Ethical egoism

<h2 id="forms">Forms</h2>
Ethical egoism can be broadly divided into three categories: individual, personal, and universal. An individual ethical egoist would hold that all people should do whatever benefits "my" (the individual's) self-interest; a personal ethical egoist would hold that they should act in their self-interest, but would make no claims about what anyone else ought to do; a universal ethical egoist would argue that everyone should act in ways that are in their self-interest.<a class="footnote-ref" id="fnref:6" href="#fn:6">6</a><a class="footnote-ref" id="fnref:7" href="#fn:7">7</a>

<h2 id="history">History</h2>
Ethical egoism was introduced by the philosopher <a href="/facts/Henry_Sidgwick/vUuScePd">Henry Sidgwick</a> in his book <a href="/facts/The_Methods_of_Ethics/KKdz7mSd">The Methods of Ethics</a>, written in 1874. Sidgwick compared egoism to the philosophy of <a href="/facts/Utilitarianism/CVw8Dmmt">utilitarianism</a>, writing that whereas utilitarianism sought to maximize overall pleasure, egoism focused only on maximizing individual pleasure.<a class="footnote-ref" id="fnref:8" href="#fn:8">8</a>
Philosophers before Sidgwick have also retroactively been identified as ethical egoists. One ancient example is the philosophy of <a href="/facts/Yang_Zhu/BAQgzJIf">Yang Zhu</a> (4th century BC), <a href="/facts/Yangism/WaS2bX1Q">Yangism</a>, who views wei wo, or "everything for myself", as the only virtue necessary for self-cultivation.<a class="footnote-ref" id="fnref:9" href="#fn:9">9</a> <a href="/facts/Ancient_Greek_philosophy/LWEkp8JX">Ancient Greek philosophers</a> like <a href="/facts/Plato/jGtT1UD5">Plato</a>, <a href="/facts/Aristotle/U2bDlBFW">Aristotle</a> and the <a href="/facts/Stoicism/hQu81X5x">Stoics</a> were exponents of <a href="/facts/Virtue_ethics/g6d88jYN">virtue ethics</a>, and "did not accept the formal principle that whatever the good is, we should seek only our own good, or prefer it to the good of others."<a class="footnote-ref" id="fnref:10" href="#fn:10">10</a> However, the beliefs of the <a href="/facts/Cyrenaics/27YmNQxy">Cyrenaics</a> have been referred to as a "form of egoistic hedonism",<a class="footnote-ref" id="fnref:11" href="#fn:11">11</a> and while some refer to <a href="/facts/Epicurus/ww2teSaQ">Epicurus</a>' <a href="/facts/Hedonism/AGw0FGFN">hedonism</a> as a form of <a href="/facts/Virtue_ethics/g6d88jYN">virtue ethics</a>, others argue his ethics are more properly described as ethical egoism.<a class="footnote-ref" id="fnref:12" href="#fn:12">12</a>

<h2 id="justifications">Justifications</h2>
Philosopher <a href="/facts/James_Rachels/cHklLFjI">James Rachels</a>, in an essay that takes as its title the theory's name, outlines the three arguments most commonly touted in its favor:<a class="footnote-ref" id="fnref:13" href="#fn:13">13</a>

<ul><li>"The first argument," writes Rachels, "has several variations, each suggesting the same general point:<a class="footnote-ref" id="fnref:14" href="#fn:14">14</a>
<ul><li>"Each of us is intimately familiar with our own individual wants and needs. Moreover, each of us is uniquely placed to pursue those wants and needs effectively. At the same time, we know the desires and needs of others only imperfectly, and we are not well situated to pursue them. Therefore, it is reasonable to believe that if we set out to be 'our brother's keeper,' we would often bungle the job and end up doing more mischief than good."<a class="footnote-ref" id="fnref:15" href="#fn:15">15</a></li>
<li>To give charity to someone is to degrade them, implying as it does that they are reliant on such munificence and quite unable to look out for themselves. "That," reckons Rachels, "is why the recipients of 'charity' are so often resentful rather than appreciative."<a class="footnote-ref" id="fnref:16" href="#fn:16">16</a></li></ul></li>
<li>Altruism, ultimately, denies an individual's value and is therefore destructive both to society and its individual components, viewing life merely as a thing to be sacrificed. Philosopher <a href="/facts/Ayn_Rand/MjuSIIng">Ayn Rand</a> is quoted as writing that, "[i]f a man accepts the ethics of altruism, his first concern is not how to live his life but how to sacrifice it."<a class="footnote-ref" id="fnref:17" href="#fn:17">17</a> Moreover, "[t]he basic principle of altruism is that man has no right to exist for his own sake, that service to others is the only justification for his existence, and that self-sacrifice is his highest moral duty, virtue or value." Rather, she writes, "[t]he purpose of morality is to teach you, not to suffer and die, but to enjoy yourself and live."<a class="footnote-ref" id="fnref:18" href="#fn:18">18</a></li>
