A grid-following (GFL) device is synchronized to the local grid voltage and injects an electric current vector aligned with the voltage (in other words, behaves like a current source6). The GFL inverters are built into an overwhelming majority of installed IBR devices.7 Due to their following nature, the GFL device will shut down if a large voltage/frequency disturbance is observed.8 The GFL devices cannot contribute to the grid strength, dampen active power oscillations, or provide inertia.9
A grid-forming (GFM) device partially mimics the behavior of a synchronous generator: its voltage is controlled by a free-running oscillator that slows down when more energy is withdrawn from the device. Unlike a conventional generator, the GFM device has no overcurrent capacity and thus will react very differently in the short-circuit situation.10 Adding the GFM capability to a GFL device is not expensive in terms of components, but affects the revenues: in order to support the grid stability by providing extra power when needed, the power semiconductors need to be oversized and energy storage added. Modeling demonstrates, however, that it is possible to run a power system that almost entirely is based on the GFL devices.11 A combination of GFM battery storage power station and synchronous condensers (SuperFACTS) is being researched.12
European Network of Transmission System Operators for Electricity (ENTSO-E) groups the GFM devices into three classes from 1 to 3, with Class 1 being at the lowest level of contribution to the grid stability (the original classification had the numbers in reverse, with class 1 being the highest). Class 2 is further subdivided in to 2A, 2B, 2C, with 2A being the most basic of the three:13
Compliance with IEEE 1547 standard makes the IBR to support safety features:14
Once an IBR ceases to provide power, it can come back only gradually, ramping its output from zero to full power.15
The electronic nature of IBRs limits their overload capability: the thermal stress causes their components to even temporarily be able to function at no more than 1-2 times the nameplate capacity, while the synchronous machines can briefly tolerate an overload as high as 5-6 times their rated power.16
A typical failure of a conventional synchronous generator (like a loss of prime mover) is slow (seconds), while the IBR has to disconnect quickly die to low margin for overload.17
North American Electric Reliability Corporation (NERC) notes that IBR, like conventional generators, can provide essential reliability services, and summarizes the differences as follows:18
The IBR devices come with many protection functions built into the inverters. Experience of the late 2010s and early 2020s had shown that some of these protections are unnecessary, as they were designed with an expectation of a strong grid with little IBR penetration. NERC 2018 guidelines suggested removing some of these checks in order to avoid unnecessary disconnections ("trips") of the IBRs, and newer devices might not have them. The remaining checks are essential for the self-protection of the inverters that, compared to a synchronous generator, have relatively little tolerance for overvoltage and overcurrent.19 The typical protections include:20
Once tripped, the IBRs will restart based on a timer or through manual intervention. A typical timer setting is in the seconds to minutes range (the IEEE-1547 default is 300 seconds).21
New challenges to the system stability came with the increased penetration of IBRs. Incidences of disconnections during contingency events where the fault ride through was expected, and poor damping of subsynchronous oscillations in weak grids were reported.22
One of the most studied major power contingencies that involved IBRs is the Blue Cut Fire of 2016 in Southern California, with a temporary loss of more than a gigawatt of photovoltaic power in a very short time.23
