Winzapper creates a backup security log, "dummy.dat," at %systemroot%\system32\config. This file may be undeleted after an attack to recover the original log.6 Conceivably, however, a savvy user might copy a sufficiently large file over the dummy.dat file and thus irretrievably overwrite it. Winzapper causes the Event Viewer to become unusable until after a reboot, so an unexpected reboot may be a clue that Winzapper has recently been used.7 Another potential clue to a Winzapper-based attempt would be corruption of the Security Log (requiring it to be cleared), since there is always a small risk that Winzapper will do this.
According to WindowsNetworking.com, "One way to prevent rogue admins from using this tool on your servers is to implement a Software Restriction Policy using Group Policy that prevents the WinZapper executable from running".8
Winzapper FAQ, NTSecurity. http://www.ntsecurity.nu/toolbox/winzapper/ ↩
Joel Scambray, Stuart McClure (October 27, 2006). Hacking Exposed Windows Server 2003. McGraw-Hill Osborne Media, 1 edition. p. 228. ISBN 9780072230611. 9780072230611 ↩
"Hacktool.Clearlogs". Symantec.com. Archived from the original on January 8, 2007. https://web.archive.org/web/20070108020358/http://www.symantec.com/security_response/writeup.jsp?docid=2004-102811-2608-99 ↩
Vidstrom, Arne (September 6, 2000). "Announcing WinZapper - erase individual event records in the security log of Windows NT 4.0 / 2000". Security-express.com. http://www.security-express.com/archives/bugtraq/2000-09/0000.html ↩
"Winzapper Trojan". Logiguard.com. http://logiguard.com/spyware/w/winzapper-trojan.htm ↩
"Forensic Footprint of Winzapper". Forensics.8thdaytech.com. http://forensics.8thdaytech.com/winzapper-forensic-foorprint ↩
Seifried, Kurt. "Microsoft Security Whitepaper - Windows NT". Seifried.org. https://www.seifried.org/security/os/microsoft/windowsnt.html ↩
"Gaps in Security Log". Windowsnetworking.com. http://www.windowsnetworking.com/kbase/WindowsTips/Windows2003/AdminTips/Security/GapsinSecurityLog.html ↩