<li>All of our commonly accepted moral duties, from doing no harm unto others to speaking always the truth to keeping promises, are rooted in the one fundamental principle of self-interest.</li>
<li>It has been observed, however, that the very act of eating (especially, when there are others starving in the world) is such an act of self-interested discrimination. Ethical egoists such as Rand who readily acknowledge the (conditional) value of others to an individual, and who readily endorse empathy for others, have argued the exact reverse from Rachels, that it is altruism which discriminates: "If the sensation of eating a cake is a value, then why is it an immoral indulgence in your stomach, but a moral goal for you to achieve in the stomach of others?"<a class="footnote-ref" id="fnref:19" href="#fn:19">19</a> It is therefore altruism which is an arbitrary position, according to Rand.</li></ul>
<h2 id="criticism">Criticism</h2>
It has been argued that extreme ethical egoism is self-defeating. Faced with a situation of limited resources, egoists would consume as much of the resource as they could, making the overall situation worse for everybody. Egoists may respond that if the situation becomes worse for everybody, that would include the egoist, so it is not, in fact, in their rational self-interest to take things to such extremes.<a class="footnote-ref" id="fnref:20" href="#fn:20">20</a> However, the (unregulated) <a href="/facts/Tragedy_of_the_commons/ctXVyh8r">tragedy of the commons</a> and the (one off) <a href="/facts/Prisoner%27s_dilemma/44kueSBQ">prisoner's dilemma</a> are cases in which, on the one hand, it is rational for an individual to seek to take as much as possible even though that makes things worse for everybody, and on the other hand, those cases are not self-refuting since that behaviour remains rational even though it is ultimately self-defeating, i.e. self-defeating does not imply self-refuting. Egoists might respond that a tragedy of the commons, however, assumes some degree of public land. That is, a commons forbidding homesteading requires regulation. Thus, an argument against the tragedy of the commons, in this belief system, is fundamentally an argument for private property rights and the system that recognizes both property rights and rational self-interest—capitalism.<a class="footnote-ref" id="fnref:21" href="#fn:21">21</a> More generally, egoists might say that an increasing respect for individual rights uniquely allows for increasing wealth creation and increasing usable resources despite a fixed amount of raw materials (e.g. the West pre-1776 versus post-1776, East versus West Germany, Hong Kong versus mainland China, North versus South Korea, etc.).<a class="footnote-ref" id="fnref:22" href="#fn:22">22</a>
It is not clear how to apply a private ownership model to many examples of "commons", however. Examples include large fisheries, the atmosphere and the ocean.<a class="footnote-ref" id="fnref:23" href="#fn:23">23</a><a class="footnote-ref" id="fnref:24" href="#fn:24">24</a>
Some perhaps decisive problems with ethical egoism have been pointed out.
One is that an ethical egoist would not want ethical egoism to be universalized: as it would be in the egoist's best self-interest if others acted altruistically towards them, they wouldn't want them to act egoistically; however, that is what they consider to be morally binding. Their moral principles would demand of others not to follow them, which can be considered self-defeating and leads to the question: "How can ethical egoism be considered morally binding if its advocates do not want it to be universally applied?"<a class="footnote-ref" id="fnref:25" href="#fn:25">25</a>
Another objection (e.g. by James Rachels) states that the distinction ethical egoism makes between "yourself" and "the rest" – demanding to view the interests of "yourself" as more important – is arbitrary, as no justification for it can be offered; considering that the merits and desires of "the rest" are comparable to those of "yourself" while lacking a justifiable distinction, Rachels concludes that "the rest" should be given the same moral consideration as "yourself".<a class="footnote-ref" id="fnref:26" href="#fn:26">26</a><a class="footnote-ref" id="fnref:27" href="#fn:27">27</a>
<a href="/facts/Derek_Parfit/bSh3uo75">Derek Parfit</a> argues against ethical egoism in the book <a href="/facts/Reasons_and_Persons/cRPJ5lkV">Reasons and Persons</a>.<a class="footnote-ref" id="fnref:28" href="#fn:28">28</a> Parfit argues that ethical egoism is collectively self-defeating due to the prisoner's dilemma. Parfit also poses thought experiments such as the <a href="/facts/Teletransportation_paradox/W78yfBu0">teletransportation paradox</a>, which challenge the idea of an objective <a href="/facts/Future_self/HVVjzfXA">future self</a> and a continuous personal identity.
