The Amman Message was delivered in Amman, Jordan, as a Ramadan sermon by Chief Justice Sheikh Izz-Eddine Al-Tamimi in the presence of King Abdullah II and a number of Muslim scholars.3 In a subsequent speech, King Abdullah invited 24 senior scholars from all legal schools to debate the following questions:
The next year, in July 2005, an Islamic convention brought together 200 Muslim scholars from over 50 countries who issued a three-point declaration, later known as the "Three Points of the Amman Message".5 This declaration focused on:6
The declaration was created in the midst of global tensions relating to the War on Terror following the September 11 attacks, and in the wake of the Iraq War. Where the message is primarily constructed as an internal dialogue between Muslim scholars, it clearly addresses Western powers. Explaining why the message was issued, King Abdullah stated: "[We] felt that the Islamic message of tolerance was being subjected to a fierce and unjust attack from some in the West who do not understand Islam's essence, and others who claim to be associated with Islam and hide behind Islam to commit irresponsible deeds."10
The following are conferences and declarations related to the message:11
The following is a list of some of the individuals and organisations who have issued fatwas and endorsements in relation to the Amman Message:12
According to a 2005 report issued by the International Crisis Group concerning the rise of Jihadi Islamism in the Middle East, the sermon "stressed the need to re-emphasise Islam's core values of compassion, mutual respect, tolerance, acceptance and freedom of religion."13 Generally the Amman Message has been welcomed by Western leaders as a significant effort towards inter-religious dialogue in an epoch of particular global politico-religious complexity. It has been hailed as "one of the most important initiatives addressing the Christian West within the framework of civilisations"[1] during a period many worried would lead to a clash of civilisations, and has come to be seen as an international reference document.1415
Tony Blair, while Prime Minister of the United Kingdom, praised the Amman Message and the gathering of numerous Islamic scholars, commenting: "this was a clear message that Islam is not a monolithic faith, but one made up of a rich pattern of diversity, albeit all flowing from the same fount."16
To address the Western world has been identified as an important aim of the Amman message, and herewith to serve the more strategic political goals of the Jordanian government and its regional partners. Several scholars have interpreted the declaration as an assertion from the Jordanian government to reassure its international allies of its own moderate stance and to create a position of religious authority within a crowded international arena.171819
Whereas the declaration is promoted as a "unanimous agreement by all Muslims everywhere,"20 observers have questioned the communicative process leading up to the agreement and its clarity of definitions, and have expressed concern over its tendency to create potential additional binary oppositions.2122 One scholar has pointed out that in spite of advancing "a more inclusive notion of an Islamic community, one also clarifies exclusion by erecting a boundary outside of which other groups will fall," adding that consensus was reached through "tactical silences over and evasions of contentious issues."23 A lack of explicit reference to – or signatories from – specific communities is mentioned, such as the Alawi, and an omission of certain branches of other communities, such as the Isma'ili.24 It has been observed that most scholars involved in the debate were those close to the Jordanian state.
The International Crisis Group report expressed the importance of the Amman Message within a context of increasing regional sectarian polarisation in the Middle East. However, it also mentions the likely limited impact of the message, which it assigns to its contents targeting mainly elites while lacking popular legitimacy.25
Further criticism has been expressed over the (lack of) actions or policies following the Amman declaration. Local Jordanian leaders have pointed to the limited impact of the Amman Message inside Jordan, manifested through the lack of engagement with the message by Jordanian municipalities, mosques and religious organisations.26
Suhail Nakhouda, editor-in-chief of the Amman-based magazine Islamica, stated that the Amman Message did little to effectively address ongoing problems within the country of Jordan: "The problem with the Amman Message is that it bears no relation to the situation on the ground. There is no water, no pavements; the economy is bad, and many young people are out of work. Peoples' lives, as well as the images they see, stay the same."27 While some point to the religious legitimacy of the Hashemite royal family for its descent from the Islamic Prophet Muhammad,28 Nakhouda states that King Abdullah's message is likely to be dampened by his lifestyle, which he claims is the subject of criticism.29
