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Geneva Protocol
Treaty prohibiting the use of chemical and biological weapons in international armed conflicts

The Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use in War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous or other Gases, and of Bacteriological Methods of Warfare, usually called the Geneva Protocol, is a treaty prohibiting the use of chemical and biological weapons in international armed conflicts. It was signed at Geneva on 17 June 1925 and entered into force on 8 February 1928. It was registered in League of Nations Treaty Series on 7 September 1929. The Geneva Protocol is a protocol to the Convention for the Supervision of the International Trade in Arms and Ammunition and in Implements of War signed on the same date, and followed the Hague Conventions of 1899 and 1907.

It prohibits the use of "asphyxiating, poisonous or other gases, and of all analogous liquids, materials or devices" and "bacteriological methods of warfare". This is now understood to be a general prohibition on chemical weapons and biological weapons between state parties, but has nothing to say about production, storage or transfer. Later treaties did cover these aspects – the 1972 Biological Weapons Convention (BWC) and the 1993 Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC).

A number of countries submitted reservations when becoming parties to the Geneva Protocol, declaring that they only regarded the non-use obligations as applying to other parties and that these obligations would cease to apply if the prohibited weapons were used against them.

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Negotiation history

In the Hague Conventions of 1899 and 1907, the use of dangerous chemical agents was outlawed. In spite of this, the First World War saw large-scale chemical warfare. France used tear gas in 1914, but the first large-scale successful deployment of chemical weapons was by the German Empire in Ypres, Belgium in 1915, when chlorine gas was released as part of a German attack at the Battle of Gravenstafel. Following this, a chemical arms race began, with the United Kingdom, Russia, Austria-Hungary, the United States, and Italy joining France and Germany in the use of chemical weapons.

This resulted in the development of a range of horrific chemicals affecting lungs, skin, or eyes. Some were intended to be lethal on the battlefield, like hydrogen cyanide, and efficient methods of deploying agents were invented. At least 124,000 tons were produced during the war. In 1918, about one grenade out of three was filled with dangerous chemical agents. Around 500k-1.3 million casualties of the conflict were attributed to the use of gas, and the psychological effect on troops may have had a much greater effect. A few thousand civilians also became casualties as collateral damage or due to production accidents.4

The Treaty of Versailles included some provisions that banned Germany from either manufacturing or importing chemical weapons. Similar treaties banned the First Austrian Republic, the Kingdom of Bulgaria, and the Kingdom of Hungary from chemical weapons, all belonging to the losing side, the Central powers. Russian bolsheviks and Britain continued the use of chemical weapons in the Russian Civil War and possibly in the Middle East in 1920.

Three years after World War I, the Allies wanted to reaffirm the Treaty of Versailles, and in 1922 the United States introduced the Treaty relating to the Use of Submarines and Noxious Gases in Warfare at the Washington Naval Conference.5 Four of the war victors, the United States, the United Kingdom, the Kingdom of Italy and the Empire of Japan, gave consent for ratification, but it failed to enter into force as the French Third Republic objected to the submarine provisions of the treaty.6

At the 1925 Geneva Conference for the Supervision of the International Traffic in Arms the French suggested a protocol for non-use of poisonous gases. The Second Polish Republic suggested the addition of bacteriological weapons.7 It was signed on 17 June.8

Historical assessment

Eric Croddy, assessing the Protocol in 2005, took the view that the historic record showed it had been largely ineffectual. Specifically it does not prohibit:9

  • use against not-ratifying parties
  • retaliation using such weapons, so effectively making it a no-first-use agreement
  • use within a state's own borders in a civil conflict
  • research and development of such weapons, or stockpiling them

In light of these shortcomings, Jack Beard notes that "the Protocol (...) resulted in a legal framework that allowed states to conduct [biological weapons] research, develop new biological weapons, and ultimately engage in [biological weapons] arms races".10

As such, the use of chemical weapons inside the nation's own territory against its citizens or subjects employed by Spain in the Rif War until 1927,1112 Japan against Seediq indigenous rebels in Taiwan (then part of the Japanese colonial empire) in 1930 during the Musha Incident, Iraq against ethnic Kurdish civilians in the 1988 attack on Halabja during the Iran–Iraq War, and Syria or Syrian opposition forces during the Syrian civil war.13

Despite the U.S. having been a proponent of the protocol, the U.S. military and American Chemical Society lobbied against it, causing the U.S. Senate not to ratify the protocol until 1975, the same year when the United States ratified the Biological Weapons Convention.1415

Violations

Several state parties have deployed chemical weapons for combat in spite of the treaty. Italy used mustard gas against the Ethiopian Empire in the Second Italo-Ethiopian War. In World War II, Germany employed chemical weapons in combat on several occasions along the Black Sea, notably in Sevastopol, where they used toxic smoke to force Soviet resistance fighters out of caverns below the city. They also used asphyxiating gas in the catacombs of Odesa in November 1941, following their capture of the city, and in late May 1942 during the Battle of the Kerch Peninsula in eastern Crimea, perpetrated by the Wehrmacht's Chemical Forces and organized by a special detail of SS troops with the help of a field engineer battalion.16 After the battle in mid-May 1942, the Germans gassed and killed almost 3,000 of the besieged and non-evacuated Red Army soldiers and Soviet civilians hiding in a series of caves and tunnels in the nearby Adzhimushkay quarry.17

During the 1980-1988 Iran-Iraq War, Iraq is known to have employed a variety of chemical weapons against Iranian forces. Some 100,000 Iranian troops were casualties of Iraqi chemical weapons during the war.181920

Subsequent interpretation of the protocol

In 1966, United Nations General Assembly resolution 2162B called for, without any dissent, all states to strictly observe the protocol. In 1969, United Nations General Assembly resolution 2603 (XXIV) declared that the prohibition on use of chemical and biological weapons in international armed conflicts, as embodied in the protocol (though restated in a more general form), were generally recognized rules of international law.21 Following this, there was discussion of whether the main elements of the protocol now form part of customary international law, and now this is widely accepted to be the case.2223

There have been differing interpretations over whether the protocol covers the use of harassing agents, such as adamsite and tear gas, and defoliants and herbicides, such as Agent Orange, in warfare.2425 The 1977 Environmental Modification Convention prohibits the military use of environmental modification techniques having widespread, long-lasting or severe effects. Many states do not regard this as a complete ban on the use of herbicides in warfare, but it does require case-by-case consideration.26 The 1993 Chemical Weapons Convention effectively banned riot control agents from being used as a method of warfare, though still permitting it for riot control.27

In recent times, the protocol had been interpreted to cover non-international armed conflicts as well international ones. In 1995, an appellate chamber in the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia stated that "there had undisputedly emerged a general consensus in the international community on the principle that the use of chemical weapons is also prohibited in internal armed conflicts." In 2005, the International Committee of the Red Cross concluded that customary international law includes a ban on the use of chemical weapons in internal as well as international conflicts.28

However, such views drew general criticism from legal authors. They noted that much of the chemical arms control agreements stems from the context of international conflicts. Furthermore, the application of customary international law to banning chemical warfare in non-international conflicts fails to meet two requirements: state practice and opinio juris. Jillian Blake & Aqsa Mahmud cited the periodic use of chemical weapons in non-international conflicts since the end of WWI (as stated above) as well as the lack of existing international humanitarian law (such as the Geneva Conventions) and national legislation and manuals prohibiting using them in such conflicts.29 Anne Lorenzat stated the 2005 ICRC study was rooted in "'political and operational issues rather than legal ones".30

State parties

To become party to the Protocol, states must deposit an instrument with the government of France (the depositary power). Thirty-eight states originally signed the Protocol. France was the first signatory to ratify the Protocol on 10 May 1926. El Salvador, the final signatory to ratify the Protocol, did so on 26 February 2008. As of April 2021, 146 states have ratified, acceded to, or succeeded to the Protocol,31 most recently Colombia on 24 November 2015.

