Epistemology

<h2 id="definition">Definition</h2>
Epistemology is the philosophical study of <a href="/facts/Knowledge/joozoaup">knowledge</a> and related concepts, such as <a href="/facts/Justification_(epistemology)/CxWaj0pY">justification</a>. Also called theory of knowledge,<a class="footnote-ref" id="fnref:1" href="#fn:1">1</a> it examines <a href="/facts/Definitions_of_knowledge/hytLblxN">the nature</a> and types of knowledge. It further investigates the sources of knowledge, like <a href="/facts/Perception/xLK0n2q4">perception</a>, <a href="/facts/Inference/RBbe95bP">inference</a>, and <a href="/facts/Testimony/dxgk0txp">testimony</a>, to understand how knowledge is created. Another set of questions concerns the extent and limits of knowledge, addressing what people can and cannot know.<a class="footnote-ref" id="fnref:2" href="#fn:2">2</a> Central concepts in epistemology include <a href="/facts/Belief/HbPvkGT6">belief</a>, <a href="/facts/Truth/NyQmBtUC">truth</a>, <a href="/facts/Evidence/d5IGUK0U">evidence</a>, and <a href="/facts/Reason/tcBImN8J">reason</a>.<a class="footnote-ref" id="fnref:3" href="#fn:3">3</a> As one of the main branches of philosophy, epistemology stands alongside fields like <a href="/facts/Ethics/wNVNgL5q">ethics</a>, <a href="/facts/Logic/8JnpJLtt">logic</a>, and <a href="/facts/Metaphysics/fSFt6SHe">metaphysics</a>.<a class="footnote-ref" id="fnref:4" href="#fn:4">4</a> The term can also refer specific positions of philosophers within this branch, as in <a href="/facts/Plato/sPedMo74">Plato</a>'s epistemology and <a href="/facts/Immanuel_Kant/vIxjdy6I">Immanuel Kant</a>'s epistemology.<a class="footnote-ref" id="fnref:5" href="#fn:5">5</a>
Epistemology explores how people should acquire beliefs. It determines which beliefs or forms of belief acquisition meet the standards or epistemic goals of knowledge and which ones fail, thereby providing an evaluation of beliefs. The fields of <a href="/facts/Psychology/duoqW7Sz">psychology</a> and <a href="/facts/Cognitive_sociology/BaWKK2jy">cognitive sociology</a> are also interested in beliefs and related cognitive processes, but examine them from a different perspective. Unlike epistemology, they study the beliefs people actually have and how people acquire them instead of examining the evaluative norms of these processes.<a class="footnote-ref" id="fnref:6" href="#fn:6">6</a> In this regard, epistemology is a <a href="/facts/Normativity/CgTa03KU">normative</a> discipline,<a class="footnote-ref" id="fnref:7" href="#fn:7">7</a> whereas psychology and cognitive sociology are descriptive disciplines.<a class="footnote-ref" id="fnref:8" href="#fn:8">8</a><a class="footnote-ref" id="fnref:9" href="#fn:9">9</a> Epistemology is relevant to many descriptive and normative disciplines, such as the other branches of philosophy and the sciences, by exploring the principles of how they may arrive at knowledge.<a class="footnote-ref" id="fnref:10" href="#fn:10">10</a>
The word epistemology comes from the <a href="/facts/Ancient_Greek/LIK7NlUh">ancient Greek</a> terms ἐπιστήμη (episteme, meaning knowledge or understanding) and λόγος (logos, meaning study of or reason), <a href="/facts/Literal_translation/0cF1oFRh">literally</a>, the study of knowledge. Despite its ancient roots, the word itself was coined only in the 19th century to designate this field as a distinct branch of philosophy.<a class="footnote-ref" id="fnref:11" href="#fn:11">11</a><a class="footnote-ref" id="fnref:12" href="#fn:12">12</a>

<h2 id="central-concepts">Central concepts</h2>
Epistemologists examine several foundational concepts to understand their essences and rely on them to formulate theories. Various epistemological disagreements have their roots in disputes about the nature and function of these concepts, like the controversies surrounding the definition of knowledge and the role of <a href="/facts/Justification_(epistemology)/CxWaj0pY">justification</a> in it.<a class="footnote-ref" id="fnref:13" href="#fn:13">13</a>

<h3>Knowledge</h3>
Main article: <a href="/facts/Knowledge/joozoaup">Knowledge</a>
Knowledge is an awareness, familiarity, understanding, or skill. Its various forms all involve a cognitive success through which a person establishes epistemic contact with reality.<a class="footnote-ref" id="fnref:14" href="#fn:14">14</a> Epistemologists typically understand knowledge as an aspect of individuals, generally as a cognitive <a href="/facts/Mental_state/sHsDj380">mental state</a> that helps them understand, interpret, and interact with the world. While this core sense is of particular interest to epistemologists, the term also has other meanings. For example, the epistemology of groups examines knowledge as a characteristic of a group of people who share ideas.<a class="footnote-ref" id="fnref:15" href="#fn:15">15</a> The term can also refer to <a href="/facts/Information/3LdrzXtJ">information</a> stored in documents and computers.<a class="footnote-ref" id="fnref:16" href="#fn:16">16</a>
Knowledge contrasts with <a href="/facts/Ignorance/FYCAAA79">ignorance</a>, often simply defined as the absence of knowledge. Knowledge is usually accompanied by ignorance because people rarely have complete knowledge of a field, forcing them to rely on incomplete or uncertain information when making decisions.<a class="footnote-ref" id="fnref:17" href="#fn:17">17</a> Even though many forms of ignorance can be mitigated through education and research, certain limits to human understanding result in inevitable ignorance.<a class="footnote-ref" id="fnref:18" href="#fn:18">18</a> Some limitations are inherent in the human <a href="/facts/Cognition/ga0tSBul">cognitive faculties</a> themselves, such as the inability to know facts too complex for the <a href="/facts/Human_mind/Y5JhtFj4">human mind</a> to conceive.<a class="footnote-ref" id="fnref:19" href="#fn:19">19</a> Others depend on external circumstances when no access to the relevant information exists.<a class="footnote-ref" id="fnref:20" href="#fn:20">20</a>
Epistemologists disagree on how much people know, for example, whether fallible beliefs can amount to knowledge or whether absolute certainty is required. The most stringent position is taken by <a href="/facts/Philosophical_skepticism/xsNp72xg">radical skeptics</a>, who argue that there is no knowledge at all.<a class="footnote-ref" id="fnref:21" href="#fn:21">21</a>

<h4>Types</h4>

Epistemologists distinguish between different types of knowledge.[27] Their primary interest is in knowledge of facts, called <a href="/facts/Propositional_knowledge/JMKfKmu7">propositional knowledge</a>.<a class="footnote-ref" id="fnref:22" href="#fn:22">22</a> It is <a href="/facts/Theory/9vrNS1Rr">theoretical</a> knowledge that can be expressed in <a href="/facts/Sentence_(linguistics)/GhKKkcm2">declarative sentences</a> using a that-clause, like "Ravi knows that kangaroos hop". For this reason, it is also called knowledge-that.[29]<a class="footnote-ref" id="fnref:23" href="#fn:23">23</a> Epistemologists often understand it as a <a href="/facts/Relation_(philosophy)/bCmKhlr1">relation</a> between a knower and a known <a href="/facts/Proposition/0877MFMD">proposition</a>, in the case above between the person Ravi and the proposition "kangaroos hop".[30] It is use-independent since it is not tied to one specific purpose, unlike practical knowledge. It is a mental representation that embodies concepts and ideas to reflect reality.<a class="footnote-ref" id="fnref:24" href="#fn:24">24</a> Because of its theoretical nature, it is typically held that only creatures with highly developed minds, such as humans, possess propositional knowledge.<a class="footnote-ref" id="fnref:25" href="#fn:25">25</a>
Propositional knowledge contrasts with non-propositional knowledge in the form of <a href="/facts/Procedural_knowledge/gYBuANxo">knowledge-how</a> and <a href="/facts/Knowledge_by_acquaintance/mIjvledD">knowledge by acquaintance</a>.[33] Knowledge-how is a practical ability or skill, like knowing how to read or how to prepare <a href="/facts/Lasagna/JC0Qnpbh">lasagna</a>.[34] It is usually tied to a specific goal and not mastered in the abstract without concrete practice.<a class="footnote-ref" id="fnref:26" href="#fn:26">26</a> To know something by acquaintance means to have an immediate familiarity with or awareness of it, usually as a result of direct experiential contact. Examples are "familiarity with the city of <a href="/facts/Perth/63YUr99S">Perth</a>", "knowing the taste of <a href="/facts/Tsampa/nGCGawRR">tsampa</a>", and "knowing <a href="/facts/Marta_Vieira_da_Silva/yI7wqIvv">Marta Vieira da Silva</a> personally".[36]

Another influential distinction in epistemology is between <a href="/facts/A_priori_and_a_posteriori/C567SkcV">a posteriori and a priori</a> knowledge.<a class="footnote-ref" id="fnref:27" href="#fn:27">27</a><a class="footnote-ref" id="fnref:28" href="#fn:28">28</a> A posteriori knowledge is knowledge of <a href="/facts/Empirical/JUaYSGJc">empirical</a> facts based on sensory experience, like "seeing that the sun is shining" and "smelling that a piece of meat has gone bad".[40] This type of knowledge is associated with the empirical science and everyday affairs. A priori knowledge, by contrast, pertains to non-empirical facts and does not depend on evidence from sensory experience, like knowing that 
 
 
 
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. It belongs to fields such as <a href="/facts/Mathematics/pxTouaz4">mathematics</a> and <a href="/facts/Logic/8JnpJLtt">logic</a>.<a class="footnote-ref" id="fnref:29" href="#fn:29">29</a> The distinction between a posteriori and a priori knowledge is central to the debate between <a href="/facts/Empiricism/f68IpCeE">empiricists</a> and <a href="/facts/Rationalism/MNk171TG">rationalists</a> regarding whether all knowledge depends on sensory experience.<a class="footnote-ref" id="fnref:30" href="#fn:30">30</a>
A closely related contrast is between <a href="/facts/Analytic%25E2%2580%2593synthetic_distinction/J1nXtGzd">analytic and synthetic truths</a>. A sentence is analytically true if its truth depends only on the meanings of the words it uses. For instance, the sentence "all bachelors are unmarried" is analytically true because the word "bachelor" already includes the meaning "unmarried". A sentence is synthetically true if its truth depends on additional facts. For example, the sentence "snow is white" is synthetically true because its truth depends on the color of snow in addition to the meanings of the words snow and white. A priori knowledge is primarily associated with analytic sentences, whereas a posteriori knowledge is primarily associated with synthetic sentences. However, it is controversial whether this is true for all cases. Some philosophers, such as <a href="/facts/Willard_Van_Orman_Quine/2RrhATxa">Willard Van Orman Quine</a>, reject the distinction, saying that there are no analytic truths.<a class="footnote-ref" id="fnref:31" href="#fn:31">31</a>

<h4>Analysis</h4>
Main article: <a href="/facts/Definitions_of_knowledge/hytLblxN">Definitions of knowledge</a>
The analysis of knowledge is the attempt to identify the <a href="/facts/Essence/X1uqmlSm">essential components</a> or <a href="/facts/Necessity_and_sufficiency/G45aDCY9">conditions of all and only</a> propositional knowledge states. According to the so-called traditional analysis,<a class="footnote-ref" id="fnref:32" href="#fn:32">32</a> knowledge has three components: it is a belief that is <a href="/facts/Justification_(epistemology)/CxWaj0pY">justified</a> and true.<a class="footnote-ref" id="fnref:33" href="#fn:33">33</a> In the second half of the 20th century, this view was challenged by a <a href="/facts/Gettier_problem/bBQT9H7o">series of thought experiments</a> aiming to show that some justified true beliefs do not amount to knowledge.<a class="footnote-ref" id="fnref:34" href="#fn:34">34</a> In one of them, a person is unaware of all the <a href="/facts/Potemkin_village/wlYdL2sJ">fake barns</a> in their area. By coincidence, they stop in front of the only real barn and form a justified true belief that it is a real barn.<a class="footnote-ref" id="fnref:35" href="#fn:35">35</a> Many epistemologists agree that this is not knowledge because the justification is not directly relevant to the truth.<a class="footnote-ref" id="fnref:36" href="#fn:36">36</a> More specifically, this and similar counterexamples involve some form of epistemic luck, that is, a cognitive success that results from fortuitous circumstances rather than competence.<a class="footnote-ref" id="fnref:37" href="#fn:37">37</a>

Following these <a href="/facts/Thought_experiment/GXlr0lz9">thought experiments</a>, philosophers proposed various alternative definitions of knowledge by modifying or expanding the traditional analysis.<a class="footnote-ref" id="fnref:38" href="#fn:38">38</a> According to one view, the known fact has to cause the belief in the right way.<a class="footnote-ref" id="fnref:39" href="#fn:39">39</a> Another theory states that the belief is the product of a reliable belief formation process.<a class="footnote-ref" id="fnref:40" href="#fn:40">40</a> Further approaches require that the person would not have the belief if it was false,<a class="footnote-ref" id="fnref:41" href="#fn:41">41</a> that the belief is not inferred from a falsehood,<a class="footnote-ref" id="fnref:42" href="#fn:42">42</a> that the justification cannot be <a href="/facts/Defeater/C0Qt3a3l">undermined</a>,<a class="footnote-ref" id="fnref:43" href="#fn:43">43</a> or that the belief is <a href="/facts/Infallible/XhMSj9Al">infallible</a>.[56] There is no consensus on which of the proposed modifications and reconceptualizations is correct.<a class="footnote-ref" id="fnref:44" href="#fn:44">44</a> Some philosophers, such as <a href="/facts/Timothy_Williamson/152ylgUd">Timothy Williamson</a>, reject the basic assumption underlying the analysis of knowledge by arguing that <a href="/facts/Knowledge-first_epistemology/PqsW4GYx">propositional knowledge is a unique state</a> that cannot be dissected into simpler components.<a class="footnote-ref" id="fnref:45" href="#fn:45">45</a>

<h4>Value</h4>
The value of knowledge is the worth it holds by expanding understanding and guiding action. Knowledge can have <a href="/facts/Instrumental_value/V6WnBobo">instrumental value</a> by helping a person achieve their goals.<a class="footnote-ref" id="fnref:46" href="#fn:46">46</a> For example, knowledge of a disease helps a doctor cure their patient.<a class="footnote-ref" id="fnref:47" href="#fn:47">47</a> The usefulness of a known fact depends on the circumstances. Knowledge of some facts may have little to no uses, like memorizing random phone numbers from an outdated phone book.<a class="footnote-ref" id="fnref:48" href="#fn:48">48</a> Being able to assess the value of knowledge matters in choosing what information to acquire and share. It affects decisions like which subjects to teach at school and how to allocate funds to research projects.<a class="footnote-ref" id="fnref:49" href="#fn:49">49</a>
Epistemologists are particularly interested in whether knowledge is more valuable than a mere true opinion.<a class="footnote-ref" id="fnref:50" href="#fn:50">50</a> Knowledge and true opinion often have a similar usefulness since both accurately represent reality. For example, if a person wants to go to <a href="/facts/Larissa/qtYRluUn">Larissa</a>, a true opinion about the directions can guide them as effectively as knowledge.<a class="footnote-ref" id="fnref:51" href="#fn:51">51</a> Considering this problem, Plato proposed that knowledge is better because it is more stable.<a class="footnote-ref" id="fnref:52" href="#fn:52">52</a> Another suggestion focuses on <a href="/facts/Practical_reasoning/lNVkg44d">practical reasoning</a>, arguing that people put more trust in knowledge than in mere true opinions when drawing conclusions and deciding what to do.<a class="footnote-ref" id="fnref:53" href="#fn:53">53</a> A different response says that knowledge has intrinsic value in addition to instrumental value. This view asserts that knowledge is always valuable, whereas true opinion is only valuable in circumstances where it is useful.<a class="footnote-ref" id="fnref:54" href="#fn:54">54</a>

<h3>Belief and truth</h3>
Main articles: <a href="/facts/Belief/HbPvkGT6">Belief</a> and <a href="/facts/Truth/NyQmBtUC">Truth</a>
Beliefs are mental states about what is the case, like believing that snow is white or that <a href="/facts/God_exists/wA5BlJQl">God exists</a>.<a class="footnote-ref" id="fnref:55" href="#fn:55">55</a> In epistemology, they are often understood as subjective <a href="/facts/Propositional_attitude/KpEYEPGc">attitudes that affirm or deny a proposition</a>, which can be expressed in a <a href="/facts/Declarative_sentence/GhKKkcm2">declarative sentence</a>. For instance, to believe that snow is white is to affirm the proposition "snow is white". According to this view, beliefs are representations of what the universe is like. They are stored in memory and retrieved when actively thinking about reality or deciding how to act.<a class="footnote-ref" id="fnref:56" href="#fn:56">56</a> A different view understands beliefs as behavioral patterns or <a href="/facts/Disposition/GBeJAYMk">dispositions</a> to act rather than as representational items stored in the mind. According to this perspective, to believe that there is mineral water in the fridge is nothing more than a group of dispositions related to mineral water and the fridge. Examples are the dispositions to answer questions about the presence of mineral water affirmatively and to go to the fridge when thirsty.<a class="footnote-ref" id="fnref:57" href="#fn:57">57</a> Some theorists deny the existence of beliefs, saying that this concept borrowed from <a href="/facts/Folk_psychology/t9XsfIy4">folk psychology</a> oversimplifies much more complex psychological or neurological processes.<a class="footnote-ref" id="fnref:58" href="#fn:58">58</a> Beliefs are central to various epistemological debates, which cover their status as a component of propositional knowledge, the question of whether people have <a href="/facts/Doxastic_voluntarism/LP0fAEpy">control over and responsibility for their beliefs</a>, and the issue of whether beliefs have degrees, called <a href="/facts/Credence_(statistics)/ErrH3ts1">credences</a>.<a class="footnote-ref" id="fnref:59" href="#fn:59">59</a>
As propositional attitudes, beliefs are true or false depending on whether they affirm a true or a false proposition.<a class="footnote-ref" id="fnref:60" href="#fn:60">60</a> According to the <a href="/facts/Correspondence_theory_of_truth/jyQht989">correspondence theory of truth</a>, to be true means to stand in the right relation to the world by accurately describing what it is like. This means that truth is objective: a belief is true if it corresponds to a <a href="/facts/Fact/jkr0IGn8">fact</a>.<a class="footnote-ref" id="fnref:61" href="#fn:61">61</a> The <a href="/facts/Coherence_theory_of_truth/nRl4luF7">coherence theory of truth</a> says that a belief is true if it belongs to a coherent system of beliefs. A result of this view is that truth is relative since it depends on other beliefs.<a class="footnote-ref" id="fnref:62" href="#fn:62">62</a> Further <a href="/facts/Theories_of_truth/CVVuAw2I">theories of truth</a> include <a href="/facts/Pragmatic_theory_of_truth/IGLmrteH">pragmatist</a>, <a href="/facts/Semantic_theory_of_truth/BtXbu5nt">semantic</a>, <a href="/facts/Pluralist_theories_of_truth/pcPX0xxM">pluralist</a>, and <a href="/facts/Deflationary_theory_of_truth/3Py23k4N">deflationary theories</a>.<a class="footnote-ref" id="fnref:63" href="#fn:63">63</a> Truth plays a central role in epistemology as a goal of cognitive processes and an attribute of propositional knowledge.<a class="footnote-ref" id="fnref:64" href="#fn:64">64</a>

<h3>Justification</h3>
Main article: <a href="/facts/Justification_(epistemology)/CxWaj0pY">Justification (epistemology)</a>
In epistemology, justification is a property of beliefs that meet certain norms about what a person should believe.<a class="footnote-ref" id="fnref:65" href="#fn:65">65</a> According to a common view, this means that the person has sufficient reasons for holding this belief because they have information that supports it.<a class="footnote-ref" id="fnref:66" href="#fn:66">66</a> Another view states that a belief is justified if it is formed by a reliable belief formation process, such as perception.<a class="footnote-ref" id="fnref:67" href="#fn:67">67</a> The terms reasonable, warranted, and supported are sometimes used as synonyms of the word justified.<a class="footnote-ref" id="fnref:68" href="#fn:68">68</a> Justification distinguishes well-founded beliefs from <a href="/facts/Superstition/XB63u3qt">superstition</a> and lucky guesses.<a class="footnote-ref" id="fnref:69" href="#fn:69">69</a> However, it does not guarantee truth. For example, a person with strong but misleading evidence may form a justified belief that is false.<a class="footnote-ref" id="fnref:70" href="#fn:70">70</a>
Epistemologists often identify justification as a key component of knowledge.<a class="footnote-ref" id="fnref:71" href="#fn:71">71</a> Usually, they are not only interested in whether a person has a sufficient reason to hold a belief, known as propositional justification, but also in whether the person holds the belief because or based on<a class="footnote-ref" id="fnref:72" href="#fn:72">72</a> this reason, known as doxastic justification. For example, if a person has sufficient reason to believe that a neighborhood is dangerous but forms this belief based on superstition then they have propositional justification but lack doxastic justification.<a class="footnote-ref" id="fnref:73" href="#fn:73">73</a>

<h4>Sources</h4>
Sources of justification are ways or cognitive capacities through which people acquire justification. Often-discussed sources include <a href="/facts/Perception/xLK0n2q4">perception</a>, <a href="/facts/Introspection/X8rBdaR0">introspection</a>, <a href="/facts/Memory/a1QSEJhj">memory</a>, <a href="/facts/Reason/tcBImN8J">reason</a>, and <a href="/facts/Testimony/dxgk0txp">testimony</a>, but there is no universal agreement to what extent they all provide valid justification.<a class="footnote-ref" id="fnref:74" href="#fn:74">74</a> Perception relies on <a href="/facts/Sense/cB7rTqYF">sensory organs</a> to gain empirical information. Distinct forms of perception correspond to different physical stimuli, such as <a href="/facts/Visual_perception/g7Tfaq2l">visual</a>, <a href="/facts/Hearing/EPYrVkSx">auditory</a>, <a href="/facts/Somatosensory_system/0nhRsBnt">haptic</a>, <a href="/facts/Sense_of_smell/t6ytFklU">olfactory</a>, and <a href="/facts/Taste/mdB8ysuK">gustatory</a> perception.<a class="footnote-ref" id="fnref:75" href="#fn:75">75</a> Perception is not merely the reception of sense impressions but an active process that selects, organizes, and interprets <a href="/facts/Sense_data/BSwNwBv0">sensory signals</a>.<a class="footnote-ref" id="fnref:76" href="#fn:76">76</a> Introspection is a closely related process focused on internal <a href="/facts/Mental_states/sHsDj380">mental states</a> rather than external physical objects. For example, seeing a bus at a bus station belongs to perception while feeling tired belongs to introspection.<a class="footnote-ref" id="fnref:77" href="#fn:77">77</a>
Rationalists understand reason as a source of justification for non-empirical facts, explaining how people can know about mathematical, logical, and conceptual truths. Reason is also responsible for inferential knowledge, in which one or more beliefs serve as premises to support another belief.[90] Memory depends on information provided by other sources, which it retains and recalls, like remembering a phone number perceived earlier.<a class="footnote-ref" id="fnref:78" href="#fn:78">78</a> Justification by testimony relies on information one person communicates to another person. This can happen by talking to each other but can also occur in other forms, like a letter, a newspaper, and a blog.<a class="footnote-ref" id="fnref:79" href="#fn:79">79</a>

