https://books.google.com/books?id=cU7cAAAAQBAJ</a> <a href="#fnref:186" class="footnote-back-ref">↩</a></li>
<li id="fn:187">Dehsen 2013, p. 132 - Dehsen, Christian von (2013). Philosophers and Religious Leaders. Routledge. ISBN 978-1-135-95102-3. <a href="https://books.google.com/books?id=cU7cAAAAQBAJ" target="_blank">https://books.google.com/books?id=cU7cAAAAQBAJ</a> <a href="#fnref:187" class="footnote-back-ref">↩</a></li>
<li id="fn:188">Frankena 2006, p. 639Sinnott-Armstrong 2023, § 1. Classic UtilitarianismChenneville 2017, p. 5Hearn 1971, p. 2 - Frankena, William K. (2006). "Value and Valuation". In Borchert, Donald M. (ed.). Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Vol. 9 (2nd ed.). Macmillan. pp. 636–641. ISBN 978-0-02-865789-9. <a href="#fnref:188" class="footnote-back-ref">↩</a></li>
<li id="fn:189">Woodward 2015, p. i - Woodward, William R. (2015). Hermann Lotze. Cambridge University Press. ISBN 978-0-521-41848-5. <a href="https://books.google.com/books?id=L4dsCQAAQBAJ&pg=PR1" target="_blank">https://books.google.com/books?id=L4dsCQAAQBAJ&pg=PR1</a> <a href="#fnref:189" class="footnote-back-ref">↩</a></li>
<li id="fn:190">Sullivan 2023, § 5.3 Value TheoryLi 2014, p. 3Sullivan 1998, § 4. MetaphysicsMilkov, § 3a. EthicsFrankena 2006, p. 636 - Sullivan, David (2023). "Hermann Lotze". The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Metaphysics Research Lab, Stanford University. Archived from the original on 22 September 2024. Retrieved 18 September 2024. <a href="https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/hermann-lotze/" target="_blank">https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/hermann-lotze/</a> <a href="#fnref:190" class="footnote-back-ref">↩</a></li>
<li id="fn:191">Dafermos 2018, p. 20 - Dafermos, Manolis (2018). Rethinking Cultural-Historical Theory: A Dialectical Perspective to Vygotsky. Springer Nature Singapore. ISBN 978-981-13-0191-9. <a href="https://books.google.com/books?id=uC1bDwAAQBAJ&pg=PA20" target="_blank">https://books.google.com/books?id=uC1bDwAAQBAJ&pg=PA20</a> <a href="#fnref:191" class="footnote-back-ref">↩</a></li>
<li id="fn:192">Heis 2018, § 3.1 Conception of Philosophy: Philosophy as Theory of ValueKinzel 2024, § 2. From Kant to the Philosophy of ValuesHiles 2008, p. 52 - Heis, Jeremy (2018). "Neo-Kantianism". The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Metaphysics Research Lab, Stanford University. Archived from the original on 6 August 2019. Retrieved 18 September 2024. <a href="https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/neo-kantianism/" target="_blank">https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/neo-kantianism/</a> <a href="#fnref:192" class="footnote-back-ref">↩</a></li>
<li id="fn:193">Dehsen 2013, p. 144 - Dehsen, Christian von (2013). Philosophers and Religious Leaders. Routledge. ISBN 978-1-135-95102-3. <a href="https://books.google.com/books?id=cU7cAAAAQBAJ" target="_blank">https://books.google.com/books?id=cU7cAAAAQBAJ</a> <a href="#fnref:193" class="footnote-back-ref">↩</a></li>
