Menu
Home Explore People Places Arts History Plants & Animals Science Life & Culture Technology
On this page
Autocracy is a form of government where absolute power is held by a single ruler or a small group, known as autocrats, encompassing some monarchies and all dictatorships, and contrasting with democracy. Autocrats maintain control through political repression, co-optation, propaganda, and sometimes unfair elections to legitimize their rule. Originating in ancient despotism seen in empires and city-states, autocracy evolved through history with figures like Napoleon and 20th-century totalitarian regimes. Modern autocracies are often described as authoritarian, balancing absolute power with practical limits to maintain their regime stability.

We don't have any images related to Autocracy yet.
We don't have any YouTube videos related to Autocracy yet.
We don't have any PDF documents related to Autocracy yet.
We don't have any Books related to Autocracy yet.

Etymology and use

Autocracy comes from the Ancient Greek auto (Greek: αὐτός; "self") and kratos (Greek: κράτος; "power, might").4 This became the Hellenistic/Byzantine Greek word autocrator (Greek: αὐτοκράτωρ) and the Latin imperator, both of which were titles for the Roman emperor. This was adopted in Old Russian as samod′rž′c′ and then modern Russian as samoderžec. In the 18th century, the title for the Russian emperor was translated to authocrateur and then autocrateur in French, while it was translated to Autocrator and then Autokrator, Selbstherrscher or Alleinherrscher in German. These terms were eventually used to refer to autocratic rulers in general.5 The term has since developed a negative connotation.6

Political structure

Many attempts have been made to define the political structure of autocracy.7 It traditionally entails a single unrestrained ruler, known as an autocrat,8 though unrestrained non-democratic rule by a group may also be defined as autocratic.910 Autocracy is distinguished from other forms of government by the power of the autocrat to unilaterally repress the civil liberties of the people and to choose what liberties they may exercise.11 It is distinct from democracy and feudalism,12 and modern autocracy is often defined as any non-democratic government.13141516 As with all forms of government, autocracy has no clearly defined boundaries, and it may intersect with other forms of government.17 Though autocracy usually encompasses an entire country, it can sometimes take place at subnational or local levels, even in countries with a more democratic government, if the national government has limited control over a specific area or its political conflicts.18

Autocracies impose few to no limits on the power of the autocrat,19 and any formal institutions that exist create only limited accountability.20 To maintain power, an autocrat must have the support of elites that hold influence in the country and assist the autocrat in carrying out their will.21 The amount of direct control that an autocrat wields in practice may vary.22 As an autocratic government solidifies its rule, it develops stronger institutions to carry out the autocrat's will. These institutions are necessary for maintaining control and extracting value from the state, but they can also serve as checks on the autocrat.23 Autocrats must also balance the affiliation that regional elites have over their jurisdiction; too little can prevent effective rule, while too much may cause the elite to favor the region's interests over the autocrat's.24 Some autocracies incorporate an elected legislature that has a limited ability to check the power of the autocrat, though these are not usually formed through free and fair elections.25 These legislatures may also be prone to corruption and can be influenced by the autocrat in exchange for preferential treatment.26 Other institutions, such as an independent judiciary or an active civil society, may also limit the autocrat's power.27

Some autocracies emphasize a ruling family rather than a single autocrat. This has been the case of most monarchies. Such arrangements allow for royal intermarriage, which can join autocracies together through dynastic unions.28 Personalist dictatorships may also give significance to the ruling family through a cult of personality, such as the Kim family of North Korea.29

Origin and development

Formation

The earliest autocracies, such as chiefdoms, formed where there was previously no centralized government.30 The initial development of an autocracy is attributed to its efficiency over anarchy, as it provides security and negates internal divisions. Mancur Olson introduced the term "stationary bandits" to describe the method of control associated with autocracy, as opposed to the "roaming bandits" that dominate anarchic society. Under this definition, autocrats as stationary bandits see long-term investment in the society that they exploit through taxation and other seizure of resources, as opposed to the bandits in stateless societies that have no incentive to improve society. This creates a Pareto efficiency in which both the autocrat and the subjects benefit over the alternative.31

Douglass North, John Joseph Wallis, and Barry R. Weingast describe autocracies as natural states that arise from this need to monopolize violence. In contrast to Olson, these scholars understand the early state not as a single ruler, but as an organization formed by many actors. They describe the process of autocratic state formation as a bargaining process among individuals with access to violence. For them, these individuals form a dominant coalition that grants each other privileges such as the access to resources. As violence reduces the economic rents, members of the dominant coalition have incentives to cooperate and to avoid fighting. A limited access to privileges is necessary to avoid competition among the members of the dominant coalition, who then will credibly commit to cooperate and will form the state.32

There is great variance in the types of states that become autocratic. Neither a state's size, its military strength, its economic success, nor its cultural attributes significantly affect whether it is likely to be autocratic.33 Autocracy is more likely to form in heterogeneous populations, as there is greater inequality and less social cohesion. Autocracies formed under these conditions are often more volatile for the same reasons.34

Stability and succession

Autocracies face challenges to their authority from several fronts, including the citizenry, political opposition, and internal disloyalty from elites.35 As autocrats must share their power with the state's elites to see their will carried out, these elites are the greatest threat to the autocrat.36 Most autocratic governments are overthrown by a coup,37 and historically most have been succeeded by another autocratic government, though a trend toward democracy developed in 20th century Europe.38 These new governments are commonly a different type of autocracy or a weaker variant of the same type.39

While popular support for revolution is often necessary to overthrow an autocratic government, most revolts are accompanied by internal support from elites who believe that it is no longer in their interest to support the autocrat.40 Overthrow of an autocratic government purely through popular revolt is virtually nonexistent throughout history,41 but popular support for democracy is a significant indicator of challenges to autocratic rule.42 Modernization and increased wealth are often associated with stronger support for democracy, though failing to provide these things also reduces support for the autocratic regime.43 Popular revolt is most likely to occur during periods of reform. Government reform can provide an impetus for stronger opposition, especially when it does not meet expectations, and it can weaken the centralization of power through poor implementation. When revolt appears likely, an autocrat may grant civil rights, redistribute wealth, or abdicate from power entirely to avoid the threat of violence.44

Some autocracies use hereditary succession in which a set of rules determines who will be the next autocrat. Otherwise, a successor may be handpicked, either by the autocrat or by another governmental body. Pre-determined successors are incentivized to overthrow and replace the autocrat, creating a dilemma for autocrats wishing to choose a successor. The threat of overthrow is greater for appointed successors over hereditary successors, as hereditary successors are often younger and less influential.45 Other autocracies have no appointed successor, and a power struggle will take place upon the death or removal of the autocrat.46 These methods of succession are a common distinction between monarchical rule and dictatorial rule; monarchies use an established system of succession such as hereditary succession, while dictatorships do not.47 Autocratic rule is most unstable during succession from one autocrat to another.48 Orders of succession allow for more peaceful transition of power, but it prevents meaningful vetting of successors for competence or fortitude.49 When rule passes between autocrats, the incoming autocrat often inherits an established bureaucracy. This bureaucracy facilitates the transfer of power, as the new ruler gains immediate control over the nation without having to conquer its people or win their popular support.50

Legitimacy

Autocrats may claim that they have legitimacy under a legal framework, or they may exert influence purely through force.51 Opinion on whether an autocratic government is legitimate can vary, even among its own population.52 An autocracy's approach to legitimacy can be affected by recognition from other nations. Widely accepted autocratic governments are more able to convince their own populations of their legitimacy. Less widely accepted autocracies may rally internal support by attributing their lack of recognition to malevolent foreign efforts, such as American imperialism or Zionism.53

Historically, the most common claim of legitimacy is birthright in an autocracy that uses hereditary succession. Theocratic governments appeal to religion to justify their rule, arguing that religious leaders must also be political leaders.54 Other autocrats may use similar claims of divine authority to justify their rule, often in absolute monarchy. This includes the Mandate of Heaven in ancient China and the divine right of kings in 17th century England and France.55 When an autocratic government has a state ideology, this may be used to justify the autocrat's rule. This is most common in communist or ethnonationalist governments. Autocracies with unfair elections will cite election results to prove that the autocrat has a mandate to rule.56 Some autocracies will use practical considerations to legitimise their rule, arguing that they are necessary to provide basic needs to the population.57

Types

Autocracy encompasses most non-democratic forms of government, including dictatorships, monarchies, and dominant-party regimes.58 Monarchies were common in medieval Europe,59 but in the modern era dictatorship is the most common form of government globally.60

Autocratic governments are classified as totalitarian when they engage in direct control of citizens' lives, or as authoritarian when they do not.61 Totalitarian governments do not allow political or cultural pluralism. Instead, citizens are expected to devote themselves to a single ideological vision and demonstrate their support of the state ideology through political engagement. Totalitarian governments are revolutionary, seeking radically to reform society, and they often engage in terror against groups that do not comply with the state's vision.62 Totalitarianism is associated with communist states and Nazi Germany.63 Authoritarian governments maintain control of a nation purely through repression and controlled opposition rather than mandated adherence to a state ideology.64 These include most traditional monarchies, military dictatorships, theocracies, and dominant party states.65