Reservations

A number of countries submitted reservations when becoming parties to the Geneva Protocol, declaring that they only regarded the non-use obligations as applying with respect to other parties to the Protocol and/or that these obligations would cease to apply with respect to any state, or its allies, which used the prohibited weapons. Several Arab states also declared that their ratification did not constitute recognition of, or diplomatic relations with, Israel, or that the provision of the Protocol were not binding with respect to Israel.

Generally, reservations not only modify treaty provisions for the reserving party, but also symmetrically modify the provisions for previously ratifying parties in dealing with the reserving party.32: 394  Subsequently, numerous states have withdrawn their reservations, including the former Czechoslovakia in 1990 prior to its dissolution,33 or the Russian reservation on biological weapons that "preserved the right to retaliate in kind if attacked" with them, which was dissolved by President Yeltsin.34

According to the Vienna Convention on Succession of States in respect of Treaties, states which succeed to a treaty after gaining independence from a state party "shall be considered as maintaining any reservation to that treaty which was applicable at the date of the succession of States in respect of the territory to which the succession of States relates unless, when making the notification of succession, it expresses a contrary intention or formulates a reservation which relates to the same subject matter as that reservation." While some states have explicitly either retained or renounced their reservations inherited on succession, states which have not clarified their position on their inherited reservations are listed as "implicit" reservations.

Party3536373839404142434445Signed46DepositedReservations474849505152535455Notes
 Afghanistan2 September 1986—
 Albania12 December 1989—
 Algeria14 January 1992
565758
 Angola30 October 1990
596061
 Antigua and Barbuda1 February 1989
6263Implicit on succession.64
Succeeded from the United Kingdom.
 Argentina8 May 1969—
 Armenia13 March 2018—
 Australia22 January 1930
6566Withdrawn in 1986.67
 Austria17 June 19259 May 1928—
 Bahrain9 November 1988
68697071
 Bangladesh20 May 1989
727374
 Barbados16 July 1976
7576Withdrew the reservations made by the United Kingdom on succession.77
Succeeded from the United Kingdom.
 Belgium17 June 19254 December 1928
7879Withdrawn in 1997.80
 Benin4 December 1986—
 Bhutan12 June 1978—
 Bolivia14 January 1985—
 Brazil17 June 192528 August 1970—
 Bulgaria17 June 19257 March 1934
8182Withdrawn in 1991.83
 Burkina Faso1 March 1971—Ratified as the Republic of Upper Volta.
 Cambodia15 March 198384The Protocol was ratified by the Coalition Government of Democratic Kampuchea in exile in 1983. 13 states (including the depositary France) objected to their ratification, and considered it legally invalid. In 1993, the Kingdom of Cambodia stated in a note verbale that it considered itself bound by the provisions of the Protocol.85
 Cameroon21 April 1989—
 Canada17 June 19256 May 1930
8687Withdrawn in 1991 as regards bacteriological agents, and completely withdrawn in 1999.88
 Cape Verde20 May 1991—
 Central African Republic30 July 1970—
 Chile17 June 19252 July 1935
8990Withdrawn in 1991.91
 China7 August 1929
92Made on succession.93
Ratified as the Republic of China, from which the People's Republic of China succeeded on 13 July 1952.94
 Colombia24 November 2015—
 Costa Rica17 June 2009—
 Côte d'Ivoire27 July 1970—
 Croatia25 September 2006—
 Cuba24 May 1966—
 Cyprus29 November 1966
9596Implicit on succession.97
Succeeded from the United Kingdom.
 Czech Republic19 September 1993
98Withdrawn prior to succession.
Succeeded from Czechoslovakia, which ratified the protocol on 16 August 1938.
 Denmark17 June 19255 May 1930—
 Dominican Republic4 December 1970—
 Ecuador10 September 1970—
 Egypt17 June 19256 December 1928—
 El Salvador17 June 192512 January 2010—
 Equatorial Guinea16 May 1989—
 Estonia17 June 192528 August 1931
99100Withdrawn in 1999.101
 Eswatini10 July 1991
 Ethiopia17 June 19257 October 1935—
 Fiji21 March 1973
102103Retained the United Kingdom's reservations on succession.104
Succeeded from the United Kingdom.
 Finland17 June 192526 June 1929—
 France17 June 192510 May 1926
105106Withdrawn in 1996.107
 Gambia5 November 1966
108109Implicit on succession.110
Succeeded from the United Kingdom.
 Germany17 June 192525 April 1929—
 Ghana2 May 1967—
 Greece17 June 192530 May 1931—
 Grenada3 January 1989
111112Implicit on succession.113
Succeeded from the United Kingdom.
 Guatemala3 May 1983—
 Guinea-Bissau20 May 1989—
 Holy See12 October 1966—
 Hungary17 June 192511 October 1952—
 Iceland19 December 1966—
 India17 June 19259 April 1930
114115116
 Indonesia14 January 1971
117Implicit on succession.118
Succeeded from the Netherlands.
 Iran4 July 1929—
 Iraq18 August 1931
119120121
 Ireland18 August 1930
122123Withdrawn in 1972.124
 Israel10 February 1969
125126127
 Italy17 June 19253 April 1928—
 Jamaica28 July 1970
128129Implicit on succession.130
Succeeded from the United Kingdom.
 Japan17 June 192521 May 1970—
 Jordan20 January 1977
131132133134
 Kazakhstan20 April 2020—
 Kenya17 June 1970—
 Korea, Democratic People's Republic of22 December 1988
135136
 Korea, Republic of29 December 1988
137138Reservation 2 withdrawn in 2002 as regards biological agents covered by the BWC.
 Kuwait15 December 1971
139140141
 Kyrgyzstan29 June 2020—
 Laos16 January 1989—
 Latvia17 June 19253 June 1931—
 Lebanon15 April 1969—
 Lesotho10 March 1972
142143Implicit on succession.144
Succeeded from the United Kingdom.
 Liberia2 April 1927—
 Libya21 December 1971
145146147148
 Liechtenstein16 May 1991—
 Lithuania17 June 192515 June 1933—
 Luxembourg17 June 19251 September 1936—
 North Macedonia20 August 2015—
 Madagascar2 August 1967—
 Malawi4 September 1970—
 Malaysia7 December 1970—
 Maldives27 December 1966—
 Malta9 October 1970
149150Implicit on succession.151
Succeeded from the United Kingdom.
 Mauritius23 December 1970
152153Implicit on succession.154
Succeeded from the United Kingdom.
 Mexico28 March 1932—
 Moldova14 January 2011—
 Monaco15 December 1966—
 Mongolia18 November 1968
155Withdrawn in 1990.156
 Morocco7 October 1970—
   Nepal7 May 1969—
 Netherlands17 June 192531 October 1930
157Withdrawn in 1995.158
 New Zealand22 January 1930
159160Withdrawn in 1989.161
 Nicaragua17 June 19255 October 1990—
 Niger5 April 1967
162163Implicit on succession.164
Succeeded from France.
 Nigeria9 October 1968
165166167
 Norway17 June 192527 July 1932—
 Pakistan15 April 1960
168169Implicit on succession.170
Succeeded from India.
 Palestine19 January 2018—
 Panama26 November 1970—
 Papua New Guinea2 September 1980
171172Retained Australia's reservations on succession.173
Succeeded from Australia.
 Paraguay22 October 1933—
 Peru5 June 1985—
 Philippines29 May 1973—
 Poland17 June 19254 February 1929—
 Portugal17 June 19251 July 1930
174175Reservation 2 withdrawn in 2003, and reservation 1 withdrawn in 2014.
 Qatar16 September 1976—
 Romania17 June 192523 August 1929
176177Withdrawn in 1991.178
 Russia17 June 19255 April 1928
179180Withdrawn in 2001.181
Ratified as the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics.
 Rwanda21 March 1964
182183Implicit on succession.184
Succeeded from Belgium.
 Saint Kitts and Nevis26 October 1989
185186Implicit on succession.187
Succeeded from the United Kingdom.
 Saint Lucia21 December 1988
188189Implicit on succession.190
Succeeded from the United Kingdom.
 Saint Vincent and the Grenadines23 April 1999
191192Implicit on succession.193
Succeeded from the United Kingdom.
 Saudi Arabia27 January 1971—
 Senegal15 June 1977—
 Serbia20 January 2003
194Implicit on succession.195 Serbia's Parliament voted to withdraw their reservation in May 2009196 and the withdrawal was announced in 2010, but the depositary has not been notified.197
Succeeded as the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia from the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia,198 which had ratified the protocol as the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes on 12 April 1929.
 Sierra Leone20 February 1967—
 Slovakia1 July 1997199
200Withdrawn prior to succession.
Succeeded from Czechoslovakia, which ratified the protocol on 16 August 1938.
 Slovenia8 April 2008—
 Solomon Islands1 June 1981
201202Retained the United Kingdom's reservations on succession.203
Succeeded from the United Kingdom.
 South Africa24 May 1930
204205Withdrawn in 1996.206
 Spain17 June 192522 August 1929
207208Withdrawn in 1992.209
 Sri Lanka20 January 1954—Ratified as the Dominion of Ceylon.
 Sudan17 December 1980—
 Sweden17 June 192525 April 1930—
  Switzerland17 June 192512 July 1932—
 Syria17 December 1968
210211
 Tajikistan15 November 2019—
 Tanzania28 February 1963—Ratified as the Republic of Tanganyika.
 Thailand17 June 19256 June 1931—212Ratified as Siam.
 Togo18 November 1970—
 Tonga19 July 1971
213214Implicit on succession.215
Succeeded from the United Kingdom.
 Trinidad and Tobago24 November 1970
216217Implicit on succession.218
Succeeded from the United Kingdom.
 Tunisia12 July 1967—
 Turkey17 June 19255 October 1929—
 Uganda2 April 1965—
 Ukraine7 August 2003
219220Implicit on succession.221
Succeeded from the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics.
 United Kingdom17 June 19259 April 1930
222223Reservation 2 withdrawn in 1991 as regards biological agents covered by the BWC, and reservations completely withdrawn in 2002.224
 United States of America17 June 192510 April 1975
225226
 Uruguay17 June 192512 April 1977—
 Uzbekistan5 October 2020—
 Venezuela17 June 19258 February 1928—
 Vietnam15 December 1980
227228229
 Yemen11 March 1971
230Made in a second instrument of accession submitted on 16 September 1973.231
Ratified as the Yemen Arab Republic. Also ratified by the People's Democratic Republic of Yemen on 20 October 1986, prior to Yemeni unification in 1990.232
  Parties with withdrawn reservations   Parties with implicit reservations   Parties with unwithdrawn reservations limiting the applicability of provisions of the Protocol Reservations Notes