<h3>Other concepts</h3>
<a href="/facts/Rationality/ueS0w9lk">Rationality</a> is closely related to justification and the terms rational belief and justified belief are sometimes used interchangeably. However, rationality has a wider scope that encompasses both a theoretical side, covering beliefs, and a practical side, covering <a href="/facts/Decision_theory/TbXcQX0v">decisions</a>, <a href="/facts/Intention/ahzUpq2G">intentions</a>, and <a href="/facts/Action_(philosophy)/TMFsJsBa">actions</a>.<a class="footnote-ref" id="fnref:80" href="#fn:80">80</a> There are different conceptions about what it means for something to be rational. According to one view, a mental state is rational if it is based on or responsive to good reasons. Another view emphasizes the role of coherence, stating that rationality requires that the different mental states of a person are <a href="/facts/Consistent/IHkdnA9M">consistent</a> and support each other.<a class="footnote-ref" id="fnref:81" href="#fn:81">81</a> A slightly different approach holds that rationality is about achieving certain goals. Two goals of theoretical rationality are accuracy and comprehensiveness, meaning that a person has as few false beliefs and as many true beliefs as possible.<a class="footnote-ref" id="fnref:82" href="#fn:82">82</a>
Epistemologists rely on the concept of epistemic norms as criteria to assess the cognitive quality of beliefs, like their justification and rationality. They distinguish between deontic norms, which <a href="/facts/Normativity/CgTa03KU">prescribe</a> what people should believe, and <a href="/facts/Axiological/l6rLbmsK">axiological</a> norms, which identify the goals and <a href="/facts/Value_(ethics_and_social_sciences)/f2RW9TXW">values</a> of beliefs.<a class="footnote-ref" id="fnref:83" href="#fn:83">83</a> Epistemic norms are closely linked to intellectual or <a href="/facts/Epistemic_virtue/1hrnEG10">epistemic virtues</a>, which are character traits like <a href="/facts/Open-mindedness/eNIegbaW">open-mindedness</a> and <a href="/facts/Conscientiousness/Lgt1ba0S">conscientiousness</a>. Epistemic virtues help individuals form true beliefs and acquire knowledge. They contrast with epistemic vices and act as foundational concepts of <a href="/facts/Virtue_epistemology/MwDTtdRk">virtue epistemology</a>.<a class="footnote-ref" id="fnref:84" href="#fn:84">84</a><a class="footnote-ref" id="fnref:85" href="#fn:85">85</a>
Epistemologists understand <a href="/facts/Evidence/d5IGUK0U">evidence</a> for a belief as information that favors or supports it. They conceptualize evidence primarily in terms of mental states, such as sensory impressions or other known propositions. But in a wider sense, it can also include physical objects, like <a href="/facts/Bloodstain_pattern_analysis/TkRjcfJe">bloodstains examined by forensic analysts</a> or financial records studied by investigative journalists.<a class="footnote-ref" id="fnref:86" href="#fn:86">86</a> Evidence is often understood in terms of <a href="/facts/Probability/fgYvMhwb">probability</a>: evidence for a belief makes it more likely that the belief is true.<a class="footnote-ref" id="fnref:87" href="#fn:87">87</a> A <a href="/facts/Defeater/C0Qt3a3l">defeater</a> is evidence against a belief or evidence that undermines another piece of evidence. For instance, <a href="/facts/Witness_testimony/RQ7kvsDI">witness testimony</a> linking a suspect to a crime is evidence of their guilt, while an <a href="/facts/Alibi/4Yf2qtrP">alibi</a> is a defeater.<a class="footnote-ref" id="fnref:88" href="#fn:88">88</a> <a href="/facts/Evidentialism/LLUA5qy0">Evidentialists</a> analyze justification in terms of evidence by asserting that for a belief to be justified, it needs to rest on adequate evidence.<a class="footnote-ref" id="fnref:89" href="#fn:89">89</a>
The presence of evidence usually affects <a href="/facts/Doubt/EdL4LPcG">doubt</a> and <a href="/facts/Certainty/rKcz7Upd">certainty</a>, which are subjective attitudes toward propositions that differ regarding their level of confidence. Doubt involves questioning the validity or truth of a proposition. Certainty, by contrast, is a strong affirmative conviction, indicating an absence of doubt about the proposition's truth. Doubt and certainty are central to ancient Greek skepticism and its goal of establishing that no belief is immune to doubt. They are also crucial in attempts to find a secure foundation of all knowledge, such as <a href="/facts/Ren%25C3%25A9_Descartes/ohqj6DMf">René Descartes</a>' <a href="/facts/Foundationalism/2hlTEXTg">foundationalist</a> epistemology.<a class="footnote-ref" id="fnref:90" href="#fn:90">90</a>
While propositional knowledge is the main topic in epistemology, some theorists focus on <a href="/facts/Understanding/D8UXbWuJ">understanding</a> instead. Understanding is a more holistic notion that involves a wider grasp of a subject. To understand something, a person requires awareness of how different things are connected and why they are the way they are. For example, knowledge of isolated facts memorized from a textbook does not amount to understanding. According to one view, understanding is a unique epistemic good that, unlike propositional knowledge, is always intrinsically valuable.<a class="footnote-ref" id="fnref:91" href="#fn:91">91</a> <a href="/facts/Wisdom/6Pqq0nAA">Wisdom</a> is similar in this regard and is sometimes considered the highest epistemic good. It encompasses a reflective understanding with practical applications, helping people grasp and evaluate complex situations and lead a good life.<a class="footnote-ref" id="fnref:92" href="#fn:92">92</a>
In epistemology, knowledge ascription is the act of attributing knowledge to someone, expressed in sentences like "Sarah knows that it will rain today".<a class="footnote-ref" id="fnref:93" href="#fn:93">93</a> According to invariantism, knowledge ascriptions have fixed standards across different contexts. <a href="/facts/Contextualism/AY17YuQI">Contextualists</a>, by contrast, argue that knowledge ascriptions are context-dependent. From this perspective, Sarah may know about the weather in the context of an everyday conversation even though she is not sufficiently informed to know it in the context of a rigorous <a href="/facts/Meteorology/xblFr28q">meteorological</a> debate.<a class="footnote-ref" id="fnref:94" href="#fn:94">94</a> <a href="/facts/Contrastivism/ee3h9S1n">Contrastivism</a>, another view, argues that knowledge ascriptions are comparative, meaning that to know something involves distinguishing it from relevant alternatives. For example, if a person spots a bird in the garden, they may know that it is a sparrow rather than an eagle, but they may not know that it is a sparrow rather than an indistinguishable sparrow hologram.<a class="footnote-ref" id="fnref:95" href="#fn:95">95</a>

<h2 id="major-schools-of-thought">Major schools of thought</h2>
<h3>Skepticism and fallibilism</h3>
Main articles: <a href="/facts/Skepticism/qXAgbbVT">Skepticism</a>, <a href="/facts/Falliblism/2FeNGuMr">Falliblism</a>, and <a href="/facts/Epistemic_relativism/d1mKoASf">Epistemic relativism</a>
<a href="/facts/Philosophical_skepticism/xsNp72xg">Philosophical skepticism</a> questions the human ability to attain knowledge by challenging the foundations upon which knowledge claims rest. Some skeptics limit their criticism to specific domains of knowledge. For example, <a href="/facts/Religious_skepticism/gDfWb8FR">religious skeptics</a> say that it is impossible to know about the existence of deities or the truth of other religious doctrines. Similarly, moral skeptics challenge the existence of moral knowledge and metaphysical skeptics say that humans cannot know ultimate reality.<a class="footnote-ref" id="fnref:96" href="#fn:96">96</a> External world skepticism questions knowledge of external facts,<a class="footnote-ref" id="fnref:97" href="#fn:97">97</a> whereas <a href="/facts/Problem_of_other_minds/em1nN1jc">skepticism about other minds</a> doubts knowledge of the mental states of others.<a class="footnote-ref" id="fnref:98" href="#fn:98">98</a>
Global skepticism is the broadest form of skepticism, asserting that there is no knowledge in any domain.<a class="footnote-ref" id="fnref:99" href="#fn:99">99</a> In <a href="/facts/Ancient_philosophy/73cd664F">ancient philosophy</a>, this view was embraced by <a href="/facts/Academic_skepticism/axnkdEte">academic skeptics</a>, whereas <a href="/facts/Pyrrhonian_skeptics/sNany6Qc">Pyrrhonian skeptics</a> recommended the <a href="/facts/Epoche/K8mK5L27">suspension of belief</a> to attain <a href="/facts/Ataraxia/Vx4IegNQ">tranquility</a>.<a class="footnote-ref" id="fnref:100" href="#fn:100">100</a> Few epistemologists have explicitly defended global skepticism. The influence of this position stems from attempts by other philosophers to show that their theory overcomes the challenge of skepticism. For example, <a href="/facts/Ren%25C3%25A9_Descartes/ohqj6DMf">René Descartes</a> used <a href="/facts/Cartesian_doubt/2IoRANUp">methodological doubt</a> to find facts that cannot be doubted.<a class="footnote-ref" id="fnref:101" href="#fn:101">101</a>
One consideration in favor of global skepticism is the <a href="/facts/Dream_argument/FA7QEllQ">dream argument</a>. It starts from the observation that, while people are dreaming, they are usually unaware of this. This inability to distinguish between dream and regular experience is used to argue that there is no certain knowledge since a person can never be sure that they are not dreaming.<a class="footnote-ref" id="fnref:102" href="#fn:102">102</a><a class="footnote-ref" id="fnref:103" href="#fn:103">103</a> Some critics assert that global skepticism is <a href="/facts/Self-refuting_idea/FRd20Ytb">self-refuting</a> because denying the existence of knowledge is itself a knowledge claim. Another objection says that the abstract reasoning leading to skepticism is not convincing enough to overrule common sense.<a class="footnote-ref" id="fnref:104" href="#fn:104">104</a>
Fallibilism is another response to skepticism.<a class="footnote-ref" id="fnref:105" href="#fn:105">105</a> Fallibilists agree with skeptics that absolute certainty is impossible. They reject the assumption that knowledge requires absolute certainty, leading them to the conclusion that fallible knowledge exists.[119] They emphasize the need to keep an open and inquisitive mind, acknowledging that doubt can never be fully excluded, even for well-established knowledge claims like thoroughly tested scientific theories.<a class="footnote-ref" id="fnref:106" href="#fn:106">106</a>
Epistemic relativism is related to skepticism but differs in that it does not question the existence of knowledge in general. Instead, epistemic relativists only reject the notion of universal epistemic standards or absolute principles that apply equally to everyone. This means that what a person knows depends on subjective criteria or social conventions used to assess epistemic status.<a class="footnote-ref" id="fnref:107" href="#fn:107">107</a>

<h3>Empiricism and rationalism</h3>
Main articles: <a href="/facts/Empiricism/f68IpCeE">Empiricism</a> and <a href="/facts/Rationalism/MNk171TG">Rationalism</a>

The debate between empiricism and rationalism centers on the origins of human knowledge. Empiricism emphasizes that <a href="/facts/Sense_experience/JUaYSGJc">sense experience</a> is the primary source of all knowledge. Some empiricists illustrate this view by describing the mind as a <a href="/facts/Blank_slate/esxlgDCh">blank slate</a> that only develops ideas about the external world through the sense data received from the sensory organs. According to them, the mind can attain various additional insights by comparing impressions, combining them, generalizing to form more abstract ideas, and deducing new conclusions from them. Empiricists say that all these mental operations depend on sensory material and do not function on their own.<a class="footnote-ref" id="fnref:108" href="#fn:108">108</a>
Even though rationalists usually accept sense experience as one source of knowledge,<a class="footnote-ref" id="fnref:109" href="#fn:109">109</a> they argue that certain forms of knowledge are directly accessed through <a href="/facts/Reason/tcBImN8J">reason</a> without sense experience,<a class="footnote-ref" id="fnref:110" href="#fn:110">110</a> like knowledge of mathematical and logical truths.<a class="footnote-ref" id="fnref:111" href="#fn:111">111</a> Some forms of rationalism state that the mind possesses <a href="/facts/Innatism/7FznTuwN">inborn ideas</a>, accessible without sensory assistance. Others assert that there is an additional cognitive faculty, sometimes called <a href="/facts/Rational_intuition/stJIX3kK">rational intuition</a>, through which people acquire nonempirical knowledge.<a class="footnote-ref" id="fnref:112" href="#fn:112">112</a> Some rationalists limit their discussion to the origin of concepts, saying that the mind relies on inborn <a href="/facts/Theory_of_categories/xG73S2Af">categories</a> to understand the world and organize experience.<a class="footnote-ref" id="fnref:113" href="#fn:113">113</a>

<h3>Foundationalism and coherentism</h3>
Main articles: <a href="/facts/Foundationalism/2hlTEXTg">Foundationalism</a> and <a href="/facts/Coherentism/7JRS1DLe">Coherentism</a>

Foundationalists and coherentists disagree about the structure of knowledge.<a class="footnote-ref" id="fnref:114" href="#fn:114">114</a><a class="footnote-ref" id="fnref:115" href="#fn:115">115</a> Foundationalism distinguishes between basic and non-basic beliefs. A belief is basic if it is justified directly, meaning that its validity does not depend on the support of other beliefs.<a class="footnote-ref" id="fnref:116" href="#fn:116">116</a> A belief is non-basic if it is justified by another belief.<a class="footnote-ref" id="fnref:117" href="#fn:117">117</a> For example, the belief that it rained last night is a non-basic belief if it is inferred from the observation that the street is wet.<a class="footnote-ref" id="fnref:118" href="#fn:118">118</a> According to foundationalism, basic beliefs are the foundation on which all other knowledge is built while non-basic beliefs act as the superstructure resting on this foundation.<a class="footnote-ref" id="fnref:119" href="#fn:119">119</a>
Coherentists reject the distinction between basic and non-basic beliefs, saying that the justification of any belief depends on other beliefs. They assert that a belief must align with other beliefs to amount to knowledge. This occurs when beliefs are consistent and support each other. According to coherentism, justification is a <a href="/facts/Holism/QnIpnLr6">holistic</a> aspect determined by the whole system of beliefs, which resembles an interconnected web.<a class="footnote-ref" id="fnref:120" href="#fn:120">120</a>
<a href="/facts/Foundherentism/2P1aNCWp">Foundherentism</a> is an intermediary position combining elements of both foundationalism and coherentism. It accepts the distinction between basic and non-basic beliefs while asserting that the justification of non-basic beliefs depends on coherence with other beliefs.<a class="footnote-ref" id="fnref:121" href="#fn:121">121</a>
<a href="/facts/Infinitism/87Tap3aI">Infinitism</a> presents a less common alternative perspective on the structure of knowledge. It agrees with coherentism that there are no basic beliefs while rejecting the view that beliefs can support each other in a <a href="/facts/Circular_reasoning/Kgac2eUw">circular manner</a>. Instead, it argues that beliefs form infinite justification chains, in which each link of the chain supports the belief following it and is supported by the belief preceding it.<a class="footnote-ref" id="fnref:122" href="#fn:122">122</a>

<h3>Internalism and externalism</h3>
Main article: <a href="/facts/Internalism_and_externalism/TcqV9gQn">Internalism and externalism (epistemology)</a>

The disagreement between internalism and externalism is about the sources of justification.<a class="footnote-ref" id="fnref:123" href="#fn:123">123</a><a class="footnote-ref" id="fnref:124" href="#fn:124">124</a> Internalists say that justification depends only on factors within the individual, such as perceptual experience, memories, and other beliefs. This view emphasizes the importance of the cognitive perspective of the individual in the form of their mental states. It is commonly associated with the idea that the relevant factors are accessible, meaning that the individual can become aware of their reasons for holding a justified belief through introspection and reflection.<a class="footnote-ref" id="fnref:125" href="#fn:125">125</a>
<a href="/facts/Evidentialism/LLUA5qy0">Evidentialism</a> is an influential internalist view, asserting that justification depends on the possession of <a href="/facts/Evidence/d5IGUK0U">evidence</a>.<a class="footnote-ref" id="fnref:126" href="#fn:126">126</a> In this context, evidence for a belief is any information in the individual's mind that supports the belief. For example, the perceptual experience of rain is evidence for the belief that it is raining. Evidentialists suggest various other forms of evidence, including memories, intuitions, and other beliefs.<a class="footnote-ref" id="fnref:127" href="#fn:127">127</a> According to evidentialism, a belief is justified if the individual's evidence supports it and they hold the belief on the basis of this evidence.<a class="footnote-ref" id="fnref:128" href="#fn:128">128</a>
Externalism, by contrast, asserts that at least some relevant factors of knowledge are external to the individual.<a class="footnote-ref" id="fnref:129" href="#fn:129">129</a> For instance, when considering the belief that a cup of coffee stands on the table, externalists are not primarily interested in the subjective perceptual experience that led to this belief. Instead, they focus on objective factors, like the quality of the person's eyesight, their ability to differentiate coffee from other beverages, and the circumstances under which they observed the cup.<a class="footnote-ref" id="fnref:130" href="#fn:130">130</a> A key motivation of many forms of externalism is that justification makes it more likely that a belief is true. Based on this view, justification is external to the extent that some factors contributing to this likelihood are not part of the believer's cognitive perspective.<a class="footnote-ref" id="fnref:131" href="#fn:131">131</a>
<a href="/facts/Reliabilism/QH4fM0yk">Reliabilism</a> is an externalist theory asserting that a reliable connection between belief and truth is required for justification.<a class="footnote-ref" id="fnref:132" href="#fn:132">132</a> Some reliabilists explain this in terms of reliable processes. According to this view, a belief is justified if it is produced by a reliable process, like perception. A belief-formation process is deemed reliable if most of the beliefs it generates are true. An alternative view focuses on beliefs rather than belief-formation processes, saying that a belief is justified if it is a reliable indicator of the fact it presents. This means that the belief tracks the fact: the person believes it because it is true but would not believe it otherwise.<a class="footnote-ref" id="fnref:133" href="#fn:133">133</a>
<a href="/facts/Virtue_epistemology/MwDTtdRk">Virtue epistemology</a>, another type of externalism, asserts that a belief is justified if it manifests intellectual virtues. Intellectual virtues are capacities or traits that perform cognitive functions and help people form true beliefs. Suggested examples include faculties, like vision, memory, and introspection, and <a href="/facts/Character_trait/Iun5UFdX">character traits</a>, like open-mindedness.<a class="footnote-ref" id="fnref:134" href="#fn:134">134</a>

<h2 id="branches-and-approaches">Branches and approaches</h2>
Some branches of epistemology are characterized by their research methods. <a href="/facts/Formal_epistemology/n5PFTQdr">Formal epistemology</a> employs formal tools from logic and mathematics to investigate the nature of knowledge.<a class="footnote-ref" id="fnref:135" href="#fn:135">135</a><a class="footnote-ref" id="fnref:136" href="#fn:136">136</a> For example, <a href="/facts/Bayesian_epistemology/kAWFP8rc">Bayesian epistemology</a> represents beliefs as degrees of certainty and uses <a href="/facts/Probability_theory/mFBn51rE">probability theory</a> to formally define norms of <a href="/facts/Rationality/ueS0w9lk">rationality</a> governing how certain people should be.<a class="footnote-ref" id="fnref:137" href="#fn:137">137</a> <a href="/facts/Experimental_philosophy/gJlKcUGI">Experimental epistemologists</a> base their research on empirical evidence about common knowledge practices.<a class="footnote-ref" id="fnref:138" href="#fn:138">138</a> <a href="/facts/Applied_epistemology/lIletask">Applied epistemology</a> focuses on the practical application of epistemological principles to diverse real-world problems, like the reliability of knowledge claims on the internet, how to assess <a href="/facts/Sexual_assault/F3zvb27R">sexual assault</a> allegations, and how <a href="/facts/Racism/SfrqGbu8">racism</a> may lead to <a href="/facts/Epistemic_injustice/c0bcvNJc">epistemic injustice</a>.<a class="footnote-ref" id="fnref:139" href="#fn:139">139</a><a class="footnote-ref" id="fnref:140" href="#fn:140">140</a> <a href="/facts/Metaepistemology/0eT3TIwx">Metaepistemologists</a> study the nature, goals, and research methods of epistemology. As a <a href="/facts/Metatheory/xqUcQD2m">metatheory</a>, it does not directly advocate for specific epistemological theories but examines their fundamental concepts and background assumptions.<a class="footnote-ref" id="fnref:141" href="#fn:141">141</a><a class="footnote-ref" id="fnref:142" href="#fn:142">142</a>
Particularism and generalism disagree about the right <a href="/facts/Philosophical_methodology/mX2lWI5d">method of conducting epistemological research</a>. Particularists start their inquiry by looking at specific cases. For example, to find a definition of knowledge, they rely on their intuitions about concrete instances of knowledge and particular thought experiments. They use these observations as methodological constraints that any theory of general principles needs to follow. Generalists proceed in the opposite direction. They prioritize general epistemic principles, saying that it is not possible to accurately identify and describe specific cases without a grasp of these principles.<a class="footnote-ref" id="fnref:143" href="#fn:143">143</a> Other methods in contemporary epistemology aim to extract <a href="/facts/Ordinary_language_philosophy/pA43hoje">philosophical insights from ordinary language</a> or look at the role of knowledge in making assertions and guiding actions.<a class="footnote-ref" id="fnref:144" href="#fn:144">144</a>
<a href="/facts/Phenomenology_(philosophy)/AILzLkKx">Phenomenological</a> epistemology emphasizes the importance of first-person experience. It distinguishes between the natural and the phenomenological attitudes. The natural attitude focuses on objects belonging to common sense and natural science. The phenomenological attitude focuses on the experience of objects and aims to provide a presuppositionless description of how objects appear to the observer.<a class="footnote-ref" id="fnref:145" href="#fn:145">145</a>
<a href="/facts/Naturalized_epistemology/08LXsJsX">Naturalized epistemology</a> is closely associated with the <a href="/facts/Natural_sciences/8hg81Q2p">natural sciences</a>, relying on their methods and theories to examine knowledge. Arguing that epistemological theories should rest on empirical observation, it is critical of a priori reasoning.<a class="footnote-ref" id="fnref:146" href="#fn:146">146</a> <a href="/facts/Evolutionary_epistemology/94ckHGlr">Evolutionary epistemology</a> is a naturalistic approach that understands cognition as a product of <a href="/facts/Evolution/qE5amP6a">evolution</a>, examining knowledge and the cognitive faculties responsible for it through the lens of <a href="/facts/Natural_selection/JXTte6en">natural selection</a>.<a class="footnote-ref" id="fnref:147" href="#fn:147">147</a> <a href="/facts/Social_epistemology/pqo5MLYH">Social epistemology</a> focuses on the social dimension of knowledge. While traditional epistemology is mainly interested in the knowledge possessed by individuals, social epistemology covers knowledge acquisition, transmission, and evaluation within groups, with specific emphasis on how people rely on each other when seeking knowledge.<a class="footnote-ref" id="fnref:148" href="#fn:148">148</a>
<a href="/facts/Pragmatism/v1zMTt3m">Pragmatist</a> epistemology is a form of fallibilism that emphasizes the close relation between knowing and acting. It sees the pursuit of knowledge as an ongoing process guided by common sense and experience while always open to revision. This approach reinterprets some core epistemological notions, for example, by conceptualizing beliefs as habits that shape actions rather than representations that mirror the world.<a class="footnote-ref" id="fnref:149" href="#fn:149">149</a> Motivated by pragmatic considerations, <a href="/facts/Epistemic_conservatism/F5Vz5NUh">epistemic conservatism</a> is a view about <a href="/facts/Belief_revision/yvQ7RHrg">belief revision</a>. It prioritizes pre-existing beliefs, asserting that a person should only change their beliefs if they have a good reason to. One argument for epistemic conservatism rests on the recognition that the cognitive resources of humans are limited, making it impractical to constantly reexamine every belief.<a class="footnote-ref" id="fnref:150" href="#fn:150">150</a>

<a href="/facts/Postmodern/aBgbw8QJ">Postmodern</a> epistemology critiques the conditions of knowledge in advanced societies. This concerns in particular the <a href="/facts/Metanarrative/x96mkbXV">metanarrative</a> of a constant progress of scientific knowledge leading to a universal and foundational understanding of reality.<a class="footnote-ref" id="fnref:151" href="#fn:151">151</a><a class="footnote-ref" id="fnref:152" href="#fn:152">152</a> Similarly, <a href="/facts/Feminist/RRqUvGmk">feminist</a> epistemology adopts a critical perspective, focusing on the effect of <a href="/facts/Gender/LfjRHcJy">gender</a> on knowledge. Among other topics, it explores how preconceptions about gender influence who has access to knowledge, how knowledge is produced, and which types of knowledge are valued in society.<a class="footnote-ref" id="fnref:153" href="#fn:153">153</a> Some postmodern and feminist thinkers adopt a <a href="/facts/Constructivism_(philosophy_of_science)/RuLU0wLF">constructivist</a> approach, arguing that the way people view the world is not a simple reflection of external reality but a social construction. This view emphasizes the creative role of interpretation while undermining objectivity since social constructions can vary across societies.<a class="footnote-ref" id="fnref:154" href="#fn:154">154</a> Another critical approach, found in decolonial scholarship, opposes the global influence of Western knowledge systems. It seeks to undermine Western hegemony and <a href="/facts/Decolonization_of_knowledge/SrCsYEq7">decolonize knowledge</a>.<a class="footnote-ref" id="fnref:155" href="#fn:155">155</a>
The decolonial outlook is also present in <a href="/facts/African_epistemology/9svoyUug">African epistemology</a>. Grounded in African <a href="/facts/Ontology/QJKTsEIJ">ontology</a>, it emphasizes the interconnectedness of reality as a <a href="/facts/Continuum_(measurement)/oz3r6kvm">continuum</a> between knowing subject and known object. It understands knowledge as a <a href="/facts/Holism/QnIpnLr6">holistic</a> phenomenon that includes sensory, emotional, intuitive, and rational aspects, extending beyond the limits of the physical domain.<a class="footnote-ref" id="fnref:156" href="#fn:156">156</a>
Another epistemological tradition is found in ancient <a href="/facts/Indian_philosophy/ddnT7Vec">Indian philosophy</a>. Its diverse <a href="/facts/%25C4%2580stika_and_n%25C4%2581stika/Hc14oDK2">schools of thought</a> examine different sources of knowledge, called <a href="/facts/Pram%25C4%2581%25E1%25B9%2587a/ay65BFp3">pramāṇa</a>. Perception, inference, and <a href="/facts/Shabda/x31zEJ8q">testimony</a> are sources discussed by most schools. Other sources only considered by some schools are non-perception, which leads to knowledge of absences, and presumption.<a class="footnote-ref" id="fnref:157" href="#fn:157">157</a><a class="footnote-ref" id="fnref:158" href="#fn:158">158</a> <a href="/facts/Buddhist/G0wsjrSl">Buddhist</a> epistemology focuses on immediate experience, understood as the presentation of unique <a href="/facts/Particular/AwbfD8jx">particulars</a> without secondary cognitive processes, like thought and desire.<a class="footnote-ref" id="fnref:159" href="#fn:159">159</a> <a href="/facts/Ny%25C4%2581ya/XXUBDXdE">Nyāya</a> epistemology is a causal theory of knowledge, understanding sources of knowledge as reliable processes that cause episodes of truthful awareness. It sees perception as the primary source of knowledge and emphasizes its importance for successful action.<a class="footnote-ref" id="fnref:160" href="#fn:160">160</a> <a href="/facts/M%25C4%25ABm%25C4%2581%25E1%25B9%2583s%25C4%2581/NxmVHUuc">Mīmāṃsā</a> epistemology considers the holy scriptures known as the <a href="/facts/Vedas/yQgc8B2x">Vedas</a> as a key source of knowledge, addressing the problem of their right interpretation.<a class="footnote-ref" id="fnref:161" href="#fn:161">161</a> <a href="/facts/Jain_epistemology/mm9vFJdP">Jain epistemology</a> states that reality is <a href="/facts/Anekantavada/4YazwSnE">many-sided</a>, meaning that no single viewpoint can capture the entirety of truth.<a class="footnote-ref" id="fnref:162" href="#fn:162">162</a>
<a href="/facts/Historical_epistemology/s0KPGe8v">Historical epistemology</a> examines how the understanding of knowledge and related concepts has changed over time. It asks whether the main issues in epistemology are perennial and to what extent past epistemological theories are relevant to contemporary debates. It is particularly concerned with scientific knowledge and practices associated with it.<a class="footnote-ref" id="fnref:163" href="#fn:163">163</a> It contrasts with the history of epistemology, which presents, reconstructs, and evaluates epistemological theories of philosophers in the past.<a class="footnote-ref" id="fnref:164" href="#fn:164">164</a><a class="footnote-ref" id="fnref:165" href="#fn:165">165</a>