An absolute autocracy may be referred to as despotism, in which the autocrat rules purely through personal control without any meaningful institutions.66 These were most common in pre-industrial societies, when large bureaucracies had not yet become standard in government.67 Sultanism is a type of personalist dictatorship68 in which a ruling family directly integrates itself into the state through a cult of personality, where it maintains control purely through rewards for allies and force against enemies. In these regimes, there is no guiding ideology or legal system, and the state serves only to bring about the leader's own personal enrichment.69 Other descriptors, such as tyranny and absolutism, may also be associated with variations of autocracy.70

Though autocracies often restrict civil and political rights, some may allow limited exercise of some rights. These autocracies grant moderate representation to political opponents and allow exercise of some civil rights, though less than those associated with democracy. These are contrasted with closed autocracies, which do not permit the exercise of these rights.71 Several forms of semi-autocratic government have been defined in which governments blend elements of democracy and autocracy.727374 These include limited autocracy, semi-autocracy, liberal autocracy,75 semi-liberal autocracy,76 anocracy,77 electoral autocracy,78 partly-free regimes, and multi-party autocracies.79 These governments may begin as democratic governments and then become autocratic as the elected leader seizes control over the nation's institutions and electoral process.80 Conversely, autocratic governments may transition to democracy through a period of semi-autocratic rule.81

History

Further information: History of monarchy and History of dictatorship

Early history

Autocracy has been the primary form of government for most of human history.82 One of the earliest forms of government was the chiefdom that developed in tribal societies, which date back to the Neolithic.83 Chiefdoms are regional collections of villages ruled over by tribal chief.84 They are an emergent form of governance, originating from societies that previously lacked a centralized authority.85 Historical chiefs often held only tenuous power over the chiefdom,86 but they trended towards autocracy as heterarchical governance was replaced with hierarchical governance.87

Early states were formed by warlords ruling over conquered territory.88 The first states were the city-states of Mesopotamia, which first developed around the 35th century BCE.89 These early states were ruled by kings who were both political and religious leaders.90 These were followed by the first empire, the Akkadian Empire, when they were conquered by Sargon of Akkad in the 24th century BCE.91 The blending of autocratic rule with religious significance continued under the Akkadian Empire, as the king Naram-Sin of Akkad was the first of several kings to be recognized as a god over the following centuries.92 Ancient Egypt also existed as an autocratic government for most of its early history,93 first developing states at the end of the fourth millennium BCE.94

China has been subject to autocratic rule almost without interruption since its ancient feudal society was replaced by the Qin dynasty in 221 BCE,95 and even its feudal government had stronger elements of autocracy than other instances of feudalism.96 The early Chinese philosophy of Confucianism emphasized the importance of benevolent autocratic rule to maintain order,97 and this philosophy heavily influenced future Chinese thought.98

City-states in Ancient Greece and the Etruscan civilization were often ruled by tyrants, though myth and historical revisionism later re-imagined these tyrants as kings with hereditary succession.99 The Roman Republic introduced the concept of the Roman dictator who would be temporarily invested with unchecked power to restore stability during periods of crisis.100 This temporary dictatorship was eventually subverted by Julius Caesar when he became dictator for life in 44 BCE, ending the Roman Republic and ushering the creation of the autocratic Roman Empire.101

Several early military dictatorships formed in East Asia during the post-classical era. These include the rule of the Goguryeo kingdom by Yŏn Kaesomun in 642,102 the Goryeo military regime beginning in 1170,103 and the shogunate in Japan between the 12th and 19th centuries.104

Parliamentary monarchies became common in the 13th century as monarchs sought larger advising bodies that were representative of the kingdom.105 European nations moved away from feudalism and towards centralized monarchy as the primary form of government in the 14th century.106

Modern era

Absolutism became more common in European monarchies at the onset of the 16th century as the continent struggled with weak leadership and religious conflict. Legislatures during this period were often tailored to enforce the king's will but not challenge it.107108 This was sometimes justified through the divine right of kings, particularly in the kingdoms of England and France.109

The French Revolution marked a significant shift in the perception of dictatorship as a form of tyrannical rule, as revolutionaries justified their actions as a means of combatting tyranny.110 In Europe, the original forms of dictatorship were Bonapartism, a form of monarchism that rejected feudalism, and Caesarism, imperial rule reminiscent of Julius Caesar. These were primarily used to define the First and Second French Empires.111 European monarchies moved away from autocracy in the 19th century as legislatures increased in power.112 In 19th century Latin America, regional rulers known as caudillos seized power in several nations as early examples of dictators.113

The 19th and 20th centuries brought about the decline of traditional monarchies in favor of modern states, many of which developed as autocracies.114 The upheaval caused by World War I resulted in a broad shift of governance across Europe, and many nations moved away from traditional monarchies.115 Most European monarchs were stripped of their powers to become constitutional monarchs, or they were displaced entirely in favor of republics.116 Totalitarianism first developed as a form of autocracy during the interwar period.117 It seized power in many of these republics, particularly during the Great Depression. This saw the establishment of fascist, communist, and military dictatorships throughout Europe.118

The communist state first developed as a new form of autocracy following the Russian Revolution. This type of autocratic government enforced totalitarian control over its citizens through a mass party said to represent the citizens.119 While other forms of European dictatorship were dissolved after World War II, communism was strengthened and became the basis of several dictatorships in Eastern Europe.120 Communist states became the primary model for autocratic government in the late-20th century, and many non-communist autocratic regimes replicated the communist style of government.121

The decline in autocracy across Western Europe affected autocratic government elsewhere in the world through colonization. Societies without a state were readily colonized by European nations and subsequently adopted democracy and parliamentary government after it became common in Europe. Regions with historically strong autocratic states were able to resist European colonization or otherwise went unchanged, allowing autocracy to be preserved.122

The strength of autocracy in global politics was significantly reduced at the end of the Cold War with the dissolution of the Soviet Union in 1991, but it saw a resurgence over the following decades through regional powers such as China, Iran, Russia, and Saudi Arabia.123 The fall of totalitarian regimes led to authoritarianism becoming the predominant form of autocracy in the 21st century.124

Political activity

Political repression is the primary method by which autocrats preserve the regime and prevent the loss of power.125 This repression may take place implicitly by coercing and intimidating potential opposition, or it may involve direct violence. Autocratic governments also engage in co-optation, in which influential figures are provided benefits by the regime in exchange for their support.126 Coercing these elites is usually more efficient for the autocrat than intimidating them through violence. Political parties are a common method of co-optation and coercion, as they provide a mechanism to control members of the government, initiate new members, and discourage a military coup. Autocratic governments controlled through a political party last longer on average than other autocratic governments.127

Control over the public is maintained through indoctrination and propaganda.128 Autocratic governments enjoy similar levels of public support to democratic governments, and a state's status as autocratic is not a significant indicator in whether it is supported by its citizens.129 Autocrats often appeal to the people by supporting a specific political, ethnic, or religious movement.130

The different forms of autocratic government create significant variance in their foreign policy.131 Overall, autocratic governments are more likely to go to war than democratic governments, as citizens are not part of the selectorate to which autocrats are accountable.132133 Totalitarian autocracies have historically engaged in militarism and expansionism after consolidating power, particularly fascist governments. This allows the autocracy to spread its state ideology, and the existence of foreign adversaries allows the autocrat to rally internal support.134

Autocratic regimes in the 21st century have departed from the historical precedent of direct rule in favor of institutions that resemble those of democratic governments. This may include controlled liberties for citizens such as the formation of opposition parties to participate in unfair elections.135136 Elections provide several benefits to autocratic regimes, allowing for a venue to restrain or appease the opposition and creating a method to transfer power without violent conflict.137 Many autocrats also institute show trials to carry out political repression rather than carrying out direct purges. This may be done to more publicly discourage future dissidents.138 Prior to this trend, autocratic elections rarely invited public participation. They were instead used by elites to choose a leader amongst themselves, such as in an electoral monarchy. The creation of a constitution is another common measure used by autocrats to stay in power; as they are able to draft the constitution unilaterally, it can be tailored to suit their rule.139

Study and evaluation

Autocratic government has been central to political theory since the development of Ancient Greek political philosophy.140 Despite its historical prominence, autocracy has not been widely recognized as its own political theory in the way that democracy has.141 Autocratic government is generally considered to be less desirable than democratic government. Reasons for this include its proclivity for corruption and violence as well as its lack of efficiency and its weakness in promoting liberty and transparency.142

Historically, data on the operation of autocratic government has been limited, preventing detailed study.143 Study of postcolonial autocracy in Africa has been particularly limited, as these governments were less likely to keep detailed records of their activities relative to other governments at the time, and they frequently destroyed the records that did exist.144 Study of citizen support for autocratic government relative to democratic government has also been infrequent, and most studies conducted in this area have been limited to East Asia.145 Collection of information on autocratic regimes has improved in the 21st century, allowing for more detailed analysis.146