<a href="/facts/Daniel_Kolak/G92n2os0">Daniel Kolak</a> argues that the entire concepts of the "self" and the "ego" are incoherent. In his book I am You, Kolak uses the terms "closed individualism", "empty individualism", and "<a href="/facts/Open_individualism/Tf34BWXl">open individualism</a>" to describe three contrasting philosophical views of the self.<a class="footnote-ref" id="fnref:29" href="#fn:29">29</a> Kolak argues that closed individualism, the idea that one's personal identity consist of a line persisting from moment to moment, is incoherent, and there is no basis for the belief that one is the "same" person from moment to moment. Empty individualism is the idea that personal identity exists, but one's identity only exists as a "time slice" existing for an infinitesimally small amount of time. Open individualism is the view advocated by Kolak, in which the self in reality does not actually exist at all, similar to <a href="/facts/Anatt%C4%81/HBtQy9lp">anattā</a> in Buddhist philosophy. Thus, according to open individualism, it could be argued that ethical egoism is incoherent, since the ego in its entirety is an illusion.

<h2 id="notable-proponents">Notable proponents</h2>
The term ethical egoism has been applied retroactively to philosophers such as <a href="/facts/Bernard_de_Mandeville/mGAMGHX0">Bernard de Mandeville</a> and to many other <a href="/facts/Dialectical_materialism/81yjAzlf">materialists</a> of his generation, although none of them declared themselves to be egoists. Note that materialism does not necessarily imply egoism, as indicated by <a href="/facts/Karl_Marx/CXYTK95X">Karl Marx</a>, and the many other <a href="/facts/Materialist/VKAovnPt">materialists</a> who espoused forms of <a href="/facts/Collectivism_and_individualism/EDpvow0U">collectivism</a>. It has been argued that ethical egoism can lend itself to <a href="/facts/Individualist_anarchism/wT2HMmVU">individualist anarchism</a> such as that of <a href="/facts/Benjamin_Tucker/lL4hyWHu">Benjamin Tucker</a>, or the combined <a href="/facts/Anarcho-communism/2rDylfkT">anarcho-communism</a> and egoism of <a href="/facts/Emma_Goldman/x8ld62Yo">Emma Goldman</a>, both of whom were proponents of many egoist ideas put forward by <a href="/facts/Max_Stirner/tGqWzlc5">Max Stirner</a>. In this context, egoism is another way of describing the sense that the common good should be enjoyed by all. However, most notable anarchists in history have been less radical, retaining altruism and a sense of the importance of the individual that is appreciable but does not go as far as egoism. Recent trends to greater appreciation of egoism within <a href="/facts/Anarchism/4a262gvQ">anarchism</a> tend to come from less classical directions such as <a href="/facts/Post-left_anarchy/DpgqsCU2">post-left anarchy</a> or <a href="/facts/Situationism/fYNjPtKB">Situationism</a> (e.g. <a href="/facts/Raoul_Vaneigem/mhsWlf2s">Raoul Vaneigem</a>). Egoism has also been referenced by <a href="/facts/Anarcho-capitalism/akg09FPb">anarcho-capitalists</a>, such as <a href="/facts/Murray_Rothbard/PLrJnRRP">Murray Rothbard</a>.
Philosopher <a href="/facts/Max_Stirner/tGqWzlc5">Max Stirner</a>, in his book <a href="/facts/The_Ego_and_Its_Own/egX3yY9L">The Ego and Its Own</a>, was the first philosopher to call himself an egoist, though his writing makes clear that he desired not a new idea of morality (ethical egoism), but rather a rejection of morality (<a href="/facts/Amoralism/EjoR2pu5">amoralism</a>), as a nonexistent and limiting "spook"; for this, Stirner has been described as the first <a href="/facts/Individualist_anarchism/wT2HMmVU">individualist anarchist</a>. Other philosophers, such as <a href="/facts/Thomas_Hobbes/VUGt3jNW">Thomas Hobbes</a> and <a href="/facts/David_Gauthier/q3hS2FvB">David Gauthier</a>, have argued that the conflicts which arise when people each pursue their own ends can be resolved for the best of each individual only if they all voluntarily forgo some of their aims—that is, one's self-interest is often best pursued by allowing others to pursue their self-interest as well so that liberty is equal among individuals. Sacrificing one's short-term self-interest to maximize one's long-term self-interest is one form of "<a href="/facts/Rational_selfishness/n8DE7aLP">rational self-interest</a>" which is the idea behind most philosophers' advocacy of ethical egoism. Egoists have also argued that one's actual interests are not immediately obvious, and that the pursuit of self-interest involves more than merely the acquisition of some good, but the maximizing of one's chances of survival and/or happiness.
