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History

1919–1945

In 1919, the French formed the Troupes spéciales du Levant as part of the Army of the Levant in the French Mandate for Syria and the Lebanon. The former with 8,000 men later grew into both the Syrian and Lebanese armies. This force was used primarily as auxiliaries in support of French troops, and senior officer posts were held by Frenchmen, although Syrians were allowed to hold commissions below the rank of major.⁶ The Syrian officer corps of the Troupes spéciales du Levant mainly consisted of former officers of the Ottoman Army and members of Syria's ethnic and religious minorities.⁷ By 1927, more than 35% of Syrian soldiers came from the auxiliary troops; they were traditionally Kurdish, Druze or Circassian. After the repression of the Great Syrian Revolt by General Maurice Gamelin, commander of the Troupes du Levant, they were strengthened and became the main forces of the French apparatus.⁸

In 1927, the force was augmented by North African infantry (tirailleurs) and cavalry (spahis), French Foreign Legion, Troupes de marine infantry and artillery units (both French and Senegalese). The whole force constituted the Army of the Levant.

1945–1970

In August 1945, the Syrian Army was formed mainly from Army of the Levant. As Syria gained independence in 1946, its leaders envisioned a division-sized army. On June 19, 1947, the Syrian Army took the survivors of Pan Am Flight 121 to the Presbyterian mission hospital at Deir ez-Zor. The 1st Brigade was ready by the time of the Syrian war against Israel on May 15, 1948. It consisted of two infantry battalions and one armored battalion. The 2nd Brigade was organized during the 1948 Arab–Israeli War and also included two infantry battalions and one armored battalion.⁹

At the time of the 1948 Arab–Israeli War, the army was small, poorly armed, and poorly trained. "Paris had relied primarily on French regulars to keep the peace in Syria and had neglected indigenous forces. Consequently, training was lackadaisical, discipline lax, and staff work almost unheard of. ... there were about 12,000 men in the Syrian army. These troops were mostly grouped into three infantry brigades and an armored force of about battalion size," writes Pollack.¹⁰

Between 1949 and 1966, a series of military coups destroyed the stability of the government and any remaining professionalism within the army. In March 1949, the chief of staff, General Husni al-Za'im, installed himself as president. Two more military dictators followed by December 1949. General Adib Shishakli then held power until deposed in the 1954 Syrian coup d'etat. Further coups followed, each attended by a purge of the officer corps to remove supporters of the losers from the force.¹¹ 'Discipline in the army broke down across the board as units and their commanders pledged their allegiance to different groups and parties. Indeed, by the late 1950s, the situation had become so bad that Syrian officers regularly disobeyed the orders of superiors who belonged to different ethnic or political groups.¹²

The 1963 Syrian coup d'état had as one of its key objectives the seizure of the Al-Kiswah military camp, home to the 70th Armored Brigade. In June 1963, Syria took part in the Iraqi military campaign against the Kurds by providing aircraft, armoured vehicles and a force of 6,000 soldiers. Syrian troops crossed the Iraqi border and moved into the Kurdish town of Zakho in pursuit of Barzani's fighters.¹³ There was another coup d'etat in 1966.

However, in 1967 the army did appear to have some strength. It had around 70,000 personnel, roughly 550 tanks and assault guns, 500 APCs, and nearly 300 artillery pieces.¹⁴ The army had sixteen brigades: twelve infantry, two armored (probably including the 70th Armored), and two mechanized. The Syrian government deployed twelve of the sixteen brigades to the Golan, including both armored brigades and one mechanized brigade. Three 'brigade groups', each comprising four brigades, were deployed: the 12th in the north, holding the sector from the B'nat Ya'acov bridge to the slopes of Mount Hermon, the 35th in the south from the B'nat Ya'acov bridge to the Yarmuk River border with Jordan, and the 42nd in reserve, earmarked for a theater-level counterattack role. During the Six-Day War Israeli assault of the Golan heights, the Syrian army failed to counterattack the Israelis as the Israelis breached the Syrian positions. While Syrian units fought hard whenever the Israelis entered their fields of fire, no attempts appear to have been made to exploit Israeli disorientation and confusion during the initial assault.¹⁵

Judging from reports of 1967–1970, including the reporting of the 5th Infantry Division in 1970, the Army appears to have formed its first divisions during this period. The 1st and 3rd Armored Division, and 5th, 7th, and 9th Mechanized Infantry Divisions were all formed prior to 1973.¹⁶ Samuel M. Katz wrote that after Hafez al-Assad gained power in November 1970, the army expanded to the five divisions listed above, plus ten independent brigades, an artillery rocket brigade (the 69th), and "a reinforced brigade variously termed the 70th Armored Brigade or the Assad Republican Guard. It is today known as the Armored Defense Force; as Assad's praetorian guard it is stationed in and around Damascus and subordinate to the Defense Companies under the command of Assad's brother Rifaat."¹⁷

1970–2010

On 18 September 1970, the Syrian government became involved in Black September in Jordan when it sent a reinforced armored brigade to aid the Palestine Liberation Organization.¹⁸ Syrian armored units crossed the border and overran Irbid with the help of local Palestinian forces. They encountered several Jordanian Army detachments, but rebuffed them without major difficulty. Two days later, the 5th Infantry Division, heavily reinforced, was also sent into Jordan. Two armored brigades were attached to the division, bringing its tank strength up to over 300 T-55s and its manpower to over 16,000. The division entered Jordan at ar-Ramtha, destroyed a company of Jordanian Centurion tanks there, and continued directly towards Amman.