Non-signatory states

The remaining UN member states and UN observers that have not acceded or succeeded to the Protocol are:

Chemical weapons prohibitions

YearNameEffect
1675Strasbourg AgreementThe first international agreement limiting the use of chemical weapons, in this case, poison bullets.
1874Brussels Convention on the Law and Customs of WarProhibited the employment of poison or poisoned weapons (Never entered into force.)
18991st Peace Conference at the HagueSignatories agreed to abstain from "the use of projectiles the object of which is the diffusion of asphyxiating or deleterious gases."
19072nd Peace Conference at the HagueThe Conference added the use of poison or poisoned weapons.
1919Treaty of VersaillesProhibited poison gas in Germany.
1922Treaty relating to the Use of Submarines and Noxious Gases in WarfareFailed because France objected to clauses relating to submarine warfare.
1925Geneva ProtocolProhibited the "use in war of asphyxiating, poisonous or other gases, and of all analogous liquids, materials or devices" and "bacteriological methods" in international conflicts.
1972Biological and Toxins Weapons ConventionNo verification mechanism, negotiations for a protocol to make up this lack halted by USA in 2001.
1993Chemical Weapons ConventionComprehensive bans on development, production, stockpiling and use of chemical weapons, with destruction timelines.
1998Rome Statute of the International Criminal CourtMakes it a war crime to employ chemical weapons in international conflicts. (2010 amendment extends prohibition to internal conflicts.)

Further reading

  • Frederic Joseph Brown (2005). "Chapter 3: The Evolution of Policy 1922-1939 / Geneva Gas Protocol". Chemical warfare: a study in restraints. Transaction Publishers. pp. 98–110. ISBN 1-4128-0495-7.
  • Bunn, George. "Gas and germ warfare: international legal history and present status." Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America 65.1 (1970): 253+. online
  • Webster, Andrew. "Making Disarmament Work: The implementation of the international disarmament provisions in the League of Nations Covenant, 1919–1925." Diplomacy and Statecraft 16.3 (2005): 551–569.
Wikisource has original text related to this article: Geneva Protocol to Hague Convention

References

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  21. "2603 (XXIV). Question of chemical and bacteriological (biological) weapons" (PDF). United Nations General Assembly. 16 December 1969. Retrieved 24 August 2013. use in international armed conflicts of: (a) Any chemical agents of warfare - chemical substances, whether gaseous, liquid or solid - which might be employed because of their direct toxic effects on man, animals or plants; (b) Any biological agents of warfare - living organisms, whatever their nature, or infective material derived from them - which are intended to cause disease or death in man, animals or plants, and which depend for their effects on their ability to multiply in the person, animal or plant attacked. http://www.worldlii.org/int/other/UNGARsn/1969/110.pdf ↩

  22. Bunn, George (1969). "Banning Poison Gas and Germ Warfare: Should the United States Agree" (PDF). Wisconsin Law Review. 1969 (2): 375–420. Archived from the original (PDF) on 2 July 2014. Retrieved 5 August 2013. https://web.archive.org/web/20140702004808/http://iis-db.stanford.edu/pubs/22365/Bunn_Banning_Poison_Gas_and_Germ_Warfare.pdf ↩

  23. Angela Woodward (17 May 2012). "The 1925 Geneva Protocol goes digital". VERTIC. Retrieved 26 August 2013. http://www.vertic.org/pages/posts/the-1925-geneva-protocol-goes-digital-298.php ↩

  24. Bunn, George (1969). "Banning Poison Gas and Germ Warfare: Should the United States Agree" (PDF). Wisconsin Law Review. 1969 (2): 375–420. Archived from the original (PDF) on 2 July 2014. Retrieved 5 August 2013. https://web.archive.org/web/20140702004808/http://iis-db.stanford.edu/pubs/22365/Bunn_Banning_Poison_Gas_and_Germ_Warfare.pdf ↩

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  29. Jillian Blake & Aqsa Mahmud (15 October 2013). "A Legal "Red Line"? Syria and the Use of Chemical Weapons in Civil Conflict". UCLA Law Review. https://www.uclalawreview.org/a-legal-red-line-syria-and-the-use-of-chemical-weapons-in-civil-conflict/ ↩

  30. Anne Lorenzat (2017–2018). "The Current State of Customary International Law with regard to the Use of Chemical Weapons in Non-International Armed Conflicts". The Military Law and the Law of War Review. http://www.ismllw.org/REVIEW/2017-2018%20ART%20Lorenzat.php ↩

  31. "Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use in War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous or Other Gases, and of Bacteriological Methods of Warfare". United Nations Office of Disarmament Affairs. Retrieved 24 July 2013. https://treaties.unoda.org/t/1925 ↩