Philosopher <a href="/facts/Friedrich_Nietzsche/u7VdQ5sg">Friedrich Nietzsche</a> suggested that egoistic or "life-affirming" behavior stimulates jealousy or "<a href="/facts/Ressentiment/cDYnb3PG">ressentiment</a>" in others, and that this is the psychological motive for the altruism in <a href="/facts/Christianity/nKyJHlqq">Christianity</a>. Sociologist <a href="/facts/Helmut_Schoeck/HWgndTTT">Helmut Schoeck</a> similarly considered <a href="/facts/Envy/ABzyw8oT">envy</a> the motive of collective efforts by society to reduce the disproportionate gains of successful individuals through moral or legal constraints, with altruism being primary among these.<a class="footnote-ref" id="fnref:30" href="#fn:30">30</a> In addition, Nietzsche (in <a href="/facts/Beyond_Good_and_Evil/79zsyCaQ">Beyond Good and Evil</a>) and <a href="/facts/Alasdair_MacIntyre/VSVUsVck">Alasdair MacIntyre</a> (in <a href="/facts/After_Virtue/u2LAIDvo">After Virtue</a>) have pointed out that the <a href="/facts/Ancient_Greeks/PTVBrWXq">ancient Greeks</a> did not associate <a href="/facts/Morality/CSjHHvff">morality</a> with altruism in the way that post-Christian <a href="/facts/Western_culture/rPbgAhzI">Western civilization</a> has done.
<a href="/facts/Aristotle/U2bDlBFW">Aristotle</a>'s view is that we have duties to ourselves as well as to other people (e.g. friends) and to the <a href="/facts/Polis/U4qS9yqU">polis</a> as a whole. The same is true for <a href="/facts/Thomas_Aquinas/h2vN2VkX">Thomas Aquinas</a>, <a href="/facts/Christian_Wolff_(philosopher)/xqtQwMfK">Christian Wolff</a> and <a href="/facts/Immanuel_Kant/vIxjdy6I">Immanuel Kant</a>, who claim that there are duties to ourselves as Aristotle did, although it has been argued that, for Aristotle, the duty to one's self is primary.<a class="footnote-ref" id="fnref:31" href="#fn:31">31</a>
<a href="/facts/Ayn_Rand/MjuSIIng">Ayn Rand</a> argued that there is a positive harmony of interests among free, rational humans, such that no moral agent can rationally coerce another person consistently with their own long-term self-interest. Rand argued that other people are an enormous value to an individual's well-being (through education, trade and affection), but also that this value could be fully realized only under conditions of political and economic freedom. According to Rand, voluntary trade alone can assure that human interaction is mutually beneficial.<a class="footnote-ref" id="fnref:32" href="#fn:32">32</a> Rand's student, <a href="/facts/Leonard_Peikoff/rebWAxmn">Leonard Peikoff</a> has argued that the identification of one's interests itself is impossible absent the use of principles, and that self-interest cannot be consistently pursued absent a consistent adherence to certain ethical principles.<a class="footnote-ref" id="fnref:33" href="#fn:33">33</a> Recently, Rand's position has also been defended by such writers as <a href="/facts/Tara_Smith_(philosopher)/oMYSedvE">Tara Smith</a>, <a href="/facts/Tibor_Machan/s5T32T8w">Tibor Machan</a>, <a href="/facts/Allan_Gotthelf/agX8AR6w">Allan Gotthelf</a>, <a href="/facts/David_Kelley/4SkFuyze">David Kelley</a>, <a href="/facts/Douglas_Rasmussen/d8H2sHQw">Douglas Rasmussen</a>, <a href="/facts/Nathaniel_Branden/h6MI70lk">Nathaniel Branden</a>, <a href="/facts/Harry_Binswanger/e5eGW6rf">Harry Binswanger</a>, <a href="/facts/Andrew_Bernstein_(philosopher)/RAUQMpYQ">Andrew Bernstein</a>, and <a href="/facts/Craig_Biddle/3eQ2znqd">Craig Biddle</a>.
