The existence of the color phi phenomenon poses an interesting philosophical problem. When asked to describe their experience, subjects report seeing the abrupt color change before the second dot is presented. However, it is impossible for a subject to actually experience the color change before the second dot has been presented.
Philosopher Daniel Dennett utilizes the color phi phenomenon in his argument against a philosophy known as Cartesian materialism.2 Psychobiologist John Staddon contrasts a simple "new behaviorism" interpretation of color phi with Dennett and Kinsbourne's account. The basic idea is that because of well-known processes such as lateral inhibition, the internal states created by the two stimuli are identical, hence are so reported.3 Alternatively, phi can be explained without Dennett's argument.4
Kolers, Paul A.; von Grünau, Michael (1976). "Shape and color in apparent motion". Vision Research. 16 (4): 329–335. doi:10.1016/0042-6989(76)90192-9. ISSN 0042-6989. PMID 941407. S2CID 19376707. /wiki/Doi_(identifier) ↩
Dennett, Daniel Clement (1991). Consciousness Explained. Little, Brown and Company. ISBN 978-0-316-18065-8. 978-0-316-18065-8 ↩
John Staddon The New Behaviorism: Foundation of behavioral science (3rd edition)| 2021| ↩
Bringsjord, Selmer (6 December 1996). "Explaining phi without Dennett's exotica: Good ol' computation suffices". Retrieved 26 September 2023. https://homepages.rpi.edu/~brings/SELPAP/phi/phi.html ↩