Menu
Home Explore People Places Arts History Plants & Animals Science Life & Culture Technology
On this page
Islamic State of Iraq
Militant jihadist group in Iraq (2006–2013)

The Islamic State of Iraq (ISI) originated from the Jama'at al-Tawhid wal-Jihad group led by Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, which pledged allegiance to al-Qaeda in 2004. After forming the Mujahideen Shura Council, ISI was established in 2006 under Emir Abu Omar al-Baghdadi, seeking to create an Islamic state governed by Sharia law in Iraq. Controlling territories including Baqubah and Mosul, ISI fought the U.S.-led coalition during the Iraqi insurgency. After leadership changes, Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi rebranded ISI as ISIL, expanding into Syria and clashing with al-Qaeda over control, eventually declaring a caliphate following rapid territorial gains in 2014.

Related Image Collections Add Image
Profiles
1 Image
We don't have any YouTube videos related to Islamic State of Iraq yet.
We don't have any PDF documents related to Islamic State of Iraq yet.
We don't have any Books related to Islamic State of Iraq yet.

Background

See also: Iraq § 2003–2007

Jordanian militant Abu Musab al-Zarqawi started a group called Jama'at al-Tawhid wal-Jihad (Organization of Monotheism and Jihad) in 1999, aiming to overthrow the 'apostate' Kingdom of Jordan. Although they are believed to have assassinated US diplomat Laurence Foley in 2002, they became notorious for their violent campaign in Iraq, which began in August 2003.

In October 2004, Zarqawi pledged alliance to Osama bin Laden and changed the name of his group to Tanzim Qaidat al-Jihad fi Bilad al-Rafidayn (Organization of Jihad's Base in Mesopotamia), often referred to as Al Qaeda in Iraq (AQI), which indulged in dozens of violent attacks per year in Iraq.

In January 2006, AQI joined seven Sunni Islamist groups to form the coalition of Mujahideen Shura Council (MSC) and continued its attacks in Iraq. In June 2006, al-Zarqawi was killed by a United States airstrike, and the Egyptian Abu Ayyub al-Masri became the leader of AQI.11 Abu Omar al-Baghdadi, who led the Jaish al-Ta'ifa al-Mansurah group, became the new leader of Mujahideen Shura Council (MSC).12

General characteristics

Formation

On 1313 and 15 October 2006, messages on the Internet issued by the Mujahideen Shura Council (MSC) officially declared the establishment of the Islamic State of Iraq (ISI), which should encompass the governorates of Baghdad, Anbar, Diyala, Kirkuk, Saladin, Niniveh and parts of Babil and Wasit – a swathe of central and western Iraq where most Sunni Arabs live.14

In its founding declaration, the ISI spokesperson asserted that the organization was inspired by the archetype of the Islamic state established by Muhammad in Medina.15 Urging all Muslims in Iraq to give bay'ah to Abu Omar al-Baghdadi, the declaration stated:

“And today we call on all Iraqi mujahideen, scholars and tribal sheikhs. And the general Sunnis; To pledge allegiance to the Commander of the Faithful, the honorable Sheikh Abu Omar al-Baghdadi, to listen and obey in times of action or hatred, and to work hard to strengthen the foundations of this state and to sacrifice life and treasure for it.”16

Goals

Between 2003 and 2004, targets of the "Jama'at al-Tawhid wal-Jihad" group had included the assets of the US-led Multi-National Force in Iraq and the U.S.-installed Iraqi provisional government. After pledging allegiance to al-Qaeda in 2004, the group became a major insurgent faction that fought the forces of American occupation. Until its dissolution is October 2006, the goals of al-Qaeda in Iraq, as well as its allies in the Mujahideen Shura Council, included: expelling the US from Iraq, establishing an Islamic state in Iraq, and extending this program to neighboring countries. The objectives of its predecessor organization were also the core goals of the Islamic State of Iraq organization.17

ISI also aspired to declare itself as a Caliphate at some point in the future. After the establishment of ISI, the organization's first Emir Abu Omar al-Baghdadi stated in 2006:

"[We have] reached the end of a stage of jihad and the start of a new one, in which we lay the first cornerstone of the Islamic Caliphate project and revive the glory of our religion."18

A document explaining the mission, core principles and methodology of ISI published in 2006, described the organization as “the new Islamic state”, which emerged to wage Jihad against the forces of the "Crusader invasion" and establish Islamic governance in the region.1920

Leadership

When ISI was formed in October 2006, Abu Omar al-Baghdadi was declared as the organization's Emir.2122 The US government initially viewed Abu Omar al-Baghdadi as a fictitious persona, invented to put an Iraqi face on the leadership of ISI which the US saw as a front organization of the global Al-Qaeda network.23 However, US military officials later came to believe that the Baghdadi 'role' had been taken by an actual ISI leader.24

Abu Ayyub al-Masri (an Egyptian also known as Abu Hamza al-Muhajir25), was the leader of Al Qaeda in Iraq from June 2006 until its dissolution in October 2006.26 Weeks after the formation of ISI, Abu Hamza al-Muhajir gave bay'ah to Abu Omar al-Baghdadi and declared that AQI had ceased to exist, being entirely supplanted by the ISI.2728 Al-Qaeda's central command acknowledged Abu Ayyub al-Masri's pledge of allegiance to al-Baghdadi, and Ayman al-Zawihiri confirmed in a 2007 interview that Al-Qaeda's Iraq branch no longer existed after its absorption by the ISI organization.29 Officially, Abu Hamza al-Mujahir was the Islamic State of Iraq's military commander,30 and from April 2007 its Minister of War.31

Al-Masri and Omar al-Baghdadi were both reported killed on 18 April 2010 in a raid by Iraqi and US forces.32 On 16 May 2010, Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi was announced as the new leader of the Islamic State of Iraq; his deputy was Abu Abdallah al-Husseini al-Qurashi.33 On 14 May 2010, al-Masri was succeeded by Abu Suleiman al-Naser,34 who was in turn killed some time in 2011.3536 Following Suleiman's death, the position of "War Minister" was replaced by a Military Council composed of former military officers of Ba'athist Iraq, under the leadership of Haji Bakr.3738

'Cabinet'

For ISI management after April 2010, see § 2010 revival ISI, new attacks.

In April 2007, the ISI declared a 'cabinet' of ten 'ministers', under its leader Abu Omar al-Baghdadi.39 The 'ministers' included:

Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, who in May 2010 would become the new leader of ISI, was before April 2010 the general supervisor of ISI's provincial sharia committees and a member of its senior consultative council.43

Funding and financing

According to American authorities, the group lost considerable funding sources and popular support from 2007 onwards.44 A 2008 report on the group's funding reported that its most lucrative source of income was stolen oil in the region of Bayji (between Baghdad and Mosul), which yielded them $2 million a month. Other sources of income were kidnappings of wealthy Iraqi people for ransom, car theft, robbery, hijacking fuel trucks, counterfeiting, commandeering rations and shaking down Iraqi soldiers for ammunition, these activities brought in tens of millions of dollars.45 In addition, jihadists in Saudi Arabia and Syria and other elements outside Iraq provided funding.46

Between 2005 and 2010, according to an analysis by RAND Corporation of 200 documents—personal letters, expense reports and membership rosters—captured by US Forces between 2005 and 2010, 95% of the group's budget was raised in Iraq, from the oil business, kidnappings, extortion, cash of members from Mosul, etc. Only 5% of the budget came from outside donations.47

Structure

For speculation about ISI's later management structure, see § 2010 revival ISI, new attacks.

In 2006, Iraqis effectively ran Al Qaeda in Iraq (AQI) in positions like internal security and battalion commanders, with foreign fighters' often relegated to suicide attackers, however the upper tiers of the organization were still dominated by non-Iraqis.48 AQI was a well-oiled and bureaucratic organisation with a high degree of documentation of its activities, from records of payments to its members, lists of opponents to be killed, and verdicts and sentences given to its prisoners.49 In 2007, Ayman al-Zawahiri declared that the structure of AQI was absorbed into the ISI organization and asserted that al-Qaeda no longer had a branch in Iraq.50

In 2008, Islamic State of Iraq appeared to have at least 80 execution videos, mostly beheadings, lying on the shelf that had never been distributed or released on the Internet: a former AQI commander told CNN that they were used to verify the deaths to their superiors and to justify continued funding and support.51 During an online Q&A session conducted in 2009, Zawahiri confirmed that the Islamic State of Iraq organization operated independently of Al-Qaeda and was working towards the establishment of a Caliphate.52 Asserting that the former AQ members in Iraq are under the command of ISI, Zawahiri stated:

“The State [i.e., ISI] is a step on the path to establishing the caliphate. It is superior to mujahid groups. These organizations [in Iraq] must give allegiance to the State, not vice versa. The Commander of the Faithful, Abu Omar al-Baghdadi - may God protect him - is one of the leaders of the Muslims and the mujahideen in this era.”5354

By the end of 2009, ISI was, according to US and Iraqi officials, a mostly Iraqi network of small, roving cells, still relying on fighters and weapons smuggled through the Syrian border.55

Strength

During 2004–2006, ISI's predecessor organization, Al Qaeda in Iraq (AQI), steadily rose in popularity in Western Iraq. By August 2006, AQI had emerged the dominant power in Anbar region and a U.S. military report described Al-Qaeda as an "integral part of the social fabric of western Iraq".56 A 2006 report from U.S. State Department's Bureau of Intelligence and Research estimated that the number of core fighters of AQI exceeded one thousand. This estimate excluded the fighters of other Al-Qaeda allied organizations in the Mujahideen Shura Council (MSC).5758 American military analyst Malcolm Nance estimated that AQI's strength ranged from 850 to several thousand full-time fighters.596061

In November 2006, former AQI Emir Abu Hamza al-Muhajir gave bay'ah to Abu Omar al-Baghdadi. Subsequently, the Islamic State of Iraq (ISI) organization gained command of an estimated 12,000 AQI fighters and an additional 10,000 al-Qaeda recruits.62 After the withdrawal of U.S. troops from Iraq in late 2011, U.S. estimates of ISI's strength ranged from 1,000 to 2,500 fighters.63

History

2006–2008 military presence or control

See also: Iraq § 2003–2007, and Iraq § 2008–present

The Washington Post reported that AQI and its successor organization Islamic State of Iraq came to control large parts of Iraq between 2005 and 2008.64 In autumn 2006, AQI had taken over Baqubah, the capital of Diyala Governorate, and by March 2007 ISI had claimed Baqubah as its capital.65 In 2006, AQI/ISI had strongholds in Al Anbar Governorate, from Fallujah to Qaim,66 and were the dominant power there, according to the US.67 In 2007, ISI had military units in Baghdad Governorate,68 and in 2007–2008, ISI had strongholds in Mosul in Ninawa Governorate.69

Between July and October 2007, AQI/ISI lost military bases in Anbar province and the Baghdad area70 and between April 2007 and April 2009, it lost considerable support, mobility and financial backing.71

2006–2007 attacks claimed by or attributed to ISI

The 23 November 2006 Sadr City bombings, killing 215 people, were blamed by the US on Islamic State of Iraq (ISI).72

In February and on 16 and 27 March 2007, lethal attacks on Sunni Iraqi targets took place that were not claimed, but that either Western observers or Iraqi rivals blamed on ISI (see section 2007 conflicts with Sunni and nationalist Iraqi groups).

The 23 March 2007 assassination attempt on Sunni Deputy Prime Minister of Iraq Salam al-Zaubai was claimed by ISI: "We tell the traitors of al-Maliki's infidel government, wait for what will destroy you".73

The 12 April 2007 Iraqi Parliament bombing was reportedly also claimed by ISI.74

In May 2007, Islamic State of Iraq claimed responsibility for an attack on a US military post that cost the live of seven Americans.

The 25 June 2007 suicide bombing of a meeting of Al Anbar tribal leaders and officials at Mansour Hotel, Baghdad, killing 13 people, including six Sunni sheikhs and other prominent figures,75 was claimed by ISI who in a statement on the Internet said this attack was revenge for the rape of a girl by "members of the apostate police force at Anbar".76

For the August 2007 Yazidi communities bombings, which killed some 800 people, US military and government sources named al-Qaeda in Iraq (Islamic State of Iraq) as the "prime suspect", but there was no claim of responsibility for those attacks.