Autocratic government has been found to have effects on a country's politics, including its government's structure and bureaucracy, long after it democratizes. Comparisons between regions have found disparities in citizen attitudes, policy preferences, and political engagement depending on whether it had been subject to autocracy, even in different regions within the same country. Citizens of postcommunist nations are more likely to distrust government and free markets, directly hindering the long-term economic prosperity of these nations. Xenophobia is generally more common in post-autocratic nations, and voters in these nations are more likely to vote for far-right or far-left political parties.147

Many democracy indices have been developed to measure how democratic or authoritarian countries are, such as the Polity data series, the Freedom in the World report, and the Varieties of Democracy indices.148149 These indices measure various attributes of a government's actions and its citizens' rights to sort democracies and autocracies. These attributes might include enfranchisement, freedom of expression, freedom of information, separation of powers, or free and fair elections, among others.150 Both the choice in attributes and the method of measuring them are subjective, and they are defined individually be each index.151 Despite this, different democracy indices generally produce similar results.152153 Most discrepancies come from the measurement governments that blend democratic and autocratic traits.154155 Different democracy indices refer to such types of government using a range of different names, for example, hybrid regimes, anocracies, partly-free regimes or electoral autocracies, and use different definitions and indicators to distinguish them from full autocracies and democracies.156157

The concepts of tyranny and despotism as distinct modes of government were abandoned in the 19th century in favor of more specific typologies.158 Modern typology of autocratic regimes originates from the work of Juan Linz in the mid-20th century, when his division of democracy, authoritarianism, and totalitarianism became accepted.159 The first general theory of autocracy that defined it independently of other systems was created by Gordon Tullock in 1974 through applied public choice theory.160 At the end of the Cold War, Francis Fukuyama's theory of the end of history became popular among political scientists. This theory proposed that autocratic government was approaching a permanent decline to be replaced by liberal democracy. This theory was largely abandoned after the increase in autocratic government over the following decades.161 In the 2010s, the concept of "autocracy promotion" became influential in the study of autocracy, proposing that some governments have sought to establish autocratic rule in foreign nations, though subsequent studies have found little evidence to support that such efforts are as widespread or successful as originally thought.162163

See also

Notes

Books

Journals

Web

Wikisource has the text of the 1911 Encyclopædia Britannica article "Autocracy".

References

  1. Cassani, Andrea (1 November 2014). "Hybrid what? Partial consensus and persistent divergences in the analysis of hybrid regimes". International Political Science Review. 35 (5): 542–558. doi:10.1177/0192512113495756. ISSN 0192-5121. https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/10.1177/0192512113495756 ↩

  2. Schmid, Jonas Willibald. "Electoral autocracies, hybrid regimes, and multiparty autocracies: same, same but different?". Democratization. 0 (0): 1–24. doi:10.1080/13510347.2025.2476183. ISSN 1351-0347. https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/13510347.2025.2476183 ↩

  3. Diamond, Larry (2002). "Elections Without Democracy: Thinking About Hybrid Regimes". Journal of Democracy. 13 (2): 21–35. doi:10.1353/jod.2002.0025. ISSN 1086-3214. https://muse.jhu.edu/article/17195 ↩

  4. Fiala 2015, Glossary. - Fiala, Andrew, ed. (2015). The Bloomsbury Companion to Political Philosophy. Bloomsbury Publishing. ISBN 978-1-4411-1434-1. ↩

  5. Oxford English Dictionary 2023. - "Autocrator (n.), Etymology". Oxford English Dictionary. Oxford University Press. 2023. doi:10.1093/OED/2280847239. https://www.oed.com/dictionary/autocrator_n?tab=etymology ↩

  6. Fiala 2015, Glossary. - Fiala, Andrew, ed. (2015). The Bloomsbury Companion to Political Philosophy. Bloomsbury Publishing. ISBN 978-1-4411-1434-1. ↩

  7. Burnell 2006, p. 546. - Burnell, Peter (2006). "Autocratic opening to democracy: why legitimacy matters". Third World Quarterly. 27 (4): 545–562. doi:10.1080/01436590600720710. ISSN 0143-6597. S2CID 153419534. http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/01436590600720710 ↩

  8. Siaroff 2013, p. 79. - Siaroff, Alan (2013). Comparing Political Regimes: A Thematic Introduction to Comparative Politics, Third Edition. University of Toronto Press. ISBN 978-1-4426-0702-6. https://archive.org/details/comparingpolitic0000siar_q7j3 ↩

  9. Siaroff 2013, p. 79. - Siaroff, Alan (2013). Comparing Political Regimes: A Thematic Introduction to Comparative Politics, Third Edition. University of Toronto Press. ISBN 978-1-4426-0702-6. https://archive.org/details/comparingpolitic0000siar_q7j3 ↩

  10. Gerschewski 2023, p. 30. - Gerschewski, Johannes (2023). The Two Logics of Autocratic Rule. Cambridge University Press. ISBN 978-1-009-19941-4. https://www.cambridge.org/core/books/two-logics-of-autocratic-rule/9C61972920FEE9E850313E54936A9D1E ↩

  11. Burnell 2006, p. 546. - Burnell, Peter (2006). "Autocratic opening to democracy: why legitimacy matters". Third World Quarterly. 27 (4): 545–562. doi:10.1080/01436590600720710. ISSN 0143-6597. S2CID 153419534. http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/01436590600720710 ↩

  12. Tullock 1987, p. 2. - Tullock, Gordon (1987). Autocracy. Springer. ISBN 978-90-247-3398-9. https://archive.org/details/tullockautocracy ↩

  13. Siaroff 2013, p. 79. - Siaroff, Alan (2013). Comparing Political Regimes: A Thematic Introduction to Comparative Politics, Third Edition. University of Toronto Press. ISBN 978-1-4426-0702-6. https://archive.org/details/comparingpolitic0000siar_q7j3 ↩

  14. Mauk 2019, p. 24. - Mauk, Marlene (2019). Citizen Support for Democratic and Autocratic Regimes. Oxford University Press. ISBN 978-0-19-885485-2. https://academic.oup.com/book/36535 ↩

  15. Gerschewski 2023, p. 29. - Gerschewski, Johannes (2023). The Two Logics of Autocratic Rule. Cambridge University Press. ISBN 978-1-009-19941-4. https://www.cambridge.org/core/books/two-logics-of-autocratic-rule/9C61972920FEE9E850313E54936A9D1E ↩

  16. Mukherjee & Koren 2018, p. 5. - Mukherjee, Bumba; Koren, Ore (2018). The Politics of Mass Killing in Autocratic Regimes. Springer. doi:10.1007/978-3-319-91758-0. ISBN 978-3-319-91758-0. https://link.springer.com/book/10.1007/978-3-319-91758-0 ↩

  17. Tullock 1987, pp. 7–8. - Tullock, Gordon (1987). Autocracy. Springer. ISBN 978-90-247-3398-9. https://archive.org/details/tullockautocracy ↩

  18. Grzymala-Busse & Finkel 2022, How Autocracies Die. - Grzymala-Busse, Anna; Finkel, Eugene (2022). "Historical Political Economy of Autocracy". In Jenkins, Jeffrey A.; Rubin, Jared (eds.). The Oxford Handbook of Historical Political Economy. Oxford University Press. doi:10.1093/oxfordhb/9780197618608.013.9. ISBN 978-0-19-761860-8. https://dx.doi.org/10.1093/oxfordhb/9780197618608.013.9 ↩

  19. Gurr, Jaggers & Moore 1990, p. 85. - Gurr, Ted Robert; Jaggers, Keith; Moore, Will H. (1990). "The Transformation of the Western State: The Growth of Democracy, Autocracy, and State Power Since 1800". Studies in Comparative International Development. 25 (1): 73–108. doi:10.1007/BF02716906. ISSN 0039-3606. S2CID 154432421. http://link.springer.com/10.1007/BF02716906 ↩

  20. Mauk 2019, p. 24. - Mauk, Marlene (2019). Citizen Support for Democratic and Autocratic Regimes. Oxford University Press. ISBN 978-0-19-885485-2. https://academic.oup.com/book/36535 ↩

  21. Mauk 2019, pp. 26–27. - Mauk, Marlene (2019). Citizen Support for Democratic and Autocratic Regimes. Oxford University Press. ISBN 978-0-19-885485-2. https://academic.oup.com/book/36535 ↩

  22. Tullock 1987, p. 7. - Tullock, Gordon (1987). Autocracy. Springer. ISBN 978-90-247-3398-9. https://archive.org/details/tullockautocracy ↩

  23. Grzymala-Busse & Finkel 2022, How Autocracies Emerge. - Grzymala-Busse, Anna; Finkel, Eugene (2022). "Historical Political Economy of Autocracy". In Jenkins, Jeffrey A.; Rubin, Jared (eds.). The Oxford Handbook of Historical Political Economy. Oxford University Press. doi:10.1093/oxfordhb/9780197618608.013.9. ISBN 978-0-19-761860-8. https://dx.doi.org/10.1093/oxfordhb/9780197618608.013.9 ↩

