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Stability–instability paradox
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<h2 id="mechanism">Mechanism</h2> <p>The stability–instability paradox: </p> <blockquote><p>"posits that both parties to a conflict will rationally view strategic conflict and the attendant risk of a strategic nuclear exchange as untenable, and will thus avoid any escalation of sub-strategic conflicts to the strategic level. This effective “cap” on sub-strategic militarized conflict escalation emboldens states to engage in such conflict with the confidence that it would not spiral out of control and threaten their strategic interests. The causal force of this theory of increased sub-strategic conflict is the mutual recognition of the untenability of conflict at the level of strategic interests—a product of MAD [Mutually Assured Destruction]. With strategic interests forming the “red line” neither side would dare to cross, both sides are free to pursue sub-strategic political objectives through militarized conflict without the fear that the terms of such conflict will escalate beyond their control and jeopardize their strategic interests. Effectively, with the risk of uncontrolled escalation removed, the net costs to engage in conflict are reduced."<a class="footnote-ref" id="fnref:6" href="#fn:6"><sup>6</sup></a></p></blockquote> <h2 id="see-also">See also</h2> <ul><li><a href="/facts/Nuclear_peace/suo1PDx4">Nuclear peace</a></li> <li><a href="/facts/Minimal_deterrence/W5B2gefT">Minimal deterrence</a></li> <li><a href="/facts/Deterrence_theory/rllU6aJf">Deterrence theory</a></li></ul> <h2 id="references">References</h2> <ol> <li id="fn:1"><p>Snyder, Glenn Herald (1965). The Balance of Power and the Balance of Terror. <a href="https://books.google.com/books?id=io4AcgAACAAJ" target="_blank">https://books.google.com/books?id=io4AcgAACAAJ</a> <a href="#fnref:1" class="footnote-back-ref">↩</a></p></li> <li id="fn:2"><p>Jervis, Robert (1979). "Why Nuclear Superiority Doesn't Matter". Political Science Quarterly. 94 (4): 617–633. doi:10.2307/2149629. ISSN 0032-3195. JSTOR 2149629. <a href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/2149629" target="_blank">https://www.jstor.org/stable/2149629</a> <a href="#fnref:2" class="footnote-back-ref">↩</a></p></li> <li id="fn:3"><p>Jervis, Robert (1989). The Meaning of the Nuclear Revolution: Statecraft and the Prospect of Armageddon. Cornell University Press. ISBN 978-0-8014-9565-6. <a href="978-0-8014-9565-6" target="_blank">978-0-8014-9565-6</a> <a href="#fnref:3" class="footnote-back-ref">↩</a></p></li> <li id="fn:4"><p>Krepon, Michael. "The Stability-Instability Paradox, Misperception, and Escalation Control in South Asia" (PDF). The Henry Stimson Center. Archived from the original (PDF) on 12 August 2017. Retrieved 12 August 2017. <a href="https://web.archive.org/web/20170812115507/https://www.stimson.org/sites/default/files/file-attachments/stability-instability-paradox-south-asia.pdf" target="_blank">https://web.archive.org/web/20170812115507/https://www.stimson.org/sites/default/files/file-attachments/stability-instability-paradox-south-asia.pdf</a> <a href="#fnref:4" class="footnote-back-ref">↩</a></p></li> <li id="fn:5"><p>Rauchhaus, Robert (2009). "Evaluating the Nuclear Peace Hypothesis - A Quantitative Approach". Journal of Conflict Resolution. 53 (2): 258–277. doi:10.1177/0022002708330387. S2CID 34287191. <a href="/wiki/Doi_(identifier)" target="_blank">/wiki/Doi_(identifier)</a> <a href="#fnref:5" class="footnote-back-ref">↩</a></p></li> <li id="fn:6"><p>Christopher J. Watterson 2017, 'Competing interpretations of the stability–instability paradox: the case of the Kargil War', The Nonproliferation Review, 24(1-2), 86, https://doi.org/10.1080/10736700.2017.1366623 <a href="https://doi.org/10.1080/10736700.2017.1366623" target="_blank">https://doi.org/10.1080/10736700.2017.1366623</a> <a href="#fnref:6" class="footnote-back-ref">↩</a></p></li> </ol>