  32. Bunn, George (1969). "Banning Poison Gas and Germ Warfare: Should the United States Agree" (PDF). Wisconsin Law Review. 1969 (2): 375–420. Archived from the original (PDF) on 2 July 2014. Retrieved 5 August 2013. https://web.archive.org/web/20140702004808/http://iis-db.stanford.edu/pubs/22365/Bunn_Banning_Poison_Gas_and_Germ_Warfare.pdf ↩

  33. "Czech Republic: Succession to 1925 Geneva Protocol". United Nations Office of Disarmament Affairs. Retrieved 26 July 2014. http://disarmament.un.org/treaties/a/1925/czechrepublic/suc/paris ↩

  34. Kelly, David (2002). "The Trilateral Agreement: lessons for biological weapons verification]" (PDF). In Findlay, Trevor; Meier, Oliver (eds.). Verification Yearbook 2002 (PDF). London: Verification Research, Training and Information Centre (VERTIC). pp. 93–109. ISBN 978-1-899548-35-4. 978-1-899548-35-4 ↩

  35. "Protocole concernant la prohibition d'emploi à la guerre de gaz asphyxiants, toxiques ou similaires et de moyens bactériologiques, fait à Genève le 17 juin 1925" (in French). Ministry of Foreign and European Affairs of France. Archived from the original on 2 December 2008. Retrieved 23 July 2013. https://web.archive.org/web/20081202071155/http://www.doc.diplomatie.gouv.fr/BASIS/pacte/webext/multidep/DDW?W%3D+ORDER+BY+DATOP%2FAscend%26M%3D18%26K%3D19250001%26R%3DY%26U%3D1 ↩

  36. "Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use in War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous or Other Gases, and of Bacteriological Methods of Warfare". United Nations Office of Disarmament Affairs. Retrieved 24 July 2013. https://treaties.unoda.org/t/1925 ↩

  37. "Le traité international en detail". Federal Department of Foreign Affairs of Switzerland. Retrieved 21 May 2018. https://www.eda.admin.ch/eda/fr/dfae/politique-exterieure/droit-international-public/traites-internationaux/banque-donnees-traites-internationaux/detailansicht-staatsvertrag.ggst0_51.contract19250020.html?_charset_=UTF-8 ↩

  38. "Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use in War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous or Other Gases, and of Bacteriological Methods of Warfare (Geneva Protocol)". United States Department of State. Retrieved 31 July 2013. https://2009-2017.state.gov/t/isn/4784.htm ↩

  39. "Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use of Asphyxiating, Poisonous or Other Gases, and of Bacteriological Methods of Warfare. Geneva, 17 June 1925". International Committee of the Red Cross. Retrieved 31 July 2013. http://www.icrc.org/applic/ihl/ihl.nsf/States.xsp?xp_viewStates=XPages_NORMStatesParties&xp_treatySelected=280 ↩

  40. "States parties to the Protocol for the prohibition of the use in war of asphyxiating, poisonous or other gases, and of bacteriological methods of warfare, Done at Geneva 17 June 1925". University of Illinois at Chicago. Archived from the original on 7 April 2015. Retrieved 5 August 2013. https://web.archive.org/web/20150407003400/http://dosfan.lib.uic.edu/acda/treaties/geneva7.txt ↩

  41. "Protocol for the prohibition of the use in war of asphyxiating, poisonous or other gases, and of bacteriological methods of warfare". United Nations Treaty Series. Retrieved 5 August 2013. http://treaties.un.org/Pages/showDetails.aspx?objid=0800000280167ca8 ↩

  42. "Protocol for the prohibition of the use in war of asphyxiating, poisonous or other gases, and of bacteriological methods of warfare". Federation of American Scientists. Retrieved 5 August 2013. http://www.fas.org/nuke/control/geneva/text/geneva1.htm ↩

  43. "Protocole concernant la prohibition d'emploi à la guerre de gaz asphyxiants, toxiques ou similaires et de moyens bactériologiques". Government of Switzerland. 15 August 2013. Retrieved 13 July 2014. http://www.admin.ch/opc/fr/classified-compilation/19250020/index.html ↩

  44. "Protocole du 17 juin 1925 concernant la prohibition d'emploi à la guerre de gaz asphyxiants, toxiques ou similaires et de moyens bactériologiques" (PDF). Government of Switzerland. 2004. Retrieved 13 July 2014. http://www.admin.ch/opc/fr/official-compilation/2005/1209.pdf ↩

  45. "Protocole concernant la prohibition d'emploi à la guerre de gaz asphyxiants, toxiques ou similaires et de moyens bactériologiques" (PDF). Government of Switzerland. 15 August 2013. Archived from the original (PDF) on 23 May 2018. Retrieved 13 July 2014. https://web.archive.org/web/20180523011329/https://www.admin.ch/opc/fr/classified-compilation/19250020/201308150000/0.515.105.pdf ↩

  46. "No. 2138 - Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use in War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous or other Gases, and of Bacteriological Methods of Warfare. Signed at Geneva, 17 June 1925" (PDF). League of Nations Treaty Series - Publication of Treaties and International Engagements Registered with the Secretariat of the League of Nations. XCIV (1, 2, 3 and 4). League of Nations: 65–74. 1929. Retrieved 28 July 2013. http://treaties.un.org/doc/Publication/UNTS/LON/Volume%2094/v94.pdf ↩

  47. "Protocole concernant la prohibition d'emploi à la guerre de gaz asphyxiants, toxiques ou similaires et de moyens bactériologiques, fait à Genève le 17 juin 1925" (in French). Ministry of Foreign and European Affairs of France. Archived from the original on 2 December 2008. Retrieved 23 July 2013. https://web.archive.org/web/20081202071155/http://www.doc.diplomatie.gouv.fr/BASIS/pacte/webext/multidep/DDW?W%3D+ORDER+BY+DATOP%2FAscend%26M%3D18%26K%3D19250001%26R%3DY%26U%3D1 ↩

  48. Bunn, George (1969). "Banning Poison Gas and Germ Warfare: Should the United States Agree" (PDF). Wisconsin Law Review. 1969 (2): 375–420. Archived from the original (PDF) on 2 July 2014. Retrieved 5 August 2013. https://web.archive.org/web/20140702004808/http://iis-db.stanford.edu/pubs/22365/Bunn_Banning_Poison_Gas_and_Germ_Warfare.pdf ↩

  49. "Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use in War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous or Other Gases, and of Bacteriological Methods of Warfare (Geneva Protocol)". United States Department of State. Retrieved 31 July 2013. https://2009-2017.state.gov/t/isn/4784.htm ↩

  50. "Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use of Asphyxiating, Poisonous or Other Gases, and of Bacteriological Methods of Warfare. Geneva, 17 June 1925". International Committee of the Red Cross. Retrieved 31 July 2013. http://www.icrc.org/applic/ihl/ihl.nsf/States.xsp?xp_viewStates=XPages_NORMStatesParties&xp_treatySelected=280 ↩

  51. "Seventh BWC Review Conference Briefing Book" (PDF). Biological Weapons Convention. 2011. Retrieved 17 November 2014. http://www.bwc2011.info/BB2011-by-doc/1/GP-Res.pdf ↩

  52. "High Contracting Parties to the Geneva Protocol". SIPRI. Retrieved 5 August 2013. http://www.sipri.org/contents/expcon/cbwarfare/cbw_research_doc/cbw_historical/cbw-hist-geneva-parties.html ↩

  53. Schindler, Dietrich; Toman, Jiří (1988). The Laws of Armed Conflicts: A Collection of Conventions, Resolutions, and Other Documents. Brill Publishers. pp. 115–127. ISBN 9024733065. Retrieved 5 August 2013. 9024733065 ↩

  54. "Geneva Protocol reservations" (PDF). Biological Weapons Convention Review Conference. Retrieved 5 August 2013. http://www.bwc2011.info/BB2011-by-doc/1/GP-Res.pdf ↩

  55. Papanicolopulu, Irini; Scovazzi, Tullio, eds. (2006). Quale diritto nei conflitti armati? (in Italian). Giuffrè Editore. pp. 231–237. ISBN 9788814130625. Retrieved 5 August 2013. 9788814130625 ↩