  24. Finer 1997, p. 67. - Finer, Samuel Edward (1997). The History of Government from the Earliest Times. Vol. 1. Oxford University Press. ISBN 978-0-19-820664-4. https://archive.org/details/historyofgovernm0003fine ↩

  25. Tullock 1987, p. 7. - Tullock, Gordon (1987). Autocracy. Springer. ISBN 978-90-247-3398-9. https://archive.org/details/tullockautocracy ↩

  26. Tullock 1987, p. 57. - Tullock, Gordon (1987). Autocracy. Springer. ISBN 978-90-247-3398-9. https://archive.org/details/tullockautocracy ↩

  27. Grzymala-Busse & Finkel 2022, How Autocracies Emerge. - Grzymala-Busse, Anna; Finkel, Eugene (2022). "Historical Political Economy of Autocracy". In Jenkins, Jeffrey A.; Rubin, Jared (eds.). The Oxford Handbook of Historical Political Economy. Oxford University Press. doi:10.1093/oxfordhb/9780197618608.013.9. ISBN 978-0-19-761860-8. https://dx.doi.org/10.1093/oxfordhb/9780197618608.013.9 ↩

  28. Grzymala-Busse & Finkel 2022, How Autocracies Are Sustained. - Grzymala-Busse, Anna; Finkel, Eugene (2022). "Historical Political Economy of Autocracy". In Jenkins, Jeffrey A.; Rubin, Jared (eds.). The Oxford Handbook of Historical Political Economy. Oxford University Press. doi:10.1093/oxfordhb/9780197618608.013.9. ISBN 978-0-19-761860-8. https://dx.doi.org/10.1093/oxfordhb/9780197618608.013.9 ↩

  29. Siaroff 2013, pp. 237–238. - Siaroff, Alan (2013). Comparing Political Regimes: A Thematic Introduction to Comparative Politics, Third Edition. University of Toronto Press. ISBN 978-1-4426-0702-6. https://archive.org/details/comparingpolitic0000siar_q7j3 ↩

  30. Earle 1997, p. 14. - Earle, Timothy K. (1997). How Chiefs Come to Power: The Political Economy in Prehistory. Stanford University Press. ISBN 978-0-8047-2856-0. https://archive.org/details/howchiefscometop0000earl ↩

  31. Grzymala-Busse & Finkel 2022, How Autocracies Emerge. - Grzymala-Busse, Anna; Finkel, Eugene (2022). "Historical Political Economy of Autocracy". In Jenkins, Jeffrey A.; Rubin, Jared (eds.). The Oxford Handbook of Historical Political Economy. Oxford University Press. doi:10.1093/oxfordhb/9780197618608.013.9. ISBN 978-0-19-761860-8. https://dx.doi.org/10.1093/oxfordhb/9780197618608.013.9 ↩

  32. North, Wallis & Weingast 2008. - North, Douglass C.; Wallis, John Joseph; Weingast, Barry R. (2008). "Violence and the Rise of Open-Access Orders". Journal of Democracy. 20 (1): 55–68. doi:10.1353/jod.0.0060. S2CID 153774943. https://muse.jhu.edu/article/257587 ↩

  33. Burnell 2006, p. 547. - Burnell, Peter (2006). "Autocratic opening to democracy: why legitimacy matters". Third World Quarterly. 27 (4): 545–562. doi:10.1080/01436590600720710. ISSN 0143-6597. S2CID 153419534. http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/01436590600720710 ↩

  34. Grzymala-Busse & Finkel 2022, How Autocracies Emerge. - Grzymala-Busse, Anna; Finkel, Eugene (2022). "Historical Political Economy of Autocracy". In Jenkins, Jeffrey A.; Rubin, Jared (eds.). The Oxford Handbook of Historical Political Economy. Oxford University Press. doi:10.1093/oxfordhb/9780197618608.013.9. ISBN 978-0-19-761860-8. https://dx.doi.org/10.1093/oxfordhb/9780197618608.013.9 ↩

  35. Gerschewski 2023, p. 17. - Gerschewski, Johannes (2023). The Two Logics of Autocratic Rule. Cambridge University Press. ISBN 978-1-009-19941-4. https://www.cambridge.org/core/books/two-logics-of-autocratic-rule/9C61972920FEE9E850313E54936A9D1E ↩

  36. Grzymala-Busse & Finkel 2022, How Autocracies Are Sustained. - Grzymala-Busse, Anna; Finkel, Eugene (2022). "Historical Political Economy of Autocracy". In Jenkins, Jeffrey A.; Rubin, Jared (eds.). The Oxford Handbook of Historical Political Economy. Oxford University Press. doi:10.1093/oxfordhb/9780197618608.013.9. ISBN 978-0-19-761860-8. https://dx.doi.org/10.1093/oxfordhb/9780197618608.013.9 ↩

  37. Gerschewski 2023, p. 13. - Gerschewski, Johannes (2023). The Two Logics of Autocratic Rule. Cambridge University Press. ISBN 978-1-009-19941-4. https://www.cambridge.org/core/books/two-logics-of-autocratic-rule/9C61972920FEE9E850313E54936A9D1E ↩

  38. Tullock 1987, p. 178. - Tullock, Gordon (1987). Autocracy. Springer. ISBN 978-90-247-3398-9. https://archive.org/details/tullockautocracy ↩

  39. Burnell 2006, p. 549. - Burnell, Peter (2006). "Autocratic opening to democracy: why legitimacy matters". Third World Quarterly. 27 (4): 545–562. doi:10.1080/01436590600720710. ISSN 0143-6597. S2CID 153419534. http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/01436590600720710 ↩

  40. Grzymala-Busse & Finkel 2022, How Autocracies Die. - Grzymala-Busse, Anna; Finkel, Eugene (2022). "Historical Political Economy of Autocracy". In Jenkins, Jeffrey A.; Rubin, Jared (eds.). The Oxford Handbook of Historical Political Economy. Oxford University Press. doi:10.1093/oxfordhb/9780197618608.013.9. ISBN 978-0-19-761860-8. https://dx.doi.org/10.1093/oxfordhb/9780197618608.013.9 ↩

  41. Tullock 1987, p. 20. - Tullock, Gordon (1987). Autocracy. Springer. ISBN 978-90-247-3398-9. https://archive.org/details/tullockautocracy ↩

  42. Mauk 2019, p. 34. - Mauk, Marlene (2019). Citizen Support for Democratic and Autocratic Regimes. Oxford University Press. ISBN 978-0-19-885485-2. https://academic.oup.com/book/36535 ↩

  43. Mauk 2019, p. 7. - Mauk, Marlene (2019). Citizen Support for Democratic and Autocratic Regimes. Oxford University Press. ISBN 978-0-19-885485-2. https://academic.oup.com/book/36535 ↩

  44. Grzymala-Busse & Finkel 2022, How Autocracies Die. - Grzymala-Busse, Anna; Finkel, Eugene (2022). "Historical Political Economy of Autocracy". In Jenkins, Jeffrey A.; Rubin, Jared (eds.). The Oxford Handbook of Historical Political Economy. Oxford University Press. doi:10.1093/oxfordhb/9780197618608.013.9. ISBN 978-0-19-761860-8. https://dx.doi.org/10.1093/oxfordhb/9780197618608.013.9 ↩

  45. Kurrild-Klitgaard 2000, pp. 68–70. - Kurrild-Klitgaard, Peter (2000). "The Constitutional Economics of Autocratic Succession". Public Choice. 103 (1): 63–84. doi:10.1023/A:1005078532251. S2CID 154097838. https://link.springer.com/article/10.1023/A:1005078532251 ↩

  46. Kurrild-Klitgaard 2000, p. 66. - Kurrild-Klitgaard, Peter (2000). "The Constitutional Economics of Autocratic Succession". Public Choice. 103 (1): 63–84. doi:10.1023/A:1005078532251. S2CID 154097838. https://link.springer.com/article/10.1023/A:1005078532251 ↩

  47. Tullock 1987, p. 18. - Tullock, Gordon (1987). Autocracy. Springer. ISBN 978-90-247-3398-9. https://archive.org/details/tullockautocracy ↩

  48. Gerschewski 2023, p. 32. - Gerschewski, Johannes (2023). The Two Logics of Autocratic Rule. Cambridge University Press. ISBN 978-1-009-19941-4. https://www.cambridge.org/core/books/two-logics-of-autocratic-rule/9C61972920FEE9E850313E54936A9D1E ↩

  49. Tullock 1987, p. 18. - Tullock, Gordon (1987). Autocracy. Springer. ISBN 978-90-247-3398-9. https://archive.org/details/tullockautocracy ↩

  50. Grzymala-Busse & Finkel 2022, How Autocracies Emerge. - Grzymala-Busse, Anna; Finkel, Eugene (2022). "Historical Political Economy of Autocracy". In Jenkins, Jeffrey A.; Rubin, Jared (eds.). The Oxford Handbook of Historical Political Economy. Oxford University Press. doi:10.1093/oxfordhb/9780197618608.013.9. ISBN 978-0-19-761860-8. https://dx.doi.org/10.1093/oxfordhb/9780197618608.013.9 ↩