Pollack says it is likely that they intended to overthrow the Jordanian monarchy itself. Despite defeating the Jordanian Army at al-Ramtha on 21 September, after fierce air attacks on 22 September, the Syrians stopped the attack and began to retreat.The retreat was caused by Jordan's appeal for international aid : "The report said that Hussein “not only appealed for the moral and diplomatic support of the United Kingdom and the United States, coupled with the threat of international action, but had also asked for an air strike by Israel against Syrian troops.” (New York Post)¹⁹

After 1970 further Syrian engagements included:

• October War against Israel²⁰
• Lebanese Civil War (1975–1990), (against Lebanese militias, the PLO and Israel)

The Syrian armed forces have also been involved in suppressing dissident movements within Syria, for example the Islamist uprising in Syria in 1979–1982. In March 1980 the 3rd Armored Division and detachments from the Defense Companies arrived in Aleppo. The division was under the command of General Shafiq Fayadh, Hafez al-Assad's first cousin. The troops sealed "off whole quarters and carr[ied] out house-to-house searches, often preceded by tank fire."²¹ Hundreds of suspects were rounded up. Only two conventional Army brigades deployed to Hama in 1982, the 3rd Armored Division's 47th Armored and 21st Mechanized Brigades. Three quarters of the officers and one third of the soldiers in the two brigades were Alawites.²² Most of the repression was carried out by the Defense Companies and the Special Forces. Meanwhile, the Special Forces were isolating and combing through Hama, killing and capturing suspected government opponents.²³

Syrian forces fought Israel during the 1982 Lebanon War.

In 1984, Major General Ali Haidar's Special Forces were instrumental in blocking an abortive attempt by Rifaat al-Assad and his Defense Companies to seize the capital.²⁴ Fayadh's 3rd Armoured Division moved into the capital to join Haidar's forces in the confrontation with the Defense Companies. The 3rd Armoured Division, it seems, had historically been based at al-Qutayfah, near Damascus.²⁵

Bennett dates the establishment of corps in the Syrian Army to 1985. Writing forty years later, Tom Cooper says "..despite the establishment of.. corps.. most division commanders continued reporting directly to the President. Correspondingly, not only the Chief of Staff of the Syrian Armed Forces but also the Corps HQ exercised only a limited operational control over the Army's divisions."²⁶ Declassified CIA documents from February 1987 say that the 3rd Corps and 17th and 18th Armoured Divisions were established in 1986.²⁷

The 9th Armoured Division served in the 1991 Persian Gulf War as the Arab Joint Forces Command North reserve and saw little action.²⁸

In 1994, Haidar expressed objections to the Syrian president's decision to bring Bashar home from his studies in Britain and groom him for the succession after the death of Basil, the eldest Assad son.²⁹ Soon afterwards, on 3 September 1994, Jane's Defence Weekly reported that then-President Hafez Assad had dismissed at least 16 senior military commanders. Among them was Haidar, then commander of the Special Forces, and General Shafiq Fayadh, a cousin of the President who had commanded the "crack" 3rd Armored Division for nearly two decades. The 3rd Armored Division was "deployed around Damascus." JDW commented that "the Special Forces and the 3rd Armored Division, along with the 1st Armored Division are key elements in the security structure that protects Assad's government. Any command changes involving those formations have considerable political significance." Post-uprising reporting indicated the 1st Armored Division had historically been at al-Kiswah.³⁰

On 29 September 2004, Jane's Defence Weekly reported that Syria had begun to redeploy elements of one or more Syrian Army special forces regiments based in the coastal hills a few kilometres south of Beirut in Lebanon. A senior Lebanese Army officer told JDW that the 3,000 troops involved would return to Syria.³¹

Cordesman wrote that in 2006 the Syrian Army had "organized two corps that reported to the Land Forces General Staff and the Commander of the Land Force."

As of 2010, the army's formations included three army corps (the 1st, 2nd, and 3rd), eight armored divisions (with one independent armored brigade), three mechanized divisions, one armored-special forces division and ten independent airborne-special forces brigades.³² The army had 11 divisional formations reported in 2011, with a fall in the number of armored divisions reported from the 2010 edition from eight to seven.³³ The independent armored brigade had been replaced by an independent tank regiment.

In 2009 and 2010, according to the International Institute for Strategic Studies in London, the Syrian army comprised 220,000 regular personnel, and the entire armed forces (including the navy, air force and Air Defence Force) had 325,000 regular troops.³⁴ Additionally, it had about 290,000 reservists.³⁵³⁶³⁷

Syrian Civil War

Military equipment in April 2011 (including storage)

Main article: List of equipment of the Syrian Army

The vast majority of Syrian military equipment was Soviet manufactured.³⁸

• ≈ 9,300 armoured fighting vehicles (including in storage):
  • ≈ 4,800 main battle tanks
  • ≈ 4,500 infantry fighting vehicles and armored personnel carriers
• ≈ 6,400 towed artillery pieces:
  • 1,900 guns/howitzers
  • ≈ 1,500 anti-aircraft guns
• ≈ 850 self-propelled artillery pieces:
  • ≈ 450 self-propelled howitzers
  • ≈ 400 self-propelled anti-aircraft guns
• 2,190+ anti-tank guided weapon launchers
• 500 multiple launch rocket systems
  • 84 tactical ballistic missile launchers
• 4,235+ surface-to-air missile launchers:
  • 4,000+ MANPADS
  • 235 self-propelled anti-aircraft weapons

Defections

At October 1, 2011, according to high-ranking defected Syrian Colonel Riad Assaad, 10,000 soldiers, including high-ranking officers, had deserted the Syrian Army.³⁹ Some of these defectors had formed the Free Syrian Army, engaging in combat with security forces and soldiers in what would turn into the Syrian Civil War.