Philosopher <a href="/facts/David_L._Norton/RAG2b3Hs">David L. Norton</a> identified himself as an "ethical individualist", and, like Rand, saw a harmony between an individual's fidelity to their own self-actualization, or "personal destiny", and the achievement of society's well-being.<a class="footnote-ref" id="fnref:34" href="#fn:34">34</a>

<h2 id="see-also">See also</h2>

<ul><li><a href="/facts/Adam_Smith/sj2Tt18r">Adam Smith</a> and the <a href="/facts/Invisible_hand/lC6H2bHA">invisible hand</a></li>
<li><a href="/facts/Baruch_Spinoza/CB9g9BbG">Baruch Spinoza</a></li>
<li><a href="/facts/Behavioral_economics/bbSgL7Ad">Behavioral economics</a></li>
<li><a href="/facts/C%C4%81rv%C4%81ka/Ndtldsj9">Cārvāka</a>, an egoistic Indian philosophy</li>
<li><a href="/facts/Ethical_solipsism/sHXVGv9W">Ethical solipsism</a></li>
<li><a href="/facts/Helping_behavior/yN0MJ0ck">Helping behavior</a></li>
<li><a href="/facts/Objectivism/ncVacNjX">Objectivism</a></li>
<li><a href="/facts/Profit_motive/yXvRd3yP">Profit motive</a></li>
<li><a href="/facts/Rational_expectations/SSMQLugI">Rational expectations</a></li></ul>

<h2 id="footnotes">Footnotes</h2>

<ul><li><a href="/facts/Aristotle/U2bDlBFW">Aristotle</a>, <a href="/facts/Nicomachean_Ethics/QsCgUJ10">Nicomachean Ethics</a>.</li>
<li><a href="/facts/Aristotle/U2bDlBFW">Aristotle</a>, <a href="/facts/Eudemian_Ethics/h0U83P3q">Eudemian Ethics</a>.</li>
<li>Evans, Matthew (2004). "Can Epicureans be friends?". Ancient Philosophy. 24 (2): 407–424. <a href="/facts/Doi_(identifier)/muM9Etpq">doi</a>:<a href="https://doi.org/10.5840%2Fancientphil200424250">10.5840/ancientphil200424250</a>.</li>
<li><a href="/facts/Kurt_Baier/oDMwGD6S">Baier, Kurt</a>, 1990, "Egoism" in A Companion to Ethics, <a href="/facts/Peter_Singer/0b2KY9kf">Peter Singer</a> (ed.), Blackwell: Oxford. <a href="/facts/ISBN_(identifier)/15AdSPa9">ISBN</a> 978-0-631-18785-1</li>
<li>Biddle, Craig, Loving Life: The Morality of Self-Interest and the Facts that Support It, 2002, Glen Allen.</li>
<li><a href="/facts/Nathaniel_Branden/h6MI70lk">Branden, Nathaniel</a>, <a href="/facts/The_Psychology_of_Self-Esteem/WIQuHv6V">The Psychology of Self-Esteem</a>, 1969, Nash.</li>
<li><a href="/facts/Thomas_Hobbes/VUGt3jNW">Hobbes, Thomas</a>, 1968, Leviathan, <a href="/facts/C._B._Macpherson/Q8FMub8F">C. B. Macpherson</a> (ed.), Harmondsworth: Penguin. <a href="/facts/ISBN_(identifier)/15AdSPa9">ISBN</a> 978-0-14-043195-7</li>
<li><a href="/facts/Tibor_Machan/s5T32T8w">Machan, Tibor</a>, Classical Individualism: The Supreme Importance of Each Human Being, 1998, Routledge.</li>
<li><a href="/facts/Friedrich_Nietzsche/u7VdQ5sg">Nietzsche, Friedrich</a>, 1886, <a href="/facts/Beyond_Good_and_Evil/79zsyCaQ">Beyond Good and Evil</a>.</li></ul>
<ul><li><a href="/facts/David_L._Norton/RAG2b3Hs">Norton, David</a>, Personal Destinies: A Philosophy of Ethical Individualism, 1976, <a href="/facts/Princeton_University_Press/kwvFlKEj">Princeton University Press</a>.</li>
<li>Paul, E. & F. Miller & J. Paul (1997). Self-Interest. Cambridge University Press</li>
<li><a href="/facts/Leonard_Peikoff/rebWAxmn">Peikoff, Leonard</a>, "Why Should One Act on Principle?," <a href="/facts/The_Objectivist_Forum/60S5b4fb">The Objectivist Forum</a>, 1988.</li>
<li><a href="/facts/James_Rachels/cHklLFjI">Rachels, James</a>. 2008, "Ethical Egoism." In Reason & Responsibility: Readings in Some Basic Problems of Philosophy, edited by <a href="/facts/Joel_Feinberg/62dERdxM">Joel Feinberg</a> and <a href="/facts/Russ_Shafer-Landau/SgNucRCD">Russ Shafer-Landau</a>, 532–540. California: <a href="/facts/The_Thomson_Corporation/EDNXn9VX">Thomson Wadsworth</a>. <a href="/facts/ISBN_(identifier)/15AdSPa9">ISBN</a> 978-0495500698.</li>
<li><a href="/facts/Ayn_Rand/MjuSIIng">Rand, Ayn</a>, 1964, <a href="/facts/The_Virtue_of_Selfishness/EUt0StcJ">The Virtue of Selfishness</a>. Signet. <a href="/facts/ISBN_(identifier)/15AdSPa9">ISBN</a> 978-0-451-16393-6</li>