On 13 September 2007, ISI killed Sunni sheikh Abdul Sattar Abu Risha, and on 25 September, another lethal attack on Sunni as well as Shiite leaders was blamed on ISI (for both, see section 2007 conflicts with Sunni and nationalist Iraqi groups).

ISI expelling Christians

In 2004, Sunni militants bombed churches and kidnapped Christians in the Baghdad district of Dora. The US military briefly 'cleared' Dora in autumn 2006, but militants tied to Al Qaeda in Iraq reestablished themselves in Dora in late 2006 and began harassing Christians.77 By January 2007, ISI proclamations appeared on walls in Dora and leaflets were circulated: women should wear veils; shorts and cellphones were prohibited.78 Christians were given the choice: either pay a tax, or become a Muslim, or leave the district. By May 2007, 500 Christian families had left Dora.79 ISI also targeted Christians in the 2010 Baghdad church massacre.For continued persecution of (Christian) Assyrians in 2014 by ISIL, see: Persecution of Assyrians by ISIL.

Threatening Iran

In July 2007, ISI's leader Abu Omar al-Baghdadi threatened Iran with war: "We are giving the Majus, and especially the rulers of Iran, a two-month period to end all kinds of support for the Iraqi Shia government and to stop direct and indirect intervention ... otherwise a severe war is waiting for you." He also warned Arab states against doing business with Iran.80

2007 conflicts with Sunni and nationalist Iraqi groups

See also: Sons of Iraq

By the beginning of 2007, Sunni tribes and nationalist insurgents were battling with AQI over control of Sunni communities,81 and some Sunni groups agreed to fight the group in exchange for American arms, ammunition, cash, pick-up trucks, fuel and supplies.8283

In February 2007, a truck bomb exploded near a mosque near Fallujah where the imam had criticised ISI, killing 35 people, the BBC suggested this attack may have been a retaliation from ISI.84

On 16 March 2007, three attacks near Fallujah and Ramadi (50 km west of Fallujah) killed eight people: a BBC correspondent assumed two of those attacks to have been targeting tribal leaders who had spoken out against ISI.85

On 27 March 2007, the leader of Sunni Arab insurgent group 1920 Revolution Brigades was killed. An official of the group blamed ISI for the attack. The 1920 Revolution Brigades had been rumored to have taken part in secret talks with American and Iraqi officials who tried to draw Sunni groups away from AQI.86

Around 10 April 2007,87 a spokesman of Islamic Army in Iraq (IAI), a significant Sunni Arab insurgent group fighting Iraqi and US forces,88 accused ISI of killing 3089 members of his group,90 and also members of the Army of the Mujahideen and the Ansar Al-Sunna resistance group,91 and called on ISI to review its behaviour: "Killing Sunnis has become a legitimate target for them, especially rich ones. Either they pay them what they want or they kill them", their statement said; "They would kill any critic or whoever tries to show them their mistakes. Assaulting people's homes became permitted and calling people infidels became popular".92 In a 42-minute audiotape released on 17 April, Abu Omar al-Baghdadi responded: "To my sons of the Islamic Army (...) We swear to you we don't shed the protected blood of Muslims intentionally", and, calling for unity: "One group is essential to accomplish victory".93

The first week of June 2007, ISI fighters exchanged heavy fire with Sunni insurgents, including IAI members, in several Baghdad neighborhoods.94 On 6 June 2007, the Islamic Army in Iraq "reached an agreement with al-Qaeda in Iraq, leading to an immediate cessation of all military operations between the two sides", according to an IAI statement. An IAI commander explained to Time: IAI and ISI still disagree on some things, but "the most important thing is that it's our common duty to fight the Americans".95

ISI on 14 September 2007 claimed responsibility for the killing of Sunni sheikh Abdul Sattar Abu Risha, leader of the Anbar Salvation Council, who had cooperated with the US to push the group out of Anbar Province, and vowed to assassinate other tribal leaders who cooperate with US and Iraqi government forces.96

On 23 September 2007, ISI in a statement accused Hamas of Iraq and the 1920 Revolution Brigades of killing its fighters. On 25 September, a bomb in a Shiite mosque in the city of Baqubah, during a meeting between tribal, police and guerrilla leaders, killed leaders of Hamas of Iraq and the 1920 Revolution Brigades and others: local reports said the attack was the work of ISI.97

US' rhetorical focusing on "al Qaeda (in Iraq)"

During 2007, US authorities and President George W. Bush strongly emphasized the role of "Al Qaeda (in Iraq)" in violence, insurgency and attacks on US troops, and the threat of them acquiring 'real power' in Iraq.9899 While some 30 groups claimed responsibility for attacks on US troops and Iraqi government targets in an examined period in May 2007, US military authorities mentioned the name "al-Qaida (in Iraq)" 51 times against only five mentions of other groups.100 Observers and scholars (like US Middle East specialist Steven Simon,101 US terrorism analyst Lydia Khalil,102 and Anthony H. Cordesman of the US Center for Strategic and International Studies103) asserted that the role played by 'AQI' was being unduly stressed.

In March 2007, the US-sponsored Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty analyzed attacks in Iraq in that month and concluded that ISI had taken credit for 43 out of 439 attacks on Iraqi security forces and Shia militias, and 17 out of 357 attacks on US troops.104 According to National Intelligence Estimate and Defense Intelligence Agency reports in July 2007, AQI accounted for 15% of the attacks in Iraq. The Congressional Research Service noted in its September 2007 report that attacks from al-Qaeda were less than 2% of the violence in Iraq. It criticized the Bush administration's statistics, noting that its false reporting of insurgency attacks as 'AQI attacks' had increased since the surge operations began in 2007.105106 At a press conference on 29 December 2007, US General David Petraeus again said that "the vast majority" of attacks in Iraq are still carried out by ISI.107

Despite claims made by the Obama Administration that Al Qaeda in Iraq was still active in 2013, AQI had been dissolved sometime after ISI was established in October 2006 when Abu Musab al-Zarqawi's successor Abu Hamza al-Muhajir swore allegiance to the ISI leadership. The independence of ISI from al-Qaeda Central was also affirmed by Ayman al-Zawahiri when, during a 2007 interview, he stated that al-Qaeda no longer operated in Iraq and that it had been incorporated into the ISI.108

American analyst Cole Bunzel rejected the US military's characterization of ISI being loyal to al-Qaeda's central leadership as "misleading".109110 According to Bunzel the Bin Laden Papers "indicate that AQC never approved of the Islamic State's establishment and that a leadership-to-leadership relationship hardly ever existed."111

2007 US arming militias against ISI

See also: Sons of Iraq

Starting early in 2007 in Anbar Province, according to American commanders and officials, insurgent groups in several Iraqi provinces that had grown disillusioned with ISI tactics like suicide bombings against Iraqi civilians, agreed to fight Islamic State of Iraq in exchange for American arms, ammunition, cash, pick-up trucks, fuel and supplies, and in some cases had agreed to alert American troops on locations of roadside bombs and booby traps.112113 This practice of negotiating arms deals with "Sunni insurgents" was approved of by the US high command in June 2007.114

By December 2007, the so-called "Awakening movement", an Arab tribal force in the Anbar region paid by the American military to fight ISI, had grown to 65,000–80,000 fighters.115 The Iraqi government and some Shiites expressed their worry that this would lead to tens of thousands of armed Sunnis in autonomous tribal "Awakening groups", leading to Shiite militias growing in reaction, and potentially leading to civil war.116

2007 US and others fighting ISI

Main article: 2007 American troop surge in Iraq

An August 2006 report released by U.S. Marine Corps intelligence had described AI-Qaeda in Iraq as the most dominant force in the Anbar region and as an "integral part of the social fabric of western Iraq". The U.S. intelligence report concluded that MNF-I coalition forces lacked the ability to impede the expansion of the AQ-led insurgency in northern Iraq without a massive American troop surge.117

In January 2007, US President George W. Bush ordered an extra 20,000 soldiers into Iraq ('the surge'), mostly into Baghdad and Al Anbar Governorate, to help provide security and support reconciliation between communities, and explained the decision predominantly by pointing at the "outrageous acts of murder aimed at innocent Iraqis" by "Al Qaeda terrorists".118

31 May 2007, in Baghdad's Amariyah district, gunmen shot randomly in the air, claiming through loudspeakers that Amariyah was under control of the Islamic State of Iraq. Armed residents are said to have resisted, set the men's cars on fire, and called the Americans for help; the Americans came in the afternoon, and "it got quiet for a while", according to one resident.119

Between March and August 2007, US and Iraqi government forces fought the Battle of Baqubah in the Diyala Governorate against ISI, "to eliminate al-Qaeda in Iraq terrorists operating in Baqubah and its surrounding areas",120 resulting in 227 ISI fighters being killed and 100 arrested, and 31 US and 12 Iraqi soldiers being killed. By July 7,000 US troops and 2,500 Iraqi troops were fighting ISI in that battle, the US army claimed that 80 percent of ISI leaders had fled the area.121

The US troop surge went into full effect in June 2007, and supplied the military with more manpower for operations targeting Islamic State of Iraq. According to US Colonel Donald Bacon, 19 senior operatives of Islamic State of Iraq were killed or captured by US and Iraqi Security Forces in July; 25 in August; 29 in September; and 45 in October.122

By October 2007, US military were believed to have dealt devastating blows to ISI, but a senior intelligence official advised against a declaration of victory over the group, because ISI retained the ability for surprise and catastrophic attacks.123

2008 US and others fighting ISI

In Operation Phantom Phoenix, over January–July 2008, the multi-national force in Iraq attempted to hunt down the last 200 ISI militants in the eastern Diyala Governorate, which resulted in 900 'insurgents' being killed and 2,500 captured, and 59 US, 776 Iraqi, three Georgian and one UK soldiers killed. By May 2008, according to Newsweek, US and Iraqi military offensives had driven AQI from Al Anbar and Diyala Provinces, leaving ISI holed up in and around the northern city of Mosul.124 The effect of the US troop surge between June 2007 and January 2009, together with American-funding of various groups fighting ISI, was—according to The Washington Post—the killing or detention of 'scores of AQI leaders'.125

2009 attacks (possibly) by ISI; revival

See also: Iraq § 2008–present

3 January 2009, a suicide bomb attack in Yusufiyah, 25 miles from Baghdad, killed 23 people; The Christian Science Monitor speculated ISI was responsible. A local Sons of Iraq spokesman said: "There are still some tribes who are trying to hide ISI members".126

After the Iraqi provincial elections in January 2009, Islamic State of Iraq offered an olive branch to other Sunni insurgent groups, and even extended "a hand of forgiveness" to those who had worked with the Americans. Some Sunni groups responded positively to this invitation.127

Beginning of April 2009, 'Sunni insurgent groups' warned that they would step up attacks against US troops and Iraq's Shiite-led government.128 Between 7 and 22 April 10 bomb attacks killed 74 people.129 Two more suicide attacks on 23 April 2009, causing 76 deaths, were without evidence attributed to 'AQI-affiliated' groups. Additional suicide bombings brought the number of Iraqis killed in bombings that month on 350.130

In the 20 June 2009 Taza bombing near a mosque, 73 Shias were killed; Western media, like Reuters, hinted at "...Sunni Islamist insurgents, including al Qaeda...".131

On 19 August 2009, three car bombs exploded in Baghdad, targeting the Iraqi Finance and Foreign Ministries, a hotel and a commercial district, killing 101 and injuring 563 people. The attacks were claimed, two months later, by Islamic State of Iraq, calling the targets "dens of infidelity".132

On 25 October 2009 twin bombings targeted Iraqi government buildings in Baghdad killing 155 people and injuring 721,133 and were also claimed by Islamic State of Iraq.134

In November 2009, Islamic State of Iraq issued another plea on the Internet, calling for Sunnis to rally around a common end goal.135 Iraqi (Shi'ite) Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki—installed December 2006—claimed in November 2009 that Al Qaeda in Iraq and former Ba'athists were together trying to undermine security and the January 2010 elections.136

8 December 2009, ISI committed five bomb attacks in Baghdad targeting government buildings and a police patrol, killing 127 people and injuring 448 more. ISI declared the targets "headquarters of evil, nests of unbelief".137

2010 revival ISI, new attacks

On 18 April 2010 Abu Ayyub al-Masri and Abu Omar al-Baghdadi, leader of the Islamic State of Iraq, were killed in a joint US-Iraqi raid on a safehouse near Tikrit,138 On 16 May 2010 Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi was announced as the new leader of the Islamic State of Iraq; his deputy was Abu Abdallah al-Husseini al-Qurashi.139

The New York Times reported that Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi had a preference for his deputies to be former Ba'athist military and intelligence officers who had served during the Saddam Hussein regime and who knew how to fight and make strategic military plans.140 He built a management structure of mostly middle-aged, Hussein-era Iraqi officers overseeing the group's departments of finance, arms, local governance, military operations and recruitment.141 These leaders added terrorist techniques, refined through years of fighting American troops, to their traditional military skill, and so made ISI a hybrid of terrorists and army.142 Analysts believe a Saddam-era officer, known as Haji Bakr, was appointed as military commander of ISI, heading a military council including three other former regime officers.143

13 June 2010, suicide bombers disguised in military uniforms attacked the Central Bank of Iraq, killing 18 people and wounding 55. ISI claimed the attack in a 16 June message on the Hanein jihadist forum.144

17 August 2010, ISI executed a suicide bomb attack on army recruits queuing outside a recruiting centre in Baghdad, killing 60 people. 19 or 20 August, ISI claimed the attack, saying it targeted "a group of Shias and apostates who sold their faith for money and to be a tool in the war on Iraqi Sunnis".145

On 31 October 2010, members of ISI attacked Our Lady of Salvation Syrian Catholic church in Baghdad—purportedly in revenge for an American Christian burning of the Qur'an that had not actually happened yet. 58 worshippers, priests, policemen and bystanders were killed, and many were wounded. The mastermind behind this attack, Huthaifa al-Batawi, was captured and arrested a month later.