At 16 November 2011, Rami Abdel Rahman, the head of the UK-based Syrian Observatory for Human Rights, however estimated that less than 1,000 soldiers had deserted the Syrian Army; at the same moment, an FSA battalion commander claimed that the FSA embraced 25,000 army deserters.⁴⁰ Also in November 2011, the Free Syrian Army or the website of France 24 estimated the Syrian Army at 200,000 troops.⁴¹ According to General Mustafa al-Sheikh, one of the most senior defectors, however, in January 2012 the Syrian forces were estimated at 280,000 including conscripts.⁴²

By March 15, 2012, many more soldiers, unhappy with crackdowns on pro-democracy protesters, switched sides and a Turkish official said that 60,000 soldiers had deserted the Syrian army, including 20,000 since February 20. It was added that most of the deserters were junior officers and soldiers.⁴³ By 5 July 2012, the Syrian Observatory for Human Rights estimated "tens of thousands" of soldiers to have defected.⁴⁴ By August 2012, 40 brigadier generals from the Army had defected to the opposition army, out of a total of 1,200 generals.⁴⁵

On June 14, 2013, 73 Syrian Army officers and their families, some 202 people in total, sought refuge in Turkey. Amongst their number were seven generals and 20 colonels.⁴⁶ In 2013, Agence France Press wrote on 'Syria's diminished security forces.'⁴⁷

Strength impaired

Up until July 2012, the scale of defections from the Syrian Army, though hard to quantify, was too small to make an impact on the strength of that army, according to Aram Nerguizian from the Washington-based Center for Strategic and International Studies.⁴⁸ Strategically important units of the Syrian armed forces are always controlled by Alawite officers; defecting soldiers – by July 2012 "tens of thousands" according to the Syrian Observatory for Human Rights – are mainly Sunni without access to vital command and control, Nerguizian said,⁴⁹ however the formed Syrian Minister of Defence General Dawoud Rajiha killed in the 18 July 2012 Damascus bombing was a Christian.

Analyst Joseph Holliday wrote in 2013 that "the Assad government has from the beginning of the conflict been unable to mobilize all of its forces without risking large-scale defections. The single greatest liability that the Assad regime has faced in employing its forces has been the challenge of relying on units to carry out orders to brutalize the opposition."⁵⁰ This has resulted in Bashar following his father's precedent by attaching regular army units to more reliable forces (Special Forces, Republican Guard, or 4th Armored Division). When Hafez al-Assad directed the suppression of revolts in Hama in 1982, this technique was also used.⁵¹

In 2014, analyst Charles Lister wrote that "As of April 1, 2014, the SAA had incurred at least 35,601 fatalities, which when combined with a reasonable ratio of 3 wounded personnel for every soldier killed and approximately 50,000 defections, suggests the SAA presently commands roughly 125,000 personnel. This loss of manpower is exacerbated by Syria's long entrenched problem of having to selectively deploy forces based on their perceived trustworthiness."⁵² The International Institute for Strategic Studies in London calculated that by August 2013 the strength of the Syrian army had, compared with 2010, roughly been cut in half, due to defections, desertions and casualties: it now counted 110,000 troops.⁵³

Prior to its collapse, the Syrian Arab Army suffered from serious recruitment issues as the Syrian Civil War dragged on, with military age men across sectarian lines no longer willing to join or serve their conscription terms. These issues were especially notable among the Druze population, who have clashed with regime security forces and broken Druze youths out of regime imprisonment to avoid them serving in the army.⁵⁴ Increasingly, Assad's Alawite base of support refuse to send their sons to the military due to massive casualty rates among military age men in their community; according to pro oppositions sources a third of 250,000 Alawite men of fighting age have been killed in the Syrian Civil War, leading to major tensions between the sect and the Syrian government.⁵⁵

As of mid-2018, then-Israeli Defence Minister Avigdor Lieberman said that the Syrian Arab Army had regained its pre-2011 strength levels, recovering from manpower shortages earlier in the Syrian Civil War.⁵⁶

Roles of 3rd, 11th, 17th and 18th Divisions

The 3rd Armored Division had deployed elements of three brigades from its bases around Qutayfah to Deraa, Zabadani, and Hama, while the 11th Armored Division had stayed close to its bases in Homs and Hama.⁵⁷

The European Council named Major General Wajih Mahmud as commander of the 18th Armored Division in the Official Journal of the European Union on 15 November 2011, sanctioning him for violence committed in Homs.⁵⁸ Henry Boyd of the IISS noted that "in Homs, the 18th Armored Division was reinforced by Special Forces units and ... by elements of the 4th Division under Maher's de facto command."⁵⁹

Information from Holliday 2013 suggests that the reserve armored division is the 17th (rather than any other designation), which was responsible for eastern Syria.⁶⁰ The division's 93rd Brigade left Idlib to secure Raqqa Governorate in early 2012.⁶¹ Following the reported capture of Raqqa on 3–6 March 2013, elements of the 17th Division remained under siege to the north of the city in October 2013.⁶²

Relationship with National Defence Force

The National Defence Force was under the control and supervision of the Syrian Army⁶³ and acted in an infantry role, directly fighting against rebels on the ground and running counter-insurgency operations in co-ordination with the army which provided them logistical and artillery support.