  51. Burnell 2006, p. 546. - Burnell, Peter (2006). "Autocratic opening to democracy: why legitimacy matters". Third World Quarterly. 27 (4): 545–562. doi:10.1080/01436590600720710. ISSN 0143-6597. S2CID 153419534. http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/01436590600720710 ↩

  52. Burnell 2006, p. 548. - Burnell, Peter (2006). "Autocratic opening to democracy: why legitimacy matters". Third World Quarterly. 27 (4): 545–562. doi:10.1080/01436590600720710. ISSN 0143-6597. S2CID 153419534. http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/01436590600720710 ↩

  53. Burnell 2006, p. 549. - Burnell, Peter (2006). "Autocratic opening to democracy: why legitimacy matters". Third World Quarterly. 27 (4): 545–562. doi:10.1080/01436590600720710. ISSN 0143-6597. S2CID 153419534. http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/01436590600720710 ↩

  54. Burnell 2006, p. 548. - Burnell, Peter (2006). "Autocratic opening to democracy: why legitimacy matters". Third World Quarterly. 27 (4): 545–562. doi:10.1080/01436590600720710. ISSN 0143-6597. S2CID 153419534. http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/01436590600720710 ↩

  55. Murphy 2014. ↩

  56. Burnell 2006, p. 548. - Burnell, Peter (2006). "Autocratic opening to democracy: why legitimacy matters". Third World Quarterly. 27 (4): 545–562. doi:10.1080/01436590600720710. ISSN 0143-6597. S2CID 153419534. http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/01436590600720710 ↩

  57. Burnell 2006, p. 549. - Burnell, Peter (2006). "Autocratic opening to democracy: why legitimacy matters". Third World Quarterly. 27 (4): 545–562. doi:10.1080/01436590600720710. ISSN 0143-6597. S2CID 153419534. http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/01436590600720710 ↩

  58. Golosov 2021, pp. 10–11. - Golosov, Grigorii V. (2021). Authoritarian Party Systems: Party Politics in Autocratic Regimes, 1945-2019. World Scientific. ISBN 978-1-80061-116-0. ↩

  59. Grzymala-Busse & Finkel 2022, How Autocracies Are Sustained. - Grzymala-Busse, Anna; Finkel, Eugene (2022). "Historical Political Economy of Autocracy". In Jenkins, Jeffrey A.; Rubin, Jared (eds.). The Oxford Handbook of Historical Political Economy. Oxford University Press. doi:10.1093/oxfordhb/9780197618608.013.9. ISBN 978-0-19-761860-8. https://dx.doi.org/10.1093/oxfordhb/9780197618608.013.9 ↩

  60. Tullock 1987, p. 18. - Tullock, Gordon (1987). Autocracy. Springer. ISBN 978-90-247-3398-9. https://archive.org/details/tullockautocracy ↩

  61. Tullock 1987, pp. 5–6. - Tullock, Gordon (1987). Autocracy. Springer. ISBN 978-90-247-3398-9. https://archive.org/details/tullockautocracy ↩

  62. Siaroff 2013, pp. 232–233. - Siaroff, Alan (2013). Comparing Political Regimes: A Thematic Introduction to Comparative Politics, Third Edition. University of Toronto Press. ISBN 978-1-4426-0702-6. https://archive.org/details/comparingpolitic0000siar_q7j3 ↩

  63. Siaroff 2013, pp. 229, 232. - Siaroff, Alan (2013). Comparing Political Regimes: A Thematic Introduction to Comparative Politics, Third Edition. University of Toronto Press. ISBN 978-1-4426-0702-6. https://archive.org/details/comparingpolitic0000siar_q7j3 ↩

  64. Siaroff 2013, pp. 239–240. - Siaroff, Alan (2013). Comparing Political Regimes: A Thematic Introduction to Comparative Politics, Third Edition. University of Toronto Press. ISBN 978-1-4426-0702-6. https://archive.org/details/comparingpolitic0000siar_q7j3 ↩

  65. Siaroff 2013, pp. 240, 242–243, 245. - Siaroff, Alan (2013). Comparing Political Regimes: A Thematic Introduction to Comparative Politics, Third Edition. University of Toronto Press. ISBN 978-1-4426-0702-6. https://archive.org/details/comparingpolitic0000siar_q7j3 ↩

  66. Finer 1997, p. 70. - Finer, Samuel Edward (1997). The History of Government from the Earliest Times. Vol. 1. Oxford University Press. ISBN 978-0-19-820664-4. https://archive.org/details/historyofgovernm0003fine ↩

  67. Finer 1997, p. 66. - Finer, Samuel Edward (1997). The History of Government from the Earliest Times. Vol. 1. Oxford University Press. ISBN 978-0-19-820664-4. https://archive.org/details/historyofgovernm0003fine ↩

  68. Burnell 2006, p. 548. - Burnell, Peter (2006). "Autocratic opening to democracy: why legitimacy matters". Third World Quarterly. 27 (4): 545–562. doi:10.1080/01436590600720710. ISSN 0143-6597. S2CID 153419534. http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/01436590600720710 ↩

  69. Siaroff 2013, pp. 237–238. - Siaroff, Alan (2013). Comparing Political Regimes: A Thematic Introduction to Comparative Politics, Third Edition. University of Toronto Press. ISBN 978-1-4426-0702-6. https://archive.org/details/comparingpolitic0000siar_q7j3 ↩

  70. Gerschewski 2023, p. 30. - Gerschewski, Johannes (2023). The Two Logics of Autocratic Rule. Cambridge University Press. ISBN 978-1-009-19941-4. https://www.cambridge.org/core/books/two-logics-of-autocratic-rule/9C61972920FEE9E850313E54936A9D1E ↩

  71. Siaroff 2013, p. 90. - Siaroff, Alan (2013). Comparing Political Regimes: A Thematic Introduction to Comparative Politics, Third Edition. University of Toronto Press. ISBN 978-1-4426-0702-6. https://archive.org/details/comparingpolitic0000siar_q7j3 ↩

  72. Burnell 2006, p. 546. - Burnell, Peter (2006). "Autocratic opening to democracy: why legitimacy matters". Third World Quarterly. 27 (4): 545–562. doi:10.1080/01436590600720710. ISSN 0143-6597. S2CID 153419534. http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/01436590600720710 ↩

  73. Schmid, Jonas Willibald. "Electoral autocracies, hybrid regimes, and multiparty autocracies: same, same but different?". Democratization. 0 (0): 1–24. doi:10.1080/13510347.2025.2476183. ISSN 1351-0347. https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/13510347.2025.2476183 ↩

  74. Cassani, Andrea (1 November 2014). "Hybrid what? Partial consensus and persistent divergences in the analysis of hybrid regimes". International Political Science Review. 35 (5): 542–558. doi:10.1177/0192512113495756. ISSN 0192-5121. https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/10.1177/0192512113495756 ↩

  75. Burnell 2006, p. 546. - Burnell, Peter (2006). "Autocratic opening to democracy: why legitimacy matters". Third World Quarterly. 27 (4): 545–562. doi:10.1080/01436590600720710. ISSN 0143-6597. S2CID 153419534. http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/01436590600720710 ↩

  76. Siaroff 2013, p. 90. - Siaroff, Alan (2013). Comparing Political Regimes: A Thematic Introduction to Comparative Politics, Third Edition. University of Toronto Press. ISBN 978-1-4426-0702-6. https://archive.org/details/comparingpolitic0000siar_q7j3 ↩

  77. Mukherjee & Koren 2018, p. 5. - Mukherjee, Bumba; Koren, Ore (2018). The Politics of Mass Killing in Autocratic Regimes. Springer. doi:10.1007/978-3-319-91758-0. ISBN 978-3-319-91758-0. https://link.springer.com/book/10.1007/978-3-319-91758-0 ↩

  78. Wong & Or 2020. - Wong, Stan Hok-Wui; Or, Nick H. K. (1 December 2020). "To Compete or to Cooperate". Communist and Post-Communist Studies. 53 (4): 91–117. doi:10.1525/j.postcomstud.2020.53.4.91. ISSN 0967-067X. S2CID 234556117. https://online.ucpress.edu/cpcs/article/53/4/91/114584/To-Compete-or-to-CooperateIntra-elite-Dynamics-in ↩

  79. Schmid, Jonas Willibald. "Electoral autocracies, hybrid regimes, and multiparty autocracies: same, same but different?". Democratization. 0 (0): 1–24. doi:10.1080/13510347.2025.2476183. ISSN 1351-0347. https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/13510347.2025.2476183 ↩

  80. Miller 2012. - Miller, Michael K (5 November 2012). "Electoral authoritarianism and democracy: A formal model of regime transitions". Journal of Theoretical Politics. 25 (2): 153–181. doi:10.1177/0951629812460122. ISSN 0951-6298. S2CID 153751930. https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/abs/10.1177/0951629812460122 ↩