2009–2010 US and others fighting ISI

In May 2009, Iraqi officials said they again needed US troops in Diyala Governorate, because of suicide bomb attacks.146

On 11 March 2010, an ISI operative known as Manaf Abd al-Rahim al-Rawi who was their governor of Baghdad province was arrested by Iraqi authorities. Manaf al-Rawi gave up important information which eventually led the American and Iraqi forces to the locations of the two top ISI leaders, its minister of war Abu Ayyub al-Masri and the "caliph" Abu Omar al-Baghdadi. On 18 April 2010, Abu Ayyub al-Masri and Abu Omar al-Baghdadi, leader of the Islamic State of Iraq, were killed in a joint US-Iraqi raid on a safehouse near Tikrit.147

In June 2010, US General Ray Odierno said that 34 of 42 top leaders of ISI had been killed or captured, not specifying the period in which that had happened, and announced that AQI had "lost connection" with its leadership in Pakistan and would have difficulties in recruiting, finding new leaders, establishing havens, or challenging the Iraqi government.148149150

In November 2010, 12 suspects, including Huthaifa al-Batawi, ISI's "Emir of Baghdad", were arrested in connection with the October 2010 assault on Our Lady of Salvation church in Baghdad a month earlier. Batawi was locked up in a counter-terrorism jail complex in Baghdad's Karrada district. During a prison riot and an attempt to escape in May 2011, Batawi and 10 other senior ISI militants were killed by an Iraqi SWAT team.151152

Revival in Iraq (2011)

See also: Iraq § 2008–present

According to the United States Department of State, ISI operated in 2011 predominantly in Iraq but it also had carried out an attack in Jordan, and maintained a logistical network throughout the Middle East, North Africa, South Asia and Europe.153

In a speech on 22 July 2012, Abu Bakr Al-Baghdadi announced a return of ISI to Iraqi strongholds they had been driven from by US forces and allied militias in 2007 and 2008 (see section 2007–2008, US and others fighting ISI), and a launching of the "Breaking the Walls" campaign to free imprisoned ISI members, and urged Iraqi tribal leaders to send their sons "to join the ranks of the mujahideen (fighters) in defense of your religion and honor ... The majority of the Sunnis in Iraq support al-Qaida and are waiting for its return to crush the Rawafidh".154 In that speech, Baghdadi also predicted a wave of 40 attacks across Iraq the next day,155 in which more than 107 were killed and over 200 wounded.156

Between July 2012 and July 2013, ISI carried out 24 waves of car bomb attacks and eight prison breaks throughout Iraq.157 By 2013, the Sunni minority increasingly resented Iraq's Shi'ite led-government, and Sunni insurgents regrouped, carrying out violent attacks and drawing new recruits.158

Expansion into Syria

In August 2011, Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi and al-Qaeda's central command authorized the Syrian al-Qaeda member Abu Mohammad al-Jawlani to set up a Syrian offshoot of al-Qaeda, to bring down the Syrian Assad government and establish an Islamic state there. Golani was part of a small group of ISI operatives who crossed into Syria, and reached out to cells of militant Islamists who had been released from Syrian military prisons in May–June 2011 and were already fighting an insurgency against Assad's security forces. Golani's group formally announced itself under the name "Jabhat al-Nusra l'Ahl as-Sham" (Support Front for the People of the Sham) on 23 January 2012.159160

On 22 July 2012, Al-Baghdadi released a 33-minute speech, mostly devoted to the Syrian uprising or civil war: "Our people there have fired the coup de grace at the terror that grasped the nation [Syria] for decades ... and taught the world lessons of courage and jihad and proved that injustice could only be removed by force", he said.161

By the second half of 2012, Jabhat al-Nusra stood out among the array of armed groups emerging in Syria as a disciplined and effective fighting force. In December 2012, the U.S. government added Jabhat al-Nusra to its list of "Foreign Terrorist Organizations" and designated the organization as an alias of what the U.S. State Department then described as "al-Qaeda in Iraq". By January 2013, al-Nusra was a formidable force with strong popular support in Syria.162

On 8 April 2013, ISI leader Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi publicly claimed that he had created Jabhat al-Nusra as a Syrian extension of the ISI and announced that he was forcibly merging it with the ISI into one group under his command, forming the "Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant" (ISIL), also known as "Islamic State of Iraq and Syria" (ISIS).163164165166 Golani rejected this merger attempt. Al-Nusra split up, some members, particularly foreign fighters, followed Baghdadi's edict and joined ISIL, others stayed with Golani.167

Comments on Egypt

On 8 February 2011, when Egyptian mass protests ran in their 15th consecutive day, ISI called on Egyptian protesters to wage jihad and strive for an Islamic government: "The market of jihad (has opened) ... the doors of martyrdom have opened ... (Egyptians must ignore the) ignorant deceiving ways of rotten democratic nationalism ... The jihad of the mujahideen is for every Muslim touched by oppression of the tyrant of Egypt and his masters in Washington and Tel Aviv".168

2011 US designation

On 4 October 2011, the United States Department of State listed ISI leader Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi as a Specially Designated Global Terrorist, and announced a reward of US$10 million for information leading to his capture or death.169 After his death, ISI reorganized in the multiple provinces of Iraq and increased his operation in 2021, such as attacks in Kirkuk, Diyala Province, Salah al-Din Governorate and Baghdad.170 To it date there were 8.000 fighters in the province.171

Redesignations: 2013–2014

Islamic State of Iraq and Levant

In a video released on 7 April 2013, Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi announced the renaming of ISI as the "Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant" (ISIL), signaling the group's expansion into Syria and its intention to forcibly absorb the Al-Nusra Front. Al-Qaeda Emir Ayman al-Zawahiri strongly denounced the announcement, asserting that Syria was the "spatial state" of the Al-Nusra Front. Zawahiri officially demanded the dissolution of the new entity and urged Baghdadi to withdraw all his fighters from Syria and for him to operate only within Iraq. Al-Baghdadi's refusal to withdraw ISIL fighters from Syria and his rejection of Zawahiri's demands initiated hostilities between the ISIL and Al-Qaeda, eventually escalating into a full-scale global conflict between the two jihadist organizations.172173174

In a letter addressed to the leaderships of ISIL and Al-Nusra Front, Ayman al-Zawahiri directly rebuked Al-Baghdadi's attempt to absorb Al-Nusra Front.175176 Demanding the dissolution of ISIL, Al-Zawahiri wrote:

“Sheikh Abou Bakr Al-Baghdadi was wrong when he announced the Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant without asking permission or receiving advice from us and even without notifying us. ... The Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant is to be dissolved, while Islamic State in Iraq is to continue its work. Jabhat Al-Nusra is an independent entity for Qaedat Al-Jihad group, under the (al-Qaeda) general command. The seat of the Islamic State in Iraq is in Iraq. The seat of Jabhat Al-Nusra for the people of Al-Sham is in Syria.”177

Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi publicly rejected the proposals of Ayman al-Zawahiri, marking a turning point in AQ-ISIL relations.178179 According to a report released by Al-Jazeera in June 2013, a source from the Al-Nusra Front described the emerging AQ-ISIL conflict as “the most dangerous development in the history of global jihad”.180 In an audiotape released by ISIL on 15 June 2013, Abubakr al-Baghdadi publicly denounced Al-Zawahiri's letter. In another audiotape, ISIL spokesperson Abu Muhammad al-Adnani condemned Zawahiri's demands in harsher terms.181

Conflict with Al-Qaeda and Al-Nusra Front

Further information: Opposition–Islamic State conflict during the Syrian civil war and Northern Aleppo offensive (February–July 2014)

By January 2014, hostile rhetoric between ISIL and the Al-Nusra Front had escalated into a full-blown violent armed conflict.182183 ISIL began expanding further into north-eastern Syria taking over the territory of smaller rebel groups as well as Jabhat al-Nusra and initiated ground operations against Al-Qaeda and its allies. ISIL expelled the al-Nusra Front and took complete control of the city Raqqa by 13 January 2014 making it the capital of the organisation.184 On 1 February 2014, ISIL launched suicide-bombing attacks on the headquarters of the Al-Qaeda-allied Al-Tawhid Brigade militia group in Aleppo, killing 26 people, including the brigade commander Adnan Bakour. Several fighters of the Al-Nusra Front were also killed in the attacks.185 A day later, the central command of Al-Qaeda issued a public statement condemning the attacks and officially terminating all relations with the ISIL group.186187

In March 2014, ISIL and Al-Nusra Front fought the Battle of Markada. In parallel, ISIL initiated ground assaults across Deir ez-Zor countryside, which were repelled by Al-Nusra Front and allies. However, ISIL forces were able to capture the strategic town of Markada on 29 March 2014, forcing Al-Nusra Front fighters to pull back and retreat to the Deir ez-Zor countryside.188189190 The capture of Markada by ISIL paved the way for the organization's subsequent rapid territorial expansion across Syria and Iraq during its April–July 2014 Deir ez-Zor offensive and June 2014 Northern Iraq Offensive.191

Re-designation as the "Islamic State"

Further information: Deir ez-Zor offensive (April–July 2014) and June 2014 Northern Iraq offensive

On 10 April 2014, ISIL launched the Deir ez-Zor offensive, and captured the vast majority of the Deir ez-Zor region by the end of the campaign. On 16 April, ISIL killed Abu Muhammad al-Ansari, Al-Nusra Front's Emir in the Mayadin region. Although Al-Nusra Front and allies resisted the attacks, ISIL had managed to capture parts of northern country-side of Raqqa region as well as the strategic parts of Deir ez-Zor. By 10 June, ISIL had gained control over most of the territories of the Deir ez-Zor region north of the Euphrates river and completely expelled the Al-Nusra Front, Free Syrian Army and other Syrian rebels. ISIL subsequently expanded its campaign to the Aleppo region.192193194 On 4 June 2014, ISIL launched a major offensive in northern Iraq, gaining control of most regions of Northern Iraq and capturing the cities of Mosul, Baiji, Tal Afar and Tikrit. By the end of the campaign, ISIL had also captured most of Western Iraq and gained full control over the main border crossing of Iraq and Syria.195 On 29 June 2014, ISIL announced its name change to the "Islamic State" and declared the establishment of a "Caliphate", aiming to rule Iraq, Syria, as well as the entire Muslim world.196 Proclaiming Ibrahim Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi as “the caliph” and “leader for Muslims everywhere”, as well as demanding the allegiance of all Muslim groups, the announcement by Abu Muhammad al-Adnani stated:197198

The “Iraq and Shām” in the name of the Islamic State is henceforth removed from all official deliberations and communications, and the official name is the Islamic State from the date of this declaration.

We clarify to the Muslims that with this declaration of khilāfah, it is incumbent upon all Muslims to pledge allegiance to the khalīfah Ibrāhīm and support him (may Allah preserve him). The legality of all emirates, groups, states, and organizations, becomes null by the expansion of the khilāfah’s authority and arrival of its troops to their areas. ...