Struggling with reliability issues and defections, officers of the SAA increasingly preferred the part-time volunteers of the NDF, who they regarded as more motivated and loyal, over regular army conscripts to conduct infantry operations and act as support for advancing tanks.⁶⁴

An officer in Homs, who asked not to be identified, said the army was increasingly playing a logistical and directive role, while NDF fighters act as combatants on the ground.⁶⁵

The NDF continued to play a significant role in military operations across Syria despite the formation of other elite units, many of which received direct assistance from Russia.

Post-Assad Syria

The fall of the Assad regime led by Hay'at Tahrir al-Sham in December 2024 ended the existence of the Ba'athist Syrian state. A new unified Syrian Army began its process of reconstruction. At first, the leaders of the different Syrian rebel forces announced on 21 December 2024 that it would disband their forces and merge them under the defence ministry.⁶⁶ A number of reconcillation centres opened all across the country as several soldiers that previously served under the Assad regime turned over their weapons to the state in exchange for new civilian identity cards to disassociate themselves from the old regime.⁶⁷

Demographics

In 2011, the majority of the Syrian military were Sunni, but most of the military leadership were Alawites.⁶⁸ Alawites made up 12% of the pre-war Syrian population, but 70% of the career soldiers in the Syrian Army.⁶⁹ A similar imbalance is seen in the officer corps, where some 80% of the officers are Alawites. The military's most elite divisions, the Republican Guard and the 4th Armored Division, which are commanded by Bashar al-Assad's brother Maher, are exclusively Alawite. Most of Syria's 300,000 conscripts in 2011 were Sunni.⁷⁰

In mid-2022, the Minister of Defence and also Deputy Commander-in-Chief of the Army and the Armed Forces Lieutenant General Ali Mahmoud Abbas, and Major General Mufid Hassan, Deputy Chief of the General Staff, were some of the Sunni Muslims in the positions of power.⁷¹ Some volunteer brigades, such as Arab Nationalist Guard, are made up of Sunni Syrians and other Sunnis from the Middle Eastern region that adhere to pan-Arab ideals.⁷²

Structure

2001 Order of Battle

Before 2011, it was difficult to access reliable information about the SAA because of the Damascus government's sensitivity to potential espionage, particularly by Israel.⁷³

Richard Bennett wrote in 2001 that "..corps [were] formed in 1985 to give the Army more flexibility and to improve combat efficiency by decentralizing the command structure, absorbing at least some of the lessons learned during the Israeli invasion of the Lebanon in 1982."⁷⁴ The organization and military doctrine of the army followed the Soviet model.⁷⁵

Richard Bennett's estimate of the 2001 order of battle was:

• 1st Corps HQ Damascus, which covered from Golan Heights, the fortified zone and south to Der'a near the Jordanian border.
  • 5th Armored Division, which included the 17th and 96th Armored Brigades and the 112th Mechanized Brigade
  • 6th Armored Division, with the 12th and 98th Armored Brigades and the 11th Mechanized Brigades
  • 7th Mechanized Division, with the 58th and 68th Armored Brigades and the 78th Mechanized Brigade
  • 8th Armored Division, which included the 62nd and 65th Armored Brigades and the 32nd Mechanized Brigade
  • 9th Armored Division, with the 43rd and 91st Armored Brigades and the 52nd Mechanized Brigade.

Bennett said the 1st Corps also [had] four independent special forces regiments, including two trained for heliborne commando operations against the Israeli signals intelligence & observation posts on Mount Hermon and elsewhere in the Golan Heights.

• 2nd Corps HQ Zabadani, covers north of Damascus, to Homs and includes Lebanon.
  • Bennett said in 2001 that the corps' principal units were believed to include:
  • 1st Armored Division, with the 44th and 46th Armored Brigades and the 42nd Mechanized Brigade
  • 3rd Armored Division, with the 47th and 82nd Armored Brigades and the 132nd Mechanized Brigade
  • 11th Armored Division, with the 60th and 67th Armored Brigades and the 87th Mechanized Brigade
  • 4th Mechanized Division with the 1st Armored Brigade and the 61st and 89th Mechanized Brigades
  • 10th Mechanized Division, headquartered in Shtoura, Lebanon. Its main units [were in 2001] deployed to control the strategic Beirut-Damascus highway with the 123rd Mechanized Brigade near Yanta, the 51st Armored Brigade near Zahle in the Beqaa Valley and the 85th Armored Brigade, deployed around the complex of positions at Dahr al-Baidar.
  • three other heavy brigades from the 3rd and 11th Armored Divisions [were] known to be regularly deployed to eastern Lebanon.
  • there [were] five special forces regiments in the Lebanon.
• 3rd Corps HQ Aleppo, based in the north and covered Hama, the Turkish and Iraqi borders, the Mediterranean coastline and was tasked with protecting the complex of chemical and biological warfare and missile production and launch facilities.
  • The 2nd Reserve Armored Division, with the 14th and 15th Armored Brigades and the 19th Mechanized Brigade. The 2nd [was] also believed to operate as the main armored forces training formation. It seems likely that the "2nd" designation, reported in 2001, was incorrect, as it has not been reported during the Syrian Civil War.
  • Other units under the control of this corps included four independent infantry brigades, one border guard brigade, one independent armored regiment, effectively a brigade group, and one special forces regiment.
  • the Coastal Defence Brigade, which [operated] largely as an independent unit within the 3rd Corps area, [was] headquartered in the naval base of Latakia with four Coastal Defence Battalions in Latakia, Banias, Hamidieh and Tartus. Each Battalion has four batteries of both the short range SSC-3 Styx and long range SSC-1B Sepal missile systems.