<li id="fn:194">Frankena 2006, pp. 636, 639Li 2014, p. 4Anderson 2024, § 3. Value CreationHiles 2008, p. 52Direk 2014, pp. 374, 378 - Frankena, William K. (2006). "Value and Valuation". In Borchert, Donald M. (ed.). Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Vol. 9 (2nd ed.). Macmillan. pp. 636–641. ISBN 978-0-02-865789-9. <a href="#fnref:194" class="footnote-back-ref">↩</a></li>
<li id="fn:195">Dehsen 2013, p. 52 - Dehsen, Christian von (2013). Philosophers and Religious Leaders. Routledge. ISBN 978-1-135-95102-3. <a href="https://books.google.com/books?id=cU7cAAAAQBAJ" target="_blank">https://books.google.com/books?id=cU7cAAAAQBAJ</a> <a href="#fnref:195" class="footnote-back-ref">↩</a></li>
<li id="fn:196">Hart 1971, pp. 36–38Marcum 2008, p. 192 - Hart, Samuel L. (1971). "Axiology – Theory of Values". Philosophy and Phenomenological Research. 32 (1): 29–41. doi:10.2307/2105883. JSTOR 2105883. <a href="https://doi.org/10.2307%2F2105883" target="_blank">https://doi.org/10.2307%2F2105883</a> <a href="#fnref:196" class="footnote-back-ref">↩</a></li>
<li id="fn:197">Clarence Irving Lewis (1883–1964) accepted and further elaborated many of Dewey's insights.[195] <a href="/wiki/Clarence_Irving_Lewis" target="_blank">/wiki/Clarence_Irving_Lewis</a> <a href="#fnref:197" class="footnote-back-ref">↩</a></li>
<li id="fn:198">Bunnin & Yu 2009, p. 443 - Bunnin, Nicholas; Yu, Jiyuan (2009). The Blackwell Dictionary of Western Philosophy. John Wiley & Sons. ISBN 978-1-4051-9112-8. Retrieved January 3, 2024. <a href="https://books.google.com/books?id=M7ZFEAAAQBAJ&pg=PA134" target="_blank">https://books.google.com/books?id=M7ZFEAAAQBAJ&pg=PA134</a> <a href="#fnref:198" class="footnote-back-ref">↩</a></li>
<li id="fn:199">Findlay 1970, pp. 2, 37–38, 41Dancy 2004, p. 165Hart 1971, p. 33 - Findlay, John Niemeyer (1970). Axiological Ethics. Macmillan. ISBN 978-0-333-00269-8. <a href="#fnref:199" class="footnote-back-ref">↩</a></li>
<li id="fn:200">Kunnan 2020, p. 86 - Kunnan, Antony John (2020). "A Case for an Ethics-Based Approach to Evaluate Language". In Ockey, Gary J.; Green, Brent A. (eds.). Another Generation of Fundamental Considerations in Language Assessment: A Festschrift in Honor of Lyle F. Bachman. Springer Nature Singapore. pp. 77–94. ISBN 978-981-15-8952-2. <a href="https://books.google.com/books?id=IwgLEAAAQBAJ&pg=PA86" target="_blank">https://books.google.com/books?id=IwgLEAAAQBAJ&pg=PA86</a> <a href="#fnref:200" class="footnote-back-ref">↩</a></li>
<li id="fn:201">Mason 2023, § 1.1 Foundational and Non-foundational PluralismSimpson, Lead section, § 6. Ross’s Ethical Theory: Main Components and PrinciplesFindlay 1970, p. 2 - Mason, Elinor (2023). "Value Pluralism". The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Metaphysics Research Lab, Stanford University. Archived from the original on 23 June 2023. Retrieved 6 September 2024. <a href="https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/value-pluralism/" target="_blank">https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/value-pluralism/</a> <a href="#fnref:201" class="footnote-back-ref">↩</a></li>