The Blue Cut fire in the Cajon Pass on August 16, 2016, has affected multiple high-voltage (500 kV and 287 kV) power transmission lines passing through the canyon. Throughout the day thirteen 500 kV line faults and two 287 kV faults were recorded.24 The faults themselves were transitory and self-cleared in a short time (2-3.5 cycles, less than 60 milliseconds), but the unexpected features of the algorithms in the photovoltaic inverter software triggered multiple massive losses of power, with the largest one of almost 1,200 megawatts25 at 11:45:16 AM, persisting for multiple minutes.26
The analysis performed by the North American Electric Reliability Corporation (NERC) had shown that:
As a result of the incident, NERC had issued multiple recommendations, involving the changes in inverter design and amendments to the standards.29
Gu & Green 2022, p. 1. - Gu, Yunjie; Green, Timothy C. (2022). "Power System Stability With a High Penetration of Inverter-Based Resources" (PDF). Proceedings of the IEEE. 111 (7): 832–853. doi:10.1109/JPROC.2022.3179826. eISSN 1558-2256. ISSN 0018-9219. https://spiral.imperial.ac.uk/bitstream/10044/1/97588/2/IEEE_Proceedings-2.pdf ↩
ENTSO-E 2020, p. 1. - ENTSO-E (2020). High Penetration of Power Electronic Interfaced Power Sources and the Potential Contribution of Grid Forming Converters (PDF). ENTSO-E Technical Group on High Penetration of Power Electronic Interfaced Power Sources. https://eepublicdownloads.entsoe.eu/clean-documents/Publications/SOC/High_Penetration_of_Power_Electronic_Interfaced_Power_Sources_and_the_Potential_Contribution_of_Grid_Forming_Converters.pdf ↩
Khan & Minai 2023, p. 1. - Khan, Akhlaque Ahmad; Minai, Ahmad Faiz (13 January 2023). "Introduction to Grid-Forming Inverters". Grid-Forming Power Inverters. CRC Press. pp. 1–14. doi:10.1201/9781003302520-1. ISBN 978-1-003-30252-0. https://books.google.com/books?id=6I-nEAAAQBAJ&pg=PA1 ↩
NERC 2017, p. 10. - NERC (June 2017). 1,200 MW Fault Induced Solar Photovoltaic Resource Interruption Disturbance Report (PDF). North American Electric Reliability Corporation. https://www.nerc.com/pa/rrm/ea/1200_MW_Fault_Induced_Solar_Photovoltaic_Resource_/1200_MW_Fault_Induced_Solar_Photovoltaic_Resource_Interruption_Final.pdf ↩
Khan & Minai 2023, pp. 1–2. - Khan, Akhlaque Ahmad; Minai, Ahmad Faiz (13 January 2023). "Introduction to Grid-Forming Inverters". Grid-Forming Power Inverters. CRC Press. pp. 1–14. doi:10.1201/9781003302520-1. ISBN 978-1-003-30252-0. https://books.google.com/books?id=6I-nEAAAQBAJ&pg=PA1 ↩
Khan & Minai 2023, p. 4. - Khan, Akhlaque Ahmad; Minai, Ahmad Faiz (13 January 2023). "Introduction to Grid-Forming Inverters". Grid-Forming Power Inverters. CRC Press. pp. 1–14. doi:10.1201/9781003302520-1. ISBN 978-1-003-30252-0. https://books.google.com/books?id=6I-nEAAAQBAJ&pg=PA1 ↩
AEMO 2021, p. 15. - AEMO (August 2021). Application of Advanced Grid-scale Inverters in the NEM (PDF). Australian Energy Market Operator. https://aemo.com.au/-/media/files/initiatives/engineering-framework/2021/application-of-advanced-grid-scale-inverters-in-the-nem.pdf ↩
Gu & Green 2022, p. 2. - Gu, Yunjie; Green, Timothy C. (2022). "Power System Stability With a High Penetration of Inverter-Based Resources" (PDF). Proceedings of the IEEE. 111 (7): 832–853. doi:10.1109/JPROC.2022.3179826. eISSN 1558-2256. ISSN 0018-9219. https://spiral.imperial.ac.uk/bitstream/10044/1/97588/2/IEEE_Proceedings-2.pdf ↩
Gevorgian, V.; Shah, S.; Yan, W. (2021). "Hybridizing synchronous condensers with grid forming batteries for PV integration – a solution to enhance grid reliability and resiliency". Iet Conference Proceedings (12). Institution of Engineering and Technology: 85–108. doi:10.1049/icp.2021.2488. ISBN 978-1-83953-680-9. 978-1-83953-680-9 ↩
ENTSO-E 2020, pp. 20–21. - ENTSO-E (2020). High Penetration of Power Electronic Interfaced Power Sources and the Potential Contribution of Grid Forming Converters (PDF). ENTSO-E Technical Group on High Penetration of Power Electronic Interfaced Power Sources. https://eepublicdownloads.entsoe.eu/clean-documents/Publications/SOC/High_Penetration_of_Power_Electronic_Interfaced_Power_Sources_and_the_Potential_Contribution_of_Grid_Forming_Converters.pdf ↩