  56. Binding only with regards to states which have ratified or acceded to the protocol. ↩

  57. Ceases to be binding in regards to any state, and its allies, which does not observe the prohibitions of the protocol. ↩

  58. "Algeria: Accession to 1925 Geneva Protocol". United Nations Office of Disarmament Affairs. Retrieved 27 July 2013. http://disarmament.un.org/treaties/a/1925/algeria/acc/paris ↩

  59. Binding only with regards to states which have ratified or acceded to the protocol. ↩

  60. Ceases to be binding in regards to any state, and its allies, which does not observe the prohibitions of the protocol. ↩

  61. "Angola: Accession to 1925 Geneva Protocol". United Nations Office of Disarmament Affairs. Retrieved 27 July 2013. http://disarmament.un.org/treaties/a/1925/angola/acc/paris ↩

  62. Binding only with regards to states which have ratified or acceded to the protocol. ↩

  63. Ceases to be binding in regards to any state, and its allies, which does not observe the prohibitions of the protocol. ↩

  64. According to the Vienna Convention on Succession of States in respect of Treaties, states which succeed to a treaty after gaining independence from a state party "shall be considered as maintaining any reservation to that treaty which was applicable at the date of the succession of States in respect of the territory to which the succession of States relates unless, when making the notification of succession, it expresses a contrary intention or formulates a reservation which relates to the same subject matter as that reservation." Any state which has not clarified their position on reservations inherited on succession are listed as "implicit" reservations. /wiki/Vienna_Convention_on_Succession_of_States_in_respect_of_Treaties ↩

  65. Binding only with regards to states which have ratified or acceded to the protocol. ↩

  66. Ceases to be binding in regards to any state, and its allies, which does not observe the prohibitions of the protocol. ↩

  67. "Australia: Accession to 1925 Geneva Protocol". United Nations Office of Disarmament Affairs. Retrieved 20 September 2014. http://disarmament.un.org/treaties/a/1925/australia/acc/paris ↩

  68. Binding only with regards to states which have ratified or acceded to the protocol. ↩

  69. Ceases to be binding in regards to any state, and its allies, which does not observe the prohibitions of the protocol. ↩

  70. Does not constitute recognition of, or establishing any relations with, Israel. /wiki/Israel ↩

  71. "Bahrain: Accession to 1925 Geneva Protocol". United Nations Office of Disarmament Affairs. Retrieved 27 July 2013. http://disarmament.un.org/treaties/a/1925/bahrain/acc/paris ↩

  72. Binding only with regards to states which have ratified or acceded to the protocol. ↩

  73. Ceases to be binding in regards to any state, and its allies, which does not observe the prohibitions of the protocol. ↩

  74. "Bangladesh: Accession to 1925 Geneva Protocol". United Nations Office of Disarmament Affairs. Retrieved 27 July 2013. http://disarmament.un.org/treaties/a/1925/bangladesh/acc/paris ↩

  75. Binding only with regards to states which have ratified or acceded to the protocol. ↩

  76. Ceases to be binding in regards to any state, and its allies, which does not observe the prohibitions of the protocol. ↩

  77. "Barbados: Succession to 1925 Geneva Protocol". United Nations Office of Disarmament Affairs. Retrieved 27 July 2013. http://disarmament.un.org/treaties/a/1925/barbados/suc/paris ↩

  78. Binding only with regards to states which have ratified or acceded to the protocol. ↩

  79. Ceases to be binding in regards to any state, and its allies, which does not observe the prohibitions of the protocol. ↩

  80. "Belgium: Ratification of 1925 Geneva Protocol". United Nations Office of Disarmament Affairs. Retrieved 27 July 2013. http://disarmament.un.org/treaties/a/1925/belgium/rat/paris ↩

  81. Binding only with regards to states which have ratified or acceded to the protocol. ↩

  82. Ceases to be binding in regards to any state, and its allies, which does not observe the prohibitions of the protocol. ↩

  83. "Bulgaria: Ratification of 1925 Geneva Protocol". United Nations Office of Disarmament Affairs. Retrieved 28 July 2013. http://disarmament.un.org/treaties/a/1925/bulgaria/rat/paris ↩

  84. Ceases to be binding in regards to any state, and its allies, which does not observe the prohibitions of the protocol. ↩

  85. "Cambodia: Accession to 1925 Geneva Protocol". United Nations Office of Disarmament Affairs. Retrieved 28 July 2013. http://disarmament.un.org/treaties/a/1925/cambodia/acc/paris ↩

  86. Binding only with regards to states which have ratified or acceded to the protocol. ↩

  87. Ceases to be binding in regards to any state, and its allies, which does not observe the prohibitions of the protocol. ↩

  88. "Canada: Ratification of 1925 Geneva Protocol". United Nations Office of Disarmament Affairs. Retrieved 28 July 2013. http://disarmament.un.org/treaties/a/1925/canada/rat/paris ↩

  89. Binding only with regards to states which have ratified or acceded to the protocol. ↩

  90. Ceases to be binding in regards to any state, and its allies, which does not observe the prohibitions of the protocol. ↩

  91. "Chile: Ratification of 1925 Geneva Protocol". United Nations Office of Disarmament Affairs. Retrieved 28 July 2013. http://disarmament.un.org/treaties/a/1925/chile/rat/paris ↩

  92. Ceases to be binding in regards to any state, and its allies, which does not observe the prohibitions of the protocol. ↩

  93. "China: Succession to 1925 Geneva Protocol". United Nations Office of Disarmament Affairs. Retrieved 28 July 2013. http://disarmament.un.org/treaties/a/1925/china/suc/paris ↩

  94. "China: Succession to 1925 Geneva Protocol". United Nations Office of Disarmament Affairs. Retrieved 28 July 2013. http://disarmament.un.org/treaties/a/1925/china/suc/paris ↩

  95. Binding only with regards to states which have ratified or acceded to the protocol. ↩

  96. Ceases to be binding in regards to any state, and its allies, which does not observe the prohibitions of the protocol. ↩

  97. According to the Vienna Convention on Succession of States in respect of Treaties, states which succeed to a treaty after gaining independence from a state party "shall be considered as maintaining any reservation to that treaty which was applicable at the date of the succession of States in respect of the territory to which the succession of States relates unless, when making the notification of succession, it expresses a contrary intention or formulates a reservation which relates to the same subject matter as that reservation." Any state which has not clarified their position on reservations inherited on succession are listed as "implicit" reservations. /wiki/Vienna_Convention_on_Succession_of_States_in_respect_of_Treaties ↩

  98. Ceases to be binding in regards to any state, and its allies, which does not observe the prohibitions of the protocol. ↩

  99. Binding only with regards to states which have ratified or acceded to the protocol. ↩

  100. Ceases to be binding in regards to any state, and its allies, which does not observe the prohibitions of the protocol. ↩

  101. "Estonia: Ratification of 1925 Geneva Protocol". United Nations Office of Disarmament Affairs. Retrieved 28 July 2013. http://disarmament.un.org/treaties/a/1925/estonia/rat/paris ↩

  102. Binding only with regards to states which have ratified or acceded to the protocol. ↩

  103. Ceases to be binding in regards to any state, and its allies, which does not observe the prohibitions of the protocol. ↩

  104. "Fiji: Succession to 1925 Geneva Protocol". United Nations Office of Disarmament Affairs. Retrieved 28 July 2013. http://disarmament.un.org/treaties/a/1925/fiji/suc/paris ↩

  105. Binding only with regards to states which have ratified or acceded to the protocol. ↩

  106. Ceases to be binding in regards to any state, and its allies, which does not observe the prohibitions of the protocol. ↩