<li id="fn:202">Ross is primarily known for his deontological pluralism about different types of prima facie duties, which is related but not identical to his axiological pluralism about different types of values.[200] <a href="/wiki/Prima_facie_duties" target="_blank">/wiki/Prima_facie_duties</a> <a href="#fnref:202" class="footnote-back-ref">↩</a></li>
<li id="fn:203">Anderson 2013, p. 222 - Anderson, Douglas R. (2013). "Peirce: Pragmatism and Nature after Hegel". In Schrift, Alan D. (ed.). The History of Continental Philosophy. Vol. 2. University of Chicago Press. pp. 217–238. ISBN 978-0-226-74049-2. <a href="https://books.google.com/books?id=SFVhEAAAQBAJ&pg=RA1-PA222" target="_blank">https://books.google.com/books?id=SFVhEAAAQBAJ&pg=RA1-PA222</a> <a href="#fnref:203" class="footnote-back-ref">↩</a></li>
<li id="fn:204">Townsend 2006, p. xvi - Townsend, Dabney (2006). Historical Dictionary of Aesthetics. Scarecrow Press. ISBN 978-0-8108-6483-2. <a href="https://books.google.com/books?id=GGgAAwAAQBAJ&pg=PR16" target="_blank">https://books.google.com/books?id=GGgAAwAAQBAJ&pg=PR16</a> <a href="#fnref:204" class="footnote-back-ref">↩</a></li>
<li id="fn:205">Hart 1971, p. 31Frankena 2006, p. 637 - Hart, Samuel L. (1971). "Axiology – Theory of Values". Philosophy and Phenomenological Research. 32 (1): 29–41. doi:10.2307/2105883. JSTOR 2105883. <a href="https://doi.org/10.2307%2F2105883" target="_blank">https://doi.org/10.2307%2F2105883</a> <a href="#fnref:205" class="footnote-back-ref">↩</a></li>
<li id="fn:206">Edwards & Hartman 2023, p. 173 - Edwards, Rem; Hartman, Robert S. (2023). Poff, Deborah C.; Michalos, Alex C. (eds.). Encyclopedia of Business and Professional Ethics. Springer. ISBN 978-3-030-22767-8. <a href="https://books.google.com/books?id=y8rAEAAAQBAJ&pg=PA173" target="_blank">https://books.google.com/books?id=y8rAEAAAQBAJ&pg=PA173</a> <a href="#fnref:206" class="footnote-back-ref">↩</a></li>
<li id="fn:207">Edwards 2021, pp. 3–4Hartman 2011, pp. 105–106 - Edwards, Rem B. (2021). "1. Introduction". Formal Axiology and Its Critics. Brill. pp. 1–8. ISBN 978-90-04-49596-8. JSTOR 10.1163/j.ctv20dsb9p.5. Archived from the original on 2024-09-08. Retrieved 2024-09-09. <a href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/10.1163/j.ctv20dsb9p.5" target="_blank">https://www.jstor.org/stable/10.1163/j.ctv20dsb9p.5</a> <a href="#fnref:207" class="footnote-back-ref">↩</a></li>
<li id="fn:208">Tuboly 2021, p. 2 - Tuboly, Adam Tamas (2021). "Introduction: From Spying to Canonizing—Ayer and His Language, Truth and Logic". The Historical and Philosophical Significance of Ayer's Language, Truth and Logic. Palgrave Macmillan. pp. 1–38. ISBN 978-3-030-50884-5. <a href="https://books.google.com/books?id=R-oEEAAAQBAJ&pg=PA2" target="_blank">https://books.google.com/books?id=R-oEEAAAQBAJ&pg=PA2</a> <a href="#fnref:208" class="footnote-back-ref">↩</a></li>
<li id="fn:209">Hart 1971, pp. 34–35 - Hart, Samuel L. (1971). "Axiology – Theory of Values". Philosophy and Phenomenological Research. 32 (1): 29–41. doi:10.2307/2105883. JSTOR 2105883. <a href="https://doi.org/10.2307%2F2105883" target="_blank">https://doi.org/10.2307%2F2105883</a> <a href="#fnref:209" class="footnote-back-ref">↩</a></li>
