Universal prescriptivism

Universal prescriptivism (often simply called prescriptivism) is the <a href="/facts/Meta-ethics/a8pTEKr2">meta-ethical</a> view that claims that, rather than expressing <a href="/facts/Proposition/0877MFMD">propositions</a>, ethical <a href="/facts/Sentence_(linguistics)/GhKKkcm2">sentences</a> function similarly to <a href="/facts/Imperative_mood/E3zRtPgJ">imperatives</a> which are <a href="/facts/Universalizability/ehRmkoup">universalizable</a>—whoever makes a moral judgment is committed to the same judgment in any situation where the same relevant facts pertain.
This makes prescriptivism a <a href="/facts/Moral_universalism/nQX7nood">universalist</a> form of <a href="/facts/Non-cognitivism/KmkHpvsX">non-cognitivism</a>. Prescriptivism stands in opposition to other forms of non-cognitivism (such as <a href="/facts/Emotivism/lEcWIoz4">emotivism</a> and <a href="/facts/Quasi-realism/gHurEn1h">quasi-realism</a>), as well as to all forms of <a href="/facts/Cognitivism_(ethics)/fa9kVXvJ">cognitivism</a> (including both <a href="/facts/Moral_realism/3St1SwA1">moral realism</a> and <a href="/facts/Ethical_subjectivism/GmV8a7BM">ethical subjectivism</a>).
Since prescriptivism was introduced by philosopher <a href="/facts/R._M._Hare/suA8X8hM">R. M. Hare</a> in his 1952 book The Language of Morals, it has been compared to emotivism and to the <a href="/facts/Categorical_imperative/8RLjqDzj">categorical imperative</a> of <a href="/facts/Immanuel_Kant/vIxjdy6I">Immanuel Kant</a>. Unlike Kant, however, Hare does not invoke <a href="/facts/Universalizability/ehRmkoup">universalizability</a> as a test of moral permissibility. Instead, he sees it as a consistency requirement that is built into the logic of moral language and helps to make moral thinking a rational enterprise.

Universal prescriptivism open-in-new

Universal prescriptivism