The khalīfah Ibrāhīm (may Allah preserve him) has fulfilled all the conditions for khilāfah mentioned by the scholars. He was given bay’ah in Iraq by the people of authority in the Islamic State as the successor to Abū ‘Umar al-Baghdādī (may Allah have mercy upon him). His authority has expanded over wide areas in Iraq and Shām. The land now submits to his order and authority from Aleppo to Diyala. So fear Allah, O slaves of Allah. Listen to your khalīfah and obey him. Support your state, which grows everyday – by Allah's grace – with honor and loftiness, while its enemy increases in retreat and defeat.

So rush O Muslims and gather around your khalīfah, so that you may return as you once were for ages, kings of the earth and knights of war.

— Official announcement of the Islamic State organization declaring its establishment of a "Caliphate"199200

In July 2014, the Islamic State captured numerous villages and towns in the northern Aleppo countryside. In response, al-Nusra Front and its allied militias such as Liwa al-Tawhid, Ajnad al-Sham, etc. launched a counter-offensive in Northern Aleppo against ISIL.201 The second issue of the Dabiq magazine, published by the Islamic State group on 27 July 2014, vehemently denounced the leaderships of Al-Nusra Front and Al-Qaeda.202 Accusing Al-Qaeda of conspiring with the enemies of the Islamic State, the magazine stated:

Despite what the Islamic State faces of economic, military, political, and media war, and despite all the different parties unified against it-from the new Al-Qa'idah leadership in Khurasan, to the [S]afawis in Tehran, and all the way to the crusaders in Washington-it advances from victory to victory.... It killed rafidah ("Muslims" according to the new Al-Qa'idah leadership) by the thousands. It kept to its promise and destroyed the border obstacles that formerly separated the lands of Iraq from Sham. Its numbers continue to grow.203

Changes in leadership

ISIL Military Council head Haji Bakr, whose name was Samir Abd Muhammad al-Khlifawi, was killed in January 2014,204205 and was succeeded by Abu Abdulrahman al-Bilawi as head of the ISIL Military Council.206 Al-Bilawi was killed on 4 June 2014,207208 and was reportedly succeeded by Abu Mohannad al-Sweidawi as leader of the ISIL Military Council.209 There were reports in November 2014 that al-Sweidawi had been killed in an Iraqi airstrike that reportedly also injured Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi.210211 The Daily Beast reported that al-Sweidawi was succeeded by senior IS figure Abu Ali al-Anbari,212 who was in turn killed on 24 March 2016.213 Al-Anbari was considered by many as the Islamic State organization's second-in-command in Syria and was viewed as a potential successor of IS leader Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi. The second-in-command in Iraq was Abu Muslim al-Turkmani, who was killed on 18 August 2015, and who was succeeded as the IS leader in Iraq by Abu Fatima al-Jaheishi.214215

See also

References

  1. Abu Musab Al-Zarqawi, translated by Jeffrey Pool (18 October 2004). "Zarqawi's pledge of allegiance to al-Qaeda: From Mu'Asker Al-Battar, Issue 21". Jamestown. Jamestown Foundation. Retrieved 16 September 2014. /wiki/Abu_Musab_Al-Zarqawi ↩

  2. "Al-Zarqawi group vows allegiance to bin Laden". NBC News. Associated Press. 18 October 2004. Retrieved 13 July 2007. https://www.nbcnews.com/id/wbna6268680 ↩

  3. Gordon Corera (16 December 2004). "Unraveling Zarqawi's al-Qaeda connection". Jamestown. Jamestown Foundation. Retrieved 16 September 2014. /wiki/Gordon_Corera ↩

  4. "Call for Sunni state in Iraq". www.ft.com. Retrieved 14 January 2024. https://www.ft.com/content/e239159e-5c6a-11db-9e7e-0000779e2340 ↩

  5. Perkoski, Evan (2022). "5: Al-Qaeda and the Islamic State". Divided, Not Conquered: How Rebels Fracture and Splinters Behave. New York: Oxford University Press. pp. 158, 159. ISBN 9780197627075. 9780197627075 ↩

  6. Perkoski, Evan (2022). "5: Al-Qaeda and the Islamic State". Divided, Not Conquered: How Rebels Fracture and Splinters Behave. New York: Oxford University Press. pp. 158, 159. ISBN 9780197627075. 9780197627075 ↩

  7. Sources: Bunzel, Cole (5 October 2013). "al-Baghdadi Triumphant". Jihadica. Archived from the original on 9 November 2013. Caillet, Romain (27 December 2013). "The Islamic State: Leaving al-Qaeda Behind". Carnegie Middle East Center. Archived from the original on 20 January 2017. https://web.archive.org/web/20131109154128/https://www.jihadica.com/the-islamic-state-of-disobedience-al-baghdadis-defiance/ ↩

  8. Lund, Aron (3 February 2014). "A Public Service Announcement From Al-Qaeda". Carnegie Middle East Center. Archived from the original on 29 July 2017. https://web.archive.org/web/20170729032303/https://carnegie-mec.org/diwan/54411 ↩

  9. Jessica D. Lewis (September 2013). "Al-Qaeda in Iraq Resurgent" (PDF). Institute for the Study of War. Retrieved 1 April 2016. http://www.understandingwar.org/sites/default/files/AQI-Resurgent-10Sept_0.pdf ↩

  10. Atassi, Basma (9 June 2013). "Qaeda chief annuls Syrian-Iraqi jihad merger". Al Jazeera. Archived from the original on 21 December 2020. https://web.archive.org/web/20201221100148/https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2013/6/9/qaeda-chief-annuls-syrian-iraqi-jihad-merger ↩

  11. "Guide: Armed groups in Iraq". BBC. 15 August 2006. Retrieved 13 July 2007. http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle_east/4268904.stm ↩

  12. Perkoski, Evan (2022). "5: Al-Qaeda and the Islamic State". Divided, Not Conquered: How Rebels Fracture and Splinters Behave. New York: Oxford University Press. p. 158. ISBN 9780197627075. 9780197627075 ↩

  13. "The Rump Islamic Emirate of Iraq". The Long War Journal. 16 October 2006. Retrieved 2 June 2014. http://www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2006/10/the_rump_islamic_emi.php# ↩

  14. "Call for Sunni state in Iraq". www.ft.com. Retrieved 14 January 2024. https://www.ft.com/content/e239159e-5c6a-11db-9e7e-0000779e2340 ↩

  15. Bunzel, Cole (5 October 2013). "al-Baghdadi Triumphant". Jihadica. Archived from the original on 9 November 2013. https://web.archive.org/web/20131109154128/https://www.jihadica.com/the-islamic-state-of-disobedience-al-baghdadis-defiance/ ↩

  16. ""بيان إعلان قيام "دولة العراق الإسلامية" [Statement declaring the establishment of the “Islamic State of Iraq”]. 15 November 2008. Archived from the original on 28 May 2010. https://web.archive.org/web/20100528173458/http://www.tawhed.ws/r?i=xsdcfre4 ↩

  17. Londoño, Ernesto (22 November 2009). "Resurgent Al-Qaeda in Iraq seeks to undermine government (page 1)". The Washington Post. Retrieved 22 December 2014. https://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2009/11/21/AR2009112102009.html ↩

  18. Perkoski, Evan (2022). "5: Al-Qaeda and the Islamic State". Divided, Not Conquered: How Rebels Fracture and Splinters Behave. New York: Oxford University Press. p. 158. ISBN 9780197627075. 9780197627075 ↩

  19. Bunzel, Cole (5 October 2013). "al-Baghdadi Triumphant". Jihadica. Archived from the original on 9 November 2013. https://web.archive.org/web/20131109154128/https://www.jihadica.com/the-islamic-state-of-disobedience-al-baghdadis-defiance/ ↩

  20. "إعلام الأنام بميلاد دولة الإسلام" [Informing people of the birth of the Islamic State]. Archived from the original on 26 February 2010. https://web.archive.org/web/20100226091408/http://www.tawhed.ws/r1?i=6773&x=436zeuhb ↩

  21. "The Rump Islamic Emirate of Iraq". The Long War Journal. 16 October 2006. Retrieved 2 June 2014. http://www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2006/10/the_rump_islamic_emi.php# ↩

  22. Yates, Dean (18 July 2007). "Senior Qaeda figure in Iraq a myth: US military". Reuters. p. 1. Retrieved 17 January 2015. /wiki/Dean_Yates ↩

  23. Yates, Dean (18 July 2007). "Senior Qaeda figure in Iraq a myth: US military". Reuters. p. 1. Retrieved 17 January 2015. /wiki/Dean_Yates ↩

  24. Bill Roggio (19 April 2010). "US and Iraqi forces kill Al Masri and Baghdadi, al Qaeda in Iraq's top two leaders". The Long War Journal. Retrieved 27 July 2012. http://www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2010/04/al_qaeda_in_iraqs_to.php ↩

  25. Shadid, Anthony (16 May 2010). "Iraqi Insurgent Group Names New Leaders". The New York Times. Retrieved 23 December 2014. https://atwar.blogs.nytimes.com/2010/05/16/iraqi-insurgent-group-names-new-leaders/?_php=true&_type=blogs&_r=0 ↩

  26. Arango, Tim (19 April 2010). "Top Qaeda Leaders in Iraq Reported Killed in Raid". The New York Times. Retrieved 23 December 2014. https://www.nytimes.com/2010/04/20/world/middleeast/20baghdad.html ↩

  27. Perkoski, Evan (2022). "5: Al-Qaeda and the Islamic State". Divided, Not Conquered: How Rebels Fracture and Splinters Behave. New York: Oxford University Press. pp. 158, 159. ISBN 9780197627075. 9780197627075 ↩

  28. Caillet, Romain (27 December 2013). "The Islamic State: Leaving al-Qaeda Behind". Carnegie Middle East Center. Archived from the original on 20 January 2017. https://web.archive.org/web/20170120172144/https://carnegie-mec.org/diwan/54017?lang=en ↩

  29. Caillet, Romain (27 December 2013). "The Islamic State: Leaving al-Qaeda Behind". Carnegie Middle East Center. Archived from the original on 20 January 2017. https://web.archive.org/web/20170120172144/https://carnegie-mec.org/diwan/54017?lang=en ↩

  30. Shadid, Anthony (16 May 2010). "Iraqi Insurgent Group Names New Leaders". The New York Times. Retrieved 23 December 2014. https://atwar.blogs.nytimes.com/2010/05/16/iraqi-insurgent-group-names-new-leaders/?_php=true&_type=blogs&_r=0 ↩

  31. "Islamic State of Iraq Announces Establishment of the Cabinet of its First Islamic Administration in Video Issued Through al-Furqan Foundation". SITE Institute. 19 April 2007. Archived from the original on 28 September 2007. Retrieved 24 January 2015. https://web.archive.org/web/20070928061225/http://www.siteinstitute.org/bin/articles.cgi?ID=publications274907&Category=publications&Subcategory=0 ↩

  32. Arango, Tim (19 April 2010). "Top Qaeda Leaders in Iraq Reported Killed in Raid". The New York Times. Retrieved 23 December 2014. https://www.nytimes.com/2010/04/20/world/middleeast/20baghdad.html ↩

  33. Shadid, Anthony (16 May 2010). "Iraqi Insurgent Group Names New Leaders". The New York Times. Retrieved 23 December 2014. https://atwar.blogs.nytimes.com/2010/05/16/iraqi-insurgent-group-names-new-leaders/?_php=true&_type=blogs&_r=0 ↩

  34. "SITE: Qaeda in Iraq names new 'war minister1" Archived 11 November 2017 at the Wayback Machine MiddleEastOnline, 14 May 2010. http://www.middle-east-online.com/english/?id=38996 ↩

  35. "Iraqi forces kill al-Qaida 'war minister' in raid". The Washington Post. Retrieved 28 September 2014. https://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2011/02/25/AR2011022501803.html ↩

  36. "Islamic State Senior Leadership: Who's Who" (PDF). Brookings Institution. 2014. Retrieved 11 May 2015. http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/Research/Files/Reports/2014/11/profiling-islamic-state-lister/en_whos_who.pdf?la=en ↩

  37. Hassan Abu Haniyeh. "Daesh's Organisational Structure". Al Jazeera. http://studies.aljazeera.net/en/dossiers/decipheringdaeshoriginsimpactandfuture/2014/12/201412395930929444.html ↩

