Fact–value distinction

The fact–value distinction is a fundamental <a href="/facts/Epistemological/NsDwpcYH">epistemological</a> distinction described between:

<ol><li>Statements of fact (positive or descriptive statements), which are based upon <a href="/facts/Reason/tcBImN8J">reason</a> and <a href="/facts/Physical_observation/NTodmzCo">observation</a>, and examined via the <a href="/facts/Empirical_method/A6cy8Rcy">empirical method</a>.</li>
<li>Statements of value (normative or prescriptive statements), which encompass <a href="/facts/Ethics/wNVNgL5q">ethics</a> and <a href="/facts/Aesthetics/FSD8f7oF">aesthetics</a>, and are studied via <a href="/facts/Axiology/l6rLbmsK">axiology</a>.</li></ol>
This barrier between fact and value, as construed in epistemology, implies it is impossible to derive ethical claims from factual arguments, or to defend the former using the latter.
The fact–value distinction is closely related to, and derived from, the <a href="/facts/Is%25E2%2580%2593ought_problem/81PPQxE4">is–ought problem</a> in moral philosophy, characterized by <a href="/facts/David_Hume/aTwlJ80V">David Hume</a>. The terms are often used interchangeably, though <a href="/facts/Philosophical/zAH5PVD6">philosophical</a> discourse concerning the is–ought problem does not usually encompass aesthetics.

Fact–value distinction open-in-new

Fact–value distinction