  81. Siaroff 2013, p. 91. - Siaroff, Alan (2013). Comparing Political Regimes: A Thematic Introduction to Comparative Politics, Third Edition. University of Toronto Press. ISBN 978-1-4426-0702-6. https://archive.org/details/comparingpolitic0000siar_q7j3 ↩

  82. Tullock 1987, p. 8. - Tullock, Gordon (1987). Autocracy. Springer. ISBN 978-90-247-3398-9. https://archive.org/details/tullockautocracy ↩

  83. Earle 1997, p. 15. - Earle, Timothy K. (1997). How Chiefs Come to Power: The Political Economy in Prehistory. Stanford University Press. ISBN 978-0-8047-2856-0. https://archive.org/details/howchiefscometop0000earl ↩

  84. Beliaev, Bondarenko & Korotayev 2001, p. 373. - Beliaev, Dmitri D.; Bondarenko, Dmitri M.; Korotayev, Audrey V. (2001). "Origins and evolution of chiefdoms". Reviews in Anthropology. 30 (4): 373–395. doi:10.1080/00988157.2001.9978293. ISSN 0093-8157. S2CID 162365014. http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/00988157.2001.9978293 ↩

  85. Earle 1997, p. 14. - Earle, Timothy K. (1997). How Chiefs Come to Power: The Political Economy in Prehistory. Stanford University Press. ISBN 978-0-8047-2856-0. https://archive.org/details/howchiefscometop0000earl ↩

  86. Beliaev, Bondarenko & Korotayev 2001, p. 377. - Beliaev, Dmitri D.; Bondarenko, Dmitri M.; Korotayev, Audrey V. (2001). "Origins and evolution of chiefdoms". Reviews in Anthropology. 30 (4): 373–395. doi:10.1080/00988157.2001.9978293. ISSN 0093-8157. S2CID 162365014. http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/00988157.2001.9978293 ↩

  87. Beliaev, Bondarenko & Korotayev 2001, p. 381. - Beliaev, Dmitri D.; Bondarenko, Dmitri M.; Korotayev, Audrey V. (2001). "Origins and evolution of chiefdoms". Reviews in Anthropology. 30 (4): 373–395. doi:10.1080/00988157.2001.9978293. ISSN 0093-8157. S2CID 162365014. http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/00988157.2001.9978293 ↩

  88. Grzymala-Busse & Finkel 2022, How Autocracies Emerge. - Grzymala-Busse, Anna; Finkel, Eugene (2022). "Historical Political Economy of Autocracy". In Jenkins, Jeffrey A.; Rubin, Jared (eds.). The Oxford Handbook of Historical Political Economy. Oxford University Press. doi:10.1093/oxfordhb/9780197618608.013.9. ISBN 978-0-19-761860-8. https://dx.doi.org/10.1093/oxfordhb/9780197618608.013.9 ↩

  89. Finer 1997, p. 104. - Finer, Samuel Edward (1997). The History of Government from the Earliest Times. Vol. 1. Oxford University Press. ISBN 978-0-19-820664-4. https://archive.org/details/historyofgovernm0003fine ↩

  90. Brisch 2013, p. 38. - Brisch, Nicole (2013). "Of Gods and Kings: Divine Kingship in Ancient Mesopotamia: Divine Kingship in Ancient Mesopotamia". Religion Compass. 7 (2): 37–46. doi:10.1111/rec3.12031. https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/rec3.12031 ↩

  91. Schrakamp 2016. - Schrakamp, Ingo (2016). "Akkadian Empire". In MacKenzie, John (ed.). The Encyclopedia of Empire. John Wiley & Sons. doi:10.1002/9781118455074. ISBN 978-1-118-45507-4. https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1002/9781118455074.wbeoe395 ↩

  92. Brisch 2013, p. 40. - Brisch, Nicole (2013). "Of Gods and Kings: Divine Kingship in Ancient Mesopotamia: Divine Kingship in Ancient Mesopotamia". Religion Compass. 7 (2): 37–46. doi:10.1111/rec3.12031. https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/rec3.12031 ↩

  93. Finer 1997, p. 66. - Finer, Samuel Edward (1997). The History of Government from the Earliest Times. Vol. 1. Oxford University Press. ISBN 978-0-19-820664-4. https://archive.org/details/historyofgovernm0003fine ↩

  94. Finer 1997, p. 136. - Finer, Samuel Edward (1997). The History of Government from the Earliest Times. Vol. 1. Oxford University Press. ISBN 978-0-19-820664-4. https://archive.org/details/historyofgovernm0003fine ↩

  95. Fu 1993, pp. 1–2. - Fu, Zhengyuan (1993). Autocratic Tradition and Chinese Politics. Cambridge University Press. ISBN 978-0-52144-228-2. https://archive.org/details/autocratictradit0000fuzh ↩

  96. Fu 1993, p. 16. - Fu, Zhengyuan (1993). Autocratic Tradition and Chinese Politics. Cambridge University Press. ISBN 978-0-52144-228-2. https://archive.org/details/autocratictradit0000fuzh ↩

  97. Fu 1993, pp. 31–33. - Fu, Zhengyuan (1993). Autocratic Tradition and Chinese Politics. Cambridge University Press. ISBN 978-0-52144-228-2. https://archive.org/details/autocratictradit0000fuzh ↩

  98. Fu 1993, pp. 33–34. - Fu, Zhengyuan (1993). Autocratic Tradition and Chinese Politics. Cambridge University Press. ISBN 978-0-52144-228-2. https://archive.org/details/autocratictradit0000fuzh ↩

  99. Morris 2003, pp. 1–2. - Morris, Sarah (2003). "Imaginary Kings: Alternatives to Monarchy in Early Greece". In Morgan, Kathryn A. (ed.). Popular Tyranny: Sovereignty and Its Discontents in Ancient Greece. University of Texas Press. doi:10.7560/752764. ISBN 978-0-29279-782-6. https://www.degruyter.com/document/doi/10.7560/752764-003/html ↩

  100. Kalyvas 2007, p. 413. - Kalyvas, Andreas (2007). "The Tyranny of Dictatorship: When the Greek Tyrant Met the Roman Dictator". Political Theory. 35 (4): 412–442. doi:10.1177/0090591707302208. ISSN 0090-5917. S2CID 144115904. http://journals.sagepub.com/doi/10.1177/0090591707302208 ↩

  101. Zeev 1996, p. 251–253. - Zeev, Miriam Pucci Ben (1996). "When was the title "Dictator perpetuus" given to Caesar?". L'Antiquité Classique. 65: 251–253. doi:10.3406/antiq.1996.1259. ISSN 0770-2817. JSTOR 41658953. https://www.jstor.org/stable/41658953 ↩

  102. Lee 1984, p. 48. - Lee, Ki-Baik (1984). A New History of Korea. Translated by Wagner, Edward W.; Shultz, Edward J. Harvard University Press. ISBN 9780674615762. https://archive.org/details/newhistoryofkore0000leek ↩

  103. Shultz 2000, pp. 1–2. - Shultz, Edward J. (2000). Generals and Scholars: Military Rule in Medieval Korea. University of Hawaii Press. ISBN 978-0-8248-2324-5. https://archive.org/details/generalsscholars0000shul ↩

  104. Gordon 2003, p. 58. - Gordon, Andrew (2003). A Modern History of Japan: From Tokugawa Times to the Present. Oxford University Press. ISBN 978-0-19-092055-5. ↩

  105. Grzymala-Busse & Finkel 2022, How Autocracies Are Sustained. - Grzymala-Busse, Anna; Finkel, Eugene (2022). "Historical Political Economy of Autocracy". In Jenkins, Jeffrey A.; Rubin, Jared (eds.). The Oxford Handbook of Historical Political Economy. Oxford University Press. doi:10.1093/oxfordhb/9780197618608.013.9. ISBN 978-0-19-761860-8. https://dx.doi.org/10.1093/oxfordhb/9780197618608.013.9 ↩

  106. Grigg 2014. ↩

  107. Grzymala-Busse & Finkel 2022, How Autocracies Emerge. - Grzymala-Busse, Anna; Finkel, Eugene (2022). "Historical Political Economy of Autocracy". In Jenkins, Jeffrey A.; Rubin, Jared (eds.). The Oxford Handbook of Historical Political Economy. Oxford University Press. doi:10.1093/oxfordhb/9780197618608.013.9. ISBN 978-0-19-761860-8. https://dx.doi.org/10.1093/oxfordhb/9780197618608.013.9 ↩

  108. Hulliung 2014. ↩

  109. Murphy 2014. ↩

  110. Richter 2005, pp. 233–234. - Richter, Melvin (2005). "A Family of Political Concepts: Tyranny, Despotism, Bonapartism, Caesarism, Dictatorship, 1750-1917". European Journal of Political Theory. 4 (3): 221–248. doi:10.1177/1474885105052703. ISSN 1474-8851. S2CID 143577539. http://journals.sagepub.com/doi/10.1177/1474885105052703 ↩