  38. Aymenn Jawad Al-Tamimi (24 January 2016). "An Account of Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi & Islamic State Succession Lines". http://www.aymennjawad.org/2016/01/an-account-of-abu-bakr-al-baghdadi-islamic-state ↩

  39. "Islamic State of Iraq Announces Establishment of the Cabinet of its First Islamic Administration in Video Issued Through al-Furqan Foundation". SITE Institute. 19 April 2007. Archived from the original on 28 September 2007. Retrieved 24 January 2015. https://web.archive.org/web/20070928061225/http://www.siteinstitute.org/bin/articles.cgi?ID=publications274907&Category=publications&Subcategory=0 ↩

  40. "Abdullah al Janabi openly preaches in Fallujah mosque". The Long War Journal. 18 January 2014. Archived from the original on 6 September 2014. Retrieved 25 January 2015. https://web.archive.org/web/20140906035720/http://www.longwarjournal.org/threat-matrix/archives/2014/01/abdullah_al_janabi_openly_prea.php ↩

  41. Benraad, Myriam (June 2010). "Assessing AQI's Resilience After April's Leadership Decapitations". CTC Sentinel. 3 (6). Combating Terrorism Center at West Point. Retrieved 28 June 2023. https://ctc.westpoint.edu/assessing-aqis-resilience-after-aprils-leadership-decapitations/ ↩

  42. "Al-Qaeda 'military leader' Abu Suleiman killed in Iraq". BBC News. BBC. 25 February 2011. Retrieved 28 June 2023. https://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-12581313 ↩

  43. "Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi: Islamic State's driving force". BBC World News. 31 July 2014. Retrieved 19 August 2014. https://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-28560449 ↩

  44. Londoño, Ernesto (22 November 2009). "Resurgent Al-Qaeda in Iraq seeks to undermine government (page 1)". The Washington Post. Retrieved 22 December 2014. https://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2009/11/21/AR2009112102009.html ↩

  45. Samuels, Lennox (20 May 2008). "Al Qaeda in Iraq Ramps Up Its Racketeering". Newsweek. Retrieved 16 December 2014.(subscription required) Accessible via Google. http://www.newsweek.com/id/138085 ↩

  46. Samuels, Lennox (20 May 2008). "Al Qaeda in Iraq Ramps Up Its Racketeering". Newsweek. Retrieved 16 December 2014.(subscription required) Accessible via Google. http://www.newsweek.com/id/138085 ↩

  47. Allam, Hannah (23 June 2014). "Records show how Iraqi extremists withstood US anti-terror efforts". McClatchy News. Retrieved 25 June 2014. http://www.mcclatchydc.com/2014/06/23/231223/records-show-how-iraqi-extremists.html ↩

  48. Ware, Michael (11 June 2008). "Papers give peek inside al Qaeda in Iraq". CNN. Retrieved 15 December 2014. http://edition.cnn.com/2008/WORLD/meast/06/11/al.qaeda.iraq/index.html?iref=topnews ↩

  49. Ware, Michael (11 June 2008). "Papers give peek inside al Qaeda in Iraq". CNN. Retrieved 15 December 2014. http://edition.cnn.com/2008/WORLD/meast/06/11/al.qaeda.iraq/index.html?iref=topnews ↩

  50. Caillet, Romain (27 December 2013). "The Islamic State: Leaving al-Qaeda Behind". Carnegie Middle East Center. Archived from the original on 20 January 2017. https://web.archive.org/web/20170120172144/https://carnegie-mec.org/diwan/54017?lang=en ↩

  51. Ware, Michael (11 June 2008). "Papers give peek inside al Qaeda in Iraq". CNN. Retrieved 15 December 2014. http://edition.cnn.com/2008/WORLD/meast/06/11/al.qaeda.iraq/index.html?iref=topnews ↩

  52. Bunzel, Cole (5 October 2013). "al-Baghdadi Triumphant". Jihadica. Archived from the original on 9 November 2013. https://web.archive.org/web/20131109154128/https://www.jihadica.com/the-islamic-state-of-disobedience-al-baghdadis-defiance/ ↩

  53. Bunzel, Cole (5 October 2013). "al-Baghdadi Triumphant". Jihadica. Archived from the original on 9 November 2013. https://web.archive.org/web/20131109154128/https://www.jihadica.com/the-islamic-state-of-disobedience-al-baghdadis-defiance/ ↩

  54. al-Zawahiri, Ayman (15 February 2009). "اللقاء المفتوح مع الشيخ أيمن الظواهري" [The open meeting with Sheikh Ayman Al-Zawahiri]. Archived from the original on 20 February 2010. https://web.archive.org/web/20100220044807/http://www.tawhed.ws/r1?i=7534&x=1502092g ↩

  55. Londoño, Ernesto (22 November 2009). "Resurgent Al-Qaeda in Iraq seeks to undermine government (page 1)". The Washington Post. Retrieved 22 December 2014. https://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2009/11/21/AR2009112102009.html ↩

  56. "Anbar Picture Grows Clearer, and Bleaker". Washington Post, 28 November 2006. Retrieved 15 January 2015. https://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2006/11/27/AR2006112701287.html ↩

  57. Tilghman, Andrew (October 2007). "The Myth of AQI". Washington Monthly. Archived from the original on 8 September 2007. Retrieved 14 July 2014. https://web.archive.org/web/20070908125622/http://www.washingtonmonthly.com/features/2007/0710.tilghman.html ↩

  58. Dhiman, S.C. (2015). Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS). Delhi: Neha Publishers & Distributors. p. 50. ISBN 978-93-80318-67-7. 978-93-80318-67-7 ↩

  59. Tilghman, Andrew (October 2007). "The Myth of AQI". Washington Monthly. Archived from the original on 8 September 2007. Retrieved 14 July 2014. https://web.archive.org/web/20070908125622/http://www.washingtonmonthly.com/features/2007/0710.tilghman.html ↩

  60. Parker, Ned (15 July 2007). "Saudis' role in Iraq insurgency outlined". Los Angeles Times. Archived from the original on 1 September 2007. https://web.archive.org/web/20070901124203/http://www.latimes.com/news/nationworld/world/la-fg-saudi15jul15%2C0%2C3132262.story?coll=la-home-center ↩

  61. W. Nance, Malcolm (2015). "5: The Insurgent's Strategy". The Terrorists of Iraq: Inside the Strategy and Tactics of the Iraq Insurgency 2003-2014 (2nd ed.). CRC Press, Taylor & Francis group. pp. 114, 115. ISBN 978-1-4987-0691-9. 978-1-4987-0691-9 ↩

  62. Perkoski, Evan (2022). "5: Al-Qaeda and the Islamic State". Divided, Not Conquered: How Rebels Fracture and Splinters Behave. New York: Oxford University Press. p. 158. ISBN 9780197627075. 9780197627075 ↩

  63. "Al Qaeda in Iraq suicide bomber kills 31 at Iraqi Army base in Taji". The Long War Journal. 6 November 2012. Archived from the original on 10 November 2014. Retrieved 14 December 2014. https://web.archive.org/web/20141110183855/http://www.longwarjournal.org/threat-matrix/archives/2012/11/al_qaeda_in_iraq_suicide_bombe.php ↩

  64. Londoño, Ernesto (22 November 2009). "Resurgent Al-Qaeda in Iraq seeks to undermine government (page 1)". The Washington Post. Retrieved 22 December 2014. https://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2009/11/21/AR2009112102009.html ↩

  65. "TASK FORCE 5-20 INFANTRY REGIMENT OPERATION IRAQI FREEDOM 06-07 (under section 'A Commander's Perspective')". US Army 5th Battalion, 20th Infantry Regiment. Archived from the original on 18 November 2008. Retrieved 23 January 2015. https://web.archive.org/web/20081118195615/http://www.1-20infantry.org/5-20pages/oif06-07.htm ↩

  66. Beaumont, Peter (3 October 2006). "Iraqi tribes launch battle to drive al-Qaida out of troubled province". The Guardian. Retrieved 20 December 2014. https://www.theguardian.com/Iraq/Story/0,,1886076,00.html ↩

  67. "Anbar Picture Grows Clearer, and Bleaker". Washington Post, 28 November 2006. Retrieved 15 January 2015. https://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2006/11/27/AR2006112701287.html ↩

  68. Hurst, Steven R. (1 June 2007). "US battles al-Qaida gunmen in west Baghdad after Sunnis revolt against terror group". Associated Press. Archived from the original on 23 January 2015. Retrieved 19 December 2014. https://web.archive.org/web/20150123050921/http://www.southcoasttoday.com/apps/pbcs.dll/article?AID=%2F20070601%2FNEWS%2F706010381 ↩

  69. Samuels, Lennox (20 May 2008). "Al Qaeda in Iraq Ramps Up Its Racketeering". Newsweek. Retrieved 16 December 2014.(subscription required) Accessible via Google. http://www.newsweek.com/id/138085 ↩

  70. Ricks, Thomas; DeYoung, Karen (15 October 2007). "Al-Qaeda in Iraq Reported Crippled". The Washington Post. Retrieved 16 December 2014. https://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2007/10/14/AR2007101401245.html ↩

  71. LondoñO, Ernesto; Alwan, Aziz (24 April 2009). "Suicide Bombers Kill More Than 70 in Baghdad, Diyala Province". The Washington Post. Retrieved 21 December 2014. https://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2009/04/23/AR2009042300710.html?nav=rss_nation/special ↩

  72. DeYoung, Karen; Pincus, Walter (18 March 2007). "Al-Qaeda in Iraq May Not Be Threat Here". The Washington Times. Retrieved 28 November 2014. https://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2007/03/17/AR2007031701373.html ↩

  73. "Highest-ranking Sunni official in Iraq target of mosque bombing", theworldlink, 24 March 2007. Retrieved 29 December 2014. http://theworldlink.com/news/local/highest-ranking-sunni-official-in-iraq-target-of-mosque-bombing/article_45f87a97-4dee-5fad-8a6a-a24d8849c905.html ↩

  74. Insurgents claim Baghdad attack, BBC, 13 April 2007. Retrieved 29 December 2014. http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle_east/6553063.stm ↩

  75. "Suicide bomber kills 13 at busy Baghdad hotel". The Washington Times. 26 June 2014. Retrieved 13 August 2013. http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2007/jun/26/suicide-bomber-kills-13-at-busy-baghdad-hotel/ ↩

  76. Tran, Mark (26 June 2007). "Al-Qaida linked to Baghdad hotel bombing". The Guardian. Retrieved 29 December 2014. https://www.theguardian.com/Iraq/Story/0,,2112106,00.html ↩

  77. Parker, Ned (27 June 2007). "Christians chased out of district". Los Angeles Times. Retrieved 4 February 2015. https://www.latimes.com/archives/la-xpm-2007-jun-27-fg-christians27-story.html ↩

  78. Parker, Ned (27 June 2007). "Christians chased out of district". Los Angeles Times. Retrieved 4 February 2015. https://www.latimes.com/archives/la-xpm-2007-jun-27-fg-christians27-story.html ↩

  79. Parker, Ned (27 June 2007). "Christians chased out of district". Los Angeles Times. Retrieved 4 February 2015. https://www.latimes.com/archives/la-xpm-2007-jun-27-fg-christians27-story.html ↩

  80. Cordover, Adam B (9 July 2007). "Al-Qaeda Issues Ultimatum to Iran". Cafe Cordover. Retrieved 20 January 2015. http://cordover.blogspot.com/2007/07/ ↩

  81. Crain, Charles (1 January 2008). "Exit Al-Qaeda. Enter the Militias?". Time. Archived from the original on 11 February 2013. Retrieved 17 December 2014. https://web.archive.org/web/20130211030650/http://www.time.com/time/world/article/0%2C8599%2C1699187%2C00.html ↩

  82. Burns, John; Rubin, Alissa (11 June 2007). "US Arming Sunnis in Iraq to Battle Old Qaeda Allies". The New York Times. Retrieved 17 December 2014. https://www.nytimes.com/2007/06/11/world/middleeast/11iraq.html?_r=1&n=Top%2fReference%2fTimes%20Topics%2fOrganizations%2fA%2fAl%20Qaeda%20in%20Mesopotamia&oref=slogin&pagewanted=all ↩

  83. MacAskill, Ewen (12 June 2007). "US arms Sunni dissidents in risky bid to contain al-Qaida fighters in Iraq". The Guardian. London. Retrieved 20 December 2014. https://www.theguardian.com/Iraq/Story/0,,2100698,00.html?gusrc=rss&feed=12 ↩