The IISS listed smaller formations in 2006 as:⁷⁶

• Four independent Infantry Brigades
• Ten independent Airborne Special Forces Regiments (Seven regiments attached to 2nd Corps)
• Two independent Artillery Brigades
• Two independent Anti-tank Brigades
• Surface-to-surface Missile Command with three SSM Brigades (each with three SSM battalions),
  • One brigade with FROG-7,
  • One brigade with Scud-B/C/D.
  • One brigade with SS-21 Scarab,
• Three coastal defence missile brigades
  • One brigade with 4 SS-C-1B Sepal launchers,
  • One brigade with 6 P-15 Termit launchers, alternative designation SS-C-3 'Styx'
  • One brigade with 6+ P-800 Oniks launchers,
• One Border Guard Brigade

Protecting Damascus:

• 4th Mechanized Division (The Defense companies were transformed into Unit 569, equivalent to an armored division, which in 1984 became the 4th Armoured Division.)⁷⁷
• The Republican Guard Armored Division, with three Armored brigades, one Mechanized brigade, and one artillery regiment.

Basic structure until 2011

Joseph Holliday of the Institute for the Study of War described the basic structure of the Syrian Arab Army as:⁷⁸

• 3 Corps (Falaq): 50,000 men in 3–4 divisions each
• 14 Divisions (Firqa): 5,000–15,000 men in 5–6 brigades/regiments each
• More than 40 Brigades (Liwa): 2,500–3,500 men in 5–6 battalions (1–3 armored/mechanized + artillery/ADA/engineers) each
  • Mechanized:
    • 105 IFVs in 3 mechanized battalions
    • 41 Tanks in 1 armored battalion
    • 3,500 soldiers
  • Armored:
    • 105 Tanks in 3 armored battalions
    • 31 IFVs in 1 mechanized battalion
    • 2,500 soldiers
• More than 20 Regiments (Fawj): 1,500 men
  • Light Infantry: 1,500 soldiers in 3 infantry battalions
  • Artillery: 45 howitzers and 1,500 soldiers in 3 artillery battalions
• Battalion (Katiba): 300–500 men in 4–5 companies
• Company (Sariya): 60–80 men

2022 Order of Battle

Between 2015 and 2018, the Syrian Arab Army underwent many structural changes, with the cooperation of Russia and Iran.⁷⁹ In addition, new units were created by 2021.⁸⁰ As of August 2022, according to Gregory Waters, the structure as the order of battle (at full strength) was:⁸¹⁸²

Military equipment

Main article: List of equipment of the Syrian Army

The majority of Syrian military equipment was manufactured by the Soviet Union, Russia, China and Iran.¹⁶³ Military equipment of the Syrian Army as of 2020:¹⁶⁴¹⁶⁵

• ≈ 5,900 armoured fighting vehicles (including in storage):
  • ≈ 2,700 main battle tanks
  • ≈ 2,400 infantry fighting vehicles and armored personnel carriers
  • ≈ 800 reconnaissance vehicles
• ≈ 2,800 utility vehicles (including in storage):
  • ≈ 300 military engineering
  • ≈ 2500 logistics and all-terrain vehicles
• ≈ 1,600 mortars
• ≈ 5,130 towed artillery pieces:
  • ≈ 2,330 field guns/anti-tank guns/howitzers
  • ≈ 2,800 anti-aircraft guns
• ≈ 600 self-propelled artillery pieces:
  • ≈ 350 self-propelled howitzers
  • ≈ 250 self-propelled anti-aircraft guns
• ≈ 2,500 anti-tank guided weapon launchers
• ≈ 600 multiple launch rocket systems
• 5,460+ surface-to-air missile launchers:
  • 5,000+ MANPADS
  • 460+ self-propelled air-defense systems
• ≈ 100 tactical ballistic missile launchers
• ≈ N/A short and medium-range ballistic missiles
• ≈ N/A supersonic cruise missiles
• ≈ N/A unmanned aerial vehicles

Uniforms, weapons and rank insignia

Uniforms and personnel equipment

See also: Syrian Armed Forces § Uniforms (1987)

Service uniforms for Syrian officers generally followed the British Army style, although army combat clothing followed the Soviet model.¹⁶⁶ Each uniform had two coats: a long one for dress and a short jacket for informal wear. Army officer uniforms were khaki in summer, olive in winter. All Army (including paratroops and special forces) and Air Defense Force personnel wore camouflage uniforms.¹⁶⁷ Among the camouflage were Red Lizard, Syrian Leaf patterns, and EMR Desert; a locally-made copy of the ERDL and M81 Woodland.¹⁶⁸¹⁶⁹

Officers had a variety of headgear, including a service cap, garrison cap, and beret (linen in summer and wool in winter).¹⁷⁰ The color of the beret varied according to the officer's unit. The most common beret color was black, for Infantry, Engineering, Signals and supporting arms personnel, followed by green, for Armored, Mechanized and Artillery personnel, red for the Republican Guard and Military Police, and maroon (blue) for the Special Forces.¹⁷¹

