Random oracle

In <a href="/facts/Cryptography/e94PEVau">cryptography</a>, a random oracle is an <a href="/facts/Oracle_machine/6ScMuvvY">oracle</a> (a theoretical <a href="/facts/Black_box_(systems)/hJeAGnIz">black box</a>) that responds to every unique query with a (truly) <a href="/facts/Random/QJQBoEX5">random</a> response chosen <a href="/facts/Uniform_distribution_(discrete)/M52SQP5n">uniformly</a> from its output domain. If a query is repeated, it responds the <a href="/facts/Deterministic_algorithm/v8x4wz35"> same way</a> every time that query is submitted.
Stated differently, a random oracle is a <a href="/facts/Mathematical_function/CdReEKCh">mathematical function</a> chosen uniformly at random, that is, a function mapping each possible query to a (fixed) random response from its output domain.
Random oracles first appeared in the context of complexity theory, in which they were used to argue that complexity class separations may face relativization barriers, with the most prominent case being the <a href="/facts/P_vs_NP_problem/xoC7Ruda">P vs NP problem</a>, two classes shown in 1981 to be distinct relative to a random oracle <a href="/facts/Almost_surely/fWaxzpBA">almost surely</a>. They made their way into cryptography by the publication of <a href="/facts/Mihir_Bellare/uRjcPYqu">Mihir Bellare</a> and <a href="/facts/Phillip_Rogaway/hYhbH8V5">Phillip Rogaway</a> in 1993, which introduced them as a formal cryptographic model to be used in reduction proofs.
They are typically used when the proof cannot be carried out using weaker assumptions on the <a href="/facts/Cryptographic_hash_function/cuxkgbST">cryptographic hash function</a>. A system that is proven secure when every hash function is replaced by a random oracle is described as being secure in the random oracle model, as opposed to secure in the <a href="/facts/Standard_model_(cryptography)/pjCTKoKe">standard model of cryptography</a>.

Random oracle open-in-new

Random oracle