  107. "France: Ratification of 1925 Geneva Protocol". United Nations Office of Disarmament Affairs. Retrieved 28 July 2013. http://disarmament.un.org/treaties/a/1925/france/rat/paris ↩

  108. Binding only with regards to states which have ratified or acceded to the protocol. ↩

  109. Ceases to be binding in regards to any state, and its allies, which does not observe the prohibitions of the protocol. ↩

  110. According to the Vienna Convention on Succession of States in respect of Treaties, states which succeed to a treaty after gaining independence from a state party "shall be considered as maintaining any reservation to that treaty which was applicable at the date of the succession of States in respect of the territory to which the succession of States relates unless, when making the notification of succession, it expresses a contrary intention or formulates a reservation which relates to the same subject matter as that reservation." Any state which has not clarified their position on reservations inherited on succession are listed as "implicit" reservations. /wiki/Vienna_Convention_on_Succession_of_States_in_respect_of_Treaties ↩

  111. Binding only with regards to states which have ratified or acceded to the protocol. ↩

  112. Ceases to be binding in regards to any state, and its allies, which does not observe the prohibitions of the protocol. ↩

  113. According to the Vienna Convention on Succession of States in respect of Treaties, states which succeed to a treaty after gaining independence from a state party "shall be considered as maintaining any reservation to that treaty which was applicable at the date of the succession of States in respect of the territory to which the succession of States relates unless, when making the notification of succession, it expresses a contrary intention or formulates a reservation which relates to the same subject matter as that reservation." Any state which has not clarified their position on reservations inherited on succession are listed as "implicit" reservations. /wiki/Vienna_Convention_on_Succession_of_States_in_respect_of_Treaties ↩

  114. Binding only with regards to states which have ratified or acceded to the protocol. ↩

  115. Ceases to be binding in regards to any state, and its allies, which does not observe the prohibitions of the protocol. ↩

  116. "India: Ratification of 1925 Geneva Protocol". United Nations Office of Disarmament Affairs. Retrieved 28 July 2013. http://disarmament.un.org/treaties/a/1925/india/rat/paris ↩

  117. Ceases to be binding as to the use of chemical weapons in regards to any enemy state which does not observe the prohibitions of the protocol. ↩

  118. According to the Vienna Convention on Succession of States in respect of Treaties, states which succeed to a treaty after gaining independence from a state party "shall be considered as maintaining any reservation to that treaty which was applicable at the date of the succession of States in respect of the territory to which the succession of States relates unless, when making the notification of succession, it expresses a contrary intention or formulates a reservation which relates to the same subject matter as that reservation." Any state which has not clarified their position on reservations inherited on succession are listed as "implicit" reservations. /wiki/Vienna_Convention_on_Succession_of_States_in_respect_of_Treaties ↩

  119. Binding only with regards to states which have ratified or acceded to the protocol. ↩

  120. Ceases to be binding in regards to any state, and its allies, which does not observe the prohibitions of the protocol. ↩

  121. "Iraq: Accession to 1925 Geneva Protocol". United Nations Office of Disarmament Affairs. Retrieved 28 July 2013. http://disarmament.un.org/treaties/a/1925/iraq/acc/paris ↩

  122. Binding only with regards to states which have ratified or acceded to the protocol. ↩

  123. Ceases to be binding in regards to any state, and its allies, which does not observe the prohibitions of the protocol. ↩

  124. "Ireland: Accession to 1925 Geneva Protocol". United Nations Office of Disarmament Affairs. Retrieved 28 July 2013. http://disarmament.un.org/treaties/a/1925/ireland/acc/paris ↩

  125. Binding only with regards to states which have ratified or acceded to the protocol. ↩

  126. Ceases to be binding in regards to any state, and its allies, which does not observe the prohibitions of the protocol. ↩

  127. "Israel: Accession to 1925 Geneva Protocol". United Nations Office of Disarmament Affairs. Retrieved 28 July 2013. http://disarmament.un.org/treaties/a/1925/israel/acc/paris ↩

  128. Binding only with regards to states which have ratified or acceded to the protocol. ↩

  129. Ceases to be binding in regards to any state, and its allies, which does not observe the prohibitions of the protocol. ↩

  130. According to the Vienna Convention on Succession of States in respect of Treaties, states which succeed to a treaty after gaining independence from a state party "shall be considered as maintaining any reservation to that treaty which was applicable at the date of the succession of States in respect of the territory to which the succession of States relates unless, when making the notification of succession, it expresses a contrary intention or formulates a reservation which relates to the same subject matter as that reservation." Any state which has not clarified their position on reservations inherited on succession are listed as "implicit" reservations. /wiki/Vienna_Convention_on_Succession_of_States_in_respect_of_Treaties ↩

  131. Binding only with regards to states which have ratified or acceded to the protocol. ↩

  132. Ceases to be binding in regards to any state, and its allies, which does not observe the prohibitions of the protocol. ↩

  133. Does not constitute recognition of, or establishing any relations with, Israel. /wiki/Israel ↩

  134. "Jordan: Accession to 1925 Geneva Protocol". United Nations Office of Disarmament Affairs. Retrieved 28 July 2013. http://disarmament.un.org/treaties/a/1925/jordan/acc/paris ↩

  135. Ceases to be binding in regards to any state, and its allies, which does not observe the prohibitions of the protocol. ↩

  136. "Democratic People's Republic of Korea: Accession to 1925 Geneva Protocol". United Nations Office of Disarmament Affairs. Retrieved 29 August 2017. http://disarmament.un.org/treaties/a/1925/democraticpeoplesrepublicofkorea/acc/paris ↩

  137. Binding only with regards to states which have ratified or acceded to the protocol. ↩

  138. Ceases to be binding in regards to any state, and its allies, which does not observe the prohibitions of the protocol. ↩

  139. Does not constitute recognition of, or establishing any relations with, Israel. /wiki/Israel ↩

  140. Ceases to be binding in the case of a violation. ↩

  141. "Kuwait: Accession to 1925 Geneva Protocol". United Nations Office of Disarmament Affairs. Retrieved 28 July 2013. http://disarmament.un.org/treaties/a/1925/kuwait/acc/paris ↩

  142. Binding only with regards to states which have ratified or acceded to the protocol. ↩

  143. Ceases to be binding in regards to any state, and its allies, which does not observe the prohibitions of the protocol. ↩

  144. According to the Vienna Convention on Succession of States in respect of Treaties, states which succeed to a treaty after gaining independence from a state party "shall be considered as maintaining any reservation to that treaty which was applicable at the date of the succession of States in respect of the territory to which the succession of States relates unless, when making the notification of succession, it expresses a contrary intention or formulates a reservation which relates to the same subject matter as that reservation." Any state which has not clarified their position on reservations inherited on succession are listed as "implicit" reservations. /wiki/Vienna_Convention_on_Succession_of_States_in_respect_of_Treaties ↩

  145. Binding only with regards to states which have ratified or acceded to the protocol. ↩

  146. Ceases to be binding in regards to any state, and its allies, which does not observe the prohibitions of the protocol. ↩

  147. Does not constitute recognition of, or establishing any relations with, Israel. /wiki/Israel ↩

  148. "Libya: Accession to 1925 Geneva Protocol". United Nations Office of Disarmament Affairs. Retrieved 28 July 2013. http://disarmament.un.org/treaties/a/1925/libya/acc/paris ↩

  149. Binding only with regards to states which have ratified or acceded to the protocol. ↩

  150. Ceases to be binding in regards to any state, and its allies, which does not observe the prohibitions of the protocol. ↩

  151. According to the Vienna Convention on Succession of States in respect of Treaties, states which succeed to a treaty after gaining independence from a state party "shall be considered as maintaining any reservation to that treaty which was applicable at the date of the succession of States in respect of the territory to which the succession of States relates unless, when making the notification of succession, it expresses a contrary intention or formulates a reservation which relates to the same subject matter as that reservation." Any state which has not clarified their position on reservations inherited on succession are listed as "implicit" reservations. /wiki/Vienna_Convention_on_Succession_of_States_in_respect_of_Treaties ↩

