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Bargaining model of war
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<p>In <a href="/facts/International_relations_theory/XWoUgfVP">international relations theory</a>, the bargaining model of war is a method of representing the potential gains and losses and ultimate outcome of war between two actors as a <a href="/facts/Bargaining/KcUxrewP">bargaining</a> interaction. A central puzzle that motivates research in this vein is the "inefficiency puzzle of war": why do wars occur when it would be better for all parties involved to reach an agreement that goes short of war? In the bargaining model, war between rational actors is possible due to uncertainty and commitment problems. As a result, provision of reliable information and steps to alleviate commitment problems make war less likely. It is an influential strand of <a href="/facts/Rationalism_(international_relations)/5UcwhDU4">rational choice</a> scholarship in the field of international relations. </p><p><a href="/facts/Thomas_Schelling/s3fREMVz">Thomas Schelling</a> was an early proponent of formalizing conflicts as bargaining situations. Stanford University political scientist <a href="/facts/James_Fearon/Gx2g6QEd">James Fearon</a> brought prominence to the bargaining model in the 1990s. His 1995 article "Rationalist Explanations for War" is the most assigned journal article in International Relations graduate training at U.S. universities. The bargaining model of war has been described as "the dominant framework used in the study of war in the international relations field." </p>