<h3>Knowledge in particular domains</h3>
Some branches of epistemology focus on knowledge within specific academic disciplines. The <a href="/facts/Epistemology_of_science/aonsfhTY">epistemology of science</a> examines how scientific knowledge is generated and what problems arise in the process of validating, justifying, and interpreting scientific claims. A key issue concerns the problem of how <a href="/facts/Problem_of_induction/4u6Lt35z">individual observations can support universal scientific laws</a>. Other topics include the nature of scientific evidence and the aims of science.<a class="footnote-ref" id="fnref:166" href="#fn:166">166</a> The epistemology of mathematics studies the origin of mathematical knowledge. In exploring how mathematical theories are justified, it investigates the role of proofs and whether there are empirical sources of mathematical knowledge.<a class="footnote-ref" id="fnref:167" href="#fn:167">167</a>
Distinct areas of epistemology are dedicated to specific sources of knowledge. Examples are the epistemology of perception,<a class="footnote-ref" id="fnref:168" href="#fn:168">168</a> the epistemology of memory,<a class="footnote-ref" id="fnref:169" href="#fn:169">169</a> and the <a href="/facts/Epistemology_of_testimony/xldQjDCW">epistemology of testimony</a>.<a class="footnote-ref" id="fnref:170" href="#fn:170">170</a> In the epistemology of perception, <a href="/facts/Direct_and_indirect_realism/HATDapRA">direct and indirect realists</a> debate the connection between the perceiver and the perceived object. Direct realists say that this connection is direct, meaning that there is no difference between the object present in perceptual experience and the physical object causing this experience. According to indirect realism, the connection is indirect, involving mental entities, like ideas or sense data, that mediate between the perceiver and the external world. The contrast between direct and indirect realism is important for explaining the nature of <a href="/facts/Illusion/Wp52FHKV">illusions</a>.<a class="footnote-ref" id="fnref:171" href="#fn:171">171</a>
Epistemological issues are found in most areas of philosophy. The <a href="/facts/Epistemology_of_logic/8JnpJLtt">epistemology of logic</a> examines how people know that an <a href="/facts/Argument/1K1e3Xg4">argument</a> is <a href="/facts/Validity_(logic)/oMGkywGC">valid</a>. For example, it explores how logicians justify that <a href="/facts/Modus_ponens/Wq4NcmrG">modus ponens</a> is a correct <a href="/facts/Rule_of_inference/QV5NklQ9">rule of inference</a> or that all <a href="/facts/Contradictions/PQHH5a2J">contradictions</a> are false.<a class="footnote-ref" id="fnref:172" href="#fn:172">172</a> <a href="/facts/Epistemology_of_metaphysics/fSFt6SHe">Epistemologists of metaphysics</a> investigate whether knowledge of the basic structure of reality is possible and what sources this knowledge could have.<a class="footnote-ref" id="fnref:173" href="#fn:173">173</a> Knowledge of moral statements, like the claim that lying is wrong, belongs to the <a href="/facts/Epistemology_of_ethics/wNVNgL5q">epistemology of ethics</a>. It studies the role of <a href="/facts/Ethical_intuitionism/LuScuKCG">ethical intuitions</a>, <a href="/facts/Coherentism/7JRS1DLe">coherence</a> among moral beliefs, and the problem of moral disagreement.<a class="footnote-ref" id="fnref:174" href="#fn:174">174</a> The <a href="/facts/Ethics_of_belief/uEqptebY">ethics of belief</a> is a closely related field exploring the intersection of epistemology and <a href="/facts/Ethics/wNVNgL5q">ethics</a>. It examines the norms governing belief formation and asks whether violating them is morally wrong.<a class="footnote-ref" id="fnref:175" href="#fn:175">175</a> <a href="/facts/Religious_epistemology/oIqIwIWj">Religious epistemology</a> studies the role of knowledge and justification for religious doctrines and practices. It evaluates the reliability of evidence from <a href="/facts/Religious_experience/QY5LYzon">religious experience</a> and <a href="/facts/Religious_text/H2HjQEYv">holy scriptures</a> while also asking whether the norms of reason should be applied to religious <a href="/facts/Faith/ytlgRheF">faith</a>.<a class="footnote-ref" id="fnref:176" href="#fn:176">176</a>
Epistemologists of language explore the nature of linguistic knowledge. One of their topics is the role of tacit knowledge, for example, when native speakers have mastered the rules of <a href="/facts/Grammar/vprQsHIR">grammar</a> but are unable to explicitly articulate them.<a class="footnote-ref" id="fnref:177" href="#fn:177">177</a> Epistemologists of modality examine knowledge about what is possible and necessary.<a class="footnote-ref" id="fnref:178" href="#fn:178">178</a> Epistemic problems that arise when two people have diverging opinions on a topic are covered by the epistemology of disagreement.<a class="footnote-ref" id="fnref:179" href="#fn:179">179</a> Epistemologists of ignorance are interested in epistemic faults and gaps in knowledge.<a class="footnote-ref" id="fnref:180" href="#fn:180">180</a>

<h2 id="related-fields">Related fields</h2>
Epistemology and <a href="/facts/Psychology/duoqW7Sz">psychology</a> were not defined as distinct fields until the 19th century; earlier investigations about knowledge often do not fit neatly into today's academic categories.<a class="footnote-ref" id="fnref:181" href="#fn:181">181</a> Both contemporary disciplines study beliefs and the mental processes responsible for their formation and change. One key contrast is that psychology describes what beliefs people have and how they acquire them, thereby explaining why someone has a specific belief. The focus of epistemology is on evaluating beliefs, leading to a judgment about whether a belief is justified and rational in a particular case.<a class="footnote-ref" id="fnref:182" href="#fn:182">182</a> Epistemology also shares a close connection with <a href="/facts/Cognitive_science/8qoggl7r">cognitive science</a>, which understands mental events as processes that transform <a href="/facts/Information/3LdrzXtJ">information</a>.<a class="footnote-ref" id="fnref:183" href="#fn:183">183</a> <a href="/facts/Artificial_intelligence/lJGauQwX">Artificial intelligence</a> relies on the insights of epistemology and cognitive science to implement concrete solutions to problems associated with <a href="/facts/Knowledge_representation/9lnzyILD">knowledge representation</a> and <a href="/facts/Automatic_reasoning/x5EdkKoU">automatic reasoning</a>.<a class="footnote-ref" id="fnref:184" href="#fn:184">184</a>
<a href="/facts/Logic/8JnpJLtt">Logic</a> is the study of correct reasoning. For epistemology, it is relevant to inferential knowledge, which arises when a person reasons from one known fact to another.<a class="footnote-ref" id="fnref:185" href="#fn:185">185</a> This is the case, for example, when inferring that it rained based on the observation that the streets are wet.<a class="footnote-ref" id="fnref:186" href="#fn:186">186</a> Whether an inferential belief amounts to knowledge depends on the form of <a href="/facts/Logical_reasoning/NwR4hQva">reasoning</a> used, in particular, that the process does not violate the <a href="/facts/Laws_of_thought/bKm76TrI">laws of logic</a>.<a class="footnote-ref" id="fnref:187" href="#fn:187">187</a> Another overlap between the two fields is found in the epistemic approach to <a href="/facts/Fallacy/IRVuLSef">fallacies</a>.<a class="footnote-ref" id="fnref:188" href="#fn:188">188</a> Fallacies are faulty arguments based on incorrect reasoning.<a class="footnote-ref" id="fnref:189" href="#fn:189">189</a> The epistemic approach to fallacies explains why they are faulty, stating that arguments aim to expand knowledge. According to this view, an argument is a fallacy if it fails to do so.<a class="footnote-ref" id="fnref:190" href="#fn:190">190</a> A further intersection is found in <a href="/facts/Epistemic_logic/kRIBmdp5">epistemic logic</a>, which uses formal logical devices to study epistemological concepts like knowledge and belief.<a class="footnote-ref" id="fnref:191" href="#fn:191">191</a>
Both <a href="/facts/Decision_theory/TbXcQX0v">decision theory</a> and epistemology are interested in the foundations of rational thought and the role of beliefs. Unlike many approaches in epistemology, the main focus of decision theory lies less in the theoretical and more in the practical side, exploring how beliefs are translated into action.<a class="footnote-ref" id="fnref:192" href="#fn:192">192</a> Decision theorists examine the reasoning involved in decision-making and the standards of good decisions,<a class="footnote-ref" id="fnref:193" href="#fn:193">193</a> identifying beliefs as a central aspect of decision-making. One of their innovations is to distinguish between weaker and stronger beliefs, which helps them consider the effects of uncertainty on decisions.<a class="footnote-ref" id="fnref:194" href="#fn:194">194</a>
Epistemology and <a href="/facts/Education/WIwsQKF9">education</a> have a shared interest in knowledge, with one difference being that education focuses on the transmission of knowledge, exploring the roles of both learner and teacher.<a class="footnote-ref" id="fnref:195" href="#fn:195">195</a> <a href="/facts/Learning_theory_(education)/uuYQ4BHW">Learning theory</a> examines how people acquire knowledge.<a class="footnote-ref" id="fnref:196" href="#fn:196">196</a> <a href="/facts/Behaviorism/8DHljqrh">Behavioral</a> learning theories explain the process in terms of behavior changes, for example, by <a href="/facts/Classical_conditioning/ddtohoz3">associating a certain response with a particular stimulus</a>.<a class="footnote-ref" id="fnref:197" href="#fn:197">197</a> <a href="/facts/Cognitivism_(psychology)/5KQRDrsS">Cognitive</a> learning theories study how the cognitive processes that affect knowledge acquisition transform information.<a class="footnote-ref" id="fnref:198" href="#fn:198">198</a> <a href="/facts/Pedagogy/t1LIfLeC">Pedagogy</a> looks at the transmission of knowledge from the teacher's perspective, exploring the <a href="/facts/Teaching_method/tjADvYgf">teaching methods</a> they may employ.<a class="footnote-ref" id="fnref:199" href="#fn:199">199</a> In teacher-centered methods, the teacher serves as the main authority delivering knowledge and guiding the learning process. In <a href="/facts/Student-centered_learning/yQ5JAecR">student-centered methods</a>, the teacher primarily supports and facilitates the learning process, allowing students to take a more active role.<a class="footnote-ref" id="fnref:200" href="#fn:200">200</a> The beliefs students have about knowledge, called <a href="/facts/Personal_epistemology/mMdJzqAB">personal epistemology</a>, influence their intellectual development and learning success.<a class="footnote-ref" id="fnref:201" href="#fn:201">201</a>
The <a href="/facts/Anthropology/W6WK1C3a">anthropology</a> of knowledge examines how knowledge is acquired, stored, retrieved, and communicated. It studies the social and cultural circumstances that affect how knowledge is reproduced and changes, covering the role of institutions like university departments and scientific journals as well as face-to-face discussions and online communications. This field has a broad concept of knowledge, encompassing various forms of understanding and culture, including practical skills. Unlike epistemology, it is not interested in whether a belief is true or justified but in how understanding is reproduced in society.<a class="footnote-ref" id="fnref:202" href="#fn:202">202</a> A closely related field, the <a href="/facts/Sociology_of_knowledge/6sYx7KnC">sociology of knowledge</a> has a similar conception of knowledge. It explores how physical, demographic, economic, and sociocultural factors impact knowledge. This field examines in what sociohistorical contexts knowledge emerges and the effects it has on people, for example, how socioeconomic conditions are related to the <a href="/facts/Dominant_ideology/5RYTJyG4">dominant ideology</a> in a society.<a class="footnote-ref" id="fnref:203" href="#fn:203">203</a>

<h2 id="history">History</h2>

Early reflections on the nature and sources of knowledge are found in ancient history. In <a href="/facts/Ancient_Greek_philosophy/LWEkp8JX">ancient Greek philosophy</a>, <a href="/facts/Plato/sPedMo74">Plato</a> (427–347 BCE) studied <a href="/facts/Episteme/x6cBomgK">what knowledge is</a>, examining how it differs from true <a href="/facts/Doxa/DeFG7pvG">opinion</a> by being based on good reasons.<a class="footnote-ref" id="fnref:204" href="#fn:204">204</a> He proposed that learning is <a href="/facts/Anamnesis_(philosophy)/eAEo1jdl">a form of recollection</a> in which the soul remembers what it already knew but had forgotten.<a class="footnote-ref" id="fnref:205" href="#fn:205">205</a><a class="footnote-ref" id="fnref:206" href="#fn:206">206</a> Plato's student <a href="/facts/Aristotle/U2bDlBFW">Aristotle</a> (384–322 BCE) was particularly interested in scientific knowledge, exploring the role of sensory experience and the process of making inferences from general principles.<a class="footnote-ref" id="fnref:207" href="#fn:207">207</a> Aristotle's ideas influenced the <a href="/facts/Hellenistic_philosophy/xCbJuVTV">Hellenistic schools of philosophy</a>, which began to arise in the 4th century BCE and included <a href="/facts/Epicureanism/qRaaJRg4">Epicureanism</a>, <a href="/facts/Stoicism/hQu81X5x">Stoicism</a>, and <a href="/facts/Philosophical_skepticism/xsNp72xg">skepticism</a>. The Epicureans had an <a href="/facts/Empiricism/f68IpCeE">empiricist</a> outlook, stating that sensations are always accurate and act as the supreme standard of judgments.<a class="footnote-ref" id="fnref:208" href="#fn:208">208</a> The Stoics defended a similar position but confined their trust to lucid and specific sensations, which they regarded as true.<a class="footnote-ref" id="fnref:209" href="#fn:209">209</a> The skeptics questioned that knowledge is possible, recommending instead <a href="/facts/Epoche/K8mK5L27">suspension of judgment</a> to attain a <a href="/facts/Ataraxia/Vx4IegNQ">state of tranquility</a>.<a class="footnote-ref" id="fnref:210" href="#fn:210">210</a> Emerging in the 3rd century CE and inspired by Plato's philosophy,<a class="footnote-ref" id="fnref:211" href="#fn:211">211</a> <a href="/facts/Neoplatonism/Tyq4uTG0">Neoplatonism</a> distinguished knowledge from true belief, arguing that knowledge is infallible and limited to the realm of immaterial forms.<a class="footnote-ref" id="fnref:212" href="#fn:212">212</a>

The <a href="/facts/Upanishads/hr64Hhdn">Upanishads</a>, philosophical scriptures composed in <a href="/facts/Ancient_India/ntYkAYDQ">ancient India</a> between 700 and 300 BCE, examined how people acquire knowledge, including the role of introspection, comparison, and deduction.<a class="footnote-ref" id="fnref:213" href="#fn:213">213</a> In the 6th century BCE, the school of <a href="/facts/Aj%25C3%25B1ana/EuIQpzqf">Ajñana</a> developed a radical skepticism questioning the possibility and usefulness of knowledge.<a class="footnote-ref" id="fnref:214" href="#fn:214">214</a> By contrast, the school of <a href="/facts/Nyaya/XXUBDXdE">Nyaya</a>, which emerged in the 2nd century BCE, asserted that knowledge is possible. It provided a systematic treatment of how people acquire knowledge, distinguishing between valid and invalid sources.<a class="footnote-ref" id="fnref:215" href="#fn:215">215</a> When <a href="/facts/Buddhist_philosophy/sp0HbHm7">Buddhist philosophers</a> became interested in epistemology, they relied on concepts developed in Nyaya and other traditions.<a class="footnote-ref" id="fnref:216" href="#fn:216">216</a> Buddhist philosopher <a href="/facts/Dharmakirti/yhzVdcUK">Dharmakirti</a> (6th or 7th century CE)<a class="footnote-ref" id="fnref:217" href="#fn:217">217</a> analyzed the process of knowing as a series of causally related events.<a class="footnote-ref" id="fnref:218" href="#fn:218">218</a>
Ancient <a href="/facts/Chinese_philosophy/Tx4ruDzB">Chinese philosophers</a> understood knowledge as an interconnected phenomenon fundamentally linked to ethical behavior and social involvement. Many saw wisdom as the goal of attaining knowledge.<a class="footnote-ref" id="fnref:219" href="#fn:219">219</a> <a href="/facts/Mozi/qCpj5kUI">Mozi</a> (470–391 BCE) proposed a pragmatic approach to knowledge using historical records, sensory evidence, and practical outcomes to validate beliefs.<a class="footnote-ref" id="fnref:220" href="#fn:220">220</a> <a href="/facts/Mencius/MYkMN9xA">Mencius</a> (c. 372–289 BCE) explored analogical reasoning as a source of knowledge and employed this method to criticize Mozi.<a class="footnote-ref" id="fnref:221" href="#fn:221">221</a> <a href="/facts/Xunzi_(philosopher)/wLuhYuta">Xunzi</a> (c. 310–220 BCE) aimed to combine empirical observation and rational inquiry. He emphasized the importance of clarity and standards of reasoning without excluding the role of feeling and emotion.<a class="footnote-ref" id="fnref:222" href="#fn:222">222</a>
The relation between <a href="/facts/Reason/tcBImN8J">reason</a> and <a href="/facts/Faith/ytlgRheF">faith</a> was a central topic in the <a href="/facts/Medieval_philosophy/f1PmX7FB">medieval period</a>.<a class="footnote-ref" id="fnref:223" href="#fn:223">223</a> In <a href="/facts/Islamic_philosophy/QSzAKr2j">Arabic–Persian philosophy</a>, <a href="/facts/Al-Farabi/8tnl33pR">al-Farabi</a> (c. 870–950) and <a href="/facts/Averroes/kPezHDV7">Averroes</a> (1126–1198) discussed how philosophy and <a href="/facts/Theology/N71Fyw2M">theology</a> interact, debating which one is a better vehicle to truth.<a class="footnote-ref" id="fnref:224" href="#fn:224">224</a> <a href="/facts/Al-Ghazali/haPCCftt">Al-Ghazali</a> (c. 1056–1111) <a href="/facts/Incoherence_of_the_Philosophers/7qBq1b3E">criticized many core teachings</a> of previous Islamic philosophers, saying that they relied on unproven assumptions that did not amount to knowledge.<a class="footnote-ref" id="fnref:225" href="#fn:225">225</a> Similarly in Western philosophy, <a href="/facts/Anselm_of_Canterbury/nqHCYwMl">Anselm of Canterbury</a> (1033–1109) proposed that theological teaching and philosophical inquiry are in harmony and complement each other.<a class="footnote-ref" id="fnref:226" href="#fn:226">226</a> Formulating a more critical approach, <a href="/facts/Peter_Abelard/1zeNKuAT">Peter Abelard</a> (1079–1142) argued against unquestioned theological authorities and said that all things are open to rational doubt.<a class="footnote-ref" id="fnref:227" href="#fn:227">227</a> Influenced by Aristotle, <a href="/facts/Thomas_Aquinas/h2vN2VkX">Thomas Aquinas</a> (1225–1274) developed an empiricist theory, stating that "nothing is in the intellect unless it first appeared in the senses".<a class="footnote-ref" id="fnref:228" href="#fn:228">228</a> According to an early form of <a href="/facts/Direct_realism/T9pXTSH3">direct realism</a> proposed by <a href="/facts/William_of_Ockham/swyfVda2">William of Ockham</a> (c. 1285–1349), perception of mind-independent objects happens directly without intermediaries.<a class="footnote-ref" id="fnref:229" href="#fn:229">229</a> Meanwhile, in 14th-century India, <a href="/facts/Ga%25E1%25B9%2585ge%25C5%259Ba/pp9eeuHw">Gaṅgeśa</a> developed a reliabilist theory of knowledge and considered the problems of testimony and fallacies.<a class="footnote-ref" id="fnref:230" href="#fn:230">230</a> In China, <a href="/facts/Wang_Yangming/lhSMee6R">Wang Yangming</a> (1472–1529) explored the unity of knowledge and action, holding that moral knowledge is inborn and can be attained by overcoming self-interest.<a class="footnote-ref" id="fnref:231" href="#fn:231">231</a>