  84. "Iraqis killed by chlorine bombs". BBC News. 17 March 2007. Archived from the original on 6 August 2010. Retrieved 17 December 2014. http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle_east/6461757.stm ↩

  85. "Iraqis killed by chlorine bombs". BBC News. 17 March 2007. Archived from the original on 6 August 2010. Retrieved 17 December 2014. http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle_east/6461757.stm ↩

  86. "Official Blames Al Qaeda in Iraq for Death of Key Sunni Insurgent Leader". Fox News Channel. Associated Press. 27 March 2007. Retrieved 18 December 2014. https://www.foxnews.com/story/official-blames-al-qaeda-in-iraq-for-death-of-key-sunni-insurgent-leader ↩

  87. "Al-Qaida linked group moves to patch up rift among insurgent factions". International Herald Tribune. Associated Press. 17 April 2007. Archived from the original on 27 January 2008. Retrieved 18 December 2014. https://web.archive.org/web/20080127050439/http://www.iht.com/articles/ap/2007/04/17/africa/ME-GEN-Iraq-Insurgent-Split.php ↩

  88. "Rebels call on Al Qaida to 'review' behaviour". Gulf News. Reuters. 7 April 2007. Archived from the original on 29 June 2007. Retrieved 18 December 2014. https://web.archive.org/web/20070629133652/http://www.gulfnews.com/region/Iraq/10116557.html ↩

  89. Andoni, Lamis (26 April – 2 May 2007). "On whose side is Al-Qaeda?". Al-Ahram Weekly (842). Archived from the original on 28 January 2015. Retrieved 17 December 2014. https://web.archive.org/web/20150128061120/http://weekly.ahram.org.eg/2007/842/op6.htm ↩

  90. "Al-Qaida linked group moves to patch up rift among insurgent factions". International Herald Tribune. Associated Press. 17 April 2007. Archived from the original on 27 January 2008. Retrieved 18 December 2014. https://web.archive.org/web/20080127050439/http://www.iht.com/articles/ap/2007/04/17/africa/ME-GEN-Iraq-Insurgent-Split.php ↩

  91. Andoni, Lamis (26 April – 2 May 2007). "On whose side is Al-Qaeda?". Al-Ahram Weekly (842). Archived from the original on 28 January 2015. Retrieved 17 December 2014. https://web.archive.org/web/20150128061120/http://weekly.ahram.org.eg/2007/842/op6.htm ↩

  92. "Rebels call on Al Qaida to 'review' behaviour". Gulf News. Reuters. 7 April 2007. Archived from the original on 29 June 2007. Retrieved 18 December 2014. https://web.archive.org/web/20070629133652/http://www.gulfnews.com/region/Iraq/10116557.html ↩

  93. "Al-Qaida linked group moves to patch up rift among insurgent factions". International Herald Tribune. Associated Press. 17 April 2007. Archived from the original on 27 January 2008. Retrieved 18 December 2014. https://web.archive.org/web/20080127050439/http://www.iht.com/articles/ap/2007/04/17/africa/ME-GEN-Iraq-Insurgent-Split.php ↩

  94. Ghosh, Bobby (6 June 2007). "A Truce Between US Enemies in Iraq". Time. Archived from the original on 9 June 2007. Retrieved 19 December 2014. https://web.archive.org/web/20070609145222/http://www.time.com/time/world/article/0,8599,1629871,00.html ↩

  95. Ghosh, Bobby (6 June 2007). "A Truce Between US Enemies in Iraq". Time. Archived from the original on 9 June 2007. Retrieved 19 December 2014. https://web.archive.org/web/20070609145222/http://www.time.com/time/world/article/0,8599,1629871,00.html ↩

  96. Iraqis vow to fight al Qaeda after sheikh death, Reuters, 14 September 2007. Retrieved 19 December 2014. https://www.reuters.com/article/us-iraq-anbar-idUSL1477322720070914 ↩

  97. "Leader of 'Hamas of Iraq' and 1920 Brigades dead in mosque attack". Adnkronos. 25 September 2007. Retrieved 19 December 2014. http://www.adnkronos.com/AKI/English/Security/?id=1.0.1345669885 ↩

  98. Yacoub, Sameer N. (8 June 2007). "In motley array of Iraqi foes, why does US spotlight al-Qaida?". International Herald Tribune. Associated Press. Archived from the original on 27 January 2008. Retrieved 14 December 2014. https://web.archive.org/web/20080127050505/http://www.iht.com/articles/ap/2007/06/09/africa/ME-GEN-Iraq-Enemy-No.-1.php ↩

  99. Hoyt, Clark (8 July 2007). "Seeing Al Qaeda Around Every Corner". The New York Times. Retrieved 14 December 2014. https://www.nytimes.com/2007/07/08/opinion/08pubed.html?_r=1&oref=login ↩

  100. Yacoub, Sameer N. (8 June 2007). "In motley array of Iraqi foes, why does US spotlight al-Qaida?". International Herald Tribune. Associated Press. Archived from the original on 27 January 2008. Retrieved 14 December 2014. https://web.archive.org/web/20080127050505/http://www.iht.com/articles/ap/2007/06/09/africa/ME-GEN-Iraq-Enemy-No.-1.php ↩

  101. Yacoub, Sameer N. (8 June 2007). "In motley array of Iraqi foes, why does US spotlight al-Qaida?". International Herald Tribune. Associated Press. Archived from the original on 27 January 2008. Retrieved 14 December 2014. https://web.archive.org/web/20080127050505/http://www.iht.com/articles/ap/2007/06/09/africa/ME-GEN-Iraq-Enemy-No.-1.php ↩

  102. Yacoub, Sameer N. (8 June 2007). "In motley array of Iraqi foes, why does US spotlight al-Qaida?". International Herald Tribune. Associated Press. Archived from the original on 27 January 2008. Retrieved 14 December 2014. https://web.archive.org/web/20080127050505/http://www.iht.com/articles/ap/2007/06/09/africa/ME-GEN-Iraq-Enemy-No.-1.php ↩

  103. Hoyt, Clark (8 July 2007). "Seeing Al Qaeda Around Every Corner". The New York Times. Retrieved 14 December 2014. https://www.nytimes.com/2007/07/08/opinion/08pubed.html?_r=1&oref=login ↩

  104. Tilghman, Andrew (October 2007). "The Myth of AQI". Washington Monthly. Archived from the original on 8 September 2007. Retrieved 14 July 2014. https://web.archive.org/web/20070908125622/http://www.washingtonmonthly.com/features/2007/0710.tilghman.html ↩

  105. Tilghman, Andrew (October 2007). "The Myth of AQI". Washington Monthly. Archived from the original on 8 September 2007. Retrieved 14 July 2014. https://web.archive.org/web/20070908125622/http://www.washingtonmonthly.com/features/2007/0710.tilghman.html ↩

  106. "CRS Report for Congress – Iraq: Post-Saddam Governance and Security" (PDF). Congressional Research Service. 6 September 2007. Archived from the original (PDF) on 27 September 2007. Retrieved 26 July 2014. https://web.archive.org/web/20070927021331/http://thinkprogress.org/wp-content/uploads/2007/09/crsiraq0907.pdf ↩

  107. Crain, Charles (1 January 2008). "Exit Al-Qaeda. Enter the Militias?". Time. Archived from the original on 11 February 2013. Retrieved 17 December 2014. https://web.archive.org/web/20130211030650/http://www.time.com/time/world/article/0%2C8599%2C1699187%2C00.html ↩

  108. Caillet, Romain (27 December 2013). "The Islamic State: Leaving al-Qaeda Behind". Carnegie Middle East Center. Archived from the original on 20 January 2017. https://web.archive.org/web/20170120172144/https://carnegie-mec.org/diwan/54017?lang=en ↩

  109. Bunzel, Cole (5 October 2013). "al-Baghdadi Triumphant". Jihadica. Archived from the original on 9 November 2013. https://web.archive.org/web/20131109154128/https://www.jihadica.com/the-islamic-state-of-disobedience-al-baghdadis-defiance/ ↩

  110. Caillet, Romain (27 December 2013). "The Islamic State: Leaving al-Qaeda Behind". Carnegie Middle East Center. Archived from the original on 20 January 2017. https://web.archive.org/web/20170120172144/https://carnegie-mec.org/diwan/54017?lang=en ↩

  111. Bunzel, Cole (5 October 2013). "al-Baghdadi Triumphant". Jihadica. Archived from the original on 9 November 2013. https://web.archive.org/web/20131109154128/https://www.jihadica.com/the-islamic-state-of-disobedience-al-baghdadis-defiance/ ↩

  112. Burns, John; Rubin, Alissa (11 June 2007). "US Arming Sunnis in Iraq to Battle Old Qaeda Allies". The New York Times. Retrieved 17 December 2014. https://www.nytimes.com/2007/06/11/world/middleeast/11iraq.html?_r=1&n=Top%2fReference%2fTimes%20Topics%2fOrganizations%2fA%2fAl%20Qaeda%20in%20Mesopotamia&oref=slogin&pagewanted=all ↩

  113. MacAskill, Ewen (12 June 2007). "US arms Sunni dissidents in risky bid to contain al-Qaida fighters in Iraq". The Guardian. London. Retrieved 20 December 2014. https://www.theguardian.com/Iraq/Story/0,,2100698,00.html?gusrc=rss&feed=12 ↩

  114. MacAskill, Ewen (12 June 2007). "US arms Sunni dissidents in risky bid to contain al-Qaida fighters in Iraq". The Guardian. London. Retrieved 20 December 2014. https://www.theguardian.com/Iraq/Story/0,,2100698,00.html?gusrc=rss&feed=12 ↩

  115. Rubin, Alissa J.; Damien Cave (23 December 2007). "In a Force for Iraqi Calm, Seeds of Conflict". The New York Times. Retrieved 20 December 2014. /wiki/Alissa_J._Rubin ↩

  116. Rubin, Alissa J.; Damien Cave (23 December 2007). "In a Force for Iraqi Calm, Seeds of Conflict". The New York Times. Retrieved 20 December 2014. /wiki/Alissa_J._Rubin ↩

  117. Dafna Linzer; Thomas E. Ricks (28 November 2006). "Anbar Picture Grows Clearer, and Bleaker". The Washington Post Retrieved 15 January 2015. Archived from the original on 29 November 2006. https://web.archive.org/web/20061129023220/https://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2006/11/27/AR2006112701287.html ↩

  118. President George W. Bush (10 January 2007). "President's Address to the Nation". Office of the Press Secretary. Retrieved on 28 January 2015. https://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2007/01/20070110-7.html ↩

  119. Hurst, Steven R. (1 June 2007). "US battles al-Qaida gunmen in west Baghdad after Sunnis revolt against terror group". Associated Press. Archived from the original on 23 January 2015. Retrieved 19 December 2014. https://web.archive.org/web/20150123050921/http://www.southcoasttoday.com/apps/pbcs.dll/article?AID=%2F20070601%2FNEWS%2F706010381 ↩

  120. "US launches major Iraq offensive". BBC News.19 June 2007. Retrieved 27 June 2007. http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/middle_east/6766217.stm ↩

  121. Al-Mufti, Nermeen (5–11 July 2007). "More death and political intrigue". Al-Ahram Weekly (852). Archived from the original on 28 January 2015. Retrieved 20 January 2015. https://web.archive.org/web/20150128061120/http://weekly.ahram.org.eg/2007/852/re1.htm ↩

  122. Targeting al Qaeda in Iraq's Network, The Weekly Standard, 13 November 2007. Retrieved 13 December 2014. https://archive.today/20130210003451/http://www.weeklystandard.com/weblogs/TWSFP/2007/11/targeting_al_qaeda_in_iraqs_ne.asp ↩

  123. Ricks, Thomas; DeYoung, Karen (15 October 2007). "Al-Qaeda in Iraq Reported Crippled". The Washington Post. Retrieved 16 December 2014. https://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2007/10/14/AR2007101401245.html ↩

  124. Samuels, Lennox (20 May 2008). "Al Qaeda in Iraq Ramps Up Its Racketeering". Newsweek. Retrieved 16 December 2014.(subscription required) Accessible via Google. http://www.newsweek.com/id/138085 ↩

  125. Londoño, Ernesto (22 November 2009). "Resurgent Al-Qaeda in Iraq seeks to undermine government (page 2)". The Washington Post. Retrieved 22 December 2014. https://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2009/11/21/AR2009112102009_2.html ↩