  111. Richter 2005, pp. 238–239. - Richter, Melvin (2005). "A Family of Political Concepts: Tyranny, Despotism, Bonapartism, Caesarism, Dictatorship, 1750-1917". European Journal of Political Theory. 4 (3): 221–248. doi:10.1177/1474885105052703. ISSN 1474-8851. S2CID 143577539. http://journals.sagepub.com/doi/10.1177/1474885105052703 ↩

  112. Tullock 1987, p. 179. - Tullock, Gordon (1987). Autocracy. Springer. ISBN 978-90-247-3398-9. https://archive.org/details/tullockautocracy ↩

  113. Lynch 1992. - Lynch, John (1992). Caudillos in Spanish America 1800–1850. Oxford University Press. doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198211358.001.0001. ISBN 978-0-19-821135-8. https://archive.org/details/caudillosinspani0000lync ↩

  114. Gurr, Jaggers & Moore 1990, p. 74. - Gurr, Ted Robert; Jaggers, Keith; Moore, Will H. (1990). "The Transformation of the Western State: The Growth of Democracy, Autocracy, and State Power Since 1800". Studies in Comparative International Development. 25 (1): 73–108. doi:10.1007/BF02716906. ISSN 0039-3606. S2CID 154432421. http://link.springer.com/10.1007/BF02716906 ↩

  115. Gurr, Jaggers & Moore 1990, p. 90. - Gurr, Ted Robert; Jaggers, Keith; Moore, Will H. (1990). "The Transformation of the Western State: The Growth of Democracy, Autocracy, and State Power Since 1800". Studies in Comparative International Development. 25 (1): 73–108. doi:10.1007/BF02716906. ISSN 0039-3606. S2CID 154432421. http://link.springer.com/10.1007/BF02716906 ↩

  116. Tullock 1987, p. 179. - Tullock, Gordon (1987). Autocracy. Springer. ISBN 978-90-247-3398-9. https://archive.org/details/tullockautocracy ↩

  117. Siaroff 2013, p. 233. - Siaroff, Alan (2013). Comparing Political Regimes: A Thematic Introduction to Comparative Politics, Third Edition. University of Toronto Press. ISBN 978-1-4426-0702-6. https://archive.org/details/comparingpolitic0000siar_q7j3 ↩

  118. Gurr, Jaggers & Moore 1990, p. 90. - Gurr, Ted Robert; Jaggers, Keith; Moore, Will H. (1990). "The Transformation of the Western State: The Growth of Democracy, Autocracy, and State Power Since 1800". Studies in Comparative International Development. 25 (1): 73–108. doi:10.1007/BF02716906. ISSN 0039-3606. S2CID 154432421. http://link.springer.com/10.1007/BF02716906 ↩

  119. Gurr, Jaggers & Moore 1990, pp. 74–75. - Gurr, Ted Robert; Jaggers, Keith; Moore, Will H. (1990). "The Transformation of the Western State: The Growth of Democracy, Autocracy, and State Power Since 1800". Studies in Comparative International Development. 25 (1): 73–108. doi:10.1007/BF02716906. ISSN 0039-3606. S2CID 154432421. http://link.springer.com/10.1007/BF02716906 ↩

  120. Gurr, Jaggers & Moore 1990, p. 90. - Gurr, Ted Robert; Jaggers, Keith; Moore, Will H. (1990). "The Transformation of the Western State: The Growth of Democracy, Autocracy, and State Power Since 1800". Studies in Comparative International Development. 25 (1): 73–108. doi:10.1007/BF02716906. ISSN 0039-3606. S2CID 154432421. http://link.springer.com/10.1007/BF02716906 ↩

  121. Golosov 2021, p. 13. - Golosov, Grigorii V. (2021). Authoritarian Party Systems: Party Politics in Autocratic Regimes, 1945-2019. World Scientific. ISBN 978-1-80061-116-0. ↩

  122. Hariri 2012, p. 489. - Hariri, Jacob Gerner (2012). "The Autocratic Legacy of Early Statehood". American Political Science Review. 106 (3): 471–494. doi:10.1017/S0003055412000238. ISSN 0003-0554. S2CID 54222556. https://www.cambridge.org/core/product/identifier/S0003055412000238/type/journal_article ↩

  123. Mauk 2019, p. 1. - Mauk, Marlene (2019). Citizen Support for Democratic and Autocratic Regimes. Oxford University Press. ISBN 978-0-19-885485-2. https://academic.oup.com/book/36535 ↩

  124. Gerschewski 2023, p. 31. - Gerschewski, Johannes (2023). The Two Logics of Autocratic Rule. Cambridge University Press. ISBN 978-1-009-19941-4. https://www.cambridge.org/core/books/two-logics-of-autocratic-rule/9C61972920FEE9E850313E54936A9D1E ↩

  125. Gerschewski 2023, p. 3. - Gerschewski, Johannes (2023). The Two Logics of Autocratic Rule. Cambridge University Press. ISBN 978-1-009-19941-4. https://www.cambridge.org/core/books/two-logics-of-autocratic-rule/9C61972920FEE9E850313E54936A9D1E ↩

  126. Mauk 2019, p. 32. - Mauk, Marlene (2019). Citizen Support for Democratic and Autocratic Regimes. Oxford University Press. ISBN 978-0-19-885485-2. https://academic.oup.com/book/36535 ↩

  127. Grzymala-Busse & Finkel 2022, How Autocracies Are Sustained. - Grzymala-Busse, Anna; Finkel, Eugene (2022). "Historical Political Economy of Autocracy". In Jenkins, Jeffrey A.; Rubin, Jared (eds.). The Oxford Handbook of Historical Political Economy. Oxford University Press. doi:10.1093/oxfordhb/9780197618608.013.9. ISBN 978-0-19-761860-8. https://dx.doi.org/10.1093/oxfordhb/9780197618608.013.9 ↩

  128. Mauk 2019, p. 37. - Mauk, Marlene (2019). Citizen Support for Democratic and Autocratic Regimes. Oxford University Press. ISBN 978-0-19-885485-2. https://academic.oup.com/book/36535 ↩

  129. Mauk 2019, p. 161. - Mauk, Marlene (2019). Citizen Support for Democratic and Autocratic Regimes. Oxford University Press. ISBN 978-0-19-885485-2. https://academic.oup.com/book/36535 ↩

  130. Gerschewski 2023, p. 11. - Gerschewski, Johannes (2023). The Two Logics of Autocratic Rule. Cambridge University Press. ISBN 978-1-009-19941-4. https://www.cambridge.org/core/books/two-logics-of-autocratic-rule/9C61972920FEE9E850313E54936A9D1E ↩

  131. Kinne 2005, p. 126. - Kinne, Brandon J. (2005). "Decision Making in Autocratic Regimes: A Poliheuristic Perspective". International Studies Perspectives. 6 (1): 114–128. doi:10.1111/j.1528-3577.2005.00197.x. ISSN 1528-3577. https://academic.oup.com/isp/article-lookup/doi/10.1111/j.1528-3577.2005.00197.x ↩

  132. Tangerås 2009, pp. 100–101. - Tangerås, Thomas P. (2009). "Democracy, autocracy and the likelihood of international conflict" (PDF). Economics of Governance. 10 (2): 99–117. doi:10.1007/s10101-008-0055-6. hdl:10419/81362. ISSN 1435-6104. http://www.ifn.se/Wfiles/wp/wp751.pdf ↩

  133. Kinne 2005, p. 119. - Kinne, Brandon J. (2005). "Decision Making in Autocratic Regimes: A Poliheuristic Perspective". International Studies Perspectives. 6 (1): 114–128. doi:10.1111/j.1528-3577.2005.00197.x. ISSN 1528-3577. https://academic.oup.com/isp/article-lookup/doi/10.1111/j.1528-3577.2005.00197.x ↩

  134. Kneuer 2017. - Kneuer, Marianne (2017). "Autocratic Regimes and Foreign Policy". Oxford Research Encyclopedia of Politics. doi:10.1177/0090591707302208. ISBN 978-0-19-022863-7. S2CID 144115904. https://oxfordre.com/politics/display/10.1093/acrefore/9780190228637.001.0001/acrefore-9780190228637-e-392 ↩

  135. Golosov 2021, p. 1. - Golosov, Grigorii V. (2021). Authoritarian Party Systems: Party Politics in Autocratic Regimes, 1945-2019. World Scientific. ISBN 978-1-80061-116-0. ↩

  136. Mauk 2019, p. 6. - Mauk, Marlene (2019). Citizen Support for Democratic and Autocratic Regimes. Oxford University Press. ISBN 978-0-19-885485-2. https://academic.oup.com/book/36535 ↩

  137. Golosov 2021, p. 2. - Golosov, Grigorii V. (2021). Authoritarian Party Systems: Party Politics in Autocratic Regimes, 1945-2019. World Scientific. ISBN 978-1-80061-116-0. ↩