Since 2009, the SAA had acquired large numbers of Chinese-produced combat gear, including helmets and bullet proof vests.¹⁷² In 2011, the standard issue combat helmets were the olive Chinese QGF-02, and the Soviet SSh-68 for the reserve forces.¹⁷³ Both of them could be equipped with the Syrian Leaf camouflage helmet covers. Since 2015, some regular units were equipped with 6B7 helmets from Russia. Standard protective gear for all Army units were (PASGT) TAT-BA-7 bullet-proof vests. The Republican Guard and Special Forces were the only units equipped with ACH, FAST, 6B47 helmets and 6B45, Ruyin-3 ballistic vests. The Syrian military also provided NBC uniforms to soldiers to remain effective in an environment affected by biological or chemical agents. This uniform consisted of a Russian-made Model GP-5, PMK and ShMS-41 masks.¹⁷⁴

Service weapons

Main article: List of equipment of the Syrian Army

Service weapons of the Syrian Arab Army consisted of stocks of Cold War-era arms. Main service pistols of the Syrian Army were Makarov PM and Stechkin-APS. Main service assault rifles were Soviet AKM/AKMS, AK-74, Chinese Type 56 and Sa vz. 58.¹⁷⁵ Main service carbines were AKS-74U and copies of Belgian FN FAL. The Syrian Army used the Dragunov SVD sniper rifle and derivatives like the Tabuk and PSL. The Army had also modern sniper weapons like the Steyr SSG 69,¹⁷⁶ Heckler & Koch G3 and Syrian-made Golan S-01.¹⁷⁷ The most widely used machine guns were RPK, PKM, Type 73,¹⁷⁸ NSV and PKP Pecheneg.¹⁷⁹ Until 2011, the procurement of large numbers of AK-74Ms was planned to replace the AK(M) and other derivatives, the Civil War put a halt to this large scale re-equipment programme.¹⁸⁰ Since 2015, Syrian forces had received significant equipment assistance from Russia.¹⁸¹

Missile capabilities

Main article: List of equipment of the Syrian Army

At the beginning of the 1990s, Syria had one of the largest missile arsenals among the Third World countries, which until then had been replenished exclusively with the 9K52 Luna-M (70 km), OTR-21 Tochka (120 km) and Scud-B (300 km) systems supplied by the USSR.¹⁸² However, after the collapse of the USSR, a trend towards diversification of missile imports emerged. An agreement was concluded with China on the supply of M-9 (600 km) and M-600 missiles with a range of 250 to 300 kilometers to Syria.¹⁸³ In 1991 and 1992, two batches of Scud-C or Hwasong-6 missiles (600 km) of North Korean missile program manufacture were delivered to Syria. There were plans to increase the range of Scud missiles by reducing the weight of the warhead and creating solid-fuel medium-range missiles from foreign components. According to some reports, financial support for the creation of the missile-building base was provided by Iran.¹⁸⁴

Ranks

Main article: Military ranks of Syria

The rank insignia of commissioned officers.¹⁸⁶

The rank insignia of non-commissioned officers and enlisted personnel.¹⁸⁸

Awards

Although some twenty-five orders and medals were authorized, generally only senior officers and warrant officers wore medal ribbons. The following are some important Syrian awards: Order of Umayyad, Medal of Military Honor, the War Medal, Medal for Courage, Yarmuk Medal, Wounded in Action Medal, and Medal of 8 March 1963.¹⁹⁰

Chief of the General Staff of the Army

Main article: Chief of the General Staff (Syria)

The Chief of the General Staff of the Army and Armed Forces (Arabic: رئيس هيئة الأركان العامة للجيش والقوات المسلحة, romanized: Rayiys hayyat al'arkan aleamat liljaysh walquaat almusalaha) was the professional head of the Syrian Armed Forces and the Syrian Army. The Chief of the General Staff and his Deputy were appointed by the President of Syria, who was the commander-in-chief of the Armed Forces.¹⁹¹ As of 2024, the Chief of the General Staff was Lt. Gen. Abdul Karim Mahmoud Ibrahim, who was appointed to the role by former Syrian president Bashar Al-Assad.¹⁹² In April 2022, Maj. Gen. Mufid Hassan was also appointed as the Deputy Chief of the General Staff.¹⁹³ In October 2024, Maj. Gen. Osama Horia, former commander of the 5th Mechanized Division, was appointed as second Deputy Chief of the General Staff.¹⁹⁴

This article incorporates text from this source, which is in the public domain. Country Studies. Federal Research Division.