  126. Peter, Tom (13 January 2009). "As US withdraws, will Al Qaeda in Iraq find new openings?". The Christian Science Monitor. Retrieved 22 December 2014. http://www.csmonitor.com/2009/0113/p01s01-wome.html ↩

  127. Londoño, Ernesto (22 November 2009). "Resurgent Al-Qaeda in Iraq seeks to undermine government (page 2)". The Washington Post. Retrieved 22 December 2014. https://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2009/11/21/AR2009112102009_2.html ↩

  128. LondoñO, Ernesto; Alwan, Aziz (24 April 2009). "Suicide Bombers Kill More Than 70 in Baghdad, Diyala Province". The Washington Post. Retrieved 21 December 2014. https://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2009/04/23/AR2009042300710.html?nav=rss_nation/special ↩

  129. Sly, Liz; Redha, Usama (24 April 2009). "Iraq suicide bombings kill 79". Los Angeles Times. Retrieved 21 December 2014. http://www.latimes.com/wireless/avantgo/la-fg-iraq-bombings24-2009apr24,0,7590811.story ↩

  130. Arraf, Jane (13 May 2009). "Spike in suicide attacks: Is Al Qaeda in Iraq coming back?". The Christian Science Monitor. Retrieved 21 December 2014. http://www.csmonitor.com/2009/0513/p06s01-wome.html ↩

  131. "Suicide truck bomber kills dozens in northern Iraq". Reuters. 21 June 2009. Archived from the original on 22 June 2009. Retrieved 21 December 2014. https://www.reuters.com/article/worldNews/idUSTRE55J1GL20090621 ↩

  132. Londoño, Ernesto (27 October 2009). "Extremist group claims responsibility for Baghdad bombs". Washington Post. Retrieved 22 December 2014. https://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2009/10/27/AR2009102700496.html?hpid=moreheadlines ↩

  133. "Baghdad bomb fatalities pass 150". BBC News. 26 October 2009. Retrieved 26 October 2009. http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/middle_east/8325600.stm ↩

  134. Londoño, Ernesto (27 October 2009). "Extremist group claims responsibility for Baghdad bombs". Washington Post. Retrieved 22 December 2014. https://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2009/10/27/AR2009102700496.html?hpid=moreheadlines ↩

  135. Londoño, Ernesto (22 November 2009). "Resurgent Al-Qaeda in Iraq seeks to undermine government (page 2)". The Washington Post. Retrieved 22 December 2014. https://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2009/11/21/AR2009112102009_2.html ↩

  136. Christie, Michael (18 November 2009). "Al Qaeda in Iraq becoming less foreign-US general". Reuters. Retrieved 23 December 2014. https://www.reuters.com/article/idUSLI176502 ↩

  137. "Al-Qaeda group claims Iraq attack". BBC News. 10 December 2009. Retrieved 22 January 2015. http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/middle_east/8405235.stm ↩

  138. Arango, Tim (19 April 2010). "Top Qaeda Leaders in Iraq Reported Killed in Raid". The New York Times. Retrieved 23 December 2014. https://www.nytimes.com/2010/04/20/world/middleeast/20baghdad.html ↩

  139. Shadid, Anthony (16 May 2010). "Iraqi Insurgent Group Names New Leaders". The New York Times. Retrieved 23 December 2014. https://atwar.blogs.nytimes.com/2010/05/16/iraqi-insurgent-group-names-new-leaders/?_php=true&_type=blogs&_r=0 ↩

  140. "US Actions in Iraq Fueled Rise of a Rebel". The New York Times. 10 August 2014. Retrieved 23 December 2014. https://www.nytimes.com/2014/08/11/world/middleeast/us-actions-in-iraq-fueled-rise-of-a-rebel.html ↩

  141. "Military skill and terrorist technique fuel success of ISIS". The New York Times. 27 August 2014. Retrieved 23 October 2014. https://www.nytimes.com/2014/08/28/world/middleeast/army-know-how-seen-as-factor-in-isis-successes.html ↩

  142. "Military skill and terrorist technique fuel success of ISIS". The New York Times. 27 August 2014. Retrieved 23 October 2014. https://www.nytimes.com/2014/08/28/world/middleeast/army-know-how-seen-as-factor-in-isis-successes.html ↩

  143. "US Actions in Iraq Fueled Rise of a Rebel". The New York Times. 10 August 2014. Retrieved 23 December 2014. https://www.nytimes.com/2014/08/11/world/middleeast/us-actions-in-iraq-fueled-rise-of-a-rebel.html ↩

  144. "Qaeda in Iraq claims deadly central bank raid". Agence France-Presse. 17 June 2010. Archived from the original on 3 March 2014. Retrieved 22 January 2015. https://web.archive.org/web/20140303160029/https://www.google.com/hostednews/afp/article/ALeqM5j-wNJQZfVsRyyJPKTaoftEXaCmNg ↩

  145. "Al-Qaeda 'claims' Baghdad attack". Al-Jazeera. 20 August 2010. Retrieved 22 January 2015. http://www.aljazeera.com/news/middleeast/2010/08/20108204250505178.html ↩

  146. Arraf, Jane (13 May 2009). "Spike in suicide attacks: Is Al Qaeda in Iraq coming back?". The Christian Science Monitor. Retrieved 21 December 2014. http://www.csmonitor.com/2009/0513/p06s01-wome.html ↩

  147. Arango, Tim (19 April 2010). "Top Qaeda Leaders in Iraq Reported Killed in Raid". The New York Times. Retrieved 23 December 2014. https://www.nytimes.com/2010/04/20/world/middleeast/20baghdad.html ↩

  148. Shanker, Thom (4 June 2010). "Qaeda Leaders in Iraq Neutralized, US Says". The New York Times. Retrieved 10 January 2015. https://www.nytimes.com/2010/06/05/world/middleeast/05military.html ↩

  149. "US says 80% of al-Qaeda leaders in Iraq removed". BBC News. 4 June 2010. http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/world/middle_east/10243585.stm ↩

  150. "Attacks in Iraq down, Al-Qaeda arrests up: US general". Agence France-Presse. 4 June 2010. Archived from the original on 25 February 2014. https://web.archive.org/web/20140225073345/https://www.google.com/hostednews/afp/article/ALeqM5iliKXlauRMdj1Uijz1Zv-WkJ7RUQ ↩

  151. "Al-Qaeda leader attempts Baghdad jailbreak leaving 18 dead". The Telegraph. London. 8 May 2011. Archived from the original on 12 January 2022. Retrieved 11 January 2015. https://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/al-qaeda/8501190/Al-Qaeda-leader-attempts-Baghdad-jailbreak-leaving-18-dead.html ↩

  152. Mohammed, Muhanad (8 May 2011). "Al Qaeda leader and 17 others killed in Iraq jail clash". Reuters. Archived from the original on 4 July 2013. Retrieved 10 May 2011. https://web.archive.org/web/20130704153902/http://uk.reuters.com/article/2011/05/08/uk-iraq-violence-jail-idUKTRE7470HB20110508 ↩

  153. "Foreign Terrorist Organizations". Country Reports on Terrorism 2011. United States Department of State. 31 July 2012. Retrieved 15 December 2014. https://2009-2017.state.gov/j/ct/rls/crt/2011/195553.htm ↩

  154. "Al-Qaida: We're returning to old Iraq strongholds". Associated Press. 22 July 2012. Retrieved 12 January 2015. https://news.yahoo.com/al-qaida-were-returning-old-iraq-strongholds-131645698.html ↩

  155. Nordland, Rod (24 July 2012). "Al Qaeda Taking Deadly New Role in Syria Conflict". The New York Times. Retrieved 26 January 2015. https://www.nytimes.com/2012/07/25/world/middleeast/al-qaeda-insinuating-its-way-into-syrias-conflict.html?pagewanted=all ↩

  156. Report on Human Rights in Iraq: July - December 2012 (PDF). Baghdad: UNAMI Human Rights Office. 2013. pp. https://www.ohchr.org/Documents/Countries/IQ/HRO_July-December2012Report.pdf. https://www.ohchr.org/Documents/Countries/IQ/HRO_July-December2012Report.pdf ↩

  157. "Al Qaeda in Iraq Resurgent" (PDF). Institute for the Study of War. September 2013. Retrieved 22 August 2014. http://www.understandingwar.org/sites/default/files/AQI-Resurgent-10Sept_0.pdf ↩

  158. "Al Qaeda says it freed 500 inmates in Iraq jail-break". Reuters. 23 July 2013. Retrieved 14 January 2015. https://www.reuters.com/article/us-iraq-violence-alqaeda-idUSBRE96M0C720130723 ↩

  159. Abouzeid, Rania (23 June 2014). "The Jihad Next Door". Politico. Archived from the original on 22 August 2014. Retrieved 13 January 2015. https://archive.today/20140822121029/http://www.politico.com/magazine/story/2014/06/al-qaeda-iraq-syria-108214_full.html ↩

  160. "Jabhat al-Nusra A Strategic Briefing" (PDF). Quilliam Foundation. 8 January 2013. Archived from the original (PDF) on 15 January 2013. Retrieved 22 August 2014. https://web.archive.org/web/20130115170122/http://www.quilliamfoundation.org/wp/wp-content/uploads/publications/free/jabhat-al-nusra-a-strategic-briefing.pdf ↩

  161. "Al-Qaida: We're returning to old Iraq strongholds". Associated Press. 22 July 2012. Retrieved 12 January 2015. https://news.yahoo.com/al-qaida-were-returning-old-iraq-strongholds-131645698.html ↩

  162. Abouzeid, Rania (23 June 2014). "The Jihad Next Door". Politico. Archived from the original on 22 August 2014. Retrieved 13 January 2015. https://archive.today/20140822121029/http://www.politico.com/magazine/story/2014/06/al-qaeda-iraq-syria-108214_full.html ↩

  163. Abouzeid, Rania (23 June 2014). "The Jihad Next Door". Politico. Archived from the original on 22 August 2014. Retrieved 13 January 2015. https://archive.today/20140822121029/http://www.politico.com/magazine/story/2014/06/al-qaeda-iraq-syria-108214_full.html ↩

  164. "ISI Confirms That Jabhat Al-Nusra Is Its Extension In Syria, Declares 'Islamic State Of Iraq And Al-Sham' As New Name of Merged Group". MEMRI. 8 April 2013. Archived from the original on 6 October 2014. Retrieved 10 April 2013. https://web.archive.org/web/20141006085808/http://www.memri.org/report/en/0/0/0/0/0/0/7119.htm ↩

  165. "Key Free Syria Army rebel 'killed by Islamist group'". BBC News. 12 July 2013. https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-23283079 ↩

  166. "Al-Qaeda in Iraq confirms Syria's Nusra Front is part of its network". Al Arabiya. 9 April 2013. Retrieved 15 June 2014. http://english.alarabiya.net/en/News/middle-east/2013/04/09/Al-Qaeda-in-Iraq-confirms-Syria-s-Nusra-Front-is-part-of-its-network.html ↩

  167. Abouzeid, Rania (23 June 2014). "The Jihad Next Door". Politico. Archived from the original on 22 August 2014. Retrieved 13 January 2015. https://archive.today/20140822121029/http://www.politico.com/magazine/story/2014/06/al-qaeda-iraq-syria-108214_full.html ↩

  168. "Al Qaeda in Iraq calls Egypt protesters to wage jihad". Dawn. Agence France-Presse. 9 February 2011. Retrieved 23 January 2015. http://www.dawn.com/news/604942/al-qaeda-in-iraq-calls-egypt-protesters-to-wage-jihad ↩

  169. "Terrorist Designation of Ibrahim Awwad Ibrahim Ali al-Badri". United States Department of State. 4 October 2011. Retrieved 24 January 2015. https://2009-2017.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2011/10/174971.htm ↩

  170. Vohra, Anchal (2 March 2021). "'Constant fear': Iraq and Syria face ISIL resurgence". Al Jazeera News. Retrieved 15 May 2023. https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2021/3/2/we-liv-in-constant-fear-iraq-and-syria-face-isil-resurgence ↩

  171. Garofalo, Daniele (22 April 2022). "Islamic State Strategies and Propaganda in Iraq Raise Prospects for Resurgence". Terrorism Monitor. 20 (8). Jamestown Foundation. Retrieved 15 May 2023. https://jamestown.org/program/islamic-state-strategies-and-propaganda-in-iraq-raise-prospects-for-resurgence/ ↩