The course of <a href="/facts/Modern_philosophy/oU1c0lel">modern philosophy</a> was shaped by <a href="/facts/Ren%25C3%25A9_Descartes/ohqj6DMf">René Descartes</a> (1596–1650), who stated that philosophy must begin from a position of indubitable knowledge of first principles. Inspired by skepticism, he aimed to find absolutely certain knowledge by encountering truths that cannot be doubted. He thought that this is the case for the assertion "<a href="/facts/I_think%2c_therefore_I_am/43EhppDy">I think, therefore I am</a>", from which he constructed the rest of his philosophical system.<a class="footnote-ref" id="fnref:232" href="#fn:232">232</a> Descartes, together with <a href="/facts/Baruch_Spinoza/CB9g9BbG">Baruch Spinoza</a> (1632–1677) and <a href="/facts/Gottfried_Wilhelm_Leibniz/cTc2er83">Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz</a> (1646–1716), belonged to the school of <a href="/facts/Rationalism/MNk171TG">rationalism</a>, which asserts that the mind possesses <a href="/facts/Innate_ideas/7FznTuwN">innate ideas</a> independent of experience.<a class="footnote-ref" id="fnref:233" href="#fn:233">233</a> <a href="/facts/John_Locke/NlpkCxcX">John Locke</a> (1632–1704) rejected this view in favor of an empiricism according to which the mind is a <a href="/facts/Blank_slate/esxlgDCh">blank slate</a>. This means that all ideas depend on experience, either as "ideas of sense", which are directly presented through the senses, or as "ideas of reflection", which the mind creates by reflecting on its own activities.<a class="footnote-ref" id="fnref:234" href="#fn:234">234</a> <a href="/facts/David_Hume/aTwlJ80V">David Hume</a> (1711–1776) used this idea to explore the limits of what people can know. He said that knowledge of facts is never certain, adding that knowledge of relations between ideas, like mathematical truths, can be certain but contains no information about the world.<a class="footnote-ref" id="fnref:235" href="#fn:235">235</a> <a href="/facts/Immanuel_Kant/vIxjdy6I">Immanuel Kant</a> (1724–1804) sought a middle ground between rationalism and empiricism by identifying a type of knowledge overlooked by Hume. For Kant, this knowledge pertains to principles that underlie and structure all experience, such as spatial and temporal relations and fundamental <a href="/facts/Categories_of_understanding/QIP0jeQw">categories of understanding</a>.<a class="footnote-ref" id="fnref:236" href="#fn:236">236</a>
In the 19th century and influenced by Kant's philosophy, <a href="/facts/Georg_Wilhelm_Friedrich_Hegel/5NXGjvSb">Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel</a> (1770–1831) rejected empiricism by arguing that sensory impressions alone cannot amount to knowledge since all knowledge is actively structured by the knowing subject.<a class="footnote-ref" id="fnref:237" href="#fn:237">237</a> <a href="/facts/John_Stuart_Mill/0QxUR9l7">John Stuart Mill</a> (1806–1873), by contrast, defended a wide-sweeping form of empiricism and explained knowledge of general truths through <a href="/facts/Inductive_reasoning/EJ992JJ9">inductive reasoning</a>.<a class="footnote-ref" id="fnref:238" href="#fn:238">238</a> <a href="/facts/Charles_Peirce/z76dNqhM">Charles Peirce</a> (1839–1914) thought that all knowledge is <a href="/facts/Fallible/2FeNGuMr">fallible</a>, emphasizing that knowledge seekers should remain open to revising their beliefs in light of new <a href="/facts/Evidence/d5IGUK0U">evidence</a>. He used this idea to argue against Cartesian foundationalism, which seeks absolutely certain truths.<a class="footnote-ref" id="fnref:239" href="#fn:239">239</a>
In the 20th century, fallibilism was further explored by <a href="/facts/J._L._Austin/h9FeyFnP">J. L. Austin</a> (1911–1960) and <a href="/facts/Karl_Popper/RpLqMrz5">Karl Popper</a> (1902–1994).<a class="footnote-ref" id="fnref:240" href="#fn:240">240</a> In <a href="/facts/Continental_philosophy/uVbXljJo">continental philosophy</a>, <a href="/facts/Edmund_Husserl/xKlMH2KN">Edmund Husserl</a> (1859–1938) applied the skeptical idea of suspending judgment to the <a href="/facts/Phenomenology_(philosophy)/AILzLkKx">study of experience</a>. By not judging whether an experience is accurate, he tried to describe its internal structure instead.<a class="footnote-ref" id="fnref:241" href="#fn:241">241</a> Influenced by earlier empiricists, <a href="/facts/Logical_positivists/Dc6XMTsc">logical positivists</a>, like <a href="/facts/A._J._Ayer/sRo5jQsp">A. J. Ayer</a> (1910–1989), said that all knowledge is either empirical or analytic, rejecting any form of metaphysical knowledge.<a class="footnote-ref" id="fnref:242" href="#fn:242">242</a> <a href="/facts/Bertrand_Russell/SRpwNX2U">Bertrand Russell</a> (1872–1970) developed an empiricist sense-datum theory, distinguishing between direct <a href="/facts/Knowledge_by_acquaintance/mIjvledD">knowledge by acquaintance</a> of sense data and indirect knowledge by description, which is inferred from knowledge by acquaintance.<a class="footnote-ref" id="fnref:243" href="#fn:243">243</a> <a href="/facts/Common_sense/TlPpRoAx">Common sense</a> had a central place in <a href="/facts/G._E._Moore/JBPw5mT0">G. E. Moore</a>'s (1873–1958) epistemology. He used trivial observations, like the fact that he has two hands, to argue against abstract philosophical theories that deviate from common sense.<a class="footnote-ref" id="fnref:244" href="#fn:244">244</a> <a href="/facts/Ordinary_language_philosophy/pA43hoje">Ordinary language philosophy</a>, as practiced by the late <a href="/facts/Ludwig_Wittgenstein/wN9bAgMz">Ludwig Wittgenstein</a> (1889–1951), is a similar approach that tries to extract epistemological insights from how ordinary language is used.<a class="footnote-ref" id="fnref:245" href="#fn:245">245</a>
<a href="/facts/Edmund_Gettier/m2xoRfAt">Edmund Gettier</a> (1927–2021) conceived <a href="/facts/Gettier_problem/bBQT9H7o">counterexamples</a> against the idea that knowledge is justified true belief. These counterexamples prompted many philosophers to suggest alternative <a href="/facts/Definitions_of_knowledge/hytLblxN">definitions of knowledge</a>.<a class="footnote-ref" id="fnref:246" href="#fn:246">246</a> Developed by philosophers such as <a href="/facts/Alvin_Goldman/f0RVpjLq">Alvin Goldman</a> (1938–2024), <a href="/facts/Reliabilism/QH4fM0yk">reliabilism</a> emerged as one of the alternatives, asserting that knowledge requires reliable sources and shifting the focus away from justification.<a class="footnote-ref" id="fnref:247" href="#fn:247">247</a> <a href="/facts/Virtue_epistemology/MwDTtdRk">Virtue epistemologists</a>, such as <a href="/facts/Ernest_Sosa/nBE9g1nE">Ernest Sosa</a> (1940–present) and <a href="/facts/Linda_Zagzebski/mRuUJnUv">Linda Zagzebski</a> (1946–present), analyse belief formation in terms of the intellectual virtues or cognitive competencies involved in the process.<a class="footnote-ref" id="fnref:248" href="#fn:248">248</a> <a href="/facts/Naturalized_epistemology/08LXsJsX">Naturalized epistemology</a>, as conceived by <a href="/facts/Willard_Van_Orman_Quine/2RrhATxa">Willard Van Orman Quine</a> (1908–2000), employs concepts and ideas from the natural sciences to formulate its theories.<a class="footnote-ref" id="fnref:249" href="#fn:249">249</a> Other developments in late 20th-century epistemology were the emergence of <a href="/facts/Social_epistemology/pqo5MLYH">social</a>, <a href="/facts/Feminist_epistemology/dnb3N1oJ">feminist</a>, and <a href="/facts/Historical_epistemology/s0KPGe8v">historical epistemology</a>.<a class="footnote-ref" id="fnref:250" href="#fn:250">250</a>

<h2 id="see-also">See also</h2>
<ul>
<li>Philosophy portal</li></ul>
For a topical guide, see <a href="/facts/Outline_of_epistemology/5uRhyX82">Outline of epistemology</a>.
<ul><li><a href="/facts/Epistemological_pluralism/vbQby8yN">Epistemological pluralism</a> – School of thought in epistemology</li>
<li><a href="/facts/Knowledge_falsification/5VnFGrEC">Knowledge falsification</a> – Deliberate misrepresentation of knowledge</li>
<li><a href="/facts/Logology_(science)/7plUGmlq">Logology (science)</a> – Study of all aspects of science and its practitioners</li>
<li><a href="/facts/Reformed_epistemology/2kUtA03D">Reformed epistemology</a> – School of philosophical thought</li>
<li><a href="/facts/Theory_of_Knowledge_(IB_Course)/PHvBDMsK">Theory of Knowledge (IB Course)</a> – Compulsory International Baccalaureate subjectPages displaying short descriptions of redirect targets</li></ul>

<h3>Notes</h3>

<h3>Citations</h3>

<h3>Bibliography</h3>

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<h2 id="external-links">External links</h2>