Notes

Further reading

• Richard M. Bennett, The Syrian Military: A Primer, Middle East Intelligence Bulletin, August/September 2001.
• Cooper, Tom (2015). Syrian Conflagration: The Civil War 2011-2013. Middle East@War Volume 1. Helion & Co. ISBN 978-1-910294-10-9.[1]
• Joseph Holliday, 'The Assad Regime: From Counterinsurgency to Civil War,' Institute for the Study of War, March 2013. The best concise description and analysis of the Syrian Army and its involvement in the current Syrian Civil War until Cooper 2015.
• International Institute for Strategic Studies (2019). "The Military Balance 2019". Military Balance. London: Routledge. doi:10.1080/04597222.2018.1561033. ISSN 1479-9022. S2CID 219628874.
• International Institute for Strategic Studies (2011). The Military Balance 2011. Routledge. pp. 311–312. ISBN 978-1-85743-606-8.
• International Institute for Strategic Studies (2010). The Military Balance 2010. London, United Kingdom: Routledge / IISS. ISBN 978-1857435573.
• Pollack, Kenneth M. (2002). Arabs at War: Military Effectiveness 1948–91. Lincoln and London: University of Nebraska Press. Reviewed in Brooks, Risa A. "Making Military Might: Why Do States Fail and Succeed? A Review Essay." International Security 28, no. 2 (Fall 2003): 149-191.
• Department of the Army, Area Handbook for Syria, Washington, For sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Govt. Print. Off., 1965, "Department of the Army pamphlet no. 550-47." Revision of the 1958 edition.
• Pesach Melovany, Out of the North an Evil shall break forth, Tel-Aviv: Contento de Semrik, 2014.
• Hicham Bou Nassif, 'Second Class: the Grievances of Sunni Officers in the Syrian Armed Forces'
• History of the Syrian Arab Army: Prussianization of the Arab Army, the Arab Revolt of 1916–1918, and the cult of nationalization of Arabs in the Levant after World War I, Infantry Magazine, Nov-Dec 2005.
• General Mustafa Tlas (ed.), History of the Syrian Arab Army/Al-Tareekh Al-Jaish Al-Arabi Al-Soori, Volume 1: 1901–1948, Center for Military Studies. Damascus, 2000. Volume 1 is 568 pages long and covers the Arab Revolt, the short-lived monarchy under King Feisal bin Hussein, the French Mandate, the 1948 Arab-Israeli War and finally Syrian independence in 1949.

External links

• Video: ISIS secret sniper precisely targeted with Syrian Army's missile
• Gregory Waters The Lion and The Eagle: The Syrian Arab Army's Destruction and Rebirth, July 18, 2019

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104. Tal Beeri (27 July 2023). "The "Al-Imam Hussein Brigade"- The Assimilation of a Shiite Militia into The Syrian Army's 4th Division, As Well as its Attacks on Israeli and US forces". Alma Research and Education Center. Israel Alma. Retrieved 17 November 2023. https://israel-alma.org/2023/07/27/the-al-imam-hussein-brigade-the-assimilation-of-a-shiite-militia-into-the-syrian-armys-4th-division-as-well-as-its-attacks-on-israeli-and-us-forces/ ↩

105. "Harakat al-Nujaba': Interview". 5 September 2018. http://www.aymennjawad.org/2018/09/harakat-al-nujaba-interview ↩

106. "Special Forces" in the Syrian Arab Army denotes specialized "light" infantry (airborne, air assault) and are "elite" only in relation to the conventional mechanized, armored units of the SAA. According to a declassified CIA report the stated Special Forces regiments were created to conduct counter-insurgency operations.[88] Special Forces units included the: 41st, 45th, 46th, 47th, 53rd and 54th independent special forces regiments.[89] Special Forces were heavily used from the early stage of the Syrian Civil War and as a result suffered heavy casualties, possibly up to three regiments (41st, 46th, 54th) may have been destroyed during the Syrian Civil War, the surviving three regiments were merged to other formations such as the Republican Guard, Tiger Forces and 4th Corps.[74] Later reports state that two battalions from the 54th regiment serve within the 17th Division.[90] ↩

107. "Tiger Forces renamed and placed under command of Syrian Army". Al-Masdar News. 29 August 2019. Archived from the original on 29 August 2019. Retrieved 29 August 2019. https://web.archive.org/web/20190829154015/https://www.almasdarnews.com/article/tiger-forces-renamed-and-placed-under-command-of-syrian-army/ ↩

108. استشهاد العقيد شرف عبدو السلات من مرتبات اللواء 26 مشاة - فرقة 25 مهام خاصة من الجيش العربي السوري أثناء أداء واجبه الوطني في البادية السورية في المعارك ضد تنظيم "د.ا.عش" الإرهابي شرقي محافظة حمص، الشهيد من محافظة إدلب. https://twitter.com/SAMSyria0/status/1792833139758284953?t=T8XDyxmDdt8WnYay65519g&s=19 ↩

109. Gregory Waters (12 September 2022). "From Tiger Forces to the 16th Brigade: Russia's evolving Syrian proxies". Middle East Institute. Retrieved 16 November 2023. https://www.mei.edu/publications/tiger-forces-16th-brigade-russias-evolving-syrian-proxies ↩

110. "وصول قوات من الفوج 75 - فرقة 25 🇸🇾 إلى جبهات ريف حلب لتعزيز مواقع الجيش العربي السوري ومواجهة أي تصعيد من التنظيمات-الإرها-بية". https://x.com/SAMSyria0/status/1845594726021447845?t=OUMHdg4k-f41s1PBbfHC4Q&s=19 ↩

111. "ريف إدلب: الفوج 78 | فرقة 25 من الجيش العربي السوري يتصدى لمحاولة مجموعة-إرها-بية التسلل-والاعتداء على النقاط في الخطوط الأمامية وتمكنت الوحدة من-قتـ.ل 4 إرهابيين-وجرح آخرين وفرار من تبقى منهم كما تم التصدي لهجوم إرها-بي بالمسيرات على المناطق الآمنة وتدمير وإسقاط عدد من المسيرات.". https://x.com/SAMSyria0/status/1850178689041899846?t=UilQfsB3qYcBO5omUrjRSQ&s=19 ↩

