In mechanism design, implementability is a property of a social choice function. It means that there is an incentive-compatible mechanism that attains ("implements") this function. There are several degrees of implementability, corresponding to the different degrees of incentive-compatibility, including:
See for a recent reference. In some textbooks, the entire field of mechanism design is called implementation theory.7
Incentive Compatibility
Palfrey, Thomas R. "Chapter 61 Implementation Theory." Handbook of Game Theory with Economic Applications, 2002. doi:10.1016/S1574-0005(02)03024-2. /wiki/Doi_(identifier) ↩
Maskin, Eric and Sjöström, Tomas. "Implementation Theory." Handbook of Social Choice and Welfare, 2002. doi:10.1016/S1574-0110(02)80009-1. /wiki/Doi_(identifier) ↩
Vickrey, William. "Counterspeculation, Auctions, and Competitive Sealed Tenders." The Journal of Finance 16, no. 1 (1961): 8–37. doi:10.1111/j.1540-6261.1961.tb02789.x. JSTOR 2977633. /wiki/Doi_(identifier) ↩
Jackson, Matthew O. "A Crash Course in Implementation Theory." Social Choice and Welfare 18, no. 4 (2001): 655–708. doi:10.1007/s003550100152. JSTOR 41106420. /wiki/Doi_(identifier) ↩
Martin J. Osborne & Ariel Rubinstein: A Course in Game Theory (1994). ↩