  138. Shen-Bayh 2022, p. 28. - Shen-Bayh, Fiona Feiang (2022). Undue Process: Persecution and Punishment in Autocratic Courts. Cambridge University Press. ISBN 978-1-009-19713-7. https://www.cambridge.org/core/books/undue-process/D4FFC5257A81B574BA91D141712CB1B8 ↩

  139. Grzymala-Busse & Finkel 2022, How Autocracies Are Sustained. - Grzymala-Busse, Anna; Finkel, Eugene (2022). "Historical Political Economy of Autocracy". In Jenkins, Jeffrey A.; Rubin, Jared (eds.). The Oxford Handbook of Historical Political Economy. Oxford University Press. doi:10.1093/oxfordhb/9780197618608.013.9. ISBN 978-0-19-761860-8. https://dx.doi.org/10.1093/oxfordhb/9780197618608.013.9 ↩

  140. Gerschewski 2023, p. 28. - Gerschewski, Johannes (2023). The Two Logics of Autocratic Rule. Cambridge University Press. ISBN 978-1-009-19941-4. https://www.cambridge.org/core/books/two-logics-of-autocratic-rule/9C61972920FEE9E850313E54936A9D1E ↩

  141. Gerschewski 2023, p. 28. - Gerschewski, Johannes (2023). The Two Logics of Autocratic Rule. Cambridge University Press. ISBN 978-1-009-19941-4. https://www.cambridge.org/core/books/two-logics-of-autocratic-rule/9C61972920FEE9E850313E54936A9D1E ↩

  142. Mauk 2019, p. 3. - Mauk, Marlene (2019). Citizen Support for Democratic and Autocratic Regimes. Oxford University Press. ISBN 978-0-19-885485-2. https://academic.oup.com/book/36535 ↩

  143. Gerschewski 2023, p. 7. - Gerschewski, Johannes (2023). The Two Logics of Autocratic Rule. Cambridge University Press. ISBN 978-1-009-19941-4. https://www.cambridge.org/core/books/two-logics-of-autocratic-rule/9C61972920FEE9E850313E54936A9D1E ↩

  144. Shen-Bayh 2022, p. 22. - Shen-Bayh, Fiona Feiang (2022). Undue Process: Persecution and Punishment in Autocratic Courts. Cambridge University Press. ISBN 978-1-009-19713-7. https://www.cambridge.org/core/books/undue-process/D4FFC5257A81B574BA91D141712CB1B8 ↩

  145. Mauk 2019, pp. 12–15. - Mauk, Marlene (2019). Citizen Support for Democratic and Autocratic Regimes. Oxford University Press. ISBN 978-0-19-885485-2. https://academic.oup.com/book/36535 ↩

  146. Gerschewski 2023, p. 7. - Gerschewski, Johannes (2023). The Two Logics of Autocratic Rule. Cambridge University Press. ISBN 978-1-009-19941-4. https://www.cambridge.org/core/books/two-logics-of-autocratic-rule/9C61972920FEE9E850313E54936A9D1E ↩

  147. Grzymala-Busse & Finkel 2022, The Legacies Autocracies Leave Behind. - Grzymala-Busse, Anna; Finkel, Eugene (2022). "Historical Political Economy of Autocracy". In Jenkins, Jeffrey A.; Rubin, Jared (eds.). The Oxford Handbook of Historical Political Economy. Oxford University Press. doi:10.1093/oxfordhb/9780197618608.013.9. ISBN 978-0-19-761860-8. https://dx.doi.org/10.1093/oxfordhb/9780197618608.013.9 ↩

  148. Schmidt 2016, p. 111. - Schmidt, Manfred G. (2016). "Regime Types: Measuring Democracy and Autocracy". In Keman, Hans; Woldendorp, Jaap (eds.). Handbook of Research Methods and Applications in Political Science. Edward Elgar Publishing. pp. 111–126. ISBN 978-2-01-694428-8. https://www.elgaronline.com/edcollchap/edcoll/9781784710811/9781784710811.00016.xml ↩

  149. Boese 2019, p. 95. - Boese, Vanessa A (2019). "How (not) to measure democracy". International Area Studies Review. 22 (2): 95–127. doi:10.1177/2233865918815571. ISSN 2233-8659. S2CID 191935546. http://journals.sagepub.com/doi/10.1177/2233865918815571 ↩

  150. Schmidt 2016, pp. 112, 115–116. - Schmidt, Manfred G. (2016). "Regime Types: Measuring Democracy and Autocracy". In Keman, Hans; Woldendorp, Jaap (eds.). Handbook of Research Methods and Applications in Political Science. Edward Elgar Publishing. pp. 111–126. ISBN 978-2-01-694428-8. https://www.elgaronline.com/edcollchap/edcoll/9781784710811/9781784710811.00016.xml ↩

  151. Boese 2019, p. 96. - Boese, Vanessa A (2019). "How (not) to measure democracy". International Area Studies Review. 22 (2): 95–127. doi:10.1177/2233865918815571. ISSN 2233-8659. S2CID 191935546. http://journals.sagepub.com/doi/10.1177/2233865918815571 ↩

  152. Schmidt 2016, pp. 122–123. - Schmidt, Manfred G. (2016). "Regime Types: Measuring Democracy and Autocracy". In Keman, Hans; Woldendorp, Jaap (eds.). Handbook of Research Methods and Applications in Political Science. Edward Elgar Publishing. pp. 111–126. ISBN 978-2-01-694428-8. https://www.elgaronline.com/edcollchap/edcoll/9781784710811/9781784710811.00016.xml ↩

  153. Boese 2019, p. 95. - Boese, Vanessa A (2019). "How (not) to measure democracy". International Area Studies Review. 22 (2): 95–127. doi:10.1177/2233865918815571. ISSN 2233-8659. S2CID 191935546. http://journals.sagepub.com/doi/10.1177/2233865918815571 ↩

  154. Schmidt 2016, p. 123. - Schmidt, Manfred G. (2016). "Regime Types: Measuring Democracy and Autocracy". In Keman, Hans; Woldendorp, Jaap (eds.). Handbook of Research Methods and Applications in Political Science. Edward Elgar Publishing. pp. 111–126. ISBN 978-2-01-694428-8. https://www.elgaronline.com/edcollchap/edcoll/9781784710811/9781784710811.00016.xml ↩

  155. Schmid, Jonas Willibald. "Electoral autocracies, hybrid regimes, and multiparty autocracies: same, same but different?". Democratization. 0 (0): 1–24. doi:10.1080/13510347.2025.2476183. ISSN 1351-0347. https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/13510347.2025.2476183 ↩

  156. Cassani, Andrea (1 November 2014). "Hybrid what? Partial consensus and persistent divergences in the analysis of hybrid regimes". International Political Science Review. 35 (5): 542–558. doi:10.1177/0192512113495756. ISSN 0192-5121. https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/10.1177/0192512113495756 ↩

  157. Schmid, Jonas Willibald. "Electoral autocracies, hybrid regimes, and multiparty autocracies: same, same but different?". Democratization. 0 (0): 1–24. doi:10.1080/13510347.2025.2476183. ISSN 1351-0347. https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/13510347.2025.2476183 ↩

  158. Richter 2005, p. 222, 235. - Richter, Melvin (2005). "A Family of Political Concepts: Tyranny, Despotism, Bonapartism, Caesarism, Dictatorship, 1750-1917". European Journal of Political Theory. 4 (3): 221–248. doi:10.1177/1474885105052703. ISSN 1474-8851. S2CID 143577539. http://journals.sagepub.com/doi/10.1177/1474885105052703 ↩

  159. Gerschewski 2023, p. 31. - Gerschewski, Johannes (2023). The Two Logics of Autocratic Rule. Cambridge University Press. ISBN 978-1-009-19941-4. https://www.cambridge.org/core/books/two-logics-of-autocratic-rule/9C61972920FEE9E850313E54936A9D1E ↩

  160. Kurrild-Klitgaard 2000, p. 63. - Kurrild-Klitgaard, Peter (2000). "The Constitutional Economics of Autocratic Succession". Public Choice. 103 (1): 63–84. doi:10.1023/A:1005078532251. S2CID 154097838. https://link.springer.com/article/10.1023/A:1005078532251 ↩

  161. Mauk 2019, p. 1. - Mauk, Marlene (2019). Citizen Support for Democratic and Autocratic Regimes. Oxford University Press. ISBN 978-0-19-885485-2. https://academic.oup.com/book/36535 ↩

  162. Tansey 2015, pp. 155–156. - Tansey, Oisín (2015). "The problem with autocracy promotion". Democratization. 23 (1): 141–163. doi:10.1080/13510347.2015.1095736. ISSN 1351-0347. S2CID 146222778. http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/13510347.2015.1095736 ↩

  163. Way 2016, pp. 64–65. - Way, Lucan (2016). "Weaknesses of Autocracy Promotion". Journal of Democracy. 27 (1): 64–75. doi:10.1353/jod.2016.0009. ISSN 1086-3214. S2CID 155187881. https://muse.jhu.edu/content/crossref/journals/journal_of_democracy/v027/27.1.way.html ↩