<h2 id="references">References</h2>

<ol>
<li id="fn:1">Less commonly, the term "gnoseology" is also used as a synonym.[1] <a href="/wiki/Gnoseology" target="_blank">/wiki/Gnoseology</a> <a href="#fnref:1" class="footnote-back-ref">↩</a></li>
<li id="fn:2">Truncellito, Lead sectionBlaauw & Pritchard 2005, pp. 49–50Crumley II 2009, p. 16Carter & Littlejohn 2021, Introduction: 1. What Is Epistemology?Moser 2005, p. 3 - Truncellito, David A. "Epistemology". Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Archived from the original on 13 January 2022. Retrieved 12 July 2024. <a href="https://iep.utm.edu/epistemo/" target="_blank">https://iep.utm.edu/epistemo/</a> <a href="#fnref:2" class="footnote-back-ref">↩</a></li>
<li id="fn:3">Fumerton 2006, pp. 1–2Moser 2005, p. 4 - Fumerton, Richard A. (2006). Epistemology. Blackwell. ISBN 978-1-4051-2566-6. <a href="#fnref:3" class="footnote-back-ref">↩</a></li>
<li id="fn:4">Brenner 1993, p. 16Palmquist 2010, p. 800Jenicek 2018, p. 31 - Brenner, William H. (1993). Logic and Philosophy: An Integrated Introduction. University of Notre Dame Press. ISBN 978-0-268-15898-9. <a href="https://books.google.com/books?id=DFoFDgAAQBAJ&pg=PT16" target="_blank">https://books.google.com/books?id=DFoFDgAAQBAJ&pg=PT16</a> <a href="#fnref:4" class="footnote-back-ref">↩</a></li>
<li id="fn:5">Steup & Neta 2024, Lead sectionMoss 2021, pp. 1–2 - Steup, Matthias; Neta, Ram (2024). "Epistemology". The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Metaphysics Research Lab, Stanford University. Archived from the original on 21 July 2020. Retrieved 12 July 2024. <a href="https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/epistemology/" target="_blank">https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/epistemology/</a> <a href="#fnref:5" class="footnote-back-ref">↩</a></li>
<li id="fn:6">Crumley II 2009, p. 16Carter & Littlejohn 2021, Introduction: 1. What Is Epistemology? - Crumley II, Jack S. (2009). An Introduction to Epistemology (2 ed.). Broadview Press. ISBN 978-1-77048-156-5. <a href="https://books.google.com/books?id=62gYgpeVT28C" target="_blank">https://books.google.com/books?id=62gYgpeVT28C</a> <a href="#fnref:6" class="footnote-back-ref">↩</a></li>
<li id="fn:7">Normative disciplines study how things ought to be, focusing on norms of right and wrong or criteria of evaluation. They contrast with descriptive disciplines, which examine individual facts and general patterns of how things actually are.[7] <a href="#fnref:7" class="footnote-back-ref">↩</a></li>
<li id="fn:8">Crumley II 2009, p. 16 - Crumley II, Jack S. (2009). An Introduction to Epistemology (2 ed.). Broadview Press. ISBN 978-1-77048-156-5. <a href="https://books.google.com/books?id=62gYgpeVT28C" target="_blank">https://books.google.com/books?id=62gYgpeVT28C</a> <a href="#fnref:8" class="footnote-back-ref">↩</a></li>
<li id="fn:9">Despite this contrast, epistemologists may rely on insights from the empirical sciences in formulating their normative theories.[9] According to one interpretation, the aim of naturalized epistemology is to answer descriptive questions, but this characterization is disputed.[10] <a href="#fnref:9" class="footnote-back-ref">↩</a></li>
<li id="fn:10">Audi 2003, pp. 258–259Wolenski 2004, pp. 3–4Campbell 2024, Lead section - Audi, Robert (2003). Epistemology: A Contemporary Introduction to the Theory of Knowledge (2 ed.). Routledge. ISBN 978-0-415-28108-9. <a href="#fnref:10" class="footnote-back-ref">↩</a></li>
<li id="fn:11">Steup & Neta 2024, Lead sectionScott 2002, p. 30Wolenski 2004, p. 3 - Steup, Matthias; Neta, Ram (2024). "Epistemology". The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Metaphysics Research Lab, Stanford University. Archived from the original on 21 July 2020. Retrieved 12 July 2024. <a href="https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/epistemology/" target="_blank">https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/epistemology/</a> <a href="#fnref:11" class="footnote-back-ref">↩</a></li>
<li id="fn:12">As a label for a branch of philosophy, the term "epistemology" was first employed in 1854 by James E. Ferrier.[13] In a different context, the word was used as early as 1847 in New York's Eclectic Magazine.[14] As the term had not been coined before the 19th century, earlier philosophers did not explicitly label their theories as epistemology and often explored it in combination with psychology.[15] According to philosopher Thomas Sturm, it is an open question how relevant the epistemological problems addressed by past philosophers are to contemporary philosophy.[16] <a href="#fnref:12" class="footnote-back-ref">↩</a></li>
<li id="fn:13">Goldman & McGrath 2015, pp. 3–6Truncellito, § 2. The Nature of Propositional KnowledgeStroll 2023, § Issues in epistemology - Goldman, Alvin I.; McGrath, Matthew (2015). Epistemology: A Contemporary Introduction. Oxford University Press. ISBN 978-0-19-998112-0. <a href="#fnref:13" class="footnote-back-ref">↩</a></li>
<li id="fn:14">Zagzebski 1999, p. 109Steup & Neta 2024, Lead section, § 1. The Varieties of Cognitive SuccessHarperCollins 2022a - Zagzebski, Linda (1999). "What Is Knowledge?". In Greco, John; Sosa, Ernest (eds.). The Blackwell Guide to Epistemology. Blackwell. pp. 92–116. doi:10.1002/9781405164863.ch3. ISBN 978-0-631-20290-5. S2CID 158886670. Archived from the original on 2 June 2022. Retrieved 12 June 2022. <a href="https://philpapers.org/rec/ZAGWIK" target="_blank">https://philpapers.org/rec/ZAGWIK</a> <a href="#fnref:14" class="footnote-back-ref">↩</a></li>
<li id="fn:15">Klausen 2015, pp. 813–818Lackey 2021, pp. 111–112 - Klausen, Søren Harnow (2015). "Group Knowledge: A Real-world Approach". Synthese. 192 (3): 813–839. doi:10.1007/s11229-014-0589-9. ISSN 0039-7857. S2CID 207246817. Archived from the original on 1 February 2024. Retrieved 13 November 2022. <a href="https://portal.findresearcher.sdu.dk/da/publications/bbee5873-28f2-46d5-94b6-49ef5b18a38b" target="_blank">https://portal.findresearcher.sdu.dk/da/publications/bbee5873-28f2-46d5-94b6-49ef5b18a38b</a> <a href="#fnref:15" class="footnote-back-ref">↩</a></li>
<li id="fn:16">HarperCollins 2022aMagee & Popper 1971, pp. 74–75HarperCollins 2022bWalton 2005, pp. 59, 64 - HarperCollins (2022a). "Knowledge". The American Heritage Dictionary. HarperCollins. Archived from the original on 29 November 2022. Retrieved 25 October 2022. <a href="https://www.ahdictionary.com/word/search.html?q=knowledge" target="_blank">https://www.ahdictionary.com/word/search.html?q=knowledge</a> <a href="#fnref:16" class="footnote-back-ref">↩</a></li>
<li id="fn:17">Gross & McGoey 2015, pp. 1–4Haas & Vogt 2015, pp. 17–18Blaauw & Pritchard 2005, p. 79 - Gross, Matthias; McGoey, Linsey (2015). "Introduction". In Gross, Matthias; McGoey, Linsey (eds.). Routledge International Handbook of Ignorance Studies. Routledge. pp. 1–14. doi:10.4324/9781003100607. ISBN 978-1-317-96467-4. Retrieved 19 August 2024. <a href="https://books.google.com/books?id=D75hCQAAQBAJ" target="_blank">https://books.google.com/books?id=D75hCQAAQBAJ</a> <a href="#fnref:17" class="footnote-back-ref">↩</a></li>
<li id="fn:18">Markie & Folescu 2023, § 1. IntroductionRescher 2009, pp. 2, 6Stoltz 2021, p. 120 - Markie, Peter; Folescu, M. (2023). "Rationalism Vs. Empiricism". The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Metaphysics Research Lab, Stanford University. Archived from the original on 9 August 2019. Retrieved 29 February 2024. <a href="https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/rationalism-empiricism/" target="_blank">https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/rationalism-empiricism/</a> <a href="#fnref:18" class="footnote-back-ref">↩</a></li>
<li id="fn:19">Rescher 2009, pp. 10, 93Rescher 2009a, pp. x–xi, 57–58Dika 2023, p. 163 - Rescher, Nicholas (2009). Unknowability: An Inquiry into the Limits of Knowledge. Lexington Books. ISBN 978-0-7391-3615-7. <a href="#fnref:19" class="footnote-back-ref">↩</a></li>
<li id="fn:20">Rescher 2009, pp. 2, 6Rescher 2009a, pp. 140–141 - Rescher, Nicholas (2009). Unknowability: An Inquiry into the Limits of Knowledge. Lexington Books. ISBN 978-0-7391-3615-7. <a href="#fnref:20" class="footnote-back-ref">↩</a></li>
<li id="fn:21">Wilson 2008, p. 314Pritchard 2005, p. 18Hetherington, "Fallibilism", Lead section, § 8. Implications of Fallibilism: No Knowledge? - Green, Christopher R. (2022). "Epistemology of Testimony". Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Archived from the original on 7 March 2022. Retrieved 8 June 2022.Wilson, Fred (2008). The External World and Our Knowledge of It: Hume's Critical Realism, an Exposition and a Defence. University of Toronto Press. ISBN 978-0-8020-9764-4. <a href="https://iep.utm.edu/ep-testi/" target="_blank">https://iep.utm.edu/ep-testi/</a> <a href="#fnref:21" class="footnote-back-ref">↩</a></li>
<li id="fn:22">Klein 1998, § 1. The Varieties of KnowledgeHetherington, "Knowledge", § 1b. Knowledge-ThatStroll 2023, § The Nature of Knowledge - Klein, Peter D. (1998). "Knowledge, Concept of". In Craig, Edward (ed.). Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Routledge. doi:10.4324/9780415249126-P031-1. ISBN 978-0-415-25069-6. Archived from the original on 13 June 2022. Retrieved 13 June 2022. <a href="https://www.rep.routledge.com/articles/thematic/knowledge-concept-of/v-1" target="_blank">https://www.rep.routledge.com/articles/thematic/knowledge-concept-of/v-1</a> <a href="#fnref:22" class="footnote-back-ref">↩</a></li>
<li id="fn:23">Other synonyms include declarative knowledge and descriptive knowledge.[30] <a href="#fnref:23" class="footnote-back-ref">↩</a></li>
<li id="fn:24">Morrison 2005, p. 371Reif 2008, p. 33Zagzebski 1999, p. 93 - Morrison, Robert (2005). The Cambridge Handbook of Thinking and Reasoning. Cambridge University Press. p. 371. ISBN 978-0-521-82417-0. <a href="https://books.google.com/books?id=znbkHaC8QeMC&pg=PA371" target="_blank">https://books.google.com/books?id=znbkHaC8QeMC&pg=PA371</a> <a href="#fnref:24" class="footnote-back-ref">↩</a></li>
<li id="fn:25">Pritchard 2013, p. 4 - Pritchard, Duncan (2013). What Is This Thing Called Knowledge?. Routledge. ISBN 978-1-134-57367-7. <a href="https://books.google.com/books?id=sfUhAQAAQBAJ&pg=PA11" target="_blank">https://books.google.com/books?id=sfUhAQAAQBAJ&pg=PA11</a> <a href="#fnref:25" class="footnote-back-ref">↩</a></li>
<li id="fn:26">Merriënboer 1997, p. 32Klauer et al. 2016, pp. 105–6Pavese 2022, Lead section - Merriënboer, Jeroen J. G. van (1997). Training Complex Cognitive Skills: A Four-Component Instructional Design Model for Technical Training. Educational Technology. p. 32. ISBN 978-0-87778-298-8. <a href="https://books.google.com/books?id=o0I3IXLfXuAC&pg=PA32" target="_blank">https://books.google.com/books?id=o0I3IXLfXuAC&pg=PA32</a> <a href="#fnref:26" class="footnote-back-ref">↩</a></li>
<li id="fn:27">Stroll 2023, § A Priori and a Posteriori KnowledgeBaehr, "A Priori and A Posteriori", Lead sectionRussell 2020, Lead section - Stroll, Avrum (2023). "Epistemology". Encyclopædia Britannica. Archived from the original on 10 July 2019. Retrieved 20 May 2022. <a href="https://www.britannica.com/topic/epistemology" target="_blank">https://www.britannica.com/topic/epistemology</a> <a href="#fnref:27" class="footnote-back-ref">↩</a></li>
<li id="fn:28">The distinction came to prominence in the 17th century and acted as a crucial factor in the philosophies of David Hume and Immanuel Kant.[39] <a href="/wiki/David_Hume" target="_blank">/wiki/David_Hume</a> <a href="#fnref:28" class="footnote-back-ref">↩</a></li>
<li id="fn:29">Russell 2020, Lead sectionBaehr, "A Priori and A Posteriori", Lead section, § 1. An Initial CharacterizationMoser 2016, Lead section - Russell, Bruce (2020). "A Priori Justification and Knowledge". The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Metaphysics Research Lab, Stanford University. Archived from the original on 12 August 2021. Retrieved 18 September 2022. <a href="https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/apriori/" target="_blank">https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/apriori/</a> <a href="#fnref:29" class="footnote-back-ref">↩</a></li>
<li id="fn:30">Carter & Littlejohn 2021, § 3. The AprioriPopper 2014, 2. Deductivism and Inductivism - Carter, J. Adam; Littlejohn, Clayton (2021). This Is Epistemology: An Introduction. John Wiley & Sons. ISBN 978-1-119-68034-5. <a href="https://books.google.com/books?id=n_ArEAAAQBAJ" target="_blank">https://books.google.com/books?id=n_ArEAAAQBAJ</a> <a href="#fnref:30" class="footnote-back-ref">↩</a></li>
<li id="fn:31">Juhl & Loomis 2009, pp. ix–x, 1–2Russell 2023Pradhan 2019, p. 75 - Juhl, Cory; Loomis, Eric (2009). Analyticity. Routledge. ISBN 978-1-135-27841-0. <a href="https://books.google.com/books?id=8kiPAgAAQBAJ&pg=PR9" target="_blank">https://books.google.com/books?id=8kiPAgAAQBAJ&pg=PR9</a> <a href="#fnref:31" class="footnote-back-ref">↩</a></li>
<li id="fn:32">The accuracy of the label traditional analysis is debated since it suggests widespread acceptance within the history of philosophy, an idea not shared by all scholars.[44] <a href="#fnref:32" class="footnote-back-ref">↩</a></li>
<li id="fn:33">Ichikawa & Steup 2018, Lead sectionCrumley II 2009, pp. 53–54 - Ichikawa, Jonathan Jenkins; Steup, Matthias (2018). "The Analysis of Knowledge". The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Metaphysics Research Lab, Stanford University. Archived from the original on 2 May 2022. Retrieved 29 March 2023. <a href="https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/knowledge-analysis/" target="_blank">https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/knowledge-analysis/</a> <a href="#fnref:33" class="footnote-back-ref">↩</a></li>
<li id="fn:34">Crumley II 2009, pp. 61–62Ichikawa & Steup 2018, § 3. The Gettier Problem - Crumley II, Jack S. (2009). An Introduction to Epistemology (2 ed.). Broadview Press. ISBN 978-1-77048-156-5. <a href="https://books.google.com/books?id=62gYgpeVT28C" target="_blank">https://books.google.com/books?id=62gYgpeVT28C</a> <a href="#fnref:34" class="footnote-back-ref">↩</a></li>
<li id="fn:35">Rodríguez 2018, pp. 29–32Goldman 1976, pp. 771–773Sudduth, § 2b. Defeasibility Analyses and Propositional DefeatersIchikawa & Steup 2018, § 10.2 Fake Barn Cases - Rodríguez, Ángel García (2018). "Fake Barns and Our Epistemological Theorizing". Crítica: Revista Hispanoamericana de Filosofía. 50 (148): 29–54. doi:10.22201/iifs.18704905e.2018.02. ISSN 0011-1503. JSTOR 26767766. S2CID 171635198. <a href="https://doi.org/10.22201%2Fiifs.18704905e.2018.02" target="_blank">https://doi.org/10.22201%2Fiifs.18704905e.2018.02</a> <a href="#fnref:35" class="footnote-back-ref">↩</a></li>
<li id="fn:36">Crumley II 2009, pp. 61–62Ichikawa & Steup 2018, § 8. Epistemic Luck - Crumley II, Jack S. (2009). An Introduction to Epistemology (2 ed.). Broadview Press. ISBN 978-1-77048-156-5. <a href="https://books.google.com/books?id=62gYgpeVT28C" target="_blank">https://books.google.com/books?id=62gYgpeVT28C</a> <a href="#fnref:36" class="footnote-back-ref">↩</a></li>
<li id="fn:37">Pritchard 2005, pp. 1–4Broncano-Berrocal & Carter 2017, Lead section - Pritchard, Duncan (2005). Epistemic Luck. Clarendon Press. ISBN 978-0-19-153566-6. <a href="https://books.google.com/books?id=DGVcCIDbUQ8C&pg=PA1" target="_blank">https://books.google.com/books?id=DGVcCIDbUQ8C&pg=PA1</a> <a href="#fnref:37" class="footnote-back-ref">↩</a></li>
<li id="fn:38">Crumley II 2009, p. 65Ichikawa & Steup 2018, Lead section, § 3. The Gettier Problem - Crumley II, Jack S. (2009). An Introduction to Epistemology (2 ed.). Broadview Press. ISBN 978-1-77048-156-5. <a href="https://books.google.com/books?id=62gYgpeVT28C" target="_blank">https://books.google.com/books?id=62gYgpeVT28C</a> <a href="#fnref:38" class="footnote-back-ref">↩</a></li>
<li id="fn:39">Crumley II 2009, pp. 67–68 - Crumley II, Jack S. (2009). An Introduction to Epistemology (2 ed.). Broadview Press. ISBN 978-1-77048-156-5. <a href="https://books.google.com/books?id=62gYgpeVT28C" target="_blank">https://books.google.com/books?id=62gYgpeVT28C</a> <a href="#fnref:39" class="footnote-back-ref">↩</a></li>
<li id="fn:40">Ichikawa & Steup 2018, § 6.1 Reliabilist Theories of Knowledge - Ichikawa, Jonathan Jenkins; Steup, Matthias (2018). "The Analysis of Knowledge". The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Metaphysics Research Lab, Stanford University. Archived from the original on 2 May 2022. Retrieved 29 March 2023. <a href="https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/knowledge-analysis/" target="_blank">https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/knowledge-analysis/</a> <a href="#fnref:40" class="footnote-back-ref">↩</a></li>
<li id="fn:41">Ichikawa & Steup 2018, § 5.1 Sensitivity - Ichikawa, Jonathan Jenkins; Steup, Matthias (2018). "The Analysis of Knowledge". The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Metaphysics Research Lab, Stanford University. Archived from the original on 2 May 2022. Retrieved 29 March 2023. <a href="https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/knowledge-analysis/" target="_blank">https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/knowledge-analysis/</a> <a href="#fnref:41" class="footnote-back-ref">↩</a></li>
<li id="fn:42">Crumley II 2009, p. 75Ichikawa & Steup 2018, § 4. No False Lemmas - Crumley II, Jack S. (2009). An Introduction to Epistemology (2 ed.). Broadview Press. ISBN 978-1-77048-156-5. <a href="https://books.google.com/books?id=62gYgpeVT28C" target="_blank">https://books.google.com/books?id=62gYgpeVT28C</a> <a href="#fnref:42" class="footnote-back-ref">↩</a></li>
<li id="fn:43">Crumley II 2009, p. 69 - Crumley II, Jack S. (2009). An Introduction to Epistemology (2 ed.). Broadview Press. ISBN 978-1-77048-156-5. <a href="https://books.google.com/books?id=62gYgpeVT28C" target="_blank">https://books.google.com/books?id=62gYgpeVT28C</a> <a href="#fnref:43" class="footnote-back-ref">↩</a></li>
<li id="fn:44">Ichikawa & Steup 2018, § 3. The Gettier Problem, § 7. Is Knowledge Analyzable?Zagzebski 1999, pp. 93–94, 104–105Steup & Neta 2024, § 2.3 Knowing Facts - Ichikawa, Jonathan Jenkins; Steup, Matthias (2018). "The Analysis of Knowledge". The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Metaphysics Research Lab, Stanford University. Archived from the original on 2 May 2022. Retrieved 29 March 2023. <a href="https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/knowledge-analysis/" target="_blank">https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/knowledge-analysis/</a> <a href="#fnref:44" class="footnote-back-ref">↩</a></li>
<li id="fn:45">Ichikawa & Steup 2018, § 7. Is Knowledge Analyzable? - Ichikawa, Jonathan Jenkins; Steup, Matthias (2018). "The Analysis of Knowledge". The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Metaphysics Research Lab, Stanford University. Archived from the original on 2 May 2022. Retrieved 29 March 2023. <a href="https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/knowledge-analysis/" target="_blank">https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/knowledge-analysis/</a> <a href="#fnref:45" class="footnote-back-ref">↩</a></li>
<li id="fn:46">Degenhardt 2019, pp. 1–6Pritchard 2013, pp. 10–11Olsson 2011, pp. 874–875 - Degenhardt, M. A. B. (2019). Education and the Value of Knowledge. Routledge. pp. 1–6. ISBN 978-1-000-62799-2. <a href="https://books.google.com/books?id=FuCsDwAAQBAJ&pg=PA1" target="_blank">https://books.google.com/books?id=FuCsDwAAQBAJ&pg=PA1</a> <a href="#fnref:46" class="footnote-back-ref">↩</a></li>
<li id="fn:47">McCormick 2014, p. 42 - McCormick, Miriam Schleifer (2014). Believing Against the Evidence: Agency and the Ethics of Belief. Routledge. ISBN 978-1-136-68268-1. <a href="https://books.google.com/books?id=3BAhBQAAQBAJ&pg=PA42" target="_blank">https://books.google.com/books?id=3BAhBQAAQBAJ&pg=PA42</a> <a href="#fnref:47" class="footnote-back-ref">↩</a></li>
<li id="fn:48">Pritchard 2013, pp. 11–12 - Pritchard, Duncan (2013). What Is This Thing Called Knowledge?. Routledge. ISBN 978-1-134-57367-7. <a href="https://books.google.com/books?id=sfUhAQAAQBAJ&pg=PA11" target="_blank">https://books.google.com/books?id=sfUhAQAAQBAJ&pg=PA11</a> <a href="#fnref:48" class="footnote-back-ref">↩</a></li>
<li id="fn:49">Stehr & Adolf 2016, pp. 483–485Powell 2020, pp. 132–133Meirmans et al. 2019, pp. 754–756Degenhardt 2019, pp. 1–6 - Stehr, Nico; Adolf, Marian T. (2016). "The Price of Knowledge". Social Epistemology. 30 (5–6): 483–512. doi:10.1080/02691728.2016.1172366. ISSN 1464-5297. <a href="https://doi.org/10.1080%2F02691728.2016.1172366" target="_blank">https://doi.org/10.1080%2F02691728.2016.1172366</a> <a href="#fnref:49" class="footnote-back-ref">↩</a></li>
<li id="fn:50">Pritchard, Turri & Carter 2022, § 1. Value ProblemsOlsson 2011, pp. 874–875Greco 2021, § The Value of Knowledge - Pritchard, Duncan; Turri, John; Carter, J. Adam (2022). "The Value of Knowledge". The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Metaphysics Research Lab, Stanford University. Archived from the original on 10 July 2022. Retrieved 17 August 2024. <a href="https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/knowledge-value/" target="_blank">https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/knowledge-value/</a> <a href="#fnref:50" class="footnote-back-ref">↩</a></li>
<li id="fn:51">Olsson 2011, pp. 874–875Pritchard, Turri & Carter 2022, § 1. Value ProblemsPlato 2002, pp. 89–90, 97b–98a - Olsson, Erik J (2011). "The Value of Knowledge: The Value of Knowledge". Philosophy Compass. 6 (12): 874–883. doi:10.1111/j.1747-9991.2011.00425.x. ISSN 1747-9991. S2CID 143034920. <a href="https://doi.org/10.1111%2Fj.1747-9991.2011.00425.x" target="_blank">https://doi.org/10.1111%2Fj.1747-9991.2011.00425.x</a> <a href="#fnref:51" class="footnote-back-ref">↩</a></li>
<li id="fn:52">Olsson 2011, p. 875Greco 2021, § The Value of Knowledge - Olsson, Erik J (2011). "The Value of Knowledge: The Value of Knowledge". Philosophy Compass. 6 (12): 874–883. doi:10.1111/j.1747-9991.2011.00425.x. ISSN 1747-9991. S2CID 143034920. <a href="https://doi.org/10.1111%2Fj.1747-9991.2011.00425.x" target="_blank">https://doi.org/10.1111%2Fj.1747-9991.2011.00425.x</a> <a href="#fnref:52" class="footnote-back-ref">↩</a></li>
<li id="fn:53">Pritchard, Turri & Carter 2022, § 6. Other Accounts of the Value of Knowledge - Pritchard, Duncan; Turri, John; Carter, J. Adam (2022). "The Value of Knowledge". The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Metaphysics Research Lab, Stanford University. Archived from the original on 10 July 2022. Retrieved 17 August 2024. <a href="https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/knowledge-value/" target="_blank">https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/knowledge-value/</a> <a href="#fnref:53" class="footnote-back-ref">↩</a></li>
<li id="fn:54">Pritchard 2013, pp. 15–16Greco 2021, § The Value of Knowledge - Pritchard, Duncan (2013). What Is This Thing Called Knowledge?. Routledge. ISBN 978-1-134-57367-7. <a href="https://books.google.com/books?id=sfUhAQAAQBAJ&pg=PA11" target="_blank">https://books.google.com/books?id=sfUhAQAAQBAJ&pg=PA11</a> <a href="#fnref:54" class="footnote-back-ref">↩</a></li>
<li id="fn:55">Braddon-Mitchell & Jackson 2011, Lead sectionBunnin & Yu 2008, pp. 80–81Dretske 2005, p. 85Crumley II 2009, p. 18 - Braddon-Mitchell, David; Jackson, Frank (2011). "Belief". Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Routledge. doi:10.4324/9780415249126-V006-2. ISBN 978-0-415-25069-6. Archived from the original on 22 August 2024. Retrieved 21 August 2024. <a href="https://www.rep.routledge.com/articles/thematic/belief/v-2" target="_blank">https://www.rep.routledge.com/articles/thematic/belief/v-2</a> <a href="#fnref:55" class="footnote-back-ref">↩</a></li>
<li id="fn:56">Braddon-Mitchell & Jackson 2011, Lead sectionSchwitzgebel 2024, Lead section, § 1.1 RepresentationalismSchwitzgebel 2011, pp. 14–15 - Braddon-Mitchell, David; Jackson, Frank (2011). "Belief". Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Routledge. doi:10.4324/9780415249126-V006-2. ISBN 978-0-415-25069-6. Archived from the original on 22 August 2024. Retrieved 21 August 2024. <a href="https://www.rep.routledge.com/articles/thematic/belief/v-2" target="_blank">https://www.rep.routledge.com/articles/thematic/belief/v-2</a> <a href="#fnref:56" class="footnote-back-ref">↩</a></li>
<li id="fn:57">Schwitzgebel 2024, § 1.2 DispositionalismSchwitzgebel 2011, pp. 17–18 - Schwitzgebel, Eric (2024). "Belief". The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Metaphysics Research Lab, Stanford University. Archived from the original on 15 November 2019. Retrieved 13 August 2024. <a href="https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/belief/" target="_blank">https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/belief/</a> <a href="#fnref:57" class="footnote-back-ref">↩</a></li>
<li id="fn:58">Schwitzgebel 2024, § 1.5 Eliminativism, Instrumentalism, and FictionalismSchwitzgebel 2011, p. 20 - Schwitzgebel, Eric (2024). "Belief". The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Metaphysics Research Lab, Stanford University. Archived from the original on 15 November 2019. Retrieved 13 August 2024. <a href="https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/belief/" target="_blank">https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/belief/</a> <a href="#fnref:58" class="footnote-back-ref">↩</a></li>
<li id="fn:59">Blaauw & Pritchard 2005, pp. 14–15Schwitzgebel 2024, § 2.3 Degree of Belief, § 2.5 Belief and Knowledge - Blaauw, Martijn; Pritchard, Duncan (2005). Epistemology A–Z. Edinburgh University Press. ISBN 978-0-7486-2213-9. <a href="#fnref:59" class="footnote-back-ref">↩</a></li>
<li id="fn:60">Dretske 2005, p. 85Lowe 2005, p. 926Crumley II 2009, p. 18 - Dretske, Fred (2005). "Belief". In Honderich, Ted (ed.). The Oxford Companion to Philosophy. Oxford University Press. p. 85. ISBN 978-0-19-926479-7. <a href="#fnref:60" class="footnote-back-ref">↩</a></li>
<li id="fn:61">Lowe 2005, p. 926Dowden & Swartz, § 3. Correspondence TheoryLynch 2011, pp. 3–5Crumley II 2009, p. 58 - Lowe, E. J. (2005). "Truth". In Honderich, Ted (ed.). The Oxford Companion to Philosophy. Oxford University Press. pp. 926–927. ISBN 978-0-19-926479-7. <a href="#fnref:61" class="footnote-back-ref">↩</a></li>