Popiel 2020, pp. 4–5. - Popiel, Caroline Rose (2020). The Incidence of Inverter Incidents: Understanding and Quantifying Contributions to Risk in Systems with Large Amounts of Inverter-Based Resources (MSc). The University of Vermont. https://scholarworks.uvm.edu/graddis/1240 ↩
Popiel 2020, p. 5. - Popiel, Caroline Rose (2020). The Incidence of Inverter Incidents: Understanding and Quantifying Contributions to Risk in Systems with Large Amounts of Inverter-Based Resources (MSc). The University of Vermont. https://scholarworks.uvm.edu/graddis/1240 ↩
AEMO 2021, p. 16. - AEMO (August 2021). Application of Advanced Grid-scale Inverters in the NEM (PDF). Australian Energy Market Operator. https://aemo.com.au/-/media/files/initiatives/engineering-framework/2021/application-of-advanced-grid-scale-inverters-in-the-nem.pdf ↩
Pattabiraman & Inzunza 2024, p. 1. - Pattabiraman, Dinesh; Inzunza, Ruben (2024-05-06). Mitigating IBR Trips During Grid Disturbances Using Low Risk Control Approaches (PDF). IEEE. doi:10.1109/TD47997.2024.10555915. ISBN 979-8-3503-1637-7. Retrieved 2025-05-11. https://figshare.com/articles/preprint/Mitigating_IBR_Trips_During_Grid_Disturbances_Using_Low_Risk_Control_Approaches/22653979/1/files/40212613.pdf ↩
NERC 2023, p. 4. - NERC (June 2023). "Introductory Guide to Inverter-Based Resources on the Bulk Power System" (PDF). Retrieved 2025-05-11. https://www.nerc.com/pa/Documents/2023_NERC_Guide_Inverter-Based-Resources.pdf ↩
Pattabiraman & Inzunza 2024, pp. 1–2. - Pattabiraman, Dinesh; Inzunza, Ruben (2024-05-06). Mitigating IBR Trips During Grid Disturbances Using Low Risk Control Approaches (PDF). IEEE. doi:10.1109/TD47997.2024.10555915. ISBN 979-8-3503-1637-7. Retrieved 2025-05-11. https://figshare.com/articles/preprint/Mitigating_IBR_Trips_During_Grid_Disturbances_Using_Low_Risk_Control_Approaches/22653979/1/files/40212613.pdf ↩
Pattabiraman & Inzunza 2024, p. 2. - Pattabiraman, Dinesh; Inzunza, Ruben (2024-05-06). Mitigating IBR Trips During Grid Disturbances Using Low Risk Control Approaches (PDF). IEEE. doi:10.1109/TD47997.2024.10555915. ISBN 979-8-3503-1637-7. Retrieved 2025-05-11. https://figshare.com/articles/preprint/Mitigating_IBR_Trips_During_Grid_Disturbances_Using_Low_Risk_Control_Approaches/22653979/1/files/40212613.pdf ↩
NERC 2017, p. v. - NERC (June 2017). 1,200 MW Fault Induced Solar Photovoltaic Resource Interruption Disturbance Report (PDF). North American Electric Reliability Corporation. https://www.nerc.com/pa/rrm/ea/1200_MW_Fault_Induced_Solar_Photovoltaic_Resource_/1200_MW_Fault_Induced_Solar_Photovoltaic_Resource_Interruption_Final.pdf ↩
NERC 2017, p. 2. - NERC (June 2017). 1,200 MW Fault Induced Solar Photovoltaic Resource Interruption Disturbance Report (PDF). North American Electric Reliability Corporation. https://www.nerc.com/pa/rrm/ea/1200_MW_Fault_Induced_Solar_Photovoltaic_Resource_/1200_MW_Fault_Induced_Solar_Photovoltaic_Resource_Interruption_Final.pdf ↩
NERC 2017, p. 5. - NERC (June 2017). 1,200 MW Fault Induced Solar Photovoltaic Resource Interruption Disturbance Report (PDF). North American Electric Reliability Corporation. https://www.nerc.com/pa/rrm/ea/1200_MW_Fault_Induced_Solar_Photovoltaic_Resource_/1200_MW_Fault_Induced_Solar_Photovoltaic_Resource_Interruption_Final.pdf ↩
NERC 2017, p. 8. - NERC (June 2017). 1,200 MW Fault Induced Solar Photovoltaic Resource Interruption Disturbance Report (PDF). North American Electric Reliability Corporation. https://www.nerc.com/pa/rrm/ea/1200_MW_Fault_Induced_Solar_Photovoltaic_Resource_/1200_MW_Fault_Induced_Solar_Photovoltaic_Resource_Interruption_Final.pdf ↩
NERC 2017, p. 9. - NERC (June 2017). 1,200 MW Fault Induced Solar Photovoltaic Resource Interruption Disturbance Report (PDF). North American Electric Reliability Corporation. https://www.nerc.com/pa/rrm/ea/1200_MW_Fault_Induced_Solar_Photovoltaic_Resource_/1200_MW_Fault_Induced_Solar_Photovoltaic_Resource_Interruption_Final.pdf ↩