<li>Rosenstand, Nina. 2000. 'Chapter 3: Myself or Others?'. In The Moral of the Story. (3rd Edition). Mountain View, CA: Mayfield Publishing: 127–167. <a href="/facts/ISBN_(identifier)/15AdSPa9">ISBN</a> 978-0072963359</li>
<li><a href="/facts/Helmut_Schoeck/HWgndTTT">Schoeck, Helmut</a>, Der Neid. Eine Theorie der Gesellschaft (Envy: A Theory of Social Behaviour), 1966, 1st English ed. 1969.</li>
<li><a href="/facts/Tara_Smith_(philosopher)/oMYSedvE">Smith, Tara</a>, Viable Values: A Study of Life as the Root and Reward of Morality, 2000, <a href="/facts/Rowman_%26_Littlefield/NJNX9xwH">Rowman & Littlefield</a>. <a href="/facts/ISBN_(identifier)/15AdSPa9">ISBN</a> 0-8476-9760-6.</li>
<li><a href="/facts/Tara_Smith_(philosopher)/oMYSedvE">Smith, Tara</a>, The Virtuous Egoist: Ayn Rand's Normative Ethics, 2006, <a href="/facts/Cambridge_University_Press/fgEBSSRq">Cambridge University Press</a>. <a href="/facts/ISBN_(identifier)/15AdSPa9">ISBN</a> 0-521-86050-4.</li>
<li>Waller, Bruce, N. 2005. "Egoism." In Consider Ethics: Theory, Readings, and Contemporary Issues. New York: Pearson Longman: 79–83. <a href="/facts/ISBN_(identifier)/15AdSPa9">ISBN</a> 978-0-321-20280-2</li></ul>
<h2 id="external-links">External links</h2>
<ul><li><a href="/facts/Edward_N._Zalta/U8JxHaaA">Zalta, Edward N.</a> (ed.). <a href="https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/egoism/">"Egoism"</a>. <a href="/facts/Stanford_Encyclopedia_of_Philosophy/LDuL5HW4">Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy</a>.</li>
<li><a href="http://www.iep.utm.edu/egoism">"Ethical egoism"</a>. <a href="/facts/Internet_Encyclopedia_of_Philosophy/tmS0Sylv">Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy</a>.</li>
<li><a href="http://www.m-w.com/cgi-bin/dictionary?book=Dictionary&va=egoism+">Merriam-Webster Dictionary entry for egoism</a></li></ul>

<h2 id="references">References</h2>

<ol>
<li id="fn:1">Sanders, Steven M. "Is egoism morally defensible?" Philosophia. Springer Netherlands. Volume 18, Numbers 2–3 / July 1988 <a href="#fnref:1" class="footnote-back-ref">↩</a></li>
<li id="fn:2">Shaver, Robert (2019), "Egoism", in Zalta, Edward N. (ed.), The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Spring 2019 ed.), Metaphysics Research Lab, Stanford University, retrieved 2020-05-27 <a href="https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2019/entries/egoism/" target="_blank">https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2019/entries/egoism/</a> <a href="#fnref:2" class="footnote-back-ref">↩</a></li>
<li id="fn:3">"Utilitarianism". Ethics Unwrapped. Retrieved 2020-05-27. <a href="https://ethicsunwrapped.utexas.edu/glossary/utilitarianism" target="_blank">https://ethicsunwrapped.utexas.edu/glossary/utilitarianism</a> <a href="#fnref:3" class="footnote-back-ref">↩</a></li>
<li id="fn:4">Rachels 2008, p. 534. <a href="#fnref:4" class="footnote-back-ref">↩</a></li>
<li id="fn:5">Ridgely, D.A. (August 24, 2008). "Selfishness, Egoism and Altruistic Libertarianism". Archived from the original on December 2, 2008. Retrieved 2008-08-24. <a href="https://web.archive.org/web/20081202145221/http://www.positiveliberty.com/2008/08/selfishness-egoism-and-altruistic-libertarianism.html" target="_blank">https://web.archive.org/web/20081202145221/http://www.positiveliberty.com/2008/08/selfishness-egoism-and-altruistic-libertarianism.html</a> <a href="#fnref:5" class="footnote-back-ref">↩</a></li>
<li id="fn:6">Waller (2005), p. 81. <a href="#fnref:6" class="footnote-back-ref">↩</a></li>
<li id="fn:7">Waller (2005), p. 83. <a href="#fnref:7" class="footnote-back-ref">↩</a></li>
<li id="fn:8">Floridi, Luciano; Craig, Edward (1998). "Egoism and Altruism". Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Taylor & Francis. pp. 246–247. ISBN 9780415187091. <a href="9780415187091" target="_blank">9780415187091</a> <a href="#fnref:8" class="footnote-back-ref">↩</a></li>