  152. Binding only with regards to states which have ratified or acceded to the protocol. ↩

  153. Ceases to be binding in regards to any state, and its allies, which does not observe the prohibitions of the protocol. ↩

  154. According to the Vienna Convention on Succession of States in respect of Treaties, states which succeed to a treaty after gaining independence from a state party "shall be considered as maintaining any reservation to that treaty which was applicable at the date of the succession of States in respect of the territory to which the succession of States relates unless, when making the notification of succession, it expresses a contrary intention or formulates a reservation which relates to the same subject matter as that reservation." Any state which has not clarified their position on reservations inherited on succession are listed as "implicit" reservations. /wiki/Vienna_Convention_on_Succession_of_States_in_respect_of_Treaties ↩

  155. Ceases to be binding in regards to any state, and its allies, which does not observe the prohibitions of the protocol. ↩

  156. "Mongolia: Accession to 1925 Geneva Protocol". United Nations Office of Disarmament Affairs. Retrieved 28 July 2013. http://disarmament.un.org/treaties/a/1925/mongolia/acc/paris ↩

  157. Ceases to be binding as to the use of chemical weapons in regards to any enemy state which does not observe the prohibitions of the protocol. ↩

  158. "Netherlands: Ratification of 1925 Geneva Protocol". United Nations Office of Disarmament Affairs. Retrieved 28 July 2013. http://disarmament.un.org/treaties/a/1925/netherlands/rat/paris ↩

  159. Binding only with regards to states which have ratified or acceded to the protocol. ↩

  160. Ceases to be binding in regards to any state, and its allies, which does not observe the prohibitions of the protocol. ↩

  161. "New Zealand: Accession to 1925 Geneva Protocol". United Nations Office of Disarmament Affairs. Retrieved 29 July 2013. http://disarmament.un.org/treaties/a/1925/newzealand/acc/paris ↩

  162. Binding only with regards to states which have ratified or acceded to the protocol. ↩

  163. Ceases to be binding in regards to any state, and its allies, which does not observe the prohibitions of the protocol. ↩

  164. According to the Vienna Convention on Succession of States in respect of Treaties, states which succeed to a treaty after gaining independence from a state party "shall be considered as maintaining any reservation to that treaty which was applicable at the date of the succession of States in respect of the territory to which the succession of States relates unless, when making the notification of succession, it expresses a contrary intention or formulates a reservation which relates to the same subject matter as that reservation." Any state which has not clarified their position on reservations inherited on succession are listed as "implicit" reservations. /wiki/Vienna_Convention_on_Succession_of_States_in_respect_of_Treaties ↩

  165. Binding only with regards to states which have ratified or acceded to the protocol. ↩

  166. Ceases to be binding in regards to any state, and its allies, which does not observe the prohibitions of the protocol. ↩

  167. "Nigeria: Accession to 1925 Geneva Protocol". United Nations Office of Disarmament Affairs. Retrieved 29 July 2013. http://disarmament.un.org/treaties/a/1925/nigeria/acc/paris ↩

  168. Binding only with regards to states which have ratified or acceded to the protocol. ↩

  169. Ceases to be binding in regards to any state, and its allies, which does not observe the prohibitions of the protocol. ↩

  170. According to the Vienna Convention on Succession of States in respect of Treaties, states which succeed to a treaty after gaining independence from a state party "shall be considered as maintaining any reservation to that treaty which was applicable at the date of the succession of States in respect of the territory to which the succession of States relates unless, when making the notification of succession, it expresses a contrary intention or formulates a reservation which relates to the same subject matter as that reservation." Any state which has not clarified their position on reservations inherited on succession are listed as "implicit" reservations. /wiki/Vienna_Convention_on_Succession_of_States_in_respect_of_Treaties ↩

  171. Binding only with regards to states which have ratified or acceded to the protocol. ↩

  172. Ceases to be binding in regards to any state, and its allies, which does not observe the prohibitions of the protocol. ↩

  173. "Papua New Guinea: Succession to 1925 Geneva Protocol". United Nations Office of Disarmament Affairs. Retrieved 31 July 2013. http://disarmament.un.org/treaties/a/1925/papuanewguinea/suc/paris ↩

  174. Binding only with regards to states which have ratified or acceded to the protocol. ↩

  175. Ceases to be binding in regards to any state, and its allies, which does not observe the prohibitions of the protocol. ↩

  176. Binding only with regards to states which have ratified or acceded to the protocol. ↩

  177. Ceases to be binding in regards to any state, and its allies, which does not observe the prohibitions of the protocol. ↩

  178. "Romania: Ratification of 1925 Geneva Protocol". United Nations Office of Disarmament Affairs. Retrieved 31 July 2013. http://disarmament.un.org/treaties/a/1925/romania/rat/paris ↩

  179. Binding only with regards to states which have ratified or acceded to the protocol. ↩

  180. Ceases to be binding in regards to any state, and its allies, which does not observe the prohibitions of the protocol. ↩

  181. "Russian Federation: Ratification of 1925 Geneva Protocol". United Nations Office of Disarmament Affairs. Retrieved 31 July 2013. http://disarmament.un.org/treaties/a/1925/russianfederation/rat/paris ↩

  182. Binding only with regards to states which have ratified or acceded to the protocol. ↩

  183. Ceases to be binding in regards to any state, and its allies, which does not observe the prohibitions of the protocol. ↩

  184. According to the Vienna Convention on Succession of States in respect of Treaties, states which succeed to a treaty after gaining independence from a state party "shall be considered as maintaining any reservation to that treaty which was applicable at the date of the succession of States in respect of the territory to which the succession of States relates unless, when making the notification of succession, it expresses a contrary intention or formulates a reservation which relates to the same subject matter as that reservation." Any state which has not clarified their position on reservations inherited on succession are listed as "implicit" reservations. /wiki/Vienna_Convention_on_Succession_of_States_in_respect_of_Treaties ↩

  185. Binding only with regards to states which have ratified or acceded to the protocol. ↩

  186. Ceases to be binding in regards to any state, and its allies, which does not observe the prohibitions of the protocol. ↩

  187. According to the Vienna Convention on Succession of States in respect of Treaties, states which succeed to a treaty after gaining independence from a state party "shall be considered as maintaining any reservation to that treaty which was applicable at the date of the succession of States in respect of the territory to which the succession of States relates unless, when making the notification of succession, it expresses a contrary intention or formulates a reservation which relates to the same subject matter as that reservation." Any state which has not clarified their position on reservations inherited on succession are listed as "implicit" reservations. /wiki/Vienna_Convention_on_Succession_of_States_in_respect_of_Treaties ↩

  188. Binding only with regards to states which have ratified or acceded to the protocol. ↩

  189. Ceases to be binding in regards to any state, and its allies, which does not observe the prohibitions of the protocol. ↩

  190. According to the Vienna Convention on Succession of States in respect of Treaties, states which succeed to a treaty after gaining independence from a state party "shall be considered as maintaining any reservation to that treaty which was applicable at the date of the succession of States in respect of the territory to which the succession of States relates unless, when making the notification of succession, it expresses a contrary intention or formulates a reservation which relates to the same subject matter as that reservation." Any state which has not clarified their position on reservations inherited on succession are listed as "implicit" reservations. /wiki/Vienna_Convention_on_Succession_of_States_in_respect_of_Treaties ↩

  191. Binding only with regards to states which have ratified or acceded to the protocol. ↩

  192. Ceases to be binding in regards to any state, and its allies, which does not observe the prohibitions of the protocol. ↩

