Space Shuttle Challenger disaster

On January 28, 1986, the <a href="/facts/Space_Shuttle_Challenger/K4dGtVCC">Space Shuttle Challenger</a> broke apart 73 seconds into its flight, killing all seven crew members aboard. The spacecraft disintegrated 46,000 feet (14 km) above the Atlantic Ocean, off the coast of <a href="/facts/Cape_Canaveral/DsFRGqWm">Cape Canaveral</a>, Florida, at 16:39:13 <a href="/facts/Coordinated_Universal_Time/2EnjfSyu">UTC</a> (11:39:13 a.m. <a href="/facts/Eastern_Time_Zone/jP4S8j1V">EST</a>, local time at the launch site). It was the first fatal accident involving an <a href="/facts/List_of_space_programs_of_the_United_States/30jw5A9w">American spacecraft</a> while in flight.
The mission, designated <a href="/facts/STS-51-L/5zBPndgw">STS-51-L</a>, was the 10th flight for the <a href="/facts/Space_Shuttle_orbiter/pD50Txk9">orbiter</a> and the 25th flight of the Space Shuttle fleet. The crew was scheduled to deploy a commercial communications satellite and study <a href="/facts/Halley%2527s_Comet/DQongwTQ">Halley's Comet</a> while they were in orbit, in addition to taking schoolteacher <a href="/facts/Christa_McAuliffe/Fq9xeu1z">Christa McAuliffe</a> into space under the <a href="/facts/Teacher_in_Space_Project/eyUXM8v0">Teacher in Space Project</a>. The latter task resulted in a higher-than-usual media interest in and coverage of the mission; the launch and subsequent disaster were seen live in many schools across the United States.
The cause of the disaster was the failure of the primary and secondary <a href="/facts/O-ring/wp4x9hKD">O-ring</a> seals in a joint in the right <a href="/facts/Space_Shuttle_Solid_Rocket_Booster/ETayF0Xh">Space Shuttle Solid Rocket Booster</a> (SRB). The record-low temperatures on the morning of the launch had stiffened the rubber O-rings, reducing their ability to seal the joints. Shortly after liftoff, the seals were breached, and hot pressurized gas from within the SRB leaked through the joint and burned through the aft attachment strut connecting it to the <a href="/facts/Space_Shuttle_external_tank/RApJkcAq">external propellant tank</a> (ET), then into the tank itself. The <a href="/facts/Structural_integrity_and_failure/5aYoMIlw">collapse</a> of the ET's internal structures and the rotation of the SRB that followed propelled the shuttle stack, traveling at a speed of <a href="/facts/Mach_number/Ee01MIgw">Mach</a> 1.92, into a direction that allowed <a href="/facts/Aerodynamic_force/V9C98uHk">aerodynamic forces</a> to tear the orbiter apart. Both SRBs detached from the now-destroyed ET and continued to fly uncontrollably until the <a href="/facts/Range_safety/gRaLMqaj">range safety</a> officer destroyed them.
The crew compartment, containing human remains, and many other fragments from the shuttle were recovered from the ocean floor after a three-month search and recovery operation. The exact timing of the deaths of the crew is unknown, but several crew members are thought to have survived the initial breakup of the spacecraft. The orbiter had no <a href="/facts/Launch_escape_system/nPGKUesD">escape system</a>, and the impact of the crew compartment at <a href="/facts/Terminal_velocity/DYRAmEeM">terminal velocity</a> with the ocean surface was too violent to be survivable.
The disaster resulted in a 32-month hiatus in the <a href="/facts/Space_Shuttle_program/6Ikdvwsw">Space Shuttle program</a>. President <a href="/facts/Ronald_Reagan/z6AaKAad">Ronald Reagan</a> created the <a href="/facts/Rogers_Commission_Report/wqA20AgL">Rogers Commission</a> to investigate the accident. The commission criticized <a href="/facts/NASA/TIMCV0yV">NASA</a>'s organizational culture and decision-making processes that had contributed to the accident. Test data since 1977 had demonstrated a potentially catastrophic flaw in the SRBs' O-rings, but neither NASA nor SRB manufacturer <a href="/facts/Morton_Thiokol/alHU0yG6">Morton Thiokol</a> had addressed this known defect. NASA managers also disregarded engineers' warnings about the dangers of launching in low temperatures and did not report these technical concerns to their superiors.
As a result of this disaster, NASA established the Office of Safety, Reliability, and Quality Assurance, and arranged for deployment of commercial satellites from <a href="/facts/Expendable_launch_vehicles/CaW43W5z">expendable launch vehicles</a> rather than from a crewed orbiter. To replace Challenger, the construction of a new Space Shuttle orbiter, <a href="/facts/Space_Shuttle_Endeavour/fcX8nN5Q">Endeavour</a>, was approved in 1987, and the new orbiter first flew in 1992. Subsequent missions were launched with redesigned SRBs and their crews wore <a href="/facts/Advanced_Crew_Escape_Suit/6Vue5zxo">pressurized suits</a> during ascent and <a href="/facts/Atmospheric_entry/p7TMk9sa">reentry</a>.

Space Shuttle Challenger disaster open-in-new

Space Shuttle Challenger disaster