In the random oracle model, if RSA is ( t ′ , ϵ ′ ) {\displaystyle (t',\epsilon ')} -secure, then the full domain hash RSA signature scheme is ( t , ϵ ) {\displaystyle (t,\epsilon )} -secure where,
For large q sig {\displaystyle q_{\text{sig}}} this reduces to ϵ ∼ exp ( 1 ) ⋅ q sig ⋅ ϵ ′ {\displaystyle \epsilon \sim \exp(1)\cdot q_{\text{sig}}\cdot \epsilon '} .
This means that if there exists an algorithm that can forge a new FDH signature that runs in time t, computes at most q hash {\displaystyle q_{\text{hash}}} hashes, asks for at most q sig {\displaystyle q_{\text{sig}}} signatures and succeeds with probability ϵ {\displaystyle \epsilon } , then there must also exist an algorithm that breaks RSA with probability ϵ ′ {\displaystyle \epsilon '} in time t ′ {\displaystyle t'} .