<li id="fn:62">Glanzberg 2023, § 1.2 The Coherence TheoryLowe 2005, pp. 926–927Lynch 2011, p. 3Crumley II 2009, p. 58 - Glanzberg, Michael (2023). "Truth". The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Metaphysics Research Lab, Stanford University. Archived from the original on 20 January 2022. Retrieved 13 August 2024. <a href="https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/truth/" target="_blank">https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/truth/</a> <a href="#fnref:62" class="footnote-back-ref">↩</a></li>
<li id="fn:63">Lynch 2011, pp. 5–7, 10Glanzberg 2023, § 1. The Neo-classical Theories of Truth, § 2. Tarski's Theory of Truth, § 4.4 Truth Pluralism, § 5. DeflationismBlaauw & Pritchard 2005, pp. 148–149 - Lynch, Michael P. (2011). "Truth". In Bernecker, Sven; Pritchard, Duncan (eds.). The Routledge Companion to Epistemology. Routledge. pp. 3–13. ISBN 978-1-136-88200-5. <a href="#fnref:63" class="footnote-back-ref">↩</a></li>
<li id="fn:64">Lynch 2011, p. 5Blaauw & Pritchard 2005, p. 148 - Lynch, Michael P. (2011). "Truth". In Bernecker, Sven; Pritchard, Duncan (eds.). The Routledge Companion to Epistemology. Routledge. pp. 3–13. ISBN 978-1-136-88200-5. <a href="#fnref:64" class="footnote-back-ref">↩</a></li>
<li id="fn:65">Goldman & Bender 2005, p. 465Kvanvig 2011, pp. 25–26 - Goldman, Alvin; Bender, John (2005). "Justification, Epistemic". In Honderich, Ted (ed.). The Oxford Companion to Philosophy. Oxford University Press. p. 465. ISBN 978-0-19-926479-7. <a href="#fnref:65" class="footnote-back-ref">↩</a></li>
<li id="fn:66">Goldman & Bender 2005, p. 465Kvanvig 2011, pp. 25–26 - Goldman, Alvin; Bender, John (2005). "Justification, Epistemic". In Honderich, Ted (ed.). The Oxford Companion to Philosophy. Oxford University Press. p. 465. ISBN 978-0-19-926479-7. <a href="#fnref:66" class="footnote-back-ref">↩</a></li>
<li id="fn:67">Crumley II 2009, pp. 83–84Olsson 2016 - Crumley II, Jack S. (2009). An Introduction to Epistemology (2 ed.). Broadview Press. ISBN 978-1-77048-156-5. <a href="https://books.google.com/books?id=62gYgpeVT28C" target="_blank">https://books.google.com/books?id=62gYgpeVT28C</a> <a href="#fnref:67" class="footnote-back-ref">↩</a></li>
<li id="fn:68">Kvanvig 2011, p. 25Foley 1998, Lead section - Kvanvig, Jonathan L. (2011). "Epistemic Justification". In Bernecker, Sven; Pritchard, Duncan (eds.). The Routledge Companion to Epistemology. Routledge. pp. 25–36. ISBN 978-1-136-88200-5. <a href="#fnref:68" class="footnote-back-ref">↩</a></li>
<li id="fn:69">Ichikawa & Steup 2018, § 1.3 The Justification Condition - Ichikawa, Jonathan Jenkins; Steup, Matthias (2018). "The Analysis of Knowledge". The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Metaphysics Research Lab, Stanford University. Archived from the original on 2 May 2022. Retrieved 29 March 2023. <a href="https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/knowledge-analysis/" target="_blank">https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/knowledge-analysis/</a> <a href="#fnref:69" class="footnote-back-ref">↩</a></li>
<li id="fn:70">Crumley II 2009, p. 149Comesaña & Comesaña 2022, p. 44 - Crumley II, Jack S. (2009). An Introduction to Epistemology (2 ed.). Broadview Press. ISBN 978-1-77048-156-5. <a href="https://books.google.com/books?id=62gYgpeVT28C" target="_blank">https://books.google.com/books?id=62gYgpeVT28C</a> <a href="#fnref:70" class="footnote-back-ref">↩</a></li>
<li id="fn:71">Blaauw & Pritchard 2005, pp. 92–93 - Blaauw, Martijn; Pritchard, Duncan (2005). Epistemology A–Z. Edinburgh University Press. ISBN 978-0-7486-2213-9. <a href="#fnref:71" class="footnote-back-ref">↩</a></li>
<li id="fn:72">The relation between a belief and the reason on which it rests is called basing relation.[84] <a href="#fnref:72" class="footnote-back-ref">↩</a></li>
<li id="fn:73">Ichikawa & Steup 2018, § 1.3.2 Kinds of JustificationSilva & Oliveira 2022, pp. 1–4 - Ichikawa, Jonathan Jenkins; Steup, Matthias (2018). "The Analysis of Knowledge". The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Metaphysics Research Lab, Stanford University. Archived from the original on 2 May 2022. Retrieved 29 March 2023. <a href="https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/knowledge-analysis/" target="_blank">https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/knowledge-analysis/</a> <a href="#fnref:73" class="footnote-back-ref">↩</a></li>
<li id="fn:74">Kern 2017, pp. 8–10, 133Smith 2023, p. 3Steup & Neta 2024, § 5. Sources of Knowledge and JustificationHetherington, "Knowledge", § 3. Ways of Knowing - Kern, Andrea (2017). Sources of Knowledge: On the Concept of a Rational Capacity for Knowledge. Harvard University Press. pp. 8–10, 133. ISBN 978-0-674-41611-6. <a href="https://books.google.com/books?id=eyh5DQAAQBAJ&pg=PA8" target="_blank">https://books.google.com/books?id=eyh5DQAAQBAJ&pg=PA8</a> <a href="#fnref:74" class="footnote-back-ref">↩</a></li>
<li id="fn:75">Steup & Neta 2024, § 5.1 PerceptionHetherington, "Knowledge", § 3. Ways of Knowing - Steup, Matthias; Neta, Ram (2024). "Epistemology". The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Metaphysics Research Lab, Stanford University. Archived from the original on 21 July 2020. Retrieved 12 July 2024. <a href="https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/epistemology/" target="_blank">https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/epistemology/</a> <a href="#fnref:75" class="footnote-back-ref">↩</a></li>
<li id="fn:76">Khatoon 2012, p. 104Martin 1998, Lead section - Khatoon, Naima (2012). General Psychology. Pearson Education India. ISBN 978-81-317-5999-8. <a href="https://books.google.com/books?id=Ha1KBZm9CXQC&pg=PA104" target="_blank">https://books.google.com/books?id=Ha1KBZm9CXQC&pg=PA104</a> <a href="#fnref:76" class="footnote-back-ref">↩</a></li>
<li id="fn:77">Steup & Neta 2024, § 5.2 Introspection - Steup, Matthias; Neta, Ram (2024). "Epistemology". The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Metaphysics Research Lab, Stanford University. Archived from the original on 21 July 2020. Retrieved 12 July 2024. <a href="https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/epistemology/" target="_blank">https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/epistemology/</a> <a href="#fnref:77" class="footnote-back-ref">↩</a></li>
<li id="fn:78">Steup & Neta 2024, § 5.3 MemoryAudi 2002, pp. 72–75Gardiner 2001, pp. 1351–1352Michaelian & Sutton 2017, § 3. Episodicity - Steup, Matthias; Neta, Ram (2024). "Epistemology". The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Metaphysics Research Lab, Stanford University. Archived from the original on 21 July 2020. Retrieved 12 July 2024. <a href="https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/epistemology/" target="_blank">https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/epistemology/</a> <a href="#fnref:78" class="footnote-back-ref">↩</a></li>
<li id="fn:79">Steup & Neta 2024, § 5.5 TestimonyLeonard 2021, Lead section, § 1. Reductionism and Non-ReductionismGreen 2022, Lead section - Steup, Matthias; Neta, Ram (2024). "Epistemology". The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Metaphysics Research Lab, Stanford University. Archived from the original on 21 July 2020. Retrieved 12 July 2024. <a href="https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/epistemology/" target="_blank">https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/epistemology/</a> <a href="#fnref:79" class="footnote-back-ref">↩</a></li>
<li id="fn:80">Blaauw & Pritchard 2005, pp. 123–124Foley 2011, pp. 37, 39–40Harman 2013, § Theoretical and Practical RationalityMele & Rawling 2004, pp. 3–4 - Blaauw, Martijn; Pritchard, Duncan (2005). Epistemology A–Z. Edinburgh University Press. ISBN 978-0-7486-2213-9. <a href="#fnref:80" class="footnote-back-ref">↩</a></li>
<li id="fn:81">Heinzelmann 2023, pp. 312–314Kiesewetter 2020, pp. 332–334 - Heinzelmann, Nora (2023). "Rationality Is Not Coherence". The Philosophical Quarterly. 74 (1): 312–332. doi:10.1093/pq/pqac083. ISSN 1467-9213. <a href="https://doi.org/10.1093%2Fpq%2Fpqac083" target="_blank">https://doi.org/10.1093%2Fpq%2Fpqac083</a> <a href="#fnref:81" class="footnote-back-ref">↩</a></li>
<li id="fn:82">Foley 2011, pp. 39–40Blaauw & Pritchard 2005, pp. 123–124 - Foley, Richard (2011). "Epistemic Rationality". In Bernecker, Sven; Pritchard, Duncan (eds.). The Routledge Companion to Epistemology (0 ed.). Routledge. pp. 37–46. doi:10.4324/9780203839065. ISBN 978-1-136-88201-2. Archived from the original on 22 August 2024. Retrieved 10 August 2024. <a href="https://www.taylorfrancis.com/books/9781136882012" target="_blank">https://www.taylorfrancis.com/books/9781136882012</a> <a href="#fnref:82" class="footnote-back-ref">↩</a></li>
<li id="fn:83">Blaauw & Pritchard 2005, p. 109Engel 2011, p. 47 - Blaauw, Martijn; Pritchard, Duncan (2005). Epistemology A–Z. Edinburgh University Press. ISBN 978-0-7486-2213-9. <a href="#fnref:83" class="footnote-back-ref">↩</a></li>
<li id="fn:84">Blaauw & Pritchard 2005, p. 88Choo 2016, pp. 91–92Montmarquet 1987, pp. 482–483] - Blaauw, Martijn; Pritchard, Duncan (2005). Epistemology A–Z. Edinburgh University Press. ISBN 978-0-7486-2213-9. <a href="#fnref:84" class="footnote-back-ref">↩</a></li>
<li id="fn:85">Interest in epistemic virtues has increased since Ernest Sosa's formulation of virtue epistemology in the 1980s.[98] <a href="/wiki/Ernest_Sosa" target="_blank">/wiki/Ernest_Sosa</a> <a href="#fnref:85" class="footnote-back-ref">↩</a></li>
<li id="fn:86">Blaauw & Pritchard 2005, pp. 50–51DiFate, Lead section, § 1. The Nature of Evidence: What Is It and What Does It Do?Kelly 2016, Lead sectionMcGrew 2011, pp. 58–59 - Blaauw, Martijn; Pritchard, Duncan (2005). Epistemology A–Z. Edinburgh University Press. ISBN 978-0-7486-2213-9. <a href="#fnref:86" class="footnote-back-ref">↩</a></li>
<li id="fn:87">McGrew 2011, p. 59 - McGrew, Timothy (2011). "Evidence". In Bernecker, Sven; Pritchard, Duncan (eds.). The Routledge Companion to Epistemology (0 ed.). Routledge. pp. 58–67. doi:10.4324/9780203839065. ISBN 978-1-136-88201-2. <a href="https://www.taylorfrancis.com/books/9781136882012" target="_blank">https://www.taylorfrancis.com/books/9781136882012</a> <a href="#fnref:87" class="footnote-back-ref">↩</a></li>
<li id="fn:88">Sudduth, Lead section, § 2c. Constraints on Propositional DefeatersMcPherson 2020, p. 10 - Sudduth, Michael. "Defeaters in Epistemology". Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Archived from the original on 2 June 2022. Retrieved 17 May 2022. <a href="https://iep.utm.edu/defeaters-in-epistemology/" target="_blank">https://iep.utm.edu/defeaters-in-epistemology/</a> <a href="#fnref:88" class="footnote-back-ref">↩</a></li>
<li id="fn:89">Blaauw & Pritchard 2005, p. 51Kelly 2016, § 1. Evidence as That Which Justifies Belief - Blaauw, Martijn; Pritchard, Duncan (2005). Epistemology A–Z. Edinburgh University Press. ISBN 978-0-7486-2213-9. <a href="#fnref:89" class="footnote-back-ref">↩</a></li>
<li id="fn:90">Blaauw & Pritchard 2005, pp. 18–19, 44Hookway 2005a, p. 134Hookway 2005b, p. 220 - Blaauw, Martijn; Pritchard, Duncan (2005). Epistemology A–Z. Edinburgh University Press. ISBN 978-0-7486-2213-9. <a href="#fnref:90" class="footnote-back-ref">↩</a></li>
<li id="fn:91">Blaauw & Pritchard 2005, p. 150Grimm 2011, pp. 84, 88Gordon, Lead section - Blaauw, Martijn; Pritchard, Duncan (2005). Epistemology A–Z. Edinburgh University Press. ISBN 978-0-7486-2213-9. <a href="#fnref:91" class="footnote-back-ref">↩</a></li>
<li id="fn:92">Kekes 2005, p. 959Blaauw & Pritchard 2005, p. 157Whitcomb 2011, p. 95 - Kekes, John (2005). "Wisdom". In Honderich, Ted (ed.). The Oxford Companion to Philosophy. Oxford University Press. p. 959. ISBN 978-0-19-926479-7. <a href="#fnref:92" class="footnote-back-ref">↩</a></li>
<li id="fn:93">Brown & Gerken 2012, pp. 1–2 - Brown, Jessica; Gerken, Mikkel (2012). "1. Introduction - Knowledge Ascriptions: Their Semantics, Cognitive Bases, and Social Functions". In Brown, Jessica; Gerken, Mikkel (eds.). Knowledge Ascriptions. Oxford University Press. pp. 1–30. doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199693702.003.0001. ISBN 978-0-19-969370-2. <a href="https://doi.org/10.1093%2Facprof%3Aoso%2F9780199693702.003.0001" target="_blank">https://doi.org/10.1093%2Facprof%3Aoso%2F9780199693702.003.0001</a> <a href="#fnref:93" class="footnote-back-ref">↩</a></li>
<li id="fn:94">Brown & Gerken 2012, pp. 3–4Rysiew 2023, Lead section, § 3. Support for EC: Apparently Inconsistent Knowledge Claims, Skeptical and Everyday - Brown, Jessica; Gerken, Mikkel (2012). "1. Introduction - Knowledge Ascriptions: Their Semantics, Cognitive Bases, and Social Functions". In Brown, Jessica; Gerken, Mikkel (eds.). Knowledge Ascriptions. Oxford University Press. pp. 1–30. doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199693702.003.0001. ISBN 978-0-19-969370-2. <a href="https://doi.org/10.1093%2Facprof%3Aoso%2F9780199693702.003.0001" target="_blank">https://doi.org/10.1093%2Facprof%3Aoso%2F9780199693702.003.0001</a> <a href="#fnref:94" class="footnote-back-ref">↩</a></li>
<li id="fn:95">Cockram & Morton 2017Baumann 2016, pp. 59–60 - Cockram, Nathan; Morton, Adam (2017). "Contrastivism". Oxford Bibliographies. Oxford University Press. doi:10.1093/obo/9780195396577-0346. Archived from the original on 1 February 2024. Retrieved 2 August 2024. <a href="https://www.oxfordbibliographies.com/display/document/obo-9780195396577/obo-9780195396577-0346.xml" target="_blank">https://www.oxfordbibliographies.com/display/document/obo-9780195396577/obo-9780195396577-0346.xml</a> <a href="#fnref:95" class="footnote-back-ref">↩</a></li>
<li id="fn:96">Cohen 1998, § Article SummaryHookway 2005, p. 838Moser 2011, p. 200 - Cohen, Stewart (1998). "Scepticism". Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Routledge. doi:10.4324/9780415249126-P045-1. ISBN 978-0-415-25069-6. Archived from the original on 31 July 2024. Retrieved 31 July 2024. <a href="https://www.rep.routledge.com/articles/thematic/scepticism/v-1" target="_blank">https://www.rep.routledge.com/articles/thematic/scepticism/v-1</a> <a href="#fnref:96" class="footnote-back-ref">↩</a></li>
<li id="fn:97">Greco 2011, p. 108McKinsey 2018, Lead section - Greco, John (2011). "5. Skepticism about the External World". In Greco, John (ed.). The Oxford Handbook of Skepticism. Oxford University Press. pp. 108–128. doi:10.1093/oxfordhb/9780195183214.003.0006. ISBN 978-0-19-990985-8. <a href="https://books.google.com/books?id=1ETRCwAAQBAJ&pg=PA108" target="_blank">https://books.google.com/books?id=1ETRCwAAQBAJ&pg=PA108</a> <a href="#fnref:97" class="footnote-back-ref">↩</a></li>
<li id="fn:98">Gomes & Reed 2018, pp. 700–702Avramides 2023, Lead Section, § 1. The (Traditional) Epistemological Problem - Gomes, Anil; Reed, Baron (2018). "Scepticism about Other Minds". In Machuca, Diego (ed.). Skepticism: From Antiquity to the Present. Bloomsbury Publishing. pp. 700–713. ISBN 978-1-4725-1436-3. <a href="https://philarchive.org/archive/GOMSAO-2" target="_blank">https://philarchive.org/archive/GOMSAO-2</a> <a href="#fnref:98" class="footnote-back-ref">↩</a></li>
<li id="fn:99">Hookway 2005, p. 838Bergmann 2021, p. 57Moreland & Craig 2003, p. 95 - Hookway, C. J. (2005). "Scepticism". In Honderich, Ted (ed.). The Oxford Companion to Philosophy. Oxford University Press. pp. 838–840. ISBN 978-0-19-926479-7. <a href="#fnref:99" class="footnote-back-ref">↩</a></li>
<li id="fn:100">Hazlett 2014, p. 18Levine 1999, p. 11 - Hazlett, Allan (2014). A Critical Introduction to Skepticism. Bloomsbury. ISBN 978-1-4411-4407-2. <a href="https://books.google.com/books?id=4INnAgAAQBAJ&pg=PA18" target="_blank">https://books.google.com/books?id=4INnAgAAQBAJ&pg=PA18</a> <a href="#fnref:100" class="footnote-back-ref">↩</a></li>
<li id="fn:101">Hookway 2005, p. 838Comesaña & Klein 2024, Lead section - Hookway, C. J. (2005). "Scepticism". In Honderich, Ted (ed.). The Oxford Companion to Philosophy. Oxford University Press. pp. 838–840. ISBN 978-0-19-926479-7. <a href="#fnref:101" class="footnote-back-ref">↩</a></li>
<li id="fn:102">Windt 2021, § 1.1 Cartesian Dream SkepticismKlein 1998, § 8. The Epistemic Principles and ScepticismHetherington, "Knowledge", § 4. Sceptical Doubts About Knowing - Windt, Jennifer M. (2021). "Dreams and Dreaming". The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Metaphysics Research Lab, Stanford University. Archived from the original on 1 February 2024. Retrieved 12 December 2023. <a href="https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/dreams-dreaming/#CartDreaSkep" target="_blank">https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/dreams-dreaming/#CartDreaSkep</a> <a href="#fnref:102" class="footnote-back-ref">↩</a></li>
<li id="fn:103">The brain in a vat is a similar thought experiment assuming that a person does not have a body but is merely a brain receiving electrical stimuli indistinguishable from the stimuli a brain in a body would receive. This argument also leads to the conclusion of global skepticism based on the claim that it is not possible to distinguish stimuli representing the actual world from simulated stimuli.[116] <a href="/wiki/Brain_in_a_vat" target="_blank">/wiki/Brain_in_a_vat</a> <a href="#fnref:103" class="footnote-back-ref">↩</a></li>
<li id="fn:104">Steup & Neta 2024, § 6.2 Responses to the Closure ArgumentReed 2015, p. 75 - Steup, Matthias; Neta, Ram (2024). "Epistemology". The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Metaphysics Research Lab, Stanford University. Archived from the original on 21 July 2020. Retrieved 12 July 2024. <a href="https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/epistemology/" target="_blank">https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/epistemology/</a> <a href="#fnref:104" class="footnote-back-ref">↩</a></li>
<li id="fn:105">Cohen 1998, § 1. The Philosophical Problem of Scepticism, § 2. Responses to Scepticism - Cohen, Stewart (1998). "Scepticism". Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Routledge. doi:10.4324/9780415249126-P045-1. ISBN 978-0-415-25069-6. Archived from the original on 31 July 2024. Retrieved 31 July 2024. <a href="https://www.rep.routledge.com/articles/thematic/scepticism/v-1" target="_blank">https://www.rep.routledge.com/articles/thematic/scepticism/v-1</a> <a href="#fnref:105" class="footnote-back-ref">↩</a></li>
<li id="fn:106">Rescher 1998, § Article SummaryHetherington, "Fallibilism", § 9. Implications of Fallibilism: Knowing Fallibly? - Rescher, Nicholas (1998). "Fallibilism". Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Routledge. doi:10.4324/9780415249126-P019-1. ISBN 978-0-415-25069-6. Archived from the original on 11 May 2024. Retrieved 31 July 2024. <a href="https://www.rep.routledge.com/articles/thematic/fallibilism/v-1" target="_blank">https://www.rep.routledge.com/articles/thematic/fallibilism/v-1</a> <a href="#fnref:106" class="footnote-back-ref">↩</a></li>
<li id="fn:107">Carter 2017, p. 292Luper 2004, pp. 271–272 - Carter, J. Adam (2017). "Epistemological Implications of Relativism". In Ichikawa, Jonathan Jenkins (ed.). The Routledge Handbook of Epistemic Contextualism. Taylor & Francis. pp. 292–302. ISBN 978-1-317-59469-7. Retrieved 3 August 2024. <a href="https://books.google.com/books?id=RzslDwAAQBAJ&pg=PA292" target="_blank">https://books.google.com/books?id=RzslDwAAQBAJ&pg=PA292</a> <a href="#fnref:107" class="footnote-back-ref">↩</a></li>
<li id="fn:108">Lacey 2005, p. 242Markie & Folescu 2023, Lead section, § 1.2 Empiricism - Lacey, Alan (2005). "Empiricism". In Honderich, Ted (ed.). The Oxford Companion to Philosophy. Oxford University Press. pp. 242–245. ISBN 978-0-19-926479-7. <a href="#fnref:108" class="footnote-back-ref">↩</a></li>
<li id="fn:109">Some forms of extreme rationalism, found in ancient Greek philosophy, see reason as the sole source of knowledge.[124] <a href="/wiki/Ancient_Greek_philosophy" target="_blank">/wiki/Ancient_Greek_philosophy</a> <a href="#fnref:109" class="footnote-back-ref">↩</a></li>
<li id="fn:110">Lacey 2005a, p. 783Markie & Folescu 2023, Lead section, § 1. Introduction - Lacey, Alan (2005a). "Rationalism". In Honderich, Ted (ed.). The Oxford Companion to Philosophy. Oxford University Press. pp. 783–785. ISBN 978-0-19-926479-7. <a href="#fnref:110" class="footnote-back-ref">↩</a></li>
<li id="fn:111">Tieszen 2005, p. 175 - Tieszen, Richard L. (2005). Phenomenology, Logic, and the Philosophy of Mathematics. Cambridge University Press. ISBN 978-0-521-83782-8. <a href="https://books.google.com/books?id=2fgQ_fuCcKAC&pg=PA175" target="_blank">https://books.google.com/books?id=2fgQ_fuCcKAC&pg=PA175</a> <a href="#fnref:111" class="footnote-back-ref">↩</a></li>
<li id="fn:112">Lacey 2005a, p. 783Markie & Folescu 2023, Lead section, § 1. IntroductionHales 2009, p. 29 - Lacey, Alan (2005a). "Rationalism". In Honderich, Ted (ed.). The Oxford Companion to Philosophy. Oxford University Press. pp. 783–785. ISBN 978-0-19-926479-7. <a href="#fnref:112" class="footnote-back-ref">↩</a></li>
<li id="fn:113">Lacey 2005a, p. 783Markie & Folescu 2023, Lead section, § 1. Introduction - Lacey, Alan (2005a). "Rationalism". In Honderich, Ted (ed.). The Oxford Companion to Philosophy. Oxford University Press. pp. 783–785. ISBN 978-0-19-926479-7. <a href="#fnref:113" class="footnote-back-ref">↩</a></li>
<li id="fn:114">Audi 1988, pp. 407–408Stairs 2017, pp. 155–156Margolis 2007, p. 214Fei 2023, p. 79 - Audi, Robert (1988). "Foundationalism, Coherentism, and Epistemological Dogmatism". Philosophical Perspectives. 2: 407–442. doi:10.2307/2214083. ISSN 1520-8583. JSTOR 2214083. <a href="https://doi.org/10.2307%2F2214083" target="_blank">https://doi.org/10.2307%2F2214083</a> <a href="#fnref:114" class="footnote-back-ref">↩</a></li>
<li id="fn:115">Both can be understood as responses to the regress problem.[130] In ancient philosophy, the underlying problem was discussed as Agrippa's trilemma. The trilemma distinguises three ways of providing reasons for a statement: finding a justification that needs no further reason, circular reasoning by repeating a justification stated earlier, or providing an infinite justification chain.[131] <a href="/wiki/Regress_problem" target="_blank">/wiki/Regress_problem</a> <a href="#fnref:115" class="footnote-back-ref">↩</a></li>
<li id="fn:116">The theory of classical foundationalism has a stronger requirement by saying that basic beliefs are self-evident or indubitable.[132] <a href="/wiki/Self-evidence" target="_blank">/wiki/Self-evidence</a> <a href="#fnref:116" class="footnote-back-ref">↩</a></li>
<li id="fn:117">Stairs 2017, pp. 155–156Margolis 2007, p. 214 - Stairs, Allen (2017). A Thinker's Guide to the Philosophy of Religion. Routledge. ISBN 978-1-351-21981-5. <a href="https://books.google.com/books?id=Km1QDwAAQBAJ&pg=PA156" target="_blank">https://books.google.com/books?id=Km1QDwAAQBAJ&pg=PA156</a> <a href="#fnref:117" class="footnote-back-ref">↩</a></li>
<li id="fn:118">Stairs 2017, p. 155 - Stairs, Allen (2017). A Thinker's Guide to the Philosophy of Religion. Routledge. ISBN 978-1-351-21981-5. <a href="https://books.google.com/books?id=Km1QDwAAQBAJ&pg=PA156" target="_blank">https://books.google.com/books?id=Km1QDwAAQBAJ&pg=PA156</a> <a href="#fnref:118" class="footnote-back-ref">↩</a></li>
<li id="fn:119">Stairs 2017, pp. 155–156Margolis 2007, p. 214 - Stairs, Allen (2017). A Thinker's Guide to the Philosophy of Religion. Routledge. ISBN 978-1-351-21981-5. <a href="https://books.google.com/books?id=Km1QDwAAQBAJ&pg=PA156" target="_blank">https://books.google.com/books?id=Km1QDwAAQBAJ&pg=PA156</a> <a href="#fnref:119" class="footnote-back-ref">↩</a></li>
<li id="fn:120">Stairs 2017, pp. 156–157O'Brien 2006, p. 77Slote 2021, p. 24 - Stairs, Allen (2017). A Thinker's Guide to the Philosophy of Religion. Routledge. ISBN 978-1-351-21981-5. <a href="https://books.google.com/books?id=Km1QDwAAQBAJ&pg=PA156" target="_blank">https://books.google.com/books?id=Km1QDwAAQBAJ&pg=PA156</a> <a href="#fnref:120" class="footnote-back-ref">↩</a></li>
<li id="fn:121">Ruppert, Schlüter & Seide 2016, p. 59Tramel 2008, pp. 215–216 - Ruppert, Nikolai; Schlüter, Riske; Seide, Ansgar (2016). "Problems at the Basis of Susan Haack's Foundherentism". In Göhner, Julia F.; Jung, Eva-Maria (eds.). Susan Haack: Reintegrating Philosophy. Springer. pp. 59–70. doi:10.1007/978-3-319-24969-8_3. ISBN 978-3-319-24969-8. Retrieved 3 August 2024. <a href="https://books.google.com/books?id=nF2mCwAAQBAJ&pg=PA59" target="_blank">https://books.google.com/books?id=nF2mCwAAQBAJ&pg=PA59</a> <a href="#fnref:121" class="footnote-back-ref">↩</a></li>
<li id="fn:122">Bradley 2015, pp. 170–171Stairs 2017, pp. 155–156 - Bradley, Darren (2015). A Critical Introduction to Formal Epistemology. Bloomsbury. ISBN 978-1-78093-764-9. <a href="https://books.google.com/books?id=qKXDCQAAQBAJ&pg=PA170" target="_blank">https://books.google.com/books?id=qKXDCQAAQBAJ&pg=PA170</a> <a href="#fnref:122" class="footnote-back-ref">↩</a></li>
<li id="fn:123">Pappas 2023, Lead sectionCrumley II 2009, pp. 159–160Fumerton 2011, Lead section - Pappas, George S. (2023). "Internalist Vs. Externalist Conceptions of Epistemic Justification". The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Metaphysics Research Lab, Stanford University. Archived from the original on 5 August 2019. Retrieved 1 August 2024. <a href="https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/justep-intext/" target="_blank">https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/justep-intext/</a> <a href="#fnref:123" class="footnote-back-ref">↩</a></li>
<li id="fn:124">The internalist-externalist debate in epistemology is different from the internalism-externalism debate in philosophy of mind, which asks whether mental states depend only on the individual or also on their environment.[140] <a href="/wiki/Philosophy_of_mind" target="_blank">/wiki/Philosophy_of_mind</a> <a href="#fnref:124" class="footnote-back-ref">↩</a></li>
<li id="fn:125">Pappas 2023, Lead sectionPoston, Lead sectionCrumley II 2009, pp. 159–160 - Pappas, George S. (2023). "Internalist Vs. Externalist Conceptions of Epistemic Justification". The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Metaphysics Research Lab, Stanford University. Archived from the original on 5 August 2019. Retrieved 1 August 2024. <a href="https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/justep-intext/" target="_blank">https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/justep-intext/</a> <a href="#fnref:125" class="footnote-back-ref">↩</a></li>