112. (created in 2020) ↩

113. Gregory Waters (12 September 2022). "From Tiger Forces to the 16th Brigade: Russia's evolving Syrian proxies". Middle East Institute. Retrieved 16 November 2023. https://www.mei.edu/publications/tiger-forces-16th-brigade-russias-evolving-syrian-proxies ↩

114. Gregory Waters (18 July 2019). "The Lion and The Eagle: The Syrian Arab Army's Destruction and Rebirth". Middle East Institute. Retrieved 20 September 2022. https://www.mei.edu/publications/lion-and-eagle-syrian-arab-armys-destruction-and-rebirth#pt9 ↩

115. "SAA's 59th Battalion (Commandos)". https://twitter.com/Bosni_94/status/1760387034147959161?t=AoBiayiHzVFOOXLONep4qA&s=19 ↩

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117. Gregory Waters (12 May 2020). "Current Syrian Army Deployments". International Review. Retrieved 17 October 2023. https://international-review.org/current-syrian-army-deployments/ ↩

118. Gregory Waters (12 May 2020). "Current Syrian Army Deployments". International Review. Retrieved 17 October 2023. https://international-review.org/current-syrian-army-deployments/ ↩

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121. Gregory Waters (12 May 2019). "Fighter from the 109th Battalion, 89th Brig of the #9th_Division KIA in #Idlib". Twitter. Retrieved 22 March 2024. https://twitter.com/GregoryPWaters/status/1127483700252307456?t=GHgZcxKclJtLDGFZ_87pVA&s=19 ↩

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123. Gregory Waters (8 April 2023). "SAA's 531st Battalion/44th Regiment/15th Division downed an HTS drone in Idlib". Twitter. Retrieved 24 February 2024. https://twitter.com/GregoryPWaters/status/1644741255400763392?t=8sBl1RxNNucBs8dPSiEW-A&s=19 ↩

124. Armor depot of the 404th Armored Reg, 15th Special Forces Div. https://twitter.com/GregoryPWaters/status/1090661053166379008?t=YhsHqcHLNhaLAOXfuoewEw&s=19 ↩

125. #Russia|n officers training SAA students on ATGM at the 165th Artillery Brigade base south of Kisweh https://x.com/GregoryPWaters/status/1801752211791229185?t=2LpW_ktJVwJWle4DgQMr4w&s=19 ↩

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127. Gregory Waters (12 May 2020). "Current Syrian Army Deployments". International Review. Retrieved 17 October 2023. https://international-review.org/current-syrian-army-deployments/ ↩

128. شُيّع من المشفى العسكري في طرطوس منذ قليل الشهيد النقيب شرف جعفر عماد فاضل من مرتبات الفرقة الثانية (B73 - مشاة) في الجيش العربي https://twitter.com/SAMSyria0/status/1768576644615176294?t=ftCVmYzAoBqYgtAJ_XDptw&s=19 ↩

129. Gregory Waters (8 September 2023). "Brigadier Gandhi Ibrahim has been appointed commander of its 48th Regiment". Twitter. Retrieved 25 February 2024. https://twitter.com/GregoryPWaters/status/1700213675766800754?t=EnmEJEDvSxa3s85mXCAqdw&s=19 ↩

130. 82nd Battalion of the 53rd SF Regiment (originally part of Special Forces Command now in 2nd Div) https://twitter.com/GregoryPWaters/status/1656704335932211201?t=Aw6P7GaHLWZ-JfeKB5Wl4A&s=191 ↩

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133. Joseph Holliday, 'The Assad Regime: From Counterinsurgency to Civil War,' Institute for the Study of War, March 2013. Seemingly the best concise description and analysis of the Syrian Army and its involvement in the current Syrian Civil War. ↩

134. Gregory Waters (27 July 2019). "122nd Artillery regiment belongs to the 10th Division". Twitter. Retrieved 12 February 2024. https://twitter.com/GregoryPWaters/status/1155137981914603521?t=T8DDEod-CD7YYCzNvBD7BQ&s=19 ↩

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136. Gregory Waters (20 November 2022). "Tel Rifaat #Aleppo - one 3rd Div soldier & 5 local militia-men Darbasiyah #Hasakah - 3 soldiers killed from 20th Brigade/3rd Div". Twitter. Retrieved 23 March 2024. https://twitter.com/GregoryPWaters/status/1594351166481203201?t=ihuC46GnLrz0kM_jJYZSbg&s=19 ↩

137. Gregory Waters (27 July 2019). "3rd Division's artillery regiment is the 14th (the 155th is an affiliated missile brigade)". Twitter. Retrieved 12 February 2024. https://twitter.com/GregoryPWaters/status/1155137981914603521?t=T8DDEod-CD7YYCzNvBD7BQ&s=19 ↩

138. Gregory Waters (27 July 2019). "3rd Division's artillery regiment is the 14th (the 155th is an affiliated missile brigade)". Twitter. Retrieved 12 February 2024. https://twitter.com/GregoryPWaters/status/1155137981914603521?t=T8DDEod-CD7YYCzNvBD7BQ&s=19 ↩

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144. Cooper 2015, p. 18. - Cooper, Tom (2015). Syrian Conflagration: The Civil War 2011-2013. Middle East@War Volume 1. Helion & Co. ISBN 978-1-910294-10-9. ↩

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