<li id="fn:9">Senghaas, Dieter (2002). The clash within civilizations: coming to terms with cultural conflicts. Psychology Press. p. 33. ISBN 978-0-415-26228-6. <a href="978-0-415-26228-6" target="_blank">978-0-415-26228-6</a> <a href="#fnref:9" class="footnote-back-ref">↩</a></li>
<li id="fn:10">Floridi, Luciano; Craig, Edward (1998). "Egoism and Altruism". Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Taylor & Francis. pp. 246–247. ISBN 9780415187091. <a href="9780415187091" target="_blank">9780415187091</a> <a href="#fnref:10" class="footnote-back-ref">↩</a></li>
<li id="fn:11">"Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy: Cyrenaics". <a href="http://www.iep.utm.edu/cyren/" target="_blank">http://www.iep.utm.edu/cyren/</a> <a href="#fnref:11" class="footnote-back-ref">↩</a></li>
<li id="fn:12">Evans, Matthew (2004). "Can Epicureans be friends?". Ancient Philosophy. 24 (2): 407–424. doi:10.5840/ancientphil200424250. <a href="/wiki/Doi_(identifier)" target="_blank">/wiki/Doi_(identifier)</a> <a href="#fnref:12" class="footnote-back-ref">↩</a></li>
<li id="fn:13">He notes, however, that "the theory is asserted more often than it is argued for. Many of its supporters apparently think its truth is self-evident, so that arguments are not needed." (Rachels 2008, p. 534.) <a href="#fnref:13" class="footnote-back-ref">↩</a></li>
<li id="fn:14">That is, that regarding and pursuing the interests of others is a self-defeating policy. Rachels quotes Alexander Pope in support of this: "Thus God and nature formed the general frame/And bade self-love and social be the same." <a href="#fnref:14" class="footnote-back-ref">↩</a></li>
<li id="fn:15">Rachels 2008, p. 534. <a href="#fnref:15" class="footnote-back-ref">↩</a></li>
<li id="fn:16">Rachels 2008, p. 534, where it is pointed out that, in the strictest egoistic terms, this is an inconsequential argument. Ethical egoism does not bother itself with how others receive charity, irrespective of how degraded it makes them feel. The same reasoning applies to the previous two bullets, which use self-interest as a means to the end of beneficence, rather than for its own purposes, as the theory would dictate. <a href="#fnref:16" class="footnote-back-ref">↩</a></li>
<li id="fn:17">Rachels 2008, p. 535, where this argument is attributed to Ayn Rand, "a writer little heeded by professional philosophers but who nevertheless was enormously popular on college campuses in the 1960s and 1970s". <a href="/wiki/Ayn_Rand" target="_blank">/wiki/Ayn_Rand</a> <a href="#fnref:17" class="footnote-back-ref">↩</a></li>
<li id="fn:18">Rand, Ayn, "Faith and Force: Destroyers of the Modern World," Philosophy: Who Needs It, p. 74; Atlas Shrugged, 1957, Random House, p. 1014; "Faith and Force," p. 74. <a href="/wiki/Atlas_Shrugged" target="_blank">/wiki/Atlas_Shrugged</a> <a href="#fnref:18" class="footnote-back-ref">↩</a></li>
<li id="fn:19">Rand, Ayn, Atlas Shrugged, 1957, Random House. <a href="#fnref:19" class="footnote-back-ref">↩</a></li>
<li id="fn:20">""Ethics"". 8 May 2024. Britannica <a href="http://www.britannica.com/eb/article-252577/ethics" target="_blank">http://www.britannica.com/eb/article-252577/ethics</a> <a href="#fnref:20" class="footnote-back-ref">↩</a></li>
<li id="fn:21">Block, Walter (1998). "Environmentalism and Economic Freedom: The Case for Private Property Rights". Journal of Business Ethics. 17 (16): 1887–1899. doi:10.1023/A:1005941908758. ISSN 0167-4544. JSTOR 25074025. S2CID 17655955. <a href="/wiki/Journal_of_Business_Ethics" target="_blank">/wiki/Journal_of_Business_Ethics</a> <a href="#fnref:21" class="footnote-back-ref">↩</a></li>