  172. Atassi, Basma (9 June 2013). "Qaeda chief annuls Syrian-Iraqi jihad merger". Al Jazeera. Archived from the original on 21 December 2020. https://web.archive.org/web/20201221100148/https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2013/6/9/qaeda-chief-annuls-syrian-iraqi-jihad-merger ↩

  173. Lund, Aron (3 February 2014). "A Public Service Announcement From Al-Qaeda". Carnegie Middle East Center. Archived from the original on 29 July 2017. https://web.archive.org/web/20170729032303/https://carnegie-mec.org/diwan/54411 ↩

  174. Bunzel, Cole (5 October 2013). "al-Baghdadi Triumphant". Jihadica. Archived from the original on 9 November 2013. https://web.archive.org/web/20131109154128/https://www.jihadica.com/the-islamic-state-of-disobedience-al-baghdadis-defiance/ ↩

  175. Perkoski, Evan (2022). "5: Al-Qaeda and the Islamic State". Divided, Not Conquered: How Rebels Fracture and Splinters Behave. New York: Oxford University Press. pp. 168, 169. ISBN 9780197627075. 9780197627075 ↩

  176. Atassi, Basma (9 June 2013). "Qaeda chief annuls Syrian-Iraqi jihad merger". Al Jazeera. Archived from the original on 21 December 2020. https://web.archive.org/web/20201221100148/https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2013/6/9/qaeda-chief-annuls-syrian-iraqi-jihad-merger ↩

  177. Perkoski, Evan (2022). "5: Al-Qaeda and the Islamic State". Divided, Not Conquered: How Rebels Fracture and Splinters Behave. New York: Oxford University Press. pp. 168, 169. ISBN 9780197627075. 9780197627075 ↩

  178. Lund, Aron (3 February 2014). "A Public Service Announcement From Al-Qaeda". Carnegie Middle East Center. Archived from the original on 29 July 2017. https://web.archive.org/web/20170729032303/https://carnegie-mec.org/diwan/54411 ↩

  179. Perkoski, Evan (2022). "5: Al-Qaeda and the Islamic State". Divided, Not Conquered: How Rebels Fracture and Splinters Behave. New York: Oxford University Press. p. 169. ISBN 9780197627075. 9780197627075 ↩

  180. Atassi, Basma (9 June 2013). "Qaeda chief annuls Syrian-Iraqi jihad merger". Al Jazeera. Archived from the original on 21 December 2020. https://web.archive.org/web/20201221100148/https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2013/6/9/qaeda-chief-annuls-syrian-iraqi-jihad-merger ↩

  181. Bunzel, Cole (5 October 2013). "al-Baghdadi Triumphant". Jihadica. Archived from the original on 9 November 2013. https://web.archive.org/web/20131109154128/https://www.jihadica.com/the-islamic-state-of-disobedience-al-baghdadis-defiance/ ↩

  182. "Jihadists advance on Syria's Raqqa". NOW. 10 January 2014. Archived from the original on 10 January 2014. Retrieved 10 January 2014. https://web.archive.org/web/20140110195616/https://now.mmedia.me/lb/en/nowsyrialatestnews/529580-jihadists-advance-on-syrias-raqqa ↩

  183. Yacoub Oweis, Khaled (13 January 2014). "Group linked to al-Qaeda regains ground in northeast Syria". Reuters. Archived from the original on 3 February 2016. https://web.archive.org/web/20160203171048/https://www.reuters.com/article/us-syria-crisis-qaeda-idUSBREA0B0JD20140112 ↩

  184. Nicholas Redman; Nigel Inkster (2015). The IISS Armed Conflict Survey 2015. Abingdon, UK: Routledge. ISBN 9781857437799. OCLC 911264045. 9781857437799 ↩

  185. "Al-Qaeda fighters kill Syrian rebel leaders". Al Jazeera. 2 February 2014. Archived from the original on 22 December 2020. The Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant, ... said it carried out the attack on Tawhid, a brigade aligned to the Islamic Front coalition, a group fighting the ISIL in Aleppo and beyond. ... The attack also killed members of Jabhat al-Nusra, al-Qaeda's official affiliate in Syria. The observatory said the Nusra fighters were in their headquarters when it was hit. https://web.archive.org/web/20201222050443/https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2014/2/2/al-qaeda-fighters-kill-syrian-rebel-leaders ↩

  186. Perkoski, Evan (2022). "5: Al-Qaeda and the Islamic State". Divided, Not Conquered: How Rebels Fracture and Splinters Behave. New York: Oxford University Press. p. 158. ISBN 9780197627075. 9780197627075 ↩

  187. Lund, Aron (3 February 2014). "A Public Service Announcement From Al-Qaeda". Carnegie Middle East Center. Archived from the original on 29 July 2017. https://web.archive.org/web/20170729032303/https://carnegie-mec.org/diwan/54411 ↩

  188. "ISIS seizes town from Nusra in Hassakeh province". The Daily Star Newspaper - Lebanon. Archived from the original on 28 February 2019. Retrieved 25 October 2014. https://web.archive.org/web/20190228192328/http://www.dailystar.com.lb/News/Middle-East/2014/Mar-31/251760-isis-seizes-town-from-nusra-in-hassakeh-province.ashx#axzz2xZm0xbf9 ↩

  189. Shankar, C. P. (2023). ISIS. Neha Publishers & Distributors. pp. 204, 205. https://books.google.com/books?id=iL_lEAAAQBAJ&dq=ISIS+Markadah&pg=PA204 ↩

  190. Nicholas Redman; Nigel Inkster (2015). The IISS Armed Conflict Survey 2015. Abingdon, UK: Routledge. ISBN 9781857437799. OCLC 911264045. 9781857437799 ↩

  191. Nicholas Redman; Nigel Inkster (2015). The IISS Armed Conflict Survey 2015. Abingdon, UK: Routledge. ISBN 9781857437799. OCLC 911264045. 9781857437799 ↩

  192. Shankar, C. P. (2023). ISIS. Neha Publishers & Distributors. pp. 205, 206. https://books.google.com/books?id=iL_lEAAAQBAJ&dq=ISIS+Markadah&pg=PA205 ↩

  193. "ISIS reportedly kills Al Nusrah Front's commander for Idlib province". The Long War Journal. 16 April 2014. Archived from the original on 13 July 2015. https://web.archive.org/web/20150713013658/https://www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2014/04/isis_reportedly_killed_al_nusr.php ↩

  194. "Islamic State expels rivals from Syria's Deir al-Zor - activists". Reuters. 14 July 2014. Archived from the original on 24 July 2014. https://web.archive.org/web/20140724143821/http://af.reuters.com/article/worldNews/idAFKBN0FJ1I020140714 ↩

  195. "Sunni militants 'seize Iraq's western border crossings'". BBC News. 23 June 2014. Archived from the original on 25 June 2014. https://web.archive.org/web/20140625082334/https://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-27966774 ↩

  196. "Sunni rebels declare new 'Islamic caliphate'". Al Jazeera. 30 June 2014. Archived from the original on 14 December 2020. https://web.archive.org/web/20201214084046/https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2014/6/30/sunni-rebels-declare-new-islamic-caliphate ↩

  197. "Sunni rebels declare new 'Islamic caliphate'". Al Jazeera. 30 June 2014. Archived from the original on 14 December 2020. https://web.archive.org/web/20201214084046/https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2014/6/30/sunni-rebels-declare-new-islamic-caliphate ↩

  198. "IS document - [translated]". 29 July 2014. https://archive.org/details/poa_25984 ↩

  199. "Sunni rebels declare new 'Islamic caliphate'". Al Jazeera. 30 June 2014. Archived from the original on 14 December 2020. https://web.archive.org/web/20201214084046/https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2014/6/30/sunni-rebels-declare-new-islamic-caliphate ↩

  200. "IS document- [translated]". 29 July 2014. https://archive.org/details/poa_25984 ↩

  201. "بعد معارك عنيفة مع الثوار.. داعش يحرز تقدماً بريف حلب الشمالي" [After violent battles with the rebels, ISIS is making progress in the northern countryside of Aleppo]. Al Aan TV. 2 July 2014. http://www.akhbaralaan.net/news/arab-world/2014/7/1/after-fierce-battles-rebels-isis-progressing-countryside-north-aleppo ↩

  202. Perkoski, Evan (2022). "5: Al-Qaeda and the Islamic State". Divided, Not Conquered: How Rebels Fracture and Splinters Behave. New York: Oxford University Press. p. 171. ISBN 9780197627075. 9780197627075 ↩

  203. Perkoski, Evan (2022). "5: Al-Qaeda and the Islamic State". Divided, Not Conquered: How Rebels Fracture and Splinters Behave. New York: Oxford University Press. p. 171. ISBN 9780197627075. 9780197627075 ↩

  204. Christoph Reuter (18 April 2015). "The Terror Strategist: Secret Files Reveal the Structure of Islamic State". Der Spiegel. Retrieved 18 April 2015. http://www.spiegel.de/international/world/islamic-state-files-show-structure-of-islamist-terror-group-a-1029274.html ↩

  205. "Military skill and terrorist technique fuel success of ISIS". The New York Times. 27 August 2014. Retrieved 23 October 2014. https://www.nytimes.com/2014/08/28/world/middleeast/army-know-how-seen-as-factor-in-isis-successes.html ↩

  206. "Military Skill and Terrorist Technique Fuel Success of ISIS". New York Times. 27 August 2014. Retrieved 21 October 2014. https://www.nytimes.com/2014/08/28/world/middleeast/army-know-how-seen-as-factor-in-isis-successes.html ↩

  207. Chulov, Martin (15 June 2014). "How an arrest in Iraq revealed Isis's $2bn jihadist network". The Guardian. Retrieved 22 October 2014. https://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/jun/15/iraq-isis-arrest-jihadists-wealth-power ↩

  208. "Revealed: the Islamic State 'cabinet', from finance minister to suicide bomb deployer". The Telegraph. 9 July 2014. Archived from the original on 12 January 2022. Retrieved 21 October 2014. https://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/middleeast/iraq/10956193/Revealed-the-Islamic-State-cabinet-from-finance-minister-to-suicide-bomb-deployer.html ↩

  209. "Military Skill and Terrorist Technique Fuel Success of ISIS". New York Times. 27 August 2014. Retrieved 21 October 2014. https://www.nytimes.com/2014/08/28/world/middleeast/army-know-how-seen-as-factor-in-isis-successes.html ↩

  210. Erin Cunningham (9 November 2014). "Fate of Islamic State chief unclear following U.S. airstrikes on group's leadership in Iraq". Washington Post. https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/fate-of-islamic-state-chief-unclear-following-us-strikes-on-groups-leadership-in-iraq/2014/11/09/b5f6d262-8f61-4e1e-8703-2462eed53750_story.html ↩

  211. Qassim Abdul-Zahra (9 November 2014). "Islamic State leader al-Baghdadi wounded by airstrike, Iraqi officials say". thestar.com. https://www.thestar.com/news/world/2014/11/09/islamic_state_leader_albaghdadi_wounded_by_airstrike_iraqi_officials_say.html ↩

  212. "Everything We Knew About This ISIS Mastermind Was Wrong". The Daily Beast. 15 April 2016. Retrieved 10 May 2016. al-Qaduli handled the intelligence services, or amniyat, in the country, and then in both Syria and Iraq after the killing of Abu Muhannad al-Sweidawi, a former Saddamist http://www.thedailybeast.com/articles/2016/04/15/everything-we-knew-about-this-isis-mastermind-was-wrong.html ↩

  213. Schmidt, Michael S.; Mazzetti, Mark (25 March 2016). "A Top ISIS Leader Is Killed in an Airstrike, Pentagon Says – New York Times Online". Times Online. Retrieved 25 March 2016. https://www.nytimes.com/2016/03/26/world/middleeast/abd-al-rahman-mustafa-al-qaduli-isis-reported-killed-in-syria.html ↩

  214. Al-Tamimi, Aymenn (24 January 2016). "An Account of Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi & Islamic State Succession Lines". pundicity. http://www.aymennjawad.org/2016/01/an-account-of-abu-bakr-al-baghdadi-islamic-state ↩

  215. "Brutal Efficiency: The Secret to Islamic State's Success". Wall Street Journal. 3 September 2014. Retrieved 1 October 2014. https://www.wsj.com/articles/the-secret-to-the-success-of-islamic-state-1409709762 ↩