<li id="fn:210">Bunnin & Yu 2009, p. 406 - Bunnin, Nicholas; Yu, Jiyuan (2009). The Blackwell Dictionary of Western Philosophy. John Wiley & Sons. ISBN 978-1-4051-9112-8. Retrieved January 3, 2024. <a href="https://books.google.com/books?id=M7ZFEAAAQBAJ&pg=PA134" target="_blank">https://books.google.com/books?id=M7ZFEAAAQBAJ&pg=PA134</a> <a href="#fnref:210" class="footnote-back-ref">↩</a></li>
<li id="fn:211">Sayre-McCord 1988, pp. 11–12 - Sayre-McCord, Geoffrey (1988). "Introduction: The Many Moral Realisms". In Sayre-McCord, Geoffrey (ed.). Essays on Moral Realism. Cornell University Press. pp. 1–26. ISBN 978-0-8014-9541-0. <a href="https://books.google.com/books?id=-msmrkE-67IC&pg=PA10" target="_blank">https://books.google.com/books?id=-msmrkE-67IC&pg=PA10</a> <a href="#fnref:211" class="footnote-back-ref">↩</a></li>
<li id="fn:212">Rosenkrantz & Hoffman 2011, p. 332 - Rosenkrantz, Gary S.; Hoffman, Joshua (2011). Historical Dictionary of Metaphysics. Scarecrow Press. ISBN 978-0-8108-5950-0. <a href="https://books.google.com/books?id=DQW9nyBCClMC&pg=PA332" target="_blank">https://books.google.com/books?id=DQW9nyBCClMC&pg=PA332</a> <a href="#fnref:212" class="footnote-back-ref">↩</a></li>
<li id="fn:213">Frankena 2006, pp. 637–638Ylirisku & Arvola 2018, p. 53 - Frankena, William K. (2006). "Value and Valuation". In Borchert, Donald M. (ed.). Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Vol. 9 (2nd ed.). Macmillan. pp. 636–641. ISBN 978-0-02-865789-9. <a href="#fnref:213" class="footnote-back-ref">↩</a></li>
<li id="fn:214">Kriegel 2018, p. 2 - Kriegel, Uriah (2018). Brentano's Philosophical System: Mind, Being, Value. Oxford University Press. ISBN 978-0-19-879148-5. <a href="https://books.google.com/books?id=3e9IDwAAQBAJ&pg=PA1" target="_blank">https://books.google.com/books?id=3e9IDwAAQBAJ&pg=PA1</a> <a href="#fnref:214" class="footnote-back-ref">↩</a></li>
<li id="fn:215">Kriegel 2018, pp. 10–11, 218, 221–222Kriegel 2017, p. 12 - Kriegel, Uriah (2018). Brentano's Philosophical System: Mind, Being, Value. Oxford University Press. ISBN 978-0-19-879148-5. <a href="https://books.google.com/books?id=3e9IDwAAQBAJ&pg=PA1" target="_blank">https://books.google.com/books?id=3e9IDwAAQBAJ&pg=PA1</a> <a href="#fnref:215" class="footnote-back-ref">↩</a></li>
<li id="fn:216">Kuijper 2022, p. 298 - Kuijper, Hans (2022). Comprehending the Complexity of Countries: The Way Ahead. Springer Nature Singapore. ISBN 978-981-16-4709-3. <a href="https://books.google.com/books?id=2-FZEAAAQBAJ&pg=PA298" target="_blank">https://books.google.com/books?id=2-FZEAAAQBAJ&pg=PA298</a> <a href="#fnref:216" class="footnote-back-ref">↩</a></li>
<li id="fn:217">Zimmer 2017, p. 135 - Zimmer, Alfred (2017). "Christian von Ehrenfels (1859–1932)". In Albertazzi, Liliana; Jacquette, Dale (eds.). The School of Alexius Meinong. Taylor & Francis. ISBN 978-1-351-88226-2. <a href="https://books.google.com/books?id=wkQrDwAAQBAJ&pg=PA135" target="_blank">https://books.google.com/books?id=wkQrDwAAQBAJ&pg=PA135</a> <a href="#fnref:217" class="footnote-back-ref">↩</a></li>