<li id="fn:22">Julian Simon. "The Ultimate Resource II: People, Materials, and Environment (1996)". Retrieved 2014-03-14. <a href="http://www.juliansimon.org/writings/Ultimate_Resource/" target="_blank">http://www.juliansimon.org/writings/Ultimate_Resource/</a> <a href="#fnref:22" class="footnote-back-ref">↩</a></li>
<li id="fn:23">"" The Challenge of Common-Pool Resources"". Environment Magazine <a href="http://www.environmentmagazine.org/Archives/Back%20Issues/July-August%202008/ostrom-full.html" target="_blank">http://www.environmentmagazine.org/Archives/Back%20Issues/July-August%202008/ostrom-full.html</a> <a href="#fnref:23" class="footnote-back-ref">↩</a></li>
<li id="fn:24">""Ten Real-life Examples of the Tragedy of the Commons"". Environmental Science for Dummies <a href="http://www.dummies.com/education/science/environmental-science/ten-real-life-examples-of-the-tragedy-of-the-commons/" target="_blank">http://www.dummies.com/education/science/environmental-science/ten-real-life-examples-of-the-tragedy-of-the-commons/</a> <a href="#fnref:24" class="footnote-back-ref">↩</a></li>
<li id="fn:25">"Ethical Egoism". Seven Pillars Institute. Kansas City, Missouri. August 26, 2017. Retrieved 2020-03-20. <a href="https://sevenpillarsinstitute.org/glossary/ethical-egoism/" target="_blank">https://sevenpillarsinstitute.org/glossary/ethical-egoism/</a> <a href="#fnref:25" class="footnote-back-ref">↩</a></li>
<li id="fn:26">"Ethical Egoism". Seven Pillars Institute. Kansas City, Missouri. August 26, 2017. Retrieved 2020-03-20. <a href="https://sevenpillarsinstitute.org/glossary/ethical-egoism/" target="_blank">https://sevenpillarsinstitute.org/glossary/ethical-egoism/</a> <a href="#fnref:26" class="footnote-back-ref">↩</a></li>
<li id="fn:27">Rachels, James (2003). The Elements of Moral Philosophy (4th ed.). Boston: McGraw-Hill. p. 89. ISBN 0071198768. OCLC 984391934. <a href="0071198768" target="_blank">0071198768</a> <a href="#fnref:27" class="footnote-back-ref">↩</a></li>
<li id="fn:28">Parfit, Derek (1984). Reasons and persons. Oxford [Oxfordshire]. ISBN 0-19-824615-3. OCLC 9827659.{{cite book}}: CS1 maint: location missing publisher (link) <a href="0-19-824615-3" target="_blank">0-19-824615-3</a> <a href="#fnref:28" class="footnote-back-ref">↩</a></li>
<li id="fn:29">Kolak, Daniel (2007-11-03). I Am You: The Metaphysical Foundations for Global Ethics (PDF). Springer Science & Business Media. ISBN 978-1-4020-3014-7. Archived (PDF) from the original on 2024-09-06. <a href="978-1-4020-3014-7" target="_blank">978-1-4020-3014-7</a> <a href="#fnref:29" class="footnote-back-ref">↩</a></li>
<li id="fn:30">Schoeck, Helmut, Der Neid. Eine Theorie der Gesellschaft (Envy. A Theory of Social Behaviour), 1966, 1st English ed. 1969. <a href="/wiki/Helmut_Schoeck" target="_blank">/wiki/Helmut_Schoeck</a> <a href="#fnref:30" class="footnote-back-ref">↩</a></li>
<li id="fn:31">Wheeler, Jack, "Rand and Aristotle," in Den Uyl and Rasmussen, The Philosophic Thought of Ayn Rand, 1986. <a href="/wiki/The_Philosophic_Thought_of_Ayn_Rand" target="_blank">/wiki/The_Philosophic_Thought_of_Ayn_Rand</a> <a href="#fnref:31" class="footnote-back-ref">↩</a></li>
<li id="fn:32">Rand, Ayn, The Virtue of Selfishness (1964). <a href="/wiki/The_Virtue_of_Selfishness" target="_blank">/wiki/The_Virtue_of_Selfishness</a> <a href="#fnref:32" class="footnote-back-ref">↩</a></li>
<li id="fn:33">Peikoff, Leonard, "Why Should One Act on Principle?," The Objectivist Forum, 1988, originally delivered at the Ford Hall Forum. <a href="/wiki/Ford_Hall_Forum" target="_blank">/wiki/Ford_Hall_Forum</a> <a href="#fnref:33" class="footnote-back-ref">↩</a></li>
<li id="fn:34">Norton, David, Personal Destinies: A Philosophy of Ethical Individualism, 1976, Princeton University Press. <a href="/wiki/David_L._Norton" target="_blank">/wiki/David_L._Norton</a> <a href="#fnref:34" class="footnote-back-ref">↩</a></li>
</ol>

Ethical egoism open-in-new

Ethical egoism