Despite the ecumenical nature of the Amman Message, a marked decline in Shia-Sunni relations as a result of increased sectarian conflict in such countries as Iraq, Syria, Lebanon, Bahrain and Yemen has taken shape since the message was issued including armed conflict.30 For some scholars, this has made declarations as the Amman Message all the more important.31 Others have problematised what has been referred to as a declaration proliferation taking place post-9/11.32
"Amman Message – The Official Site". Retrieved 15 May 2023. https://ammanmessage.com/ ↩
"Speech by the Prime Minister the Rt Hon Tony Blair MP Archived 2007-09-27 at the Wayback Machine" (04/06/07), British Embassy in Bahrain http://www.britishembassy.gov.uk/servlet/Front?pagename=OpenMarket/Xcelerate/ShowPage&c=Page&cid=1017170872825&a=KArticle&aid=1181127466528 ↩
"Jordan issues the 'Amman Message' on Islam". Embassy of Jordan - Washington, DC. Archived from the original on 16 August 2007. Retrieved 15 August 2007. https://web.archive.org/web/20070816204118/http://www.jordanembassyus.org/new/pr/pr11092004.shtml ↩
The Amman Message summary - Official website http://ammanmessage.com/ ↩
The Three Points of The Amman Message V.1 Archived February 2, 2013, at the Wayback Machine http://ammanmessage.com/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=91&Itemid=74 ↩
Petra News Agency. Summary of the Amman Message (In Arabic) Archived 2016-04-09 at the Wayback Machine http://www.petra.gov.jo/Public/Arabic.aspx?Site_ID=2&Page_ID=5407&Lang=1 ↩
"King Abdullah calls to end extremism". The Jerusalem Post. Retrieved 15 August 2007. http://fr.jpost.com/servlet/Satellite?cid=1150885839539&pagename=JPost/JPArticle/ShowFull ↩
"Jordan's 9/11: Dealing With Jihadi Islamism", Crisis Group Middle East Report N°47, 23 November 2005 http://www.crisisgroup.org/en/regions/middle-east-north-africa/iraq-iran-gulf/jordan/047-jordans-9-11-dealing-with-jihadi-islamism.aspx ↩
Bonney, Richard (2008). False Prophets: the 'clash of civilisations' and the global war on terror. Oxford: Peter Lang. ISBN 9781906165024. 9781906165024 ↩
Browers, Michaelle (2011). "Official Islam and the Limits of Communicative Action: the paradox of the Amman Message". Third World Quarterly. 32 (5): 943–958. doi:10.1080/01436597.2011.578969. ISSN 0143-6597. JSTOR 41300408. S2CID 143679211. https://www.jstor.org/stable/41300408 ↩
Affairs, Berkley Center for Religion, Peace and World. ""Made" in Jordan: Assessing the Legacy of the Amman Message". berkleycenter.georgetown.edu. Retrieved 15 May 2023.{{cite web}}: CS1 maint: multiple names: authors list (link) https://berkleycenter.georgetown.edu/posts/made-in-jordan-assessing-the-legacy-of-the-amman-message ↩
Gutkowski, Stacey (June 2016). "We are the very model of a moderate Muslim state: The Amman Messages and Jordan's foreign policy". International Relations. 30 (2): 206–226. doi:10.1177/0047117815598352. ISSN 0047-1178. S2CID 143376544. http://journals.sagepub.com/doi/10.1177/0047117815598352 ↩
Ikehata, Fukiko (1 January 2017). "Aspiring to be a Leader of Moderation: A Study on Jordan's Islamic Policy IKEHATA Fukiko". Kyoto Bulletin of Islamic Area Studies, 10. https://www.academia.edu/47746102 ↩
"HM King Abdullah II – Amman Message". Retrieved 15 May 2023. https://ammanmessage.com/foreword/ ↩
Sheline, Annelle R. (24 April 2020). "Shifting Reputations for "Moderation": Evidence from Qatar, Jordan, and Morocco". Middle East Law and Governance. 12 (1): 109–129. doi:10.1163/18763375-01201002. ISSN 1876-3367. S2CID 219001477. https://brill.com/view/journals/melg/12/1/article-p109_109.xml ↩
Shalabi, Jamal Al (1 January 2011). "The Amman Message: Arab Diplomacy in the Dialogue of Civilizations". Journal of US-China Public Administration. https://www.academia.edu/81030315 ↩
Volpi, Frederic (2012). Political Civility in the Middle East (1st ed.). New York: Routledge. ISBN 9781138209367. 9781138209367 ↩
Kearney, Jonathan (2018), Demiri, Lejla; Said, Yazid (eds.), "From Intra-Religious to Interreligious Dialogue: The Amman Message as a Precursor and Companion to the A Common Word Initiative", The Future of Interfaith Dialogue: Muslim-Christian Encounters through A Common Word, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. 31–47, ISBN 978-1-107-13434-8, retrieved 15 May 2023 978-1-107-13434-8 ↩
Affairs, Berkley Center for Religion, Peace and World. "Declaration Proliferation: The International Politics of Religious Tolerance". berkleycenter.georgetown.edu. Retrieved 15 May 2023.{{cite web}}: CS1 maint: multiple names: authors list (link) https://berkleycenter.georgetown.edu/posts/declaration-proliferation-the-international-politics-of-religious-tolerance ↩