<li id="fn:218">Frankena 2006, p. 637Hart 1971, pp. 30–31 - Frankena, William K. (2006). "Value and Valuation". In Borchert, Donald M. (ed.). Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Vol. 9 (2nd ed.). Macmillan. pp. 636–641. ISBN 978-0-02-865789-9. <a href="#fnref:218" class="footnote-back-ref">↩</a></li>
<li id="fn:219">Kuijper 2022, p. 298 - Kuijper, Hans (2022). Comprehending the Complexity of Countries: The Way Ahead. Springer Nature Singapore. ISBN 978-981-16-4709-3. <a href="https://books.google.com/books?id=2-FZEAAAQBAJ&pg=PA298" target="_blank">https://books.google.com/books?id=2-FZEAAAQBAJ&pg=PA298</a> <a href="#fnref:219" class="footnote-back-ref">↩</a></li>
<li id="fn:220">Frankena 2006, p. 637Direk 2014, pp. 371–372 - Frankena, William K. (2006). "Value and Valuation". In Borchert, Donald M. (ed.). Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Vol. 9 (2nd ed.). Macmillan. pp. 636–641. ISBN 978-0-02-865789-9. <a href="#fnref:220" class="footnote-back-ref">↩</a></li>
<li id="fn:221">Frankena 2006, p. 637Findlay 1970, p. 2Hart 1971, p. 32Direk 2014, pp. 371–372Løgstrup 2020, p. 105 - Frankena, William K. (2006). "Value and Valuation". In Borchert, Donald M. (ed.). Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Vol. 9 (2nd ed.). Macmillan. pp. 636–641. ISBN 978-0-02-865789-9. <a href="#fnref:221" class="footnote-back-ref">↩</a></li>
<li id="fn:222">Frankena 2006, pp. 637–639Findlay 1970, p. 2Hart 1971, p. 32 - Frankena, William K. (2006). "Value and Valuation". In Borchert, Donald M. (ed.). Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Vol. 9 (2nd ed.). Macmillan. pp. 636–641. ISBN 978-0-02-865789-9. <a href="#fnref:222" class="footnote-back-ref">↩</a></li>
<li id="fn:223">Dehsen 2013, p. 83 - Dehsen, Christian von (2013). Philosophers and Religious Leaders. Routledge. ISBN 978-1-135-95102-3. <a href="https://books.google.com/books?id=cU7cAAAAQBAJ" target="_blank">https://books.google.com/books?id=cU7cAAAAQBAJ</a> <a href="#fnref:223" class="footnote-back-ref">↩</a></li>
<li id="fn:224">Direk 2014, pp. 372–373, 384–386Findlay 1970, pp. 2–3Sullivan 2023, § 5.3 Value Theory - Direk, Zeynep (2014). "Phenomenology and Ethics: From Value Theory to an Ethics of Responsibility". Studia Phaenomenologica. 14: 371–393. doi:10.5840/studphaen20141418. Archived from the original on 2024-09-22. Retrieved 2024-09-22. <a href="http://cdm21054.contentdm.oclc.org/cdm/ref/collection/IR/id/5653" target="_blank">http://cdm21054.contentdm.oclc.org/cdm/ref/collection/IR/id/5653</a> <a href="#fnref:224" class="footnote-back-ref">↩</a></li>
<li id="fn:225">Dehsen 2013, p. 168 - Dehsen, Christian von (2013). Philosophers and Religious Leaders. Routledge. ISBN 978-1-135-95102-3. <a href="https://books.google.com/books?id=cU7cAAAAQBAJ" target="_blank">https://books.google.com/books?id=cU7cAAAAQBAJ</a> <a href="#fnref:225" class="footnote-back-ref">↩</a></li>
<li id="fn:226">Abelson & Nielsen 2006, pp. 426–428Direk 2014, pp. 384–385 - Abelson, Raziel; Nielsen, Kai (2006). "Ethics, History of". In Borchert, Donald M. (ed.). Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Vol. 3 (2nd ed.). Macmillan. pp. 394–433. ISBN 978-0-02-866072-1. <a href="#fnref:226" class="footnote-back-ref">↩</a></li>
</ol>

Value theory open-in-new

Value theory