  193. According to the Vienna Convention on Succession of States in respect of Treaties, states which succeed to a treaty after gaining independence from a state party "shall be considered as maintaining any reservation to that treaty which was applicable at the date of the succession of States in respect of the territory to which the succession of States relates unless, when making the notification of succession, it expresses a contrary intention or formulates a reservation which relates to the same subject matter as that reservation." Any state which has not clarified their position on reservations inherited on succession are listed as "implicit" reservations. /wiki/Vienna_Convention_on_Succession_of_States_in_respect_of_Treaties ↩

  194. Ceases to be binding in regards to any state, and its allies, which does not observe the prohibitions of the protocol. ↩

  195. According to the Vienna Convention on Succession of States in respect of Treaties, states which succeed to a treaty after gaining independence from a state party "shall be considered as maintaining any reservation to that treaty which was applicable at the date of the succession of States in respect of the territory to which the succession of States relates unless, when making the notification of succession, it expresses a contrary intention or formulates a reservation which relates to the same subject matter as that reservation." Any state which has not clarified their position on reservations inherited on succession are listed as "implicit" reservations. /wiki/Vienna_Convention_on_Succession_of_States_in_respect_of_Treaties ↩

  196. "Seventh Review Conference of Biological Weapons Convention" (PDF). 5 December 2011. Archived from the original (PDF) on 24 September 2015. Retrieved 10 November 2013. https://web.archive.org/web/20150924060749/http://www.opbw.org/rev_cons/7rc/BWC_CONF.VII_Press_111205_E.pdf ↩

  197. Sims, Nicholas; Pearson, Graham; Woodward, Angela. "Article VII: Geneva Protocol Obligations and the BTWC" (PDF). Archived from the original (PDF) on 23 September 2015. Retrieved 10 August 2013. https://web.archive.org/web/20150923194231/http://www.brad.ac.uk/acad/sbtwc/key7rev/article_VIII.pdf ↩

  198. Although the FR Yugoslavia claimed to be the continuator state of the SFR of Yugoslavia, the United Nations General Assembly did not accept this and forced them to reapply for membership. /wiki/United_Nations_General_Assembly ↩

  199. Listed as 28 October 1997 by the United Nations Office of Disarmament Affairs.[77] /wiki/United_Nations_Office_of_Disarmament_Affairs ↩

  200. Ceases to be binding in regards to any state, and its allies, which does not observe the prohibitions of the protocol. ↩

  201. Binding only with regards to states which have ratified or acceded to the protocol. ↩

  202. Ceases to be binding in regards to any state, and its allies, which does not observe the prohibitions of the protocol. ↩

  203. "Solomon Islands: Succession to 1925 Geneva Protocol". United Nations Office of Disarmament Affairs. Retrieved 31 July 2013. http://disarmament.un.org/treaties/a/1925/solomonislands/suc/paris ↩

  204. Binding only with regards to states which have ratified or acceded to the protocol. ↩

  205. Ceases to be binding in regards to any state, and its allies, which does not observe the prohibitions of the protocol. ↩

  206. "South Africa: Accession to 1925 Geneva Protocol". United Nations Office of Disarmament Affairs. Retrieved 31 July 2013. http://disarmament.un.org/treaties/a/1925/southafrica/acc/paris ↩

  207. Binding only with regards to states which have ratified or acceded to the protocol. ↩

  208. Ceases to be binding in regards to any state, and its allies, which does not observe the prohibitions of the protocol. ↩

  209. "Spain: Ratification of 1925 Geneva Protocol". United Nations Office of Disarmament Affairs. Retrieved 31 July 2013. http://disarmament.un.org/treaties/a/1925/spain/rat/paris ↩

  210. Does not constitute recognition of, or establishing any relations with, Israel. /wiki/Israel ↩

  211. "Syrian Arab Republic: Accession to 1925 Geneva Protocol". United Nations Office of Disarmament Affairs. Retrieved 31 July 2013. http://disarmament.un.org/treaties/a/1925/syrianarabrepublic/acc/paris ↩

  212. Some sources list two reservations by Thailand, but neither the instrument of accession,[1] nor the United Nations Office of Disarmament Affairs list,[82] makes any mention of a reservation. ↩

  213. Binding only with regards to states which have ratified or acceded to the protocol. ↩

  214. Ceases to be binding in regards to any state, and its allies, which does not observe the prohibitions of the protocol. ↩

  215. According to the Vienna Convention on Succession of States in respect of Treaties, states which succeed to a treaty after gaining independence from a state party "shall be considered as maintaining any reservation to that treaty which was applicable at the date of the succession of States in respect of the territory to which the succession of States relates unless, when making the notification of succession, it expresses a contrary intention or formulates a reservation which relates to the same subject matter as that reservation." Any state which has not clarified their position on reservations inherited on succession are listed as "implicit" reservations. /wiki/Vienna_Convention_on_Succession_of_States_in_respect_of_Treaties ↩

  216. Binding only with regards to states which have ratified or acceded to the protocol. ↩

  217. Ceases to be binding in regards to any state, and its allies, which does not observe the prohibitions of the protocol. ↩

  218. According to the Vienna Convention on Succession of States in respect of Treaties, states which succeed to a treaty after gaining independence from a state party "shall be considered as maintaining any reservation to that treaty which was applicable at the date of the succession of States in respect of the territory to which the succession of States relates unless, when making the notification of succession, it expresses a contrary intention or formulates a reservation which relates to the same subject matter as that reservation." Any state which has not clarified their position on reservations inherited on succession are listed as "implicit" reservations. /wiki/Vienna_Convention_on_Succession_of_States_in_respect_of_Treaties ↩

  219. Binding only with regards to states which have ratified or acceded to the protocol. ↩

  220. Ceases to be binding in regards to any state, and its allies, which does not observe the prohibitions of the protocol. ↩

  221. According to the Vienna Convention on Succession of States in respect of Treaties, states which succeed to a treaty after gaining independence from a state party "shall be considered as maintaining any reservation to that treaty which was applicable at the date of the succession of States in respect of the territory to which the succession of States relates unless, when making the notification of succession, it expresses a contrary intention or formulates a reservation which relates to the same subject matter as that reservation." Any state which has not clarified their position on reservations inherited on succession are listed as "implicit" reservations. /wiki/Vienna_Convention_on_Succession_of_States_in_respect_of_Treaties ↩

  222. Binding only with regards to states which have ratified or acceded to the protocol. ↩

  223. Ceases to be binding in regards to any state, and its allies, which does not observe the prohibitions of the protocol. ↩

  224. "United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland: Ratification of 1925 Geneva". United Nations Office of Disarmament Affairs. Retrieved 31 July 2013. http://disarmament.un.org/treaties/a/1925/unitedkingdomofgreatbritainandnorthernireland/rat/paris ↩

  225. Ceases to be binding as to the use of chemical weapons in regards to any enemy state which does not observe the prohibitions of the protocol. ↩

  226. "United States of America: Ratification of 1925 Geneva Protocol". United Nations Office of Disarmament Affairs. Retrieved 31 July 2013. http://disarmament.un.org/treaties/a/1925/unitedstatesofamerica/rat/paris ↩

  227. Binding only with regards to states which have ratified or acceded to the protocol. ↩

  228. Ceases to be binding in regards to any state, and its allies, which does not observe the prohibitions of the protocol. ↩

  229. "Viet Nam: Accession to 1925 Geneva Protocol". United Nations Office of Disarmament Affairs. Retrieved 31 July 2013. http://disarmament.un.org/treaties/a/1925/vietnam/acc/paris ↩

  230. Does not constitute recognition of, or establishing any relations with, Israel. /wiki/Israel ↩

  231. According to the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, states may make a reservation when "signing, ratifying, accepting, approving or acceding to a treaty". /wiki/Vienna_Convention_on_the_Law_of_Treaties ↩

  232. "Yemen: Accession to 1925 Geneva Protocol". United Nations Office of Disarmament Affairs. Retrieved 31 July 2013. http://disarmament.un.org/treaties/a/1925/yemen/acc/paris ↩