<li id="fn:126">Crumley II 2009, pp. 99, 298Carter & Littlejohn 2021, § 9.3.3 An Evidentialist ArgumentMittag, Lead section - Crumley II, Jack S. (2009). An Introduction to Epistemology (2 ed.). Broadview Press. ISBN 978-1-77048-156-5. <a href="https://books.google.com/books?id=62gYgpeVT28C" target="_blank">https://books.google.com/books?id=62gYgpeVT28C</a> <a href="#fnref:126" class="footnote-back-ref">↩</a></li>
<li id="fn:127">Mittag, § 2b. Evidence - Mittag, Daniel M. "Evidentialism". Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Archived from the original on 18 October 2023. Retrieved 1 August 2024. <a href="https://iep.utm.edu/evidentialism/" target="_blank">https://iep.utm.edu/evidentialism/</a> <a href="#fnref:127" class="footnote-back-ref">↩</a></li>
<li id="fn:128">Crumley II 2009, pp. 99, 298 - Crumley II, Jack S. (2009). An Introduction to Epistemology (2 ed.). Broadview Press. ISBN 978-1-77048-156-5. <a href="https://books.google.com/books?id=62gYgpeVT28C" target="_blank">https://books.google.com/books?id=62gYgpeVT28C</a> <a href="#fnref:128" class="footnote-back-ref">↩</a></li>
<li id="fn:129">Pappas 2023, Lead sectionPoston, Lead sectionCrumley II 2009, pp. 159–160 - Pappas, George S. (2023). "Internalist Vs. Externalist Conceptions of Epistemic Justification". The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Metaphysics Research Lab, Stanford University. Archived from the original on 5 August 2019. Retrieved 1 August 2024. <a href="https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/justep-intext/" target="_blank">https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/justep-intext/</a> <a href="#fnref:129" class="footnote-back-ref">↩</a></li>
<li id="fn:130">Crumley II 2009, p. 160 - Crumley II, Jack S. (2009). An Introduction to Epistemology (2 ed.). Broadview Press. ISBN 978-1-77048-156-5. <a href="https://books.google.com/books?id=62gYgpeVT28C" target="_blank">https://books.google.com/books?id=62gYgpeVT28C</a> <a href="#fnref:130" class="footnote-back-ref">↩</a></li>
<li id="fn:131">Pappas 2023, Lead sectionPoston, Lead sectionCrumley II 2009, pp. 159–160 - Pappas, George S. (2023). "Internalist Vs. Externalist Conceptions of Epistemic Justification". The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Metaphysics Research Lab, Stanford University. Archived from the original on 5 August 2019. Retrieved 1 August 2024. <a href="https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/justep-intext/" target="_blank">https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/justep-intext/</a> <a href="#fnref:131" class="footnote-back-ref">↩</a></li>
<li id="fn:132">Crumley II 2009, pp. 83, 301Olsson 2016 - Crumley II, Jack S. (2009). An Introduction to Epistemology (2 ed.). Broadview Press. ISBN 978-1-77048-156-5. <a href="https://books.google.com/books?id=62gYgpeVT28C" target="_blank">https://books.google.com/books?id=62gYgpeVT28C</a> <a href="#fnref:132" class="footnote-back-ref">↩</a></li>
<li id="fn:133">Crumley II 2009, p. 84Lyons 2016, pp. 160–162Olsson 2016 - Crumley II, Jack S. (2009). An Introduction to Epistemology (2 ed.). Broadview Press. ISBN 978-1-77048-156-5. <a href="https://books.google.com/books?id=62gYgpeVT28C" target="_blank">https://books.google.com/books?id=62gYgpeVT28C</a> <a href="#fnref:133" class="footnote-back-ref">↩</a></li>
<li id="fn:134">Crumley II 2009, pp. 175–176Baehr, "Virtue Epistemology", Lead section, § 1. Introduction to Virtue Epistemology - Crumley II, Jack S. (2009). An Introduction to Epistemology (2 ed.). Broadview Press. ISBN 978-1-77048-156-5. <a href="https://books.google.com/books?id=62gYgpeVT28C" target="_blank">https://books.google.com/books?id=62gYgpeVT28C</a> <a href="#fnref:134" class="footnote-back-ref">↩</a></li>
<li id="fn:135">Douven & Schupbach 2014, Lead section - Douven, Igor; Schupbach, Jonah N. (2014). "Formal Epistemology". The Oxford Handbook of Topics in Philosophy. Oxford University Press. doi:10.1093/oxfordhb/9780199935314.013.19. ISBN 978-0-19-993531-4. <a href="https://doi.org/10.1093%2Foxfordhb%2F9780199935314.013.19" target="_blank">https://doi.org/10.1093%2Foxfordhb%2F9780199935314.013.19</a> <a href="#fnref:135" class="footnote-back-ref">↩</a></li>
<li id="fn:136">It is closely related to computational epistemology, which examines the interrelation between knowledge and computational processes.[150] <a href="/wiki/Computational_epistemology" target="_blank">/wiki/Computational_epistemology</a> <a href="#fnref:136" class="footnote-back-ref">↩</a></li>
<li id="fn:137">Titelbaum 2022, pp. 3, 31–32Cozic 2018, Confirmation and Induction - Titelbaum, Michael G. (2022). Fundamentals of Bayesian Epistemology 1: Introducing Credences. Oxford University Press. ISBN 978-0-19-870760-8. <a href="https://books.google.com/books?id=AiFnEAAAQBAJ&pg=PA3" target="_blank">https://books.google.com/books?id=AiFnEAAAQBAJ&pg=PA3</a> <a href="#fnref:137" class="footnote-back-ref">↩</a></li>
<li id="fn:138">Beebe 2017, Lead section - Beebe, James (2017). "Experimental Epistemology". Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Routledge. doi:10.4324/9780415249126-P067-1. ISBN 978-0-415-25069-6. Archived from the original on 30 July 2024. Retrieved 30 July 2024. <a href="https://www.rep.routledge.com/articles/thematic/experimental-epistemology/v-1" target="_blank">https://www.rep.routledge.com/articles/thematic/experimental-epistemology/v-1</a> <a href="#fnref:138" class="footnote-back-ref">↩</a></li>
<li id="fn:139">Lackey 2021, pp. 3, 8–9, 13 - Lackey, Jennifer (2021). The Epistemology of Groups. Oxford University Press. ISBN 978-0-19-965660-8. Archived from the original on 25 October 2022. Retrieved 25 October 2022. <a href="https://academic.oup.com/book/31841/chapter-abstract/267480629?redirectedFrom=fulltext" target="_blank">https://academic.oup.com/book/31841/chapter-abstract/267480629?redirectedFrom=fulltext</a> <a href="#fnref:139" class="footnote-back-ref">↩</a></li>
<li id="fn:140">Epistemic injustice happens, for example, when valid knowledge claims are dismissed or misrepresented.[154] <a href="#fnref:140" class="footnote-back-ref">↩</a></li>
<li id="fn:141">Gerken 2018, Lead sectionMcHugh, Way & Whiting 2019, pp. 1–2 - Gerken, Mikkel (2018). "Metaepistemology". Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Routledge. doi:10.4324/0123456789-P076-1. ISBN 978-0-415-25069-6. Archived from the original on 7 August 2024. Retrieved 30 July 2024. <a href="https://www.rep.routledge.com/articles/thematic/metaepistemology/v-1" target="_blank">https://www.rep.routledge.com/articles/thematic/metaepistemology/v-1</a> <a href="#fnref:141" class="footnote-back-ref">↩</a></li>
<li id="fn:142">Nonetheless, metaepistemological insights can have various indirect effects on disputes in epistemology.[156] <a href="#fnref:142" class="footnote-back-ref">↩</a></li>
<li id="fn:143">Greco 2021, § 1. Methodology in Epistemology: Particularism and GeneralismLemos 2005, pp. 488–489Dancy 2010, pp. 532–533 - Greco, John (2021). "Epistemology". Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Routledge. doi:10.4324/9780415249126-P059-3. ISBN 978-0-415-25069-6. Archived from the original on 16 August 2024. Retrieved 17 August 2024. <a href="https://www.rep.routledge.com/articles/overview/epistemology/v-3/sections/the-value-of-knowledge-1" target="_blank">https://www.rep.routledge.com/articles/overview/epistemology/v-3/sections/the-value-of-knowledge-1</a> <a href="#fnref:143" class="footnote-back-ref">↩</a></li>
<li id="fn:144">Greco 2021, § 2. Methodology in Epistemology: Beyond ParticularismGardiner 2015, pp. 31, 33–35 - Greco, John (2021). "Epistemology". Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Routledge. doi:10.4324/9780415249126-P059-3. ISBN 978-0-415-25069-6. Archived from the original on 16 August 2024. Retrieved 17 August 2024. <a href="https://www.rep.routledge.com/articles/overview/epistemology/v-3/sections/the-value-of-knowledge-1" target="_blank">https://www.rep.routledge.com/articles/overview/epistemology/v-3/sections/the-value-of-knowledge-1</a> <a href="#fnref:144" class="footnote-back-ref">↩</a></li>
<li id="fn:145">Pietersma 2000, pp. 3–4Howarth 1998, § Article Summary - Pietersma, Henry (2000). Phenomenological Epistemology. Oxford University Press. ISBN 978-0-19-513190-1. <a href="#fnref:145" class="footnote-back-ref">↩</a></li>
<li id="fn:146">Crumley II 2009, pp. 183–184, 188–189, 300Wrenn, Lead sectionRysiew 2021, § 2. 'Epistemology Naturalized' - Crumley II, Jack S. (2009). An Introduction to Epistemology (2 ed.). Broadview Press. ISBN 978-1-77048-156-5. <a href="https://books.google.com/books?id=62gYgpeVT28C" target="_blank">https://books.google.com/books?id=62gYgpeVT28C</a> <a href="#fnref:146" class="footnote-back-ref">↩</a></li>
<li id="fn:147">Bradie & Harms 2023, Lead sectionGontier, Lead section - Bradie, Michael; Harms, William (2023). "Evolutionary Epistemology". The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Metaphysics Research Lab, Stanford University. Archived from the original on 9 December 2022. Retrieved 29 July 2024. <a href="https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/epistemology-evolutionary/" target="_blank">https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/epistemology-evolutionary/</a> <a href="#fnref:147" class="footnote-back-ref">↩</a></li>
<li id="fn:148">Tanesini 2017, Lead sectionO’Connor, Goldberg & Goldman 2024, Lead section, § 1. What Is Social Epistemology? - Tanesini, Alessandra (2017). "Social Epistemology". Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Routledge. doi:10.4324/0123456789-P046-2. ISBN 978-0-415-25069-6. Archived from the original on 29 March 2024. Retrieved 29 July 2024. <a href="https://www.rep.routledge.com/articles/thematic/social-epistemology/v-2" target="_blank">https://www.rep.routledge.com/articles/thematic/social-epistemology/v-2</a> <a href="#fnref:148" class="footnote-back-ref">↩</a></li>
<li id="fn:149">Legg & Hookway 2021, Lead section, § 4. Pragmatist EpistemologyKelly & Cordeiro 2020, p. 1 - Legg, Catherine; Hookway, Christopher (2021). "Pragmatism". The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Metaphysics Research Lab, Stanford University. Archived from the original on 8 October 2020. Retrieved 2 August 2024. <a href="https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/pragmatism/" target="_blank">https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/pragmatism/</a> <a href="#fnref:149" class="footnote-back-ref">↩</a></li>
<li id="fn:150">Foley 1983, p. 165Vahid, Lead section, § 1. Doxastic Conservatism: The Debate, § 2. Varieties of Doxastic Conservatism - Foley, Richard (1983). "Epistemic Conservatism". Philosophical Studies. 43 (2): 165–182. doi:10.1007/bf00372381. ISSN 0031-8116. <a href="https://doi.org/10.1007%2Fbf00372381" target="_blank">https://doi.org/10.1007%2Fbf00372381</a> <a href="#fnref:150" class="footnote-back-ref">↩</a></li>
<li id="fn:151">Sharpe 2018, pp. 318–319Best & Kellner 1991, p. 165 - Sharpe, Matthew (2018). "The Demise of Grand Narratives? Postmodernism, Power-knowledge, and Applied Epistemology". In Coady, David; Chase, James (eds.). The Routledge Handbook of Applied Epistemology. Routledge. pp. 318–331. doi:10.4324/9781315679099-24. ISBN 978-1-317-39314-6. <a href="https://doi.org/10.4324%2F9781315679099-24" target="_blank">https://doi.org/10.4324%2F9781315679099-24</a> <a href="#fnref:151" class="footnote-back-ref">↩</a></li>
<li id="fn:152">Influential theorists include Jean-François Lyotard and Michel Foucault.[167] <a href="/wiki/Jean-Fran%C3%A7ois_Lyotard" target="_blank">/wiki/Jean-Fran%C3%A7ois_Lyotard</a> <a href="#fnref:152" class="footnote-back-ref">↩</a></li>
<li id="fn:153">Anderson 1995, p. 50Anderson 2024, Lead section - Anderson, Elizabeth (1995). "Feminist Epistemology: An Interpretation and a Defense". Hypatia. 10 (3): 50–84. doi:10.1111/j.1527-2001.1995.tb00737.x. ISSN 0887-5367. JSTOR 3810237. Archived from the original on 2 August 2024. Retrieved 3 August 2024. <a href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/3810237" target="_blank">https://www.jstor.org/stable/3810237</a> <a href="#fnref:153" class="footnote-back-ref">↩</a></li>
<li id="fn:154">Chiari & Nuzzo 2009, p. 21Crumley II 2009, pp. 215–216, 301Warren 2002, p. 83 - Chiari, Gabriele; Nuzzo, Maria Laura (2009). Constructivist Psychotherapy: A Narrative Hermeneutic Approach. Routledge. ISBN 978-1-135-23991-6. <a href="https://books.google.com/books?id=CrqNAgAAQBAJ&pg=PA21" target="_blank">https://books.google.com/books?id=CrqNAgAAQBAJ&pg=PA21</a> <a href="#fnref:154" class="footnote-back-ref">↩</a></li>
<li id="fn:155">Lee 2017, p. 67Dreyer 2017, pp. 1–7 - Lee, Jerry Won (2017). The Politics of Translingualism: After Englishes. Routledge. p. 67. ISBN 978-1-315-31051-0. <a href="https://books.google.com/books?id=ZtArDwAAQBAJ&pg=PT67" target="_blank">https://books.google.com/books?id=ZtArDwAAQBAJ&pg=PT67</a> <a href="#fnref:155" class="footnote-back-ref">↩</a></li>
<li id="fn:156">Chimakonam & Ogbonnaya 2021, pp. 175–176, 179–182Jimoh 2017, pp. 121–122 - Chimakonam, Jonathan O.; Ogbonnaya, L. Uchenna (2021). "Toward an African Theory of Knowledge". African Metaphysics, Epistemology and a New Logic: A Decolonial Approach to Philosophy. Palgrave Macmillan. pp. 175–194. doi:10.1007/978-3-030-72445-0_8. ISBN 978-3-030-72445-0. <a href="https://link.springer.com/chapter/10.1007/978-3-030-72445-0_8" target="_blank">https://link.springer.com/chapter/10.1007/978-3-030-72445-0_8</a> <a href="#fnref:156" class="footnote-back-ref">↩</a></li>
<li id="fn:157">Phillips 1998, Lead sectionPhillips & Vaidya 2024, Lead sectionBhatt & Mehrotra 2017, pp. 12–13 - Phillips, Stephen (1998). "Epistemology, Indian Schools of". Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Routledge. doi:10.4324/9780415249126-F042-1. ISBN 978-0-415-25069-6. Archived from the original on 2 August 2024. Retrieved 2 August 2024. <a href="https://www.rep.routledge.com/articles/thematic/epistemology-indian-schools-of/v-1/sections/mimamsa-self-certificationalism" target="_blank">https://www.rep.routledge.com/articles/thematic/epistemology-indian-schools-of/v-1/sections/mimamsa-self-certificationalism</a> <a href="#fnref:157" class="footnote-back-ref">↩</a></li>
<li id="fn:158">While the discussion of different sources of knowledge is also found in other traditions, Indian epistemologists typically put special emphasis on the relation between knowledge and spiritual progress, understanding the acquisition of knowledge as part of the soteriological process.[173] <a href="/wiki/Spirituality" target="_blank">/wiki/Spirituality</a> <a href="#fnref:158" class="footnote-back-ref">↩</a></li>
<li id="fn:159">Phillips 1998, § 1. Buddhist Pragmatism and CoherentismSiderits 2021, p. 332 - Phillips, Stephen (1998). "Epistemology, Indian Schools of". Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Routledge. doi:10.4324/9780415249126-F042-1. ISBN 978-0-415-25069-6. Archived from the original on 2 August 2024. Retrieved 2 August 2024. <a href="https://www.rep.routledge.com/articles/thematic/epistemology-indian-schools-of/v-1/sections/mimamsa-self-certificationalism" target="_blank">https://www.rep.routledge.com/articles/thematic/epistemology-indian-schools-of/v-1/sections/mimamsa-self-certificationalism</a> <a href="#fnref:159" class="footnote-back-ref">↩</a></li>
<li id="fn:160">Phillips 1998, § 2. Nyāya ReliabilismDasti, Lead section, § 1.f.i. A Causal Theory of Knowledge - Phillips, Stephen (1998). "Epistemology, Indian Schools of". Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Routledge. doi:10.4324/9780415249126-F042-1. ISBN 978-0-415-25069-6. Archived from the original on 2 August 2024. Retrieved 2 August 2024. <a href="https://www.rep.routledge.com/articles/thematic/epistemology-indian-schools-of/v-1/sections/mimamsa-self-certificationalism" target="_blank">https://www.rep.routledge.com/articles/thematic/epistemology-indian-schools-of/v-1/sections/mimamsa-self-certificationalism</a> <a href="#fnref:160" class="footnote-back-ref">↩</a></li>
<li id="fn:161">Phillips 1998, § 2. Mīmāṃsā Self-certificationalism - Phillips, Stephen (1998). "Epistemology, Indian Schools of". Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Routledge. doi:10.4324/9780415249126-F042-1. ISBN 978-0-415-25069-6. Archived from the original on 2 August 2024. Retrieved 2 August 2024. <a href="https://www.rep.routledge.com/articles/thematic/epistemology-indian-schools-of/v-1/sections/mimamsa-self-certificationalism" target="_blank">https://www.rep.routledge.com/articles/thematic/epistemology-indian-schools-of/v-1/sections/mimamsa-self-certificationalism</a> <a href="#fnref:161" class="footnote-back-ref">↩</a></li>
<li id="fn:162">Webb, § 2. Epistemology and LogicSethia 2004, p. 93 - Webb, Mark Owen. "Jain Philosophy". Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Archived from the original on 28 May 2010. Retrieved 2 August 2024. <a href="https://iep.utm.edu/jain/" target="_blank">https://iep.utm.edu/jain/</a> <a href="#fnref:162" class="footnote-back-ref">↩</a></li>
<li id="fn:163">Ávila & Almeida 2023, p. 235Vermeir 2013, pp. 65–66Sturm 2011, pp. 303–304, 306, 308 - Ávila, Gabriel da Costa; Almeida, Tiago Santos (2023). "Lorraine Daston's Historical Epistemology: Style, Program, and School". In Condé, Mauro L.; Salomon, Marlon (eds.). Handbook for the Historiography of Science. Springer Nature. pp. 229–254. doi:10.1007/978-3-031-27510-4_11. ISBN 978-3-031-27510-4. Retrieved 30 July 2024. <a href="https://books.google.com/books?id=sFTaEAAAQBAJ&pg=PA235" target="_blank">https://books.google.com/books?id=sFTaEAAAQBAJ&pg=PA235</a> <a href="#fnref:163" class="footnote-back-ref">↩</a></li>
<li id="fn:164">Sturm 2011, pp. 303–304, 308–309 - Sturm, Thomas (2011). "Historical Epistemology or History of Epistemology? The Case of the Relation Between Perception and Judgment: Dedicated to Günther Patzig on His 85th Birthday". Erkenntnis. 75 (3). doi:10.1007/s10670-011-9338-3. ISSN 1572-8420. <a href="https://doi.org/10.1007%2Fs10670-011-9338-3" target="_blank">https://doi.org/10.1007%2Fs10670-011-9338-3</a> <a href="#fnref:164" class="footnote-back-ref">↩</a></li>
<li id="fn:165">The precise characterization of the contrast is disputed.[180] <a href="#fnref:165" class="footnote-back-ref">↩</a></li>
<li id="fn:166">McCain & Kampourakis 2019, pp. xiii–xivBird 2010, p. 5Merritt 2020, pp. 1–2 - McCain, Kevin; Kampourakis, Kostas (2019). "Preface". In McCain, Kevin; Kampourakis, Kostas (eds.). What Is Scientific Knowledge?: An Introduction to Contemporary Epistemology of Science. Routledge. pp. xiii–xiv. ISBN 978-1-351-33661-1. Retrieved 30 July 2024. <a href="https://books.google.com/books?id=wlAPEAAAQBAJ&pg=PR13" target="_blank">https://books.google.com/books?id=wlAPEAAAQBAJ&pg=PR13</a> <a href="#fnref:166" class="footnote-back-ref">↩</a></li>
<li id="fn:167">Murawski 2004, pp. 571–572Sierpinska & Lerman 1996, pp. 827–828 - Murawski, Roman (2004). "Mathematical Knowledge". In Niiniluoto, I.; Sintonen, Matti; Wolenski, Jan (eds.). Handbook of Epistemology. Springer. pp. 571–606. doi:10.1007/978-1-4020-1986-9_16. ISBN 978-1-4020-1986-9. Retrieved 13 July 2024. <a href="https://books.google.com/books?id=6gvlBwAAQBAJ" target="_blank">https://books.google.com/books?id=6gvlBwAAQBAJ</a> <a href="#fnref:167" class="footnote-back-ref">↩</a></li>
<li id="fn:168">Siegel, Silins & Matthen 2014, p. 781 - Siegel, Susanna; Silins, Nicholas; Matthen, Mohan (2014). "The Epistemology of Perception". In Matthen, Mohan (ed.). The Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of Perception. Oxford University Press. pp. 781–811. doi:10.1093/oxfordhb/9780199600472.013.040. <a href="https://doi.org/10.1093%2Foxfordhb%2F9780199600472.013.040" target="_blank">https://doi.org/10.1093%2Foxfordhb%2F9780199600472.013.040</a> <a href="#fnref:168" class="footnote-back-ref">↩</a></li>
<li id="fn:169">Conee 1998, Lead section - Conee, Earl (1998). "Memory, Epistemology of". Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Routledge. doi:10.4324/9780415249126-P032-1. ISBN 978-0-415-25069-6. Archived from the original on 30 July 2024. Retrieved 30 July 2024. <a href="https://www.rep.routledge.com/articles/thematic/memory-epistemology-of/v-1" target="_blank">https://www.rep.routledge.com/articles/thematic/memory-epistemology-of/v-1</a> <a href="#fnref:169" class="footnote-back-ref">↩</a></li>
<li id="fn:170">Pritchard 2004, p. 326 - Pritchard, Duncan (2004). "The Epistemology of Testimony". Philosophical Issues. 14: 326–348. doi:10.1111/j.1533-6077.2004.00033.x. ISSN 1533-6077. JSTOR 3050633. Archived from the original on 30 July 2024. Retrieved 30 July 2024. <a href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/3050633" target="_blank">https://www.jstor.org/stable/3050633</a> <a href="#fnref:170" class="footnote-back-ref">↩</a></li>
<li id="fn:171">Brown 1992, p. 341Crumley II 2009, pp. 268–269, 277–278, 300–301 - Brown, Harold I. (1992). "Direct Realism, Indirect Realism, and Epistemology". Philosophy and Phenomenological Research. 52 (2): 341–363. doi:10.2307/2107939. ISSN 1933-1592. JSTOR 2107939. <a href="https://doi.org/10.2307%2F2107939" target="_blank">https://doi.org/10.2307%2F2107939</a> <a href="#fnref:171" class="footnote-back-ref">↩</a></li>
<li id="fn:172">Warren 2020, § 6. The Epistemology of Logic - Warren, Jared (2020). Shadows of Syntax: Revitalizing Logical and Mathematical Conventionalism. Oxford University Press. ISBN 978-0-19-008615-2. Archived from the original on 28 May 2024. Retrieved 30 July 2024. <a href="https://global.oup.com/academic/product/shadows-of-syntax-9780190086152" target="_blank">https://global.oup.com/academic/product/shadows-of-syntax-9780190086152</a> <a href="#fnref:172" class="footnote-back-ref">↩</a></li>
<li id="fn:173">McDaniel 2020, § 7.2 The Epistemology of MetaphysicsVan Inwagen, Sullivan & Bernstein 2023, § 5. Is Metaphysics Possible? - McDaniel, Kris (2020). This Is Metaphysics: An Introduction. John Wiley & Sons. ISBN 978-1-118-40077-7. <a href="https://books.google.com/books?id=3tDaDwAAQBAJ&pg=PA217" target="_blank">https://books.google.com/books?id=3tDaDwAAQBAJ&pg=PA217</a> <a href="#fnref:173" class="footnote-back-ref">↩</a></li>
<li id="fn:174">DeLapp, Lead section, § 6. Epistemological Issues in MetaethicsSayre-McCord 2023, § 5. Moral Epistemology - DeLapp, Kevin M. "Metaethics". Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Archived from the original on 23 January 2024. Retrieved 19 December 2023. <a href="https://iep.utm.edu/metaethi/" target="_blank">https://iep.utm.edu/metaethi/</a> <a href="#fnref:174" class="footnote-back-ref">↩</a></li>
<li id="fn:175">Chignell 2018, Lead section - Chignell, Andrew (2018). "The Ethics of Belief". The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Metaphysics Research Lab, Stanford University. Archived from the original on 22 August 2024. Retrieved 29 July 2024. <a href="https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/ethics-belief/" target="_blank">https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/ethics-belief/</a> <a href="#fnref:175" class="footnote-back-ref">↩</a></li>
<li id="fn:176">McNabb 2019, pp. 1–3, 22–23Howard-Snyder & McKaughan 2023, pp. 96–97 - McNabb, Tyler Dalton (2019). Religious Epistemology. Cambridge University Press. ISBN 978-1-108-45753-8. <a href="#fnref:176" class="footnote-back-ref">↩</a></li>
<li id="fn:177">Barber 2003, pp. 1–3, 10–11, 15 - Barber, Alex (2003). "Introduction". In Barber, Alex (ed.). Epistemology of Language. Oxford University Press. pp. 1–46. doi:10.1093/oso/9780199250578.003.0001. ISBN 978-0-19-925057-8. <a href="https://doi.org/10.1093%2Foso%2F9780199250578.003.0001" target="_blank">https://doi.org/10.1093%2Foso%2F9780199250578.003.0001</a> <a href="#fnref:177" class="footnote-back-ref">↩</a></li>
<li id="fn:178">Vaidya & Wallner 2021, pp. 1909–1910 - Vaidya, Anand Jayprakash; Wallner, Michael (2021). "The Epistemology of Modality and the Problem of Modal Epistemic Friction". Synthese. 198 (S8): 1909–1935. doi:10.1007/s11229-018-1860-2. ISSN 0039-7857. PMC 8549955. PMID 34720230. <a href="https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC8549955" target="_blank">https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC8549955</a> <a href="#fnref:178" class="footnote-back-ref">↩</a></li>
<li id="fn:179">Croce 2023, Lead section - Croce, Michel (2023). "The Epistemology of Disagreement". Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Routledge. doi:10.4324/9780415249126-P081R1-1. ISBN 978-0-415-25069-6. <a href="https://www.rep.routledge.com/articles/thematic/the-epistemology-of-disagreement/v-1" target="_blank">https://www.rep.routledge.com/articles/thematic/the-epistemology-of-disagreement/v-1</a> <a href="#fnref:179" class="footnote-back-ref">↩</a></li>
<li id="fn:180">Maguire 2015, pp. 33–34 - Maguire, Kate (2015). "The Epistemology of Ignorance". Margaret Mead: Contributions to Contemporary Education. SpringerBriefs in Education. Springer. pp. 33–48. doi:10.1007/978-94-017-9309-4_4. ISBN 978-94-017-9309-4. Archived from the original on 29 July 2024. Retrieved 30 July 2024. <a href="https://link.springer.com/chapter/10.1007/978-94-017-9309-4_4" target="_blank">https://link.springer.com/chapter/10.1007/978-94-017-9309-4_4</a> <a href="#fnref:180" class="footnote-back-ref">↩</a></li>
<li id="fn:181">Alston 2006, p. 2 - Alston, William Payne (2006). Beyond Justification: Dimensions of Epistemic Evaluation. Cornell University Press. ISBN 978-0-8014-4291-9. <a href="#fnref:181" class="footnote-back-ref">↩</a></li>
<li id="fn:182">Kitchener 1992, p. 119Crumley II 2009, p. 16Schmitt 2004, pp. 841–842 - Kitchener, Richard (1992). "Piaget's Genetic Epistemology: Epistemological Implications for Science Education". In Duschl, Richard A.; Hamilton, Richard J. (eds.). Philosophy of Science, Cognitive Psychology, and Educational Theory and Practice. State University of New York Press. pp. 116–146. ISBN 978-1-4384-0171-3. Retrieved 24 July 2024. <a href="https://books.google.com/books?id=q_MxOPSqRjYC&pg=PA119" target="_blank">https://books.google.com/books?id=q_MxOPSqRjYC&pg=PA119</a> <a href="#fnref:182" class="footnote-back-ref">↩</a></li>
<li id="fn:183">Schmitt 2004, pp. 841–842Friedenberg, Silverman & Spivey 2022, pp. 2–3 - Schmitt, Frederick F. (2004). "Epistemology and Cognitive Science". In Niiniluoto, I.; Sintonen, Matti; Wolenski, Jan (eds.). Handbook of Epistemology. Springer. pp. 841–918. doi:10.1007/978-1-4020-1986-9_24. ISBN 978-1-4020-1986-9. Retrieved 13 July 2024. <a href="https://books.google.com/books?id=6gvlBwAAQBAJ" target="_blank">https://books.google.com/books?id=6gvlBwAAQBAJ</a> <a href="#fnref:183" class="footnote-back-ref">↩</a></li>
<li id="fn:184">Wheeler & Pereira 2004, pp. 469–470, 472, 491 - Wheeler, Gregory R.; Pereira, Luís Moniz (2004). "Epistemology and Artificial Intelligence". Journal of Applied Logic. 2 (4): 469–493. doi:10.1016/j.jal.2004.07.007. ISSN 1570-8683. <a href="https://doi.org/10.1016%2Fj.jal.2004.07.007" target="_blank">https://doi.org/10.1016%2Fj.jal.2004.07.007</a> <a href="#fnref:184" class="footnote-back-ref">↩</a></li>
<li id="fn:185">Rosenberg 2002, p. 184Steup & Neta 2024, § 4.1 FoundationalismAudi 2002, p. 90 - Rosenberg, Jay (2002). Thinking About Knowing. Clarendon Press. ISBN 978-0-19-925133-9. <a href="https://books.google.com/books?id=8UgVDAAAQBAJ&pg=PA184" target="_blank">https://books.google.com/books?id=8UgVDAAAQBAJ&pg=PA184</a> <a href="#fnref:185" class="footnote-back-ref">↩</a></li>
<li id="fn:186">Pomerol 2012, p. 190 - Pomerol, Jean-Charles (2012). Decision Making and Action. John Wiley & Sons. ISBN 978-1-118-58806-2. <a href="#fnref:186" class="footnote-back-ref">↩</a></li>
<li id="fn:187">Stairs 2017, p. 156 - Stairs, Allen (2017). A Thinker's Guide to the Philosophy of Religion. Routledge. ISBN 978-1-351-21981-5. <a href="https://books.google.com/books?id=Km1QDwAAQBAJ&pg=PA156" target="_blank">https://books.google.com/books?id=Km1QDwAAQBAJ&pg=PA156</a> <a href="#fnref:187" class="footnote-back-ref">↩</a></li>
<li id="fn:188">Hansen 2023, § 3.5 The Epistemic Approach to Fallacies - Hansen, Hans (2023). "Fallacies". The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Metaphysics Research Lab, Stanford University. Archived from the original on 29 March 2021. Retrieved 24 July 2024. <a href="https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/fallacies/" target="_blank">https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/fallacies/</a> <a href="#fnref:188" class="footnote-back-ref">↩</a></li>
<li id="fn:189">Hansen 2023, Lead sectionChatfield 2017, p. 194 - Hansen, Hans (2023). "Fallacies". The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Metaphysics Research Lab, Stanford University. Archived from the original on 29 March 2021. Retrieved 24 July 2024. <a href="https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/fallacies/" target="_blank">https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/fallacies/</a> <a href="#fnref:189" class="footnote-back-ref">↩</a></li>
<li id="fn:190">Hansen 2023, § 3.5 The Epistemic Approach to Fallacies - Hansen, Hans (2023). "Fallacies". The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Metaphysics Research Lab, Stanford University. Archived from the original on 29 March 2021. Retrieved 24 July 2024. <a href="https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/fallacies/" target="_blank">https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/fallacies/</a> <a href="#fnref:190" class="footnote-back-ref">↩</a></li>
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<li id="fn:192">Kaplan 2005, pp. 434, 443–444Steele & Stefánsson 2020, Lead section, § 7. Concluding RemarksHooker, Leach & McClennen 2012, pp. xiii–xiv - Kaplan, Mark (2005). "Decision Theory and Epistemology". In Moser, Paul K. (ed.). The Oxford Handbook of Epistemology. Oxford University Press. pp. 434–462. doi:10.1093/oxfordhb/9780195301700.003.0016. ISBN 978-0-19-513005-8. <a href="https://doi.org/10.1093%2Foxfordhb%2F9780195301700.003.0016" target="_blank">https://doi.org/10.1093%2Foxfordhb%2F9780195301700.003.0016</a> <a href="#fnref:192" class="footnote-back-ref">↩</a></li>
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<li id="fn:201">Hofer 2008, pp. 3–4Hofer 2001, pp. 353–354, 369–370 - Hofer, Barbara K. (2008). "Personal Epistemology and Culture". Knowing, Knowledge and Beliefs: Epistemological Studies Across Diverse Cultures. Springer. pp. 3–22. doi:10.1007/978-1-4020-6596-5_1. ISBN 978-1-4020-6596-5. Archived from the original on 27 July 2024. Retrieved 24 July 2024. <a href="https://link.springer.com/chapter/10.1007/978-1-4020-6596-5_1" target="_blank">https://link.springer.com/chapter/10.1007/978-1-4020-6596-5_1</a> <a href="#fnref:201" class="footnote-back-ref">↩</a></li>
<li id="fn:202">Allwood 2013, pp. 69–72Barth 2002, pp. 1–2 - Allwood, Carl Martin (2013). "Anthropology of Knowledge". The Encyclopedia of Cross-Cultural Psychology. John Wiley & Sons. pp. 69–72. doi:10.1002/9781118339893.wbeccp025. ISBN 978-1-118-33989-3. Archived from the original on 26 September 2022. Retrieved 26 September 2022. <a href="https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/abs/10.1002/9781118339893.wbeccp025" target="_blank">https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/abs/10.1002/9781118339893.wbeccp025</a> <a href="#fnref:202" class="footnote-back-ref">↩</a></li>
<li id="fn:203">Coser 2009, Knowledge, Sociology ofTufari 2003, Knowledge, Sociology ofScheler & Stikkers 2012, p. 23 - Coser, Lewis A. (2009) [1968]. "Knowledge, Sociology of". International Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences. Gale. pp. 8143–8148. doi:10.1016/B0-08-043076-7/01907-0. ISBN 978-0-02-928751-4. Archived from the original on 7 March 2023. Retrieved 7 March 2023. <a href="https://www.encyclopedia.com/social-sciences-and-law/sociology-and-social-reform/sociology-general-terms-and-concepts/sociology-knowledge" target="_blank">https://www.encyclopedia.com/social-sciences-and-law/sociology-and-social-reform/sociology-general-terms-and-concepts/sociology-knowledge</a> <a href="#fnref:203" class="footnote-back-ref">↩</a></li>
<li id="fn:204">Hamlyn 2005, p. 260Pappas 1998, § Ancient Philosophy - Hamlyn, D. W. (2005). "Epistemology, History of". In Honderich, Ted (ed.). The Oxford Companion to Philosophy. Oxford University Press. pp. 260–262. ISBN 978-0-19-926479-7. <a href="#fnref:204" class="footnote-back-ref">↩</a></li>
<li id="fn:205">Pappas 1998, § Ancient Philosophy - Pappas, George S. (1998). "Epistemology, History of". Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Routledge. doi:10.4324/9780415249126-P018-1. ISBN 978-0-415-25069-6. Archived from the original on 15 July 2024. Retrieved 15 July 2024. <a href="https://www.rep.routledge.com/articles/thematic/epistemology-history-of/v-1" target="_blank">https://www.rep.routledge.com/articles/thematic/epistemology-history-of/v-1</a> <a href="#fnref:205" class="footnote-back-ref">↩</a></li>
<li id="fn:206">To argue for this point, Plato used the example of a slave boy, who manages to answer a series of geometry questions even though he never studied geometry.[219] <a href="#fnref:206" class="footnote-back-ref">↩</a></li>
<li id="fn:207">Pappas 1998, § Ancient PhilosophyHamlyn 2005, p. 260Wolenski 2004, p. 7 - Pappas, George S. (1998). "Epistemology, History of". Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Routledge. doi:10.4324/9780415249126-P018-1. ISBN 978-0-415-25069-6. Archived from the original on 15 July 2024. Retrieved 15 July 2024. <a href="https://www.rep.routledge.com/articles/thematic/epistemology-history-of/v-1" target="_blank">https://www.rep.routledge.com/articles/thematic/epistemology-history-of/v-1</a> <a href="#fnref:207" class="footnote-back-ref">↩</a></li>
<li id="fn:208">Hamlyn 2006, pp. 287–288Wolenski 2004, p. 8 - Hamlyn, D. W. (2006). "Epistemology, History of". In Borchert, Donald M. (ed.). Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Vol. 3 (2 ed.). Macmillan. pp. 281–319. ISBN 978-0-02-865783-7. <a href="#fnref:208" class="footnote-back-ref">↩</a></li>
<li id="fn:209">Hamlyn 2006, p. 288Vogt 2011, p. 44 - Hamlyn, D. W. (2006). "Epistemology, History of". In Borchert, Donald M. (ed.). Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Vol. 3 (2 ed.). Macmillan. pp. 281–319. ISBN 978-0-02-865783-7. <a href="#fnref:209" class="footnote-back-ref">↩</a></li>
<li id="fn:210">Wolenski 2004, p. 8Pappas 1998, § Ancient Philosophy - Wolenski, Jan (2004). "History of Epistemology". In Niiniluoto, I.; Sintonen, Matti; Wolenski, Jan (eds.). Handbook of Epistemology. Springer. pp. 3–56. doi:10.1007/978-1-4020-1986-9_1. ISBN 978-1-4020-1986-9. Retrieved 13 July 2024. <a href="https://books.google.com/books?id=6gvlBwAAQBAJ" target="_blank">https://books.google.com/books?id=6gvlBwAAQBAJ</a> <a href="#fnref:210" class="footnote-back-ref">↩</a></li>
<li id="fn:211">Adkins & Adkins 2014, p. 393 - Adkins, Lesley; Adkins, Roy A. (2014). Handbook to Life in Ancient Rome. Infobase Publishing. ISBN 978-0-8160-7482-2. <a href="https://books.google.com/books?id=zGY1Sqjwf8kC" target="_blank">https://books.google.com/books?id=zGY1Sqjwf8kC</a> <a href="#fnref:211" class="footnote-back-ref">↩</a></li>
<li id="fn:212">Gerson 2014, pp. 266–267, 277–278 - Gerson, Lloyd (2014). "17. Neoplatonic Epistemology". In Remes, Pauliina; Slaveva-Griffin, Svetla (eds.). The Routledge Handbook of Neoplatonism. Routledge. pp. 266–279. ISBN 978-1-315-74418-6. <a href="https://books.google.com/books?id=yhcWBAAAQBAJ" target="_blank">https://books.google.com/books?id=yhcWBAAAQBAJ</a> <a href="#fnref:212" class="footnote-back-ref">↩</a></li>
<li id="fn:213">Black, Lead section - Black, Brian. "Upanisads". Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Archived from the original on 14 May 2024. Retrieved 14 July 2024. <a href="https://iep.utm.edu/upanisad/" target="_blank">https://iep.utm.edu/upanisad/</a> <a href="#fnref:213" class="footnote-back-ref">↩</a></li>
<li id="fn:214">Fountoulakis 2021, p. 23Warder 1998, pp. 43–44Fletcher et al. 2020, p. 46 - Fountoulakis, Konstantinos N. (2021). Psychiatry: From Its Historical and Philosophical Roots to the Modern Face. Springer Nature. ISBN 978-3-030-86541-2. <a href="https://books.google.com/books?id=xGtREAAAQBAJ&pg=PA23" target="_blank">https://books.google.com/books?id=xGtREAAAQBAJ&pg=PA23</a> <a href="#fnref:214" class="footnote-back-ref">↩</a></li>
<li id="fn:215">Prasad 1987, p. 48Dasti, Lead sectionBhatt 1989, p. 72 - Prasad, Jwala (1987). History of Indian Epistemology. Munshiram Manoharlal Publishers. ISBN 978-81-215-0072-2. <a href="#fnref:215" class="footnote-back-ref">↩</a></li>
<li id="fn:216">Prasad 1987, p. 6Dunne 2006, p. 753 - Prasad, Jwala (1987). History of Indian Epistemology. Munshiram Manoharlal Publishers. ISBN 978-81-215-0072-2. <a href="#fnref:216" class="footnote-back-ref">↩</a></li>
<li id="fn:217">Bonevac 2023, p. xviii - Bonevac, Daniel (2023). Historical Dictionary of Ethics. Rowman & Littlefield. ISBN 978-1-5381-7572-9. <a href="https://books.google.com/books?id=neDwEAAAQBAJ&pg=PR18" target="_blank">https://books.google.com/books?id=neDwEAAAQBAJ&pg=PR18</a> <a href="#fnref:217" class="footnote-back-ref">↩</a></li>
<li id="fn:218">Dunne 2006, p. 753 - Dunne, John D. (2006). "Buddhist Epistemology". In Borchert, Donald M. (ed.). Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Vol. 1 (2 ed.). Macmillan. pp. 753–758. ISBN 978-0-02-865781-3. <a href="#fnref:218" class="footnote-back-ref">↩</a></li>
<li id="fn:219">Rošker 2021, Lead section, § 2.1 Relational EpistemologyShen 2006, pp. 215–216, 219 - Rošker, Jana (2021). "Epistemology in Chinese Philosophy". The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Metaphysics Research Lab, Stanford University. Retrieved 2 September 2024. <a href="https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/chinese-epistemology/" target="_blank">https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/chinese-epistemology/</a> <a href="#fnref:219" class="footnote-back-ref">↩</a></li>
<li id="fn:220">Littlejohn, § 2a. The Mozi, Later Mohists and Debaters (bianshi)Shen 2006, p. 216 - Littlejohn, Ronnie. "Chinese Philosophy: Overview of Topics". Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Retrieved 2 September 2024. <a href="https://iep.utm.edu/chinese-philosophy-overview-of-topics/" target="_blank">https://iep.utm.edu/chinese-philosophy-overview-of-topics/</a> <a href="#fnref:220" class="footnote-back-ref">↩</a></li>
<li id="fn:221">Littlejohn, § 2c. Mencius (Mengzi, c. 372-289 B.C.E.) and Analogical ReasoningShen 2006, p. 216 - Littlejohn, Ronnie. "Chinese Philosophy: Overview of Topics". Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Retrieved 2 September 2024. <a href="https://iep.utm.edu/chinese-philosophy-overview-of-topics/" target="_blank">https://iep.utm.edu/chinese-philosophy-overview-of-topics/</a> <a href="#fnref:221" class="footnote-back-ref">↩</a></li>
<li id="fn:222">Littlejohn, § 2d. Xunzi (310-220 B.C.E.): Dispelling ObsessionsShen 2006, p. 216 - Littlejohn, Ronnie. "Chinese Philosophy: Overview of Topics". Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Retrieved 2 September 2024. <a href="https://iep.utm.edu/chinese-philosophy-overview-of-topics/" target="_blank">https://iep.utm.edu/chinese-philosophy-overview-of-topics/</a> <a href="#fnref:222" class="footnote-back-ref">↩</a></li>
<li id="fn:223">Wolenski 2004, pp. 10–11Koterski 2011, pp. 9–10 - Wolenski, Jan (2004). "History of Epistemology". In Niiniluoto, I.; Sintonen, Matti; Wolenski, Jan (eds.). Handbook of Epistemology. Springer. pp. 3–56. doi:10.1007/978-1-4020-1986-9_1. ISBN 978-1-4020-1986-9. Retrieved 13 July 2024. <a href="https://books.google.com/books?id=6gvlBwAAQBAJ" target="_blank">https://books.google.com/books?id=6gvlBwAAQBAJ</a> <a href="#fnref:223" class="footnote-back-ref">↩</a></li>
<li id="fn:224">Wolenski 2004, p. 11Schoenbaum 2015, p. 181 - Wolenski, Jan (2004). "History of Epistemology". In Niiniluoto, I.; Sintonen, Matti; Wolenski, Jan (eds.). Handbook of Epistemology. Springer. pp. 3–56. doi:10.1007/978-1-4020-1986-9_1. ISBN 978-1-4020-1986-9. Retrieved 13 July 2024. <a href="https://books.google.com/books?id=6gvlBwAAQBAJ" target="_blank">https://books.google.com/books?id=6gvlBwAAQBAJ</a> <a href="#fnref:224" class="footnote-back-ref">↩</a></li>
<li id="fn:225">Griffel 2020, Lead section, § 3. Al-Ghazâlî's 'Refutations' of Falsafa and Ismâ'îlismVassilopoulou & Clark 2009, p. 303 - Griffel, Frank (2020). "Al-Ghazali". The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Metaphysics Research Lab, Stanford University. Archived from the original on 28 May 2023. Retrieved 18 July 2024. <a href="https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/al-ghazali/" target="_blank">https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/al-ghazali/</a> <a href="#fnref:225" class="footnote-back-ref">↩</a></li>
<li id="fn:226">Wolenski 2004, p. 11Holopainen 2010, p. 75 - Wolenski, Jan (2004). "History of Epistemology". In Niiniluoto, I.; Sintonen, Matti; Wolenski, Jan (eds.). Handbook of Epistemology. Springer. pp. 3–56. doi:10.1007/978-1-4020-1986-9_1. ISBN 978-1-4020-1986-9. Retrieved 13 July 2024. <a href="https://books.google.com/books?id=6gvlBwAAQBAJ" target="_blank">https://books.google.com/books?id=6gvlBwAAQBAJ</a> <a href="#fnref:226" class="footnote-back-ref">↩</a></li>
<li id="fn:227">Wolenski 2004, p. 11 - Wolenski, Jan (2004). "History of Epistemology". In Niiniluoto, I.; Sintonen, Matti; Wolenski, Jan (eds.). Handbook of Epistemology. Springer. pp. 3–56. doi:10.1007/978-1-4020-1986-9_1. ISBN 978-1-4020-1986-9. Retrieved 13 July 2024. <a href="https://books.google.com/books?id=6gvlBwAAQBAJ" target="_blank">https://books.google.com/books?id=6gvlBwAAQBAJ</a> <a href="#fnref:227" class="footnote-back-ref">↩</a></li>
<li id="fn:228">Wolenski 2004, p. 11Hamlyn 2006, pp. 289–290 - Wolenski, Jan (2004). "History of Epistemology". In Niiniluoto, I.; Sintonen, Matti; Wolenski, Jan (eds.). Handbook of Epistemology. Springer. pp. 3–56. doi:10.1007/978-1-4020-1986-9_1. ISBN 978-1-4020-1986-9. Retrieved 13 July 2024. <a href="https://books.google.com/books?id=6gvlBwAAQBAJ" target="_blank">https://books.google.com/books?id=6gvlBwAAQBAJ</a> <a href="#fnref:228" class="footnote-back-ref">↩</a></li>
<li id="fn:229">Kaye, Lead section, § 4a. Direct Realist EmpiricismAntognazza 2024, p. 86 - BonJour, Laurence (2016). "2. Goldman Against Internalism". In McLaughlin, Brian P.; Kornblith, Hilary (eds.). Goldman and His Critics. John Wiley & Sons. pp. 22–42. doi:10.1002/9781118609378.ch2. ISBN 978-1-118-60917-0. Retrieved 22 August 2024.Kaye, Sharon. "Ockham (Occam), William of". Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Archived from the original on 23 July 2024. Retrieved 16 July 2024. <a href="https://books.google.com/books?id=2jcZDQAAQBAJ&pg=PT37" target="_blank">https://books.google.com/books?id=2jcZDQAAQBAJ&pg=PT37</a> <a href="#fnref:229" class="footnote-back-ref">↩</a></li>
<li id="fn:230">Phillips 2024, Lead sectionPrasad 1987, pp. 2, 8, 200–202 - Phillips, Stephen (2024). "Gaṅgeśa". The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Metaphysics Research Lab, Stanford University. Retrieved 3 September 2024. <a href="https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/gangesa/" target="_blank">https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/gangesa/</a> <a href="#fnref:230" class="footnote-back-ref">↩</a></li>
<li id="fn:231">Littlejohn, § 2g. Wang Yangming on liangzhi: Direct, Clear, Universal Knowledge, § 3h. Wang Yangming: Moral Willing as KnowingShen 2006, pp. 219–222 - Littlejohn, Ronnie. "Chinese Philosophy: Overview of Topics". Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Retrieved 2 September 2024. <a href="https://iep.utm.edu/chinese-philosophy-overview-of-topics/" target="_blank">https://iep.utm.edu/chinese-philosophy-overview-of-topics/</a> <a href="#fnref:231" class="footnote-back-ref">↩</a></li>
<li id="fn:232">Wolenski 2004, pp. 14–15Hamlyn 2006, p. 291 - Wolenski, Jan (2004). "History of Epistemology". In Niiniluoto, I.; Sintonen, Matti; Wolenski, Jan (eds.). Handbook of Epistemology. Springer. pp. 3–56. doi:10.1007/978-1-4020-1986-9_1. ISBN 978-1-4020-1986-9. Retrieved 13 July 2024. <a href="https://books.google.com/books?id=6gvlBwAAQBAJ" target="_blank">https://books.google.com/books?id=6gvlBwAAQBAJ</a> <a href="#fnref:232" class="footnote-back-ref">↩</a></li>
<li id="fn:233">Hamlyn 2005, p. 261Evans 2018, p. 298 - Hamlyn, D. W. (2005). "Epistemology, History of". In Honderich, Ted (ed.). The Oxford Companion to Philosophy. Oxford University Press. pp. 260–262. ISBN 978-0-19-926479-7. <a href="#fnref:233" class="footnote-back-ref">↩</a></li>
<li id="fn:234">Wolenski 2004, pp. 17–18Hamlyn 2006, pp. 298–299Hamlyn 2005, p. 261Uzgalis 2024, § 2. The Limits of Human Understanding - Wolenski, Jan (2004). "History of Epistemology". In Niiniluoto, I.; Sintonen, Matti; Wolenski, Jan (eds.). Handbook of Epistemology. Springer. pp. 3–56. doi:10.1007/978-1-4020-1986-9_1. ISBN 978-1-4020-1986-9. Retrieved 13 July 2024. <a href="https://books.google.com/books?id=6gvlBwAAQBAJ" target="_blank">https://books.google.com/books?id=6gvlBwAAQBAJ</a> <a href="#fnref:234" class="footnote-back-ref">↩</a></li>
<li id="fn:235">Coventry & Merrill 2018, p. 161Pappas 1998, § Modern Philosophy: From Hume to PeirceWolenski 2004, pp. 22–23 - Coventry, Angela; Merrill, Kenneth R. (2018). Historical Dictionary of Hume's Philosophy. Rowman & Littlefield. ISBN 978-1-5381-1916-7. <a href="https://books.google.com/books?id=X950DwAAQBAJ&pg=PA161" target="_blank">https://books.google.com/books?id=X950DwAAQBAJ&pg=PA161</a> <a href="#fnref:235" class="footnote-back-ref">↩</a></li>
<li id="fn:236">Wolenski 2004, pp. 27–30Pappas 1998, § Modern Philosophy: From Hume to PeirceThorpe 2014, p. 5 - Wolenski, Jan (2004). "History of Epistemology". In Niiniluoto, I.; Sintonen, Matti; Wolenski, Jan (eds.). Handbook of Epistemology. Springer. pp. 3–56. doi:10.1007/978-1-4020-1986-9_1. ISBN 978-1-4020-1986-9. Retrieved 13 July 2024. <a href="https://books.google.com/books?id=6gvlBwAAQBAJ" target="_blank">https://books.google.com/books?id=6gvlBwAAQBAJ</a> <a href="#fnref:236" class="footnote-back-ref">↩</a></li>
<li id="fn:237">Pappas 1998, § Modern Philosophy: From Hume to PeirceHamlyn 2005, p. 262 - Pappas, George S. (1998). "Epistemology, History of". Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Routledge. doi:10.4324/9780415249126-P018-1. ISBN 978-0-415-25069-6. Archived from the original on 15 July 2024. Retrieved 15 July 2024. <a href="https://www.rep.routledge.com/articles/thematic/epistemology-history-of/v-1" target="_blank">https://www.rep.routledge.com/articles/thematic/epistemology-history-of/v-1</a> <a href="#fnref:237" class="footnote-back-ref">↩</a></li>
<li id="fn:238">Hamlyn 2005, p. 262Hamlyn 2006, p. 312 - Hamlyn, D. W. (2005). "Epistemology, History of". In Honderich, Ted (ed.). The Oxford Companion to Philosophy. Oxford University Press. pp. 260–262. ISBN 978-0-19-926479-7. <a href="#fnref:238" class="footnote-back-ref">↩</a></li>
<li id="fn:239">Pappas 1998, § Modern Philosophy: From Hume to Peirce - Pappas, George S. (1998). "Epistemology, History of". Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Routledge. doi:10.4324/9780415249126-P018-1. ISBN 978-0-415-25069-6. Archived from the original on 15 July 2024. Retrieved 15 July 2024. <a href="https://www.rep.routledge.com/articles/thematic/epistemology-history-of/v-1" target="_blank">https://www.rep.routledge.com/articles/thematic/epistemology-history-of/v-1</a> <a href="#fnref:239" class="footnote-back-ref">↩</a></li>
<li id="fn:240">Pappas 1998, § Twentieth CenturyKvasz & Zeleňák 2009, p. 71 - Pappas, George S. (1998). "Epistemology, History of". Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Routledge. doi:10.4324/9780415249126-P018-1. ISBN 978-0-415-25069-6. Archived from the original on 15 July 2024. Retrieved 15 July 2024. <a href="https://www.rep.routledge.com/articles/thematic/epistemology-history-of/v-1" target="_blank">https://www.rep.routledge.com/articles/thematic/epistemology-history-of/v-1</a> <a href="#fnref:240" class="footnote-back-ref">↩</a></li>
<li id="fn:241">Rockmore 2011, pp. 131–132Wolenski 2004, p. 44Hamlyn 2006, p. 312 - Rockmore, Tom (2011). "Husserl's Phenomenological Epistemology". Kant and Phenomenology. University of Chicago Press. pp. 100–138. ISBN 978-0-226-72340-2. <a href="#fnref:241" class="footnote-back-ref">↩</a></li>
<li id="fn:242">Hamlyn 2005, p. 262Van Inwagen, Sullivan & Bernstein 2023, § 5. Is Metaphysics Possible? - Hamlyn, D. W. (2005). "Epistemology, History of". In Honderich, Ted (ed.). The Oxford Companion to Philosophy. Oxford University Press. pp. 260–262. ISBN 978-0-19-926479-7. <a href="#fnref:242" class="footnote-back-ref">↩</a></li>
<li id="fn:243">Pappas 1998, § Twentieth CenturyHamlyn 2006, p. 315Wolenski 2004, pp. 48–49 - Pappas, George S. (1998). "Epistemology, History of". Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Routledge. doi:10.4324/9780415249126-P018-1. ISBN 978-0-415-25069-6. Archived from the original on 15 July 2024. Retrieved 15 July 2024. <a href="https://www.rep.routledge.com/articles/thematic/epistemology-history-of/v-1" target="_blank">https://www.rep.routledge.com/articles/thematic/epistemology-history-of/v-1</a> <a href="#fnref:243" class="footnote-back-ref">↩</a></li>
<li id="fn:244">Baldwin 2010, § 6. Common Sense and CertaintyWolenski 2004, p. 49 - Baldwin, Tom (2010). "George Edward Moore". The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Metaphysics Research Lab, Stanford University. Archived from the original on 15 March 2023. Retrieved 17 July 2024. <a href="https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/moore/" target="_blank">https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/moore/</a> <a href="#fnref:244" class="footnote-back-ref">↩</a></li>
<li id="fn:245">Hamlyn 2006, pp. 317–318 - Hamlyn, D. W. (2006). "Epistemology, History of". In Borchert, Donald M. (ed.). Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Vol. 3 (2 ed.). Macmillan. pp. 281–319. ISBN 978-0-02-865783-7. <a href="#fnref:245" class="footnote-back-ref">↩</a></li>
<li id="fn:246">Hamlyn 2005, p. 262Beilby 2017, p. 74Pappas 1998, § Twentieth Century - Hamlyn, D. W. (2005). "Epistemology, History of". In Honderich, Ted (ed.). The Oxford Companion to Philosophy. Oxford University Press. pp. 260–262. ISBN 978-0-19-926479-7. <a href="#fnref:246" class="footnote-back-ref">↩</a></li>
<li id="fn:247">Goldman & Beddor 2021, Lead section, § 1. A Paradigm Shift in Analytic EpistemologyPappas 1998, § Twentieth Century, § Recent Issues - Goldman, Alvin I.; Beddor, Bob (2021). "Reliabilist Epistemology". The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Metaphysics Research Lab, Stanford University. Archived from the original on 22 August 2024. Retrieved 17 July 2024. <a href="https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/reliabilism/" target="_blank">https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/reliabilism/</a> <a href="#fnref:247" class="footnote-back-ref">↩</a></li>
<li id="fn:248">Goldman & Beddor 2021, § 4.1 Virtue ReliabilismCrumley II 2009, p. 175Battaly 2018, pp. 1–2 - Goldman, Alvin I.; Beddor, Bob (2021). "Reliabilist Epistemology". The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Metaphysics Research Lab, Stanford University. Archived from the original on 22 August 2024. Retrieved 17 July 2024. <a href="https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/reliabilism/" target="_blank">https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/reliabilism/</a> <a href="#fnref:248" class="footnote-back-ref">↩</a></li>
<li id="fn:249">Crumley II 2009, pp. 183–184, 188–189 - Crumley II, Jack S. (2009). An Introduction to Epistemology (2 ed.). Broadview Press. ISBN 978-1-77048-156-5. <a href="https://books.google.com/books?id=62gYgpeVT28C" target="_blank">https://books.google.com/books?id=62gYgpeVT28C</a> <a href="#fnref:249" class="footnote-back-ref">↩</a></li>
<li id="fn:250">Pappas 1998, § Recent IssuesVagelli 2019, p. 96 - Pappas, George S. (1998). "Epistemology, History of". Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Routledge. doi:10.4324/9780415249126-P018-1. ISBN 978-0-415-25069-6. Archived from the original on 15 July 2024. Retrieved 15 July 2024. <a href="https://www.rep.routledge.com/articles/thematic/epistemology-history-of/v-1" target="_blank">https://www.rep.routledge.com/articles/thematic/epistemology-history-of/v-1</a> <a href="#fnref:250" class="footnote-back-ref">↩</a></li>
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